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“No one can tell you how to love; 
No one can tell you how to grieve; 
No one can tell you how to worship your God.” 
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This dissertation addresses one of the classical philosophical and 
theological problems of religious language, namely, how to speak meaningfully 
about matters that appear to be inexpressible. While addressed extensively in a 
variety of literatures across cultures, the problem persists, particularly in regard 
to harmonizing theological, philosophical, and linguistic perspectives. The 
dissertation argues that (i) language is best understood as a species of ritual; (ii) 
so understood, religious language speaks to and about religious realities 
subjunctively, that is, as if such realities could be talked about; and (iii) this way 
of understanding language achieves greater harmony among philosophical and 
linguistic approaches while achieving some degree of cross-cultural generality. 
The argument begins with a cross-cultural comparison between modern 
social scientific ritual theories, especially that of Roy A. Rappaport, and the 
	 	x 
Confucian ritual theory of Xunzi. This generates a novel theory of ritual capable 
of engaging theories of language that have emerged in modern linguistics, 
philosophy of language, logic, and hermeneutics. The semiotics of Charles 
Sanders Peirce provides the unifying framework for the theory, which leads to 
the first conclusion that language can be understood as a species of ritual. 
When language is understood as ritual, there are several options for 
interpreting religious speech as meaningful. An analysis of these alternatives on 
terms semantically demarcated by Hilary Putnam leads to the conclusion that 
language expresses theological insights in the same way it expresses anything 
else: as if reality and its elements were the way the language form and process 
construes and renders them. This analysis both advances critiques of language as 
understood under the linguistic turn, especially by Terrence W. Deacon and 
Daniel L. Everett, and establishes the second and third conclusions of the thesis. 
The proposed theory of language as ritual is in need of further 
development in the directions of a philosophy of mind, an underlying 
metaphysical semiotics, and a comparative logic. But it does formalize a novel 
solution to a long-standing problem in religious language that is applicable to a 
wide variety of religious-cultural contexts and capable of registering insights 
from several relevant disciplinary domains. 
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THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE 
This dissertation sets out to address a problem both antique and 
persistent: how can language refer to God? To state the problem philosophically, 
how can something finite, like language, refer to something infinite, like God? To 
state it theologically, how can we speak to or about God if God cannot be spoken, 
i.e. God is ineffable? The dissertation defends the thesis that language is ritual 
and therefore capable of engaging ineffables, such as God, as if they are effable. 
Arriving at this solution to the problem, however, first requires unscrewing the 
hermeneutical spiral1 so as to undertake a reconstruction of the problematic, 
which is to say the “knowing” out of which the problem is generated: “within 
each question, which qua question is a ‘not-knowing,’ there is some kind of 
‘knowing;’ otherwise the question could not be grasped as pertinent.”2 The main 
thing known in positing the problem of religious language is language, but 
standard accounts of language are to be found wanting on their own terms and 
so requiring reconstruction. The reconstruction is undertaken in conversation 
with a novel theory of ritual derived in dialogue between modern social scientific 
																																																								
1 Ray L. Hart, Unfinished Man and the Imagination: Toward an Ontology and a Rhetoric of Revelation 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), 60–68. 
2 Hart, 54. 
	 	2 
accounts of ritual and the Confucian ritual theory of Xunzi 荀子 (ca. 310 – 210 
BCE). Rendered together in a theory of language as ritual, language may be seen 
to engage God in much the same way that it engages any and every other 
element of reality. This is to say that the bolt turns much more easily in the 
reconstructed nut, to the point that the problem fades as problematic. 
This introductory chapter proceeds in four parts, beginning with a 
topography of the intellectual terrain of the dissertation as religious philosophy. 
This being the sandbox in which the dissertation plays, the problem of religious 
language is located along its contours, and the metaphysics of divine ineffability 
is explored such that the problem is in fact problematic. A form of critical realism 
is construed as the walls of the sandbox, constraining the flight of inquiry 
beyond its bounds. The second section elaborates the method of religious 
philosophy as multidisciplinary comparative inquiry. The problems of 
incommensurability and reduction are often posited as roadblocks to 
multidisciplinarity and comparison. Here these problems are revealed instead to 
justify and even necessitate multidisciplinary comparison so long as the concepts 
are properly tricated in the matrices of theory, method, norms, categories, 
concepts, texts, figures, and so on, in which they are embedded in a tradition or 
discipline. The third section considers the problem of religious language as it 
	 	3 
arises classically in Western, Chinese, and South Asian contexts, and how it 
resonates among other issues at play in religious philosophy. The introduction 
concludes with an outline of the subsequent chapters. 
Religious Philosophy 
Employing “religious philosophy” to describe the present undertaking is 
largely a pragmatic move attempting to avoid the pitfalls of identifying the 
project as either theology, philosophy of religion, or religious studies. The 
nomenclature of theology frequently implies a discipline tied to confessional 
belief systems and therefore of questionable legitimacy in the academy, whereas 
religious studies demurs from making any kind of normative claim with regard 
to religious realities. Philosophy of religion, meanwhile, “suffers from 
unresolved contradictions about method and scope arising from internal 
diversity of its activities and fundamental disagreements about human reason, 
and it is significantly out of step with the academic study of religion.”3 Another 
option to describe this mode of inquiry is philosophical theology, which has 
indeed been pressed into profitable and effective service for a highly compatible 
																																																								
3 Wesley J. Wildman, Religious Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry: Envisioning a 
Future for the Philosophy of Religion (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2010), ix. 
	 	4 
project.4 Alas, it nevertheless suffers from having been specified in so many 
different ways by so many different thinkers that any focus and clarity it may 
have once registered has become diffuse. Religious philosophy, by contrast, is 
relatively novel as a term to describe an intellectual project, and yet retains 
connection with these other terms that have become problematic in these ways. 
Largely following the lead of Wesley Wildman, the present project 
proceeds with the conception of religious philosophy as multidisciplinary 
comparative inquiry. Broadly speaking, the subject matter of inquiry is God, how 
God relates to the world, and how to live in light of God. The inquiry proceeds 
by integrating insights from a variety of disciplinary perspectives5 and by 
comparison among ideas and practices in a variety of religious and philosophical 
traditions.6 A friendly amendment to Wildman, relevant to this project, arises 
from the theological methodology of Robert Neville, who argues for a third 
trajectory to be integrated alongside diverse disciplinary perspectives and 
																																																								
4 Robert C. Neville, On the Scope and Truth of Theology: Theology as Symbolic Engagement (New 
York, NY: T&T Clark, 2006); Robert C. Neville, Ultimates: Philosophical Theology, vol. I (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 2013); Robert C. Neville, Existence: Philosophical Theology, 
vol. 2 (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2014); Robert C. Neville, Religion: 
Philosophical Theology, vol. 3 (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2015). 
5 Wildman, Religious Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry, 86. 
6 Wildman, 125. 
	 	5 
comparisons: “Dialectical systematic thinking provides kinds of feedback that do 
not readily come to mind with the empiricistic rhetoric that Wildman employs.”7 
Neville has been a longtime advocate of systematic reflection: “Comparative 
theology ought to be undertaken systematically, for there is no other way to 
protect against bias.”8 The purpose of system, in Neville’s view, is to make 
publicly clear, to the theologian or philosopher as much as to anyone else, the 
full range of implications of a set of positions for each other and for any other 
claim about anything insofar as it eventually relates back to the domain of 
inquiry at hand. This is so that any discipline or perspective or piece of evidence 
can have purchase for offering criticism of the derived positions on the basis of 
rational (coherence and consistency) or empirical (adequacy, or applicability) 
evidence. In short, system is Neville’s way of dealing with the problem of the 
incommensurability of disciplinary and traditional discourses. Whereas rational 
and empirical evidence address the implications of theological positions as they 
emerge systematically, dialectical thinking provides “feedback concerning the 
																																																								
7 Neville, On the Scope and Truth of Theology, 193. 
8 Robert C. Neville, Behind the Masks of God: An Essay Toward Comparative Theology (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1991), ix. 
	 	6 
grounds of rationality itself”9 by bringing those grounds into conversation, 
dialogue, and debate with their alternatives. Alas, such dialectical systems are 
necessarily the most inefficient rational processes for providing feedback10 as the 
communities that inhabit them test them over the long haul.11 Thus, patience is a 
virtue in religious philosophy. 
An immediate problem arises from this conception of the task at hand: 
how to get a handle on the myriad perspectives and traditions invited to the 
table. One option would be to assert religious philosophy as the queen of the 
sciences, as John Milbank does, by offering an account of scientific and 
humanistic discourses, and really the entire modern project, as parasitic upon 
theology: “If theology no longer seeks to position, qualify or criticize other 
discourses, then it is inevitable that these discourses will position theology.”12 
Milbank argues that modern, “secular” epistemologies are both arbitrary and 
ultimately theological,13 while Christianity “is not deconstructible by modern 
																																																								
9 Neville, On the Scope and Truth of Theology, 193. 
10 Wildman, Religious Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry, 182. 
11 Neville, On the Scope and Truth of Theology, 193–94. 
12 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2008), 1. 
13 Milbank, 3. 
	 	7 
secular reason; rather, it is Christianity which exposes the non-necessity of 
supposing … that difference, non-totalization and indeterminancy of meaning 
necessarily imply arbitrariness and violence.”  He wants theology to be self-
aware, the one gift he acknowledges from modernity, “yet able to elaborate its 
own self-understanding in terms of a substantive and critical theory of society in 
general.”  This “third voice” would be “counter-modern:” “historicist and 
pragmatist, yet theologically realist.”14 Wildman also advocates a historicist, 
pragmatist, and realist strategy for handling the disciplines and perspectives he 
invites into the arena of religious philosophy. But whereas Milbank places 
Christian theology in a dominant position over other disciplines and 
perspectives, Wildman makes religious philosophy a generous host at the 
banquet table of inquiry. As host, he furnishes “an underlying theory of 
rationality”15 arising from the American pragmatist tradition of Charles Sanders 
Peirce (1839 – 1914), John Dewey (1859 – 1952), and William James (1842 – 1910). 
“A pragmatic theory of inquiry treats inquiry fundamentally as a kind of 
																																																								
14 Milbank, 6. 
15 Wildman, Religious Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry, xi. 
	 	8 
spontaneous interest-driven problem-solving instinct in organisms.”16 Its 
emphases include: 
• Biology: inquiry is an embodied activity made possible by senses and brains. 
• Evolution: inquiry serves survival through helping human beings solve problems. 
• Sociality: inquiry is a social process depending on cooperation and consensus. 
• Correction: inquiry is tentative formulation of hypotheses, continually seeking 
correction. 
• Fallibilism: beliefs are always subject to correction. 
• Critical realism: the source of correction is a feedback potential or an experienced 
resistance to hypotheses; this is the proper empirical basis for speaking of sensible, 
structured reality external to human experience.17 
He also suggests three distinctive features of religious philosophy beyond its 
multidisciplinary and comparative character: the existential entanglement of the 
expert inquirer, the distinction between first-level inquiries by non-experts and 
second-level inquiries by experts, and formal inquiry into ultimate concerns and 
ultimate matters.18 Decisively alternative to Milbank, “religious philosophy is 
socially and intellectually and ideologically located not in a particular religious 
tradition but in the modern academy” and accepts the academy’s “normative 
assumptions” and “orbit of inquiry.”19 And yet, Wildman even provides 
hospitality to Milbank: “religious philosophy is just as vulnerable as any other 
																																																								
16 Wildman, 168. 
17 Wildman, 170. 
18 Wildman, 233–34. 
19 Wildman, 236–37. 
	 	9 
evaluative enterprise to critique based on ideological tainting.”20 Rather than the 
“master-discourse” Milbank envisions for theology, Wildman wants to learn the 
discourses of the various disciplines, overcoming their incommensurability,21 
and weave them into a mutually informative conversation. 
Wildman espouses an underlying critical realism as the grounding for the 
feedback potential constitutive of a pragmatic theory of inquiry,22 but the full 
force of the importance of realism for the field never fully registers. In fact, it 
would be hard for religious philosophy to integrate disciplines that do not have 
an underlying realism as the epistemology, if not metaphysics, of their inquiries. 
Realism, in the medieval sense, contrasts with nominalism as commitment to the 
reality of generals as well as particulars, wholes as well as parts, and thus the 
ability to refer thereunto.23 This sort of realism contrasts with the ultimate 
ontological reductionism Mark Sidertis holds as characteristic of Buddhism, 
whereby things like tables, and even people, that are made up of other things, 
																																																								
20 Wildman, 237. 
21 Wildman, 114–24. 
22 Wildman, 78, 170, 186. 
23 Robert C. Neville, Realism in Religion: A Pragmatist’s Perspective (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 2009), 1–5. 
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such as atoms and organs, are not ultimately real, even though they are 
conventionally real.24 He further argues that this mereological reductionism in 
the context of the Buddhist two truths device is superior to Western analytic 
approaches without the conventional/ultimate distinction.25 An extended 
analysis of the implications of the two truths leads to the conclusion that the 
reduction of conventional truths to ultimate truths is necessarily ineffable.26 This 
sort of reductionism is nominalistic. Realism also contrasts with idealism in 
committing to the reality of things independent of their being known. This is 
important for Wildman’s strong sense of critical realism as it is the capacity of 
unknown things nevertheless to “push back” on an interpretation or “knowing” 
of them that really is the engine, or perhaps the fuel, driving his theory of 
inquiry.27 For religious philosophy as multidisciplinary comparative inquiry, 
realism puts its foot down and insists that all of the disciplines and comparisons 
participate in the same reality, even if they pick up on different and seemingly 
																																																								
24 Mark Siderits, “Is Reductionism Expressible?,” in Pointing at the Moon: Buddhism, Logic, Analytic 
Philosophy, ed. Jay L. Garfield, Tom J. F. Tillemans, and Mario D’Amato (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 65. 
25 Siderits, 66. 
26 Siderits, 73. 
27 Wildman, Religious Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry, 183–89. 
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incommensurate aspects of it, and that all, as inquirers, at a base level are more 
or less equally capable of accessing this reality. Realism makes integration 
possible by providing the “ontological context of mutual relevance,”28 the 
container, the laboratory, in which the disciplines and comparisons undertake 
inquiry, and without which inquiry would be impossible. 
Sitting around the table of inquiry and letting the conversation flow is 
likely highly enjoyable, but at some point, one of the guests is bound to wonder 
why the religious philosopher is bothering to play host. After all, inquiry is 
supposed to be oriented around problem solving, according to Wildman, and so 
the guests should inevitably train their inquiring minds in the direction of 
whichever problem it is they have been called together to address. (Peirce only 
made one exception to inquiry as the mode of human thought, and that was 
“musement,” or purely playful thinking without purpose, which he 
recommended in moderation, “some five to six percent of one’s waking time”).29 
Alas, at precisely this turn, Wildman becomes frustratingly vague, and not in the 
philosophically sophisticated sense he intends: “Religious philosophy involves 
																																																								
28 Neville, Ultimates, I:212–14. 
29 Charles Sanders Peirce, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings (1893-1913), vol. 2 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), 430. 
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investigation into every kind and degree of religious phenomena.”30 He goes on 
to provide a list of five features of religion, but qualifies his claim by noting that 
the list could be much longer.31 He further suggests that “the most adventurous 
forms of religious philosophy intend to inquire into ultimacy, in the double sense 
of matters that are ultimately religiously important and of ultimate reality 
itself.”32 This last leaves open both what the less adventurous forms might be 
about and the proportion of the field each encompasses. Alas, the impoverished 
attention to what his theory of inquiry is supposed to attend to leaves the project 
of religious philosophy somewhat untethered. This is no reason to abandon 
religious philosophy as multidisciplinary comparative inquiry, but rather an 
opportunity for development such that religious philosophy not only potentially 
but actually integrates the various disciplines and comparisons that fall under its 
scope into something. 
For the purposes of the present project, religious philosophy as 
multidisciplinary comparative inquiry integrates multiple disciplinary 
perspectives and comparisons by interpreting their value for understanding and 
																																																								
30 Wildman, Religious Philosophy as Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry, 19. 
31 Wildman, 37. 
32 Wildman, 26. 
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articulating God, how God relates to the world, and how to live in light of God. 
Wildman tends to demur from god-language, decamping to the vocabulary of 
ultimacy, and with good reason. Not all religious traditions are theistic, for 
starters. That said, the language of ultimacy, ultimate reality, and ultimate 
concern also brings on board significant intellectual and spiritual baggage, not 
least of all that not all traditions or subsets of traditions understand their god or 
gods to be ultimate.33 Other replacements, such as the Infinite and the Real, have 
similar problems. Thus, God language is retained in this project with the caveat 
that who or what God is for religious philosophy is a result and not a 
presupposition of the multidisciplinary comparative inquiry it pursues. It is 
arguable that all disciplines should be multidisciplinary, comparative, 
systematic, dialectical, empirical, rationalist, and realist in their inquiries into 
their own problematics; certainly, religious philosophy should be. To be so as 
religious philosophy requires hosting as many disciplinary perspectives and 
comparisons at the table as possible, making sure to be clear that the topic of 
conversation is God, whoever or whatever God turns out to be pending the 
results of the inquiry. Religious philosophy is not a master-discourse but rather 
																																																								
33 Lawrence A. Whitney, “Experience and the Ultimacy of God,” The Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy 26, no. 1 (2012): 43–60, https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.26.1.0043. 
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seeks to overcome incommensurability among discourses for the sake of 
bringing those discourses to bear for the sake of inquiry into its unique 
problematic. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of religious philosophy to 
advance a hypothesis regarding God, the relationship between God and the 
world, and how to live in light of God, and to elaborate the hypothesis 
systematically so that other disciplines and comparisons can be brought to bear 
in the proper respects. The hypothesis may be a novel metaphysical system, such 
as Neville proposes. It may also be arrived at through musement, as Peirce 
suggests, only achieving systematicity as it engages the process of inquiry and 
refines itself in light of the implications it draws, correctly or incorrectly, for 
other disciplines and traditions.34 Religious philosophy as multidisciplinary 
comparative inquiry is to be measured not by its loyalty to a religious tradition 
or institution, but by its loyalty to broad reaching inquiry, which it takes to be the 
best means of access to truth. Of course, integration of the various disciplines and 
comparisons is only a means to an end for religious philosophy; keeping the end 
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in sight – God, the relationship between God and the world, and how to live in 
light of God – is what makes it religious. 
Religious Philosophy and Religious Language 
Having charted the topography of the sandbox in which this dissertation 
intends to play, i.e. religious philosophy, it is important to locate the particular 
topic of the dissertation, i.e. religious language, therein. Since religious 
philosophy seeks to inquire about God, the relationship between God and the 
world, and how to live in light of God, the problem of religious language must 
be addressed via inquiry into one of these three topics. Inquiry into God to 
resolve the problem would require developing an understanding of God that 
would be amenable to linguistic engagement in at least some sense. To be sure, 
there are many such conceptions of God, such as that postulated in the final 
chapter of Alfred North Whitehead’s Process and Reality.35 Instead, the 
metaphysics of divine ineffability that functions as something of an assumption 
underlying the rest of the project will be considered briefly in the next section. 
Leaving God alone for the time being, the second option is to inquire into the 
relationship between God and the world in hopes of uncovering a point of 
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traction for linguistic engagement with the divine. This approach would enable 
language to engage God as in some sense revealed, and so is parasitic upon some 
notion of revelation.36 Of the various sorts of revelation, two basic approaches 
may be demarcated: revelation as supernatural intervention in reality, and 
revelation as reality itself. The first fails to meet the plausibility conditions of 
religious philosophy as a pragmatist form of critical realism, the contours of 
which will be explored in greater detail below. The second, a form of natural 
theology, presumes that something about God might be known on the basis of 
what God makes, i.e. reality, but this may not be the case if the relationship 
between God and the world is asymmetric.37 This insight reflexes back onto the 
supernatural intervention approach as what is revealed through intervention 
may not actually be God in Godself. Thus, it is not at all clear that inquiry into 
the relationship between God and the world is likely to result in a satisfactory 
resolution of the problem of religious language. 
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The third option for resolving the problem of religious language through 
religious philosophy is to inquire into how to live in light of God, and this is 
indeed the approach taken throughout the remainder of this project. Language is 
a fact of human life, and so the question of how to live, e.g. how to speak, in light 
of God holds promise for a productive result to the question. The way of going 
about this, however, is quite distinct from the metaphysical machinations of 
inquiry into God or the cosmological analysis of the relationship between God 
and the world. Inquiry into how to live in light of God is inevitably far more 
mundane, reconstructing decidedly human states of affairs that respond to 
divinity in some way, in this case human speech that seeks to engage God. Such 
inquiries must necessarily tarry at some length in the domain of their mundane, 
as opposed to ultimate, concern, seeking to get their own house in order such 
that divinity might be provided adequate hospitality therein. In the case of the 
present project, this means that the bulk of the project will be given over to 
developing a theory of language. First and foremost, the theory must be 
coherent, consistent, adequate, and applicable in all instances of language, not 
just with respect to God. Only once such a theory is constructed may it be tested 
with respect to adequacy for engaging divinity, and thus its potential for 
resolving the problem of religious language. 
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Implied in the move to develop or construct a theory of language is the 
criticism that extant theories of language are inadequate. Indeed, much of 
literature attempting to solve the problem of religious language seeks to tweak 
some aspect or another of a theory of language in order to enable a solution, as 
will be elaborated at the beginning of chapter two. The implicit critique of this 
project, rendered explicit here, is that available theories of language writ large 
are inadequate, inapplicable, inconsistent, and frequently incoherent, and so 
require a degree of renovation that might better be termed reconstruction.38 This 
is a large claim, and the best demonstration of it is in the elaboration of the 
various approaches to language that dominate academic discourse at present, 
which takes up the bulk of chapter two. It is enough for the moment to state the 
central assumption of the linguistic turn in its various aspects, to be elaborated in 
chapter two, to which the theory to be advanced in chapter five runs counter as a 
means of correction.  
All expressions of the linguistic turn, one way or another, rely upon the 
assumption that language and thought are in some form of causal relationship. 
The assumption is expressed by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857 – 1913) in his 
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Course in General Linguistics in the form of the assertion that “language is a 
system of signs that express ideas,”39 which is to say that language is conditioned 
by the ideas it exists to express. The theory of linguistic determinism, such that 
causality runs from language to mind, is expressed in the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis of linguistic relativity that language structures thought: “we dissect 
nature along lines laid down by our native languages.”40 The reverse of this 
theory is that of Universal Grammar, which argues that a genetically encoded 
mental faculty causally determines language development so as to accord with a 
set of basic rules: “It is the theory of that feature of the genetically given human 
cognitive capacity which makes language possible, and at the same time defines 
a possible human language.”41 Given these inextricable linkages between 
language and thought in the linguistic turn, language must inevitably also 
participate in the same representational paradigm as the ideas to which it is 
bound.  
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Representational theories typically portray knowledge as the apprehension and re-
presentation of an aspect of the world within the so-called mind’s eye. This position 
assumes the existence of an objective world that is separate from the knowing subject and 
fixed in some way so as to be capable of being known.42 
In this paradigm, knowledge represents reality, often in the medium of 
experience,43 and language represents knowledge. 
The inquiry to be pursued in this dissertation regarding how to live in 
light of God rejects the representational theories of knowledge and language, 
which is what necessitates the reconstruction of language in order to adequately 
pursue its goals. Instead of viewing mind as representing reality and language 
representing mental representations of reality, ritual will be offered as a 
cosmological dimension of reality in which both mentality and language 
participate as species of its genus, and which thereby mediates the interaction 
between the two. This introduction of a third term enables a more adequate 
construal of the relationship between mind and language that adopts insights 
from the notion of their “co-evolution” advanced by Terrence Deacon44 and of 
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language as a “cultural tool” advanced by Daniel Everett.45 While a full theory of 
mind exceeds the scope of the project, the emphasis of ritual as transformative 
that is adopted from the third century BCE Confucian thinker Xunzi enables an 
understanding of mind and language as transformative rather than 
representative vis-à-vis reality. Overall, the project seeks to locate the meaning of 
language not merely with respect to mind but among all of the three poles 
defining an ellipse of meaning outlined by Hilary Putnam (1926 – 2016), namely 
reality, mind, and society.46 The risk of having to undertake such an extensive 
renovation will always be a necessary liability in inquiry into how to live in light 
of God since human life is always fraught and contentious in human 
consideration. One possibility inherent in such reconstruction, however, is also 
therefore that a problem that had pertained under a previous paradigm may 
become less problematic following its reconstruction. Indeed, this is precisely 
what turns out to be the case in this instance, such that the problem of religious 
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language is not so much resolved as dissolved in this particular instance of 
religious philosophy. 
The Metaphysics of God 
Since God is not the primary topic when religious philosophy inquires 
into how to live in light of God, the concept of God at play is secondary and so 
may be assumed, as it is in this case. That said, it is therefore even more 
important to be very clear about the concept of God at play given its function as 
that in which light life is lived. Moreover, there are a number of frameworks for 
conceiving God at play in the theological literature that fall afoul of the problem 
of religious language, but it is hardly clear that they are mere linguistic variations 
on one and the same conception. Frequently the conception of God in question 
delimits possibilities for the relationship between God so conceived and the 
world, so the divine-world relation creeps into the frame as well. This is all to say 
that ineffability has to do with how life is lived in light of God, but there are 
multiple ways in which God could be metaphysically in Godself and could relate 
to the world so as to be ineffable. Thus, it is necessary to tarry briefly over the 
issue of the metaphysics of God, and related cosmologies of divine-world 
interaction, so as to be able to press onward in the inquiry at hand from a 
relatively stable starting point. 
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To give the conclusion away at the outset, the set of conceptions of God of 
interest for their resulting in divine ineffability are those in which God is such as 
to relate to all of reality all at once. The reason that God is ineffable in this case, 
on standard accounts of language as representational, is that such a God cannot 
be thought since thinking involves representation of an aspect of reality, not the 
whole of reality, which is itself not to be confused with the wholeness of reality, 
which is properly an aspect. If God relates to the whole of reality, and the whole 
of reality cannot be thought, then the relation itself is likewise unthinkable and 
God falls away in mystery. As Anselm (1033 – 1109) taught, and as John Clayton 
(1943 – 2003) reminds us,47 such a God is both “something than which nothing 
greater can be thought,”48 and “something greater than can be thought.”49 So too 
such a God must be greater than can be said, that is, must exceed speech, on the 
logic of representation elaborated above.  
Already this notion of a metaphysics that distinguishes the whole of 
reality from the myriad things that make up the whole evokes the classical 
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problem of the one and the many. Frederick Copleston (1907 – 1994) and Robert 
Neville are notable in the history of religious philosophy for their historical and 
constructive, respectively, codifications of the cross-cultural prevalence of this 
metaphysical framing for God, i.e. the one, relating to all of reality, i.e. the many, 
all at once.50 The metaphysics of the one for the many says that the one serves as 
an ultimate matrix in which all of the things in reality, which are really different 
from one another, in some cases in virtually every other respect, are nonetheless 
able to relate to one another. Neville calls this one for the many the “ontological 
context of mutual relevance,”51 which is a rather minimalist program for the one 
to serve in relation to the many by comparison with most of the other roles 
prescribed for the one across philosophical history. For example, positing the 
category of being as the one for the many has been particularly prominent 
among Western philosophers inheriting the Greek legacies of the pre-Socratics, 
Plato (ca. 429 – 347 BCE), and Aristotle (384 – 322 BCE). When being is the one 
for the many, it is the being that the many beings that inhabit reality have, and 
thus is sometimes called “being-itself.” Paul Tillich (1886 – 1965) is notable for 
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cultivating the notion of the one for the many as the “ground of being” in an 
existentialist frame.52 Tillich is also notable for connecting the category of being 
as an answer to the problem of the one and the many with the category of 
ultimacy: “Our ultimate concern is that which determines our being or not-
being.”53 Since it is the ground of being that determines our being or not-being, 
then the ground of being is our ultimate concern, or at least it should be. Tillich 
reserved the term “idolatry” to describe a mismatch between ultimate concern 
and ultimate reality: “Idolatry is the elevation of a preliminary concern to 
ultimacy.”54 The logic, then, is that whatever is taken to be the one for the many, 
i.e. being, is the proper ultimate concern for all of the many beings that are, i.e. 
participate in oneness. 
An important development in this legacy of answers to the problem of the 
one and the many, in which the one relates to the many all at once, is the 
introduction of a metaphysics of indeterminacy by Robert Neville. His 
commitment to the metaphysics and logic of indeterminacy remains consistent 
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from his earliest work, God the Creator,55 through his most recent forays in 
systematic philosophy, the three-volume Philosophical Theology.56 Attending to 
this approach is important for the role it will play in the final chapter considering 
the subjunctivity of ritual and thus language. Neville receives the notion of 
determinateness from Paul Weiss (1901 – 2002), who notes that “to be 
determinate is to be opposed to and opposed by” some other determinate thing, 
without which the thing would be “radically indeterminate.”57 Neville develops 
this logic to say that “to be determinate is, minimally, to have some identity over 
against or in difference from what is other than that identity.”58 For a thing to be 
indeterminate is thus the opposite, “it lacks a determinate real distinction from 
some other determination.”59 What makes the one for the many different is that it 
is completely indeterminate with respect to absolutely anything and everything, 
including even nothing. It “is indeterminate, that is, nothing, not something 
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rather than nothing nor something rather than something else.”60 It is only in the 
act of creating the many, that is, all of the determinate things as determinate with 
respect to one another, with respect to which the one is determinate, and this 
creative act is itself a reflexive act of self-determination.61 The force of the logic 
and metaphysics of the determinacy of reality is that the creative movement from 
sheer indeterminacy to the world of more or less determinate things is not only 
singular, as the notion of the one for the many indicates, but utterly 
asymmetrical, from nothing to everything all at once.62 
The idea that the one relates to the many “all at once” admits of at least 
two potential misunderstandings that should therefore be explicitly rejected. The 
first is that the notion of “at once” implies that the one relates to the many at a 
single, discrete temporal point. The risk of this misunderstanding is particularly 
acute when the notion of creation is deployed because it implies a temporality 
prior to and then following from the act of creation at a discrete point in time, as 
in the case of deism. Such a conception is a misunderstanding precisely because 
the one would no longer be a source of unity in relation to the many beyond the 
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moment of discrete temporality in which that relation were to pertain. Such a 
view would necessitate a form of occasionalism63 whereby either the one would 
relate anew to the many in each successive moment, or a succession of ones 
would have to step in, one after another through the course of time. The 
misunderstanding involved is mistaken precisely because it assumes that the one 
being for the many happens within time instead of time being one of the many 
determinate things the one unifies within its matrix. The one is thus also eternal 
on the account of eternity as pure atemporalism,64 which like the metaphysics of 
indeterminacy finds its greatest contemporary champion in Neville.65 In relating 
to the many all at once, the one is not relating to them temporally but eternally, 
at all points of time and in all of the temporal modes together. 
The second misunderstanding evoked by the idea of the one relating to 
the many “all at once” is parallel to the first except that it is spatial, taking its cue 
from the notion of “all,” rather than temporal. Clearly, “all” encompasses a 
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greater quantity of the many than “at once” does of their temporal progression, 
but it is precisely the very notions of quantity and quantification that lead to the 
possibility of misunderstanding. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 – 1831) in 
his Science of Logic provides a metaphor for distinguishing two meanings of “all” 
in terms of infinity, which proves useful irrespective on ongoing debates about 
what “true infinity” actually means for him in the context of his system:66 
The image of the progression in infinity is the straight line; the infinite is only at the two 
limits of this line, and always only is where the latter (which is existence) is not but 
transcends itself, in its non-existence, that is, in the indeterminate. As true infinite, bent 
back upon itself, its image becomes the circle, the line that has reached itself, closed and 
wholly present, without beginning and end.67 
The many are infinite in the first sense of the infinite straight line to which, in 
principle, more could always be added, thereby increasing the quantity of the 
infinite many that there are. By contrast, the one is infinite in principle such that 
quantification is simply not applicable as a process since there is no quantity of 
the one to be discerned, in spite of its being named “one;” the one is only one by 
virtue of its unifying function for the many. Just as the eternal one is for the 
temporal many in an eternal way with all of the moments and modes of time 
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together, the infinite one is for the quantifiable many in an infinite way with all 
of the many that there are together.  
The set of conceptions of God such that God, i.e. the one, relates to reality, 
i.e. the many, all at once includes God as ultimate, indeterminate, eternal, and 
infinite. Alas, this set of conceptions appears to run headlong into the critique of 
metaphysics as ontotheology launched by Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976), who 
sought to deconstruct the Western philosophical tradition through the radically 
historicized notion that “metaphysics grounds an age.”68 What unites 
metaphysics across epochs is a common topic of inquiry: “Metaphysics speaks of 
the totality of entities as such, [and] thus of the being of entities,”69 formulating “a 
truth about the totality of entities as such.”70 Heidegger discerns within the 
metaphysical topic two intertwined questions: 
The question of being, as the question of the being of entities, is double in form. On the 
one hand, it asks: What is an entity in general as an entity? In the history of philosophy, 
reflections which fall within the domain of this question acquire the title ontology. The 
question “What is an entity?” [or “What is that which is?”] simultaneously asks: Which 
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entity is the highest [or supreme, höchste] entity, and in what sense is it? This is the 
question of God and of the divine. We call the domain of this question theology. This 
duality in the question of the being of entities can be united under the title 
ontotheology.71 
In conceiving the one to relate to the many all at once, the metaphysics of God 
presented here “speaks of the totality of entities as such,” and so it is properly 
metaphysics according to Heidegger. Insofar as this metaphysics also speaks of 
the one as the being that the many beings are, it is a response to the ontological 
side of metaphysics, and insofar as it speaks of being as the highest, i.e. ultimate, 
then it is also a response to the theological side of metaphysics. Hence, the 
conceptions of God advanced here do in fact run headlong into the Heideggarian 
ontotheological paradigm. 
One possibility upon running headlong into a critique is that the resulting 
conflagration reveals the basis of criticism to be less than properly established, as 
turns out to be the case with respect to the accusation implied in the moniker of 
ontotheology. Heidegger takes the paradigm of being to be of central 
metaphysical concern and then divides it between ontological and theological 
substrates. The conceptualizations of God engaged here do not start with the 
question of being, however. They start with the problem of the one and the many 
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and then offer being as one possible construal of the one, thereby subordinating 
the metaphysics of being to the ontology of the one, rather than ontology being 
subordinated to metaphysics as Heidegger would have it. As Heidegger notes, 
and as has been acknowledged above, the metaphysics of being has been 
prominent in the Western philosophical tradition, but by no means predominant 
in the way that he imagines. Alongside the metaphysics of being are other 
schematizations of the one, including personhood as in personalism,72 thinking 
mind as in idealism,73 and as pervasively in process running from Heraclitus74 
through Whitehead75 and beyond. Admittedly, a number of avowed personalists, 
idealists, and even the occasional process thinker, have ventured into the idiom 
of being to mine its resources, but to interpret them as therefore reducible to the 
ontology of being is at best exegetically dishonest. Further, the parochialism 
reducing metaphysics to the ontology of being converts to outright myopia when 
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measured against the global scope of philosophical inquiry. The attempt to 
deconstruct metaphysics by rendering it historical falls apart upon a proper 
historical rendering of the global philosophical scene with regard to 
metaphysical and ontological issues. Copleston and Neville provide a necessary 
corrective to this Heideggarian overreach by demonstrating the cross-cultural 
pervasiveness of the question of the one and the many and the diversity of 
metaphysical schemes for schematizing the one. 
The importance of correcting the Heideggarian metaphysical imaginary 
for the purposes of understanding the metaphysics of God as it results in divine 
ineffability is that the metaphysics of God are properly ontological and therefore 
logically prior to any metaphysical scheme that might be applied a posteriori. 
Metaphysics is important for generating the conceptions of God according to 
which God functions as the one for the many all at once, but there are multiple 
metaphysical systems compatible with elaborating that more basic ontological 
insight. The metaphysics that will be detailed in chapter two and deployed in 
chapters five and six is generally of the process type, taking the semiotics of 
Charles Sanders Peirce as properly metaphysical and adding the category of 
ritual as the means by which harmony emerges among otherwise spontaneous 
semiotic emergence. The full metaphysical scheme requires more elaboration 
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than is relevant for the sake of this project, but it is important for understanding 
the role of language as part and parcel of the ongoing procedural apparatus of 
reality. It includes within it the analysis of determinacy and indeterminacy 
described above from Neville, which is how it links up with the ontological 
program of the one and the many and the resulting problem of religious 
language. The plausibility of such a metaphysical semiotics result from its 
adherence to a form of critical realism that sets the conditions therefore, which is 
the last aspect of religious philosophy to receive its due methodological attention 
for the time being. 
Critical Realism 
One of the risks in religious philosophy is that, lurking as it does at the 
edges of reality, life, knowledge, and everything, the program is prone to flights 
of fancy that press so far beyond the practical engagement of everyday affairs 
that the outcome fails as any kind of solution to any kind of problem. In order to 
provide some grounding, Wildman introduces critical realism as a means of 
setting plausibility conditions for religious philosophy. What he says about 
critical realism is that reality provides feedback such that incorrect hypotheses 
about reality, which is independent of the both the hypothesis and the 
philosopher who constructs it, may be corrected to better accord with and 
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engage reality as it is. He also promises to explain his theory of critical realism, 
having noted it: “The pragmatic theory of inquiry has six main emphases, and I 
will explain each in what follows.”76 Alas, he never quite gets around to doing so. 
This is especially problematic given that there are multiple theories and 
applications of critical realism in the literature, and they are not necessarily 
consistent with one another.77 This oversight in giving rigorous annunciation of 
the religious philosophy program is especially problematic for the present 
endeavor since its reconstruction draws from all three domains in which 
different theories of critical realism are at play: philosophy, theology, and social 
theory. It is therefore particularly incumbent here to be precise about how 
religious philosophy is situated amongst these disparate uses of the term. 
The principally philosophical version of critical realism emerges in 
response to the problem of the external world, which calls for explanation of 
“how perception could give us knowledge or justified belief about an external 
world, about things outside of ourselves.”78 As an approach to this problem, 
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critical realism attempts to split the baby between affirming a mind-independent 
reality, which idealism would deny, and denying the appearance of that reality 
in mind apart from its mediation in the sensory apparatus as interpreted through 
cognitive processes, which direct realism would affirm. René Descartes (1596 – 
1650) and John Locke (1632 – 1704) are early proponents of something like this 
view, although each are often also interpreted as its antagonists in various 
respects. A distinctively American tradition of critical realism in this vein 
emerged, with one of its principal proponents being Roy Wood Sellars (1880 – 
1973), who claimed that “it holds that knowledge of objects is mediated by ideas 
which are in some sense distinct from the objects of knowledge.”79 His son, Wilfrid 
Sellars (1912 – 1989), is also an important critical realist, whose approach 
“attempts to balance competing insights in several different dimensions — 
empiricist-rationalist, foundationalist-coherentist, externalist-internalist, realist-
phenomenalist-idealist — while also keeping an eye on the deep connections 
between epistemology and the metaphysics of mind.”80 Not only does this 
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approach demonstrate the attempt on the part of critical realism to harmonize 
diverse insights, the younger Sellars also demonstrates that critical realism sits at 
a point of apparent paradox between resisting the mediation of perception and 
yet acknowledging perception as irreducibly conceptual.81 Despite sympathies 
with the generosity of spirit, desire for integration, and commitment to fallibility 
espoused by this set of critical realists, it is hard to imagine that anything quite so 
restricted as this set of issues in the philosophy of mind could adequately fulfill 
the role Wildman espouses for critical realism in religious philosophy. Moreover, 
the apparently necessary commitment of this critical realism to some form of 
representationalism,82 which the present endeavor denies, makes it particularly 
unsuitable, beyond its insufficiency to provide the requisite plausibility 
conditions. 
A second form of critical realism emerges in the science and theology 
literature, which is a much safer guess as to the intended referent of the 
invocation of critical realism by Wildman given his involvement therein. 
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Whereas Kees van Kooten Niekerk sees continuity between the critical realism of 
the philosophy of perception, via a supposed influence on scientific realism,83 on 
the theology and science usage, Andreas Losch challenges this genealogy on the 
grounds of lack of reference to the relevant literature.84 This skepticism is further 
inculcated by a lack of reference to critical realism in the scientific realism 
literature,85 and the need of at least one philosopher to develop an explicitly 
Critical Scientific Realism.86 Yet, Ian Barbour (1923 – 2013), who first articulated 
critical realism as a framework for work in theology and science, exhibits the 
same impulse as the philosophers of perception to register the objectivity of 
external reality and the contributions of cognitive processes: Critical realism 
“must acknowledge both the creativity of man’s mind, and the existence of 
patterns in events that are not created by man’s mind... Critical realism 
acknowledges the indirectness of reference and the realistic intent of language as 
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used in the scientific community.”87 Arthur Peacocke (1924 – 2006) and John 
Polkinghorne are luminaries in the theology and science field who adopted 
similar forms of critical realism in the wake of Barbour, in the former case with 
some influence by Wilfrid Sellers, and in the latter with influence from Michael 
Polanyi (1891 – 1976).88 The influence of Roman Catholic philosopher and 
theologian Bernhard Lonergan (1904 – 1984) has also been influential in the 
development of this trajectory.89 Clearly, this set of derivations of critical realism 
are much better candidates for the role Wildman envisions for it in religious 
philosophy for being far more extensively construed than the limitations of the 
philosophy of perception. It is not clear that this vision of critical realism is at all 
adequate for the present project, however, due to the centrality of modeling, 
especially on the articulation of Barbour: 
“Yes, science is trying to describe reality, but it does so only very indirectly in highly 
symbolic and abstractive language.” One has to use models, but one has to recognize 
their limitations; one has to realize that they are partial and limited, that each one selects 
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certain aspects and emphasizes those that none of them corresponds exactly in any 
simple way to reality.90 
The models Barbour invokes, which seek to correlate with but not correspond to 
reality, are once again mental representations of reality and thus fall afoul of the 
same representationalism as the critical realism that emerges from the 
philosophy of perception. 
The two earlier paradigms of critical realism, in the philosophy of 
perception and in the theology and science dialogue, are relatively niche 
approaches designed for the particularities of the inquiries they seek to frame. 
The most recent, and by far the most widely recognized paradigm of critical 
realism is the philosophy of science generally, and of the social sciences 
particularly, developed by Roy Bhaskar (1944 – 2014). Like the earlier paradigms, 
Bhaskar is keen to harmonize a commitment to an independent reality from 
human thought about it with the necessity of distinctively human modes of 
engagement for the production of knowledge: 
It is ‘‘realist’’ in the generic sense that it takes a ‘‘mind-independent’’ nature as a 
fundamental ‘‘condition of possibility’’ for natural science. But it is also realist in the 
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‘‘critical’’ sense that it sees science as a human activity that is inevitably mediated (if not 
determined) by human language and social power.91 
Unlike the earlier paradigms, Bhaskar provides a fully systematic philosophy of 
science that recognizes the relative autonomy of different strata and domains of 
nature and the emergence of one stratus from another, and fully affirms both a 
fallibilistic epistemology and a probabilistic ontology of causal norms rather than 
causal laws.92 This “transcendental realism,” as Bhaskar calls it, leads to a 
“critical naturalism,” which “is ‘naturalistic’ insofar as it rejects any sharp divide 
between the natural and social sciences. It is ‘critical’ insofar as it rejects any 
reduction of the social to the natural.”93 Bhaskarian critical naturalism also 
distinguishes natural from social reality: “Unlike natural reality, social reality is 
not independent of human minds,” although it is independent of any individual 
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human mind.94 In a second stage of his thinking, Bhaskar adds a dialectical 
element to his notion of critical realism in order to give “a more adequate 
ontology of change, a better account of the real forms and processes of change, 
and one that is more adequate to the radical implications of emergence than basic 
CR was.”95 It is unlikely that Wildman would be terribly excited about a critical 
realism in the form a systematic philosophy, so the critical realism that emerges 
in the theology and science discussion remains the strongest contender for what 
he intends to invoke as a framework for religious philosophy. Neither is it of 
interest for present purposes to onboard a whole systematic philosophy, but the 
basic outlines of especially the pre-dialectical version of critical realism as 
proposed by Bhaskar are rather compatible with impulses that will play out 
especially in the later chapters of this dissertation. Even the motivation for the 
dialectical version of critical realism in providing a more adequate account of 
change resonates with a similar goal in the present project, although it is 
accomplished here through a massively processive metaphysics rather than a 
dialectical ontology. Moreover, the causal norms that Bhaskar seeks to replace for 
causal laws in positivistic science are given detailed expression in this project as 
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rituals. Finally, the idea that natural reality is entirely independent of mind 
whereas social reality is independent of any individual mind sets the stage for 
locating linguistic meaning in the ellipse defined by the poles of reality, mind, 
and society as was elaborated above from the work of Hillary Putnam. 
None of the three paradigms of critical realism outlined here are adopted 
wholesale. However, both the integrative emphasis and the attempt to reconcile 
the paradox of a mind-independent reality with the necessity of conceptual 
schemata for knowing that reality, which cross all three, are adopted here as a 
framework for the plausibility conditions of religious philosophy. The theory to 
be elaborated over the course of the dissertation is only plausible if it rigorously 
defends the independence of reality from thought, language, and society, which 
is its commitment to realism. Yet, in order to be plausible, the theory must also 
recognize that thought, language, and society are themselves elements of reality 
that reflex on reality so as to engage it in ways that are not merely 
representational but in fact transformative. Thus, as will be elaborated in greater 
detail in chapter five, reality is to be understood as not only real, i.e. 
independent, but also singular and opaque. The singularity of reality is 
important for maintaining that all processes that engage reality, regardless of 
time, place, or manner, which are to be understood as rituals, are in fact engaging 
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one and the same reality. There is only one reality to engage, which is to say that 
there is only one table of inquiry at which the religious philosopher may host 
guests from many disciplines. That said, that singular, common reality is also 
opaque, which is why inquiry is necessary in the first place. Part of that opacity 
has to do with the fact that reality is inherently less determinate than either 
modern or postmodern attempts to interpret it have allowed. Moreover, reality is 
opaque because it is constantly undergoing multiple processes of transformation, 
i.e. ritualization, at multiple levels simultaneously such that anything that might 
count as knowledge must inevitably be too discrete and is necessarily 
immediately obsolete. This is what it means for critical realism to be both 
probabilistic and fallibilistic. Critical realism, then, is something of an exercise in 
futility if the end goal is understood as some kind of final, certain knowledge. If 
the goal of certainty is abandoned, however, then critical realism becomes a 
sandbox in which the game of inquiry may be played unto infinity. When the 
game is for the sake of solving a problem, which is to say for the sake of 
improving reality, then inquiry itself transcends the category of a game and itself 
becomes a ritual activity. It is for the next section to outline how such rituals are 
to be played. 
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Multidisciplinary Comparative Inquiry 
Having adopted the framework of religious philosophy, and having 
clarified its topic of inquiry that makes it religious, the question of how inquiry is 
to proceed comes to the fore. Inquiry has already been identified as an activity 
aimed at solving problems, which is to say that it is a process by which problems, 
whether practical, abstract, or troublesome lacunae in knowledge, may be 
brought toward resolution. Inquiry writ large is thus highly abstract, residing in 
the philosophical domain of logic, and having been addressed extensively in the 
literature.96 Of greater present moment are the qualifiers appended to the notion 
of inquiry for the purposes of religious philosophy, namely “multidisciplinary” 
and “comparative.” This section addresses the related problems of 
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incommensurability and reduction, and then shows how multidisciplinary 
comparative inquiry mitigates their threats, concluding with a schematic 
rendering of the process of inquiry that will be pursued through the remainder 
of the project. 
Incommensurability 
Incommensurability has to do with domains of interpretation being 
sufficiently unrelated to one another that they are inherently incapable of 
discerning whether or not they are interpreting the same object. Drawing on a 
metaphoric application of a mathematical notion indicating a lack of common 
measure, incommensurability is classically deployed in philosophy of science by 
Thomas Kuhn (1922 – 1996) and Paul Feyerabend (1924 – 1994) to describe the 
disjunctures between successive scientific paradigms.97 Comparative 
philosophers have given due attention to the problem of incommensurability 
among various philosophical traditions, that is, to tradition incommensurability, 
particularly between traditions originating in East and South Asia and the 
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West.98 This is not to say that the problem has been resolved, but rather to 
suggest that this vector of tradition incommensurability is the dominant 
consideration of incommensurability for comparativists. It is only quite recently 
that the disciplinary vector of incommensurability, that is, the disparity in 
discourse among academic disciplines including but also beyond the sciences, is 
available for philosophical consideration. This is hardly surprising since on 
standard accounts philosophy is philosophy and not some other discipline, so 
ostensibly there is no disciplinary incommensurability because all philosophy 
participates in a common conceptual framework, albeit not necessarily a 
common language. Since philosophy involves at its heart the articulation and 
interrogation of any and all conceptual frameworks, however, it is in fact 
questionable whether philosophy could, should, or would have a common 
conceptual framework. Thus, the extant focus by comparativists on tradition 
incommensurability would benefit greatly from closer consideration of intra-
tradition incommensurabilities, e.g. disciplinary and successive, alongside the 
extant concern with inter-tradition incommensurability. 
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Further consideration of the details of tradition incommensurability 
demonstrates the inevitable crossover into issues of disciplinary 
incommensurability. One of the side effects of tradition incommensurability is 
that the conceptual frameworks of, for example, Western philosophies, and those 
of, for example, East Asian philosophies, do not draw their own boundaries as a 
discipline of philosophy in the same places. This is not to say that traditions 
cannot be shoehorned into one another, as all too frequently happens under the 
colonialism of Western philosophical discourse in the global academy.99 Of 
course, the requisite contortions to do so must of necessity leave some, if not 
significant, unaccounted remainder. One prevalent attitude toward this 
remainder is to slough it off as unphilosophical and therefore requiring no 
accounting. Such has been the fate, for example, of the songs and poetry of the 
Warring States Confucian thinker Xunzi in virtually all of the English-language 
philosophical literature pertaining to him. When failure to account for some 
aspect of the remainder threatens the coherence of the desirable material, 
however, then it is often treated as a novelty to be acknowledged for its function 
in the philosophical project but accounted as a sideshow of interest merely for 
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titillation. This fetishizing of aspects of traditions is rightly deplored as 
exoticizing orientalism, and yet remains a prevalent aspect of too many 
comparative projects. Xunzi is exemplary here as well with respect to his 
consideration of ritual (li 禮). Three works represent the predominant trends vis-
à-vis dealing with remainders. Paul Goldin is deeply appreciative of the 
contributions Xunzi makes to ritual theory, on the terms of Western social 
scientific ritual theories, but fetishizes what Xunzi understood to be the actual 
practice of ritual, “as of salutation, of mourning, of eating,” as “of only secondary 
importance to his argument.”100 In a similar move, Kurtis Hagen makes the case 
for a constructivist interpretation of ritual in Xunzi, from which he argues that 
the actual practice of ritual is contextual and must be made appropriate to 
circumstance.101 Like for Goldin, Hagen identifies a remainder of ritual practice 
and casts it onto the slaughter bench of history so that his interpretation of Xunzi 
may more adequately conform to his desired constructivism on a modern 
Western account. A somewhat different form of shoehorning emerges in a recent 
volume edited by T.C. Kline and Justin Tiwald that takes ritual to be the Xunzian 
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philosophy of religion.102 This is a very interesting interpretation except for the 
fact that the Western categories of philosophy and religion are never interrogated 
with regard to fit for Xunzi, his context, and his orientation. Furthermore, 
regardless of what Xunzi thought about religion and its various aspects, 
dimensions, realities, and practices, his theory of ritual is not primarily interested 
in such matters. It is first and foremost his political philosophy, as will be 
demonstrated in chapter four, aimed at achieving sociopolitical order in the war-
torn ravages of the Warring States. Any religious implications would be 
secondary to that focus. 
The problem with philosophical engagement with Xunzi on the topic of 
ritual is that Xunzi would not have considered himself a philosopher in anything 
like the modern Western sense of the disciplinary category. His project was not 
bound by modern Western disciplinary methods, norms, and categories. Rather, 
his project of articulating a strategy for addressing the sociopolitical 
disintegration of the Warring States was one among many such strategic 
proposals vying for attention and acceptance by the rulers of the day. This being 
the case, Xunzi appropriated good ideas from other strategists, and protested 
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vehemently against ideas he considered not only bad but likely dangerous to 
future social stability. Rather than a philosophical concept or category, his 
consideration of ritual is part of a larger social theory. Related to philosophy but 
more properly located in sociology and related social scientific disciplines, social 
theory attends to not only what would constitute a good society but also the 
mechanisms for bringing such a society about and sustaining it. Comparative 
philosophers who want to take Xunzi on as close to what might plausibly be 
considered his own terms as achievable must now cope with not only tradition 
incommensurability but also with disciplinary incommensurability. Given the 
extensive development of ritual theory and ritual studies in the Western social 
scientific literature, this disciplinary incommensurability is operating 
intratradtionally, i.e. between Western philosophy and modern social science, as 
well as intertraditionally, i.e. between Chinese and Western philosophies. 
Incommensurability, of whatever sort, is often invoked as a 
methodological trump card, arguing that the conceptual differences between 
traditional and disciplinary paradigms or successive iterations thereof create 
insurmountable barriers that block their communication with one another. 
Wesley Wildman helpfully summarizes this incommensurability hypothesis in 
three steps: 
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(1) Conceptual schemes are inextricably embedded in practices and assumptions of 
worldly realities (theories, disciplines, languages, cultures). 
(2) Conceptual schemes are incommensurable when all attempts to take the measure of 
one family of ideas or one web of practices in the terms of another necessarily distort 
what is interpreted to such a degree that co-measuring is rightly deemed a pernicious 
waste of time.  
(3) Conceptual schemes are often incommensurable in this sense.103 
The first step is important for the incommensurability hypothesis even as it is the 
very justification for a comparative philosophical project: good comparison 
demands interrogating concepts, at least at first, on the terms of the theories, 
disciplines, languages, and cultures in which they are embedded. The fact that 
not all comparisons are good comparisons does not justify abandoning the 
project, and so what it means to interrogate concepts on the terms of their 
intellectual context is elaborated below as the approach of trication. The third 
step, by contrast to the first, is a premature answer to the empirical question of 
the frequency of incommensurable conceptual schemes. Whether or not concepts 
may be fruitfully brought into comparison across their embeddedness in 
traditions or disciplines after having been properly tricated therein remains 
rather open as there are relatively few examples of good comparison that achieve 
this. This dissertation aspires to be an example of good comparison that tricates 
its terms for comparison deeply and carefully. The empirical prematurity of this 
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third step is sufficient in and of itself to justify rejecting the incommensurability 
hypothesis. That said, it is the second step, which takes the inextricability of 
conceptual embeddedness from the first step and insists that this situation results 
necessarily in extreme distortion, where the incommensurability hypothesis 
proves philosophically deficient.  
The underlying assumption in the second step is that in order to 
communicate across the contexts of the disciplines or traditions in which they are 
embedded, let alone make a meaningful comparison, concepts must first be 
abstracted from the practices and assumptions of those disciplines and 
traditions. According to this assumption, comparison requires that concepts be 
plucked out willy-nilly, dusted off until they achieve “clarity,” and then 
replanted in what might be hoped is fertile, albeit also foreign, soil. Such a 
procedure could certainly be expected to distort the so-extracted concepts since it 
involves extrication of the inextricable. The meaning of a concept does in fact 
depend on its location in the matrix of other concepts at play in the context of the 
discipline or tradition in which it emerges, and so is inextricable to this extent. 
However, it is far from clear that this is the only procedure for dealing with 
inextricably embedded concepts. Rather, the concepts can be left tricated. That is, 
concepts may be brought into multidisciplinary or comparative engagement 
	 	54 
along with all of their disciplinary and traditional baggage. This baggage 
includes the matrices of theory, method, norms, categories, concepts, texts, 
figures, and so on, in which the concept is embedded. There are two advantages 
to this procedure with regard to incommensurability. First, any distortion of the 
concept as a result of multidisciplinary or comparative engagement will more 
easily register because the concept will lose coherence with its native matrix. 
Once registered, any distortions can then be corrected using the very toolkit of 
the disciplinary or traditional matrix. Second, the matrices involved bring with 
them tools for evaluating and adjusting their own measurement mechanisms so 
as to avoid distortion of what is measured. This adjustment capacity empowers a 
strong skepticism toward the claim that conceptual schemes are incommensurate 
with anything like the frequency or pervasiveness that the incommensurability 
hypothesis suggests. 
Reduction 
A related problem to that of incommensurability is that of reduction, and 
indeed reduction may be understood as a special case of commensurability 
between theories, concepts, or phenomena. Even though the notion of 
reductionism is “one of the most used and abused terms in the philosophical 
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lexicon,”104 it is nevertheless distinguishable among ontological, methodological, 
and theoretical types, corresponding to the types of incommensurability 
addressed above. Ontological reduction, or reduction as translation, addresses 
the whole of reality as reducible to some minimal quantity of basic elements, 
which corresponds to tradition incommensurability because different traditions 
give different accounts of those minimal basic elements such that they may not 
be able to interact.105 Methodological reduction, or reduction as derivation, sees 
higher levels of reality as reducible to smaller constituent parts, which 
corresponds to disciplinary incommensurability because different disciplines 
may be construed as operating descriptively at different levels that are 
themselves isolated from one another.106 Theory reductionism, or reduction as 
explanation, sees older theories as reducible to the terms of newer theories, 
which is the successive theory from which the classical notion of 
incommensurability among scientific paradigms first emerged.107 As was the case 
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in the consideration of incommensurability above, ontological and 
methodological forms of reduction are of interest for present purposes. 
Perhaps the most stringent form of reductionism, largely ontological but 
also grounding many methodological accounts, is that of strict materialist 
physicalism, which is “the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary 
philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical.”108 
Even to say that “everything is physical” is already to presuppose that 
everything could be construed otherwise, perhaps as mental, as it is in 
idealism.109 Indeed, the tension between, or dualistic combination of, physicalism 
and idealism as responses to the mind-body problem have been central to the 
modern Western philosophical project.110 A somewhat softer form of physicalist 
reductionism is (weak) emergence physicalism in which complex combinations 
of more simple physical elements may exhibit properties that, in principle, could 
not have been predicted from an analysis of the elements apart from their 
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complex relations in the system.111 Antireductionists, by contrast, posit that 
“other forms of understanding may be needed, or perhaps there is more to 
reality than even the most fully developed physics can describe,”112 thereby 
accusing reductionists of being unjustified in either their epistemological hubris 
or ontological certainty. At stake for antireductionists is the resulting dominance 
granted to the natural sciences by reductionism in terms of controlling all other 
discourses, and the potential justification of deeply unethical abuses on its 
basis.113 
Reductionism, whether of an ontological or methodological type, raises a 
particular set of challenges for comparative and multidisciplinary inquiry 
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because it interpolates the perspective on reality to which it proposes reduction 
uninvited. For example, consider attempting to carry out a comparison between 
the conceptions of human nature proposed by Xunzi and Mencius during the 
Warring States period in ancient China on a reductionist model. The dispute 
between them may be interpreted as a disciplinary dispute as they both inhabit 
the same Warring States Confucian tradition and they operate using 
fundamentally different understandings of Xing 性 (human nature). This 
difference in their conception of what they are talking about, as will be discussed 
in chapter four, is roughly equivalent to a difference in disciplinary perspective. 
For a reductionist, carrying out the comparison would first require unpacking 
what each is talking about according to the terms of the reduction to which they 
ascribe rather than on their own terms. This has the effect of changing the 
requirements for attending the inquiry banquet the religious philosopher is 
hosting. Just as Milbank seeks to make Christian theology the controlling 
discourse for inquiry, reductionism seeks to make its ontological, or at least 
methodological, commitments determinative of how the inquiry will proceed. 
Whereas the historicist, pragmatist, and realist framing Wildman advocates are 
relatively vague in how they might be specified, and therefore allow the guests 
to play them out in relatively idiosyncratic, and even divergent, ways, 
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reductionism requires a stronger commitment to the method or metaphysics to 
be reduced to. Whereas two traditions or disciplines may not necessarily be 
incommensurable with respect to each other, it is possible that one or the other or 
both will prove incommensurable with respect to the method or metaphysics to 
which they are asked to reduce. 
Alas, adopting an antireductionist posture is at least as problematic as the 
reductionist one. Carrying out a comparison between Xunzi and Mencius on 
their own terms, carefully unpacking their positions in the conceptual matrix of 
their time period even as it was evolving therein, fails to meet the threshold for 
problem-solving activity if that conceptual matrix bears no relation to any 
plausible interpretation of reality in the present. Reductionist physicalists tend to 
deny any meaningful concept of human nature precisely because they reduce 
any such conception successively to biological, chemical, and physical elements 
and states. Antireductionists are often enough equally troubled by a definitive 
conception of human nature because any such conception appears reductive of a 
highly complex system with diverse expressions in reality. If there is no plausible 
conception of human nature such that it even could be problematic, then there is 
no purpose in comparing Xunzi and Mencius on this topic. Here the notion of 
critical realism comes back in to insist that Xunzi and Mencius are in fact 
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oriented toward a shared reality with the inquiry at hand. This then presses the 
host to find some way of accommodating their perspective without reducing it to 
either the reductionist or antireductionist rejections of human nature. Note the 
irony here that antireductionism is something to which other perspectives may 
themselves be reduced. 
As in the case of incommensurability, trication does wonders for 
overcoming the damned if you do, damned if you do not paradox of 
reductionism and antireductionism as approaches to inquiry. Once again, 
trication involves carrying a concept over into inquiry along with the full range 
of the matrices of theory, method, norms, categories, concepts, texts, figures, and 
so on, in which the concept is embedded. While the concept itself may not 
register with anything like clarity amidst contemporary plausibility structures, a 
careful mapping of its matrices may nevertheless reveal ways in which the 
concept may yet indirectly inform matters of present concern. For example, the 
different framings of Xing 性 between Xunzi and Mencius may yet provide 
insight into the role of Li 禮 ritual in guiding human affairs that may in fact be 
highly relevant to present concerns, as they prove in chapter four and following. 
Moreover, it is at least possible to conceive of a recovery of a concept of human 
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nature that avoids the pitfalls of both reductionist and antireductionist 
skepticism while still abiding by the plausibility conditions of the present.114 
Speaking of those plausibility structures, the tension between physicalism 
and idealism, and each with their combination in dualism or some forms of 
emergentism, remains a potent point of contention in contemporary debates 
ranging across the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Resolution of 
this age-old dispute falls far beyond the scope of the present project, but it seems 
inevitable that any project that aspires to operate as religious philosophy must 
engage it in one way or another. The way of doing so here will be to deny the 
whole complex by rejecting the distinction between mind and body as 
meaningful and replacing both the physical and the mental with the semiotic. 
The details of this approach will be elaborated briefly at the end of chapter two. 
For now, it is enough to say that the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce 
trailblazes a way forward by shifting the metaphysical terms such that to be a 
thing is to be neither physical nor mental but rather it is to be a sign. The 
massively processive metaphysics that derives from this fundamental insight, 
coupled with a detailed analysis of semiosis, or sign processes, provides a way 
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around the mind-body problem such that it is not a problem and so requires no 
solution. In principal, having successfully avoided the quicksand of the mind-
body problem, this metaphysical semiotics should prove capable of integrating 
tricated concepts in the vaguely historicist, pragmatist, and realist terms by 
which religious philosophy intends to proceed.  
Theory of Inquiry 
Tricating embedded concepts does wonders for overcoming the 
incommensurability and reduction problems, but introduces another threat to 
the viability of multidisciplinary and comparative projects in the process. The 
neologism of “to tricate” strips the prefixes in- and ex- from “inextricable” and 
then relies on the meaning of the Latin root “tricae,” meaning perplexities or 
complexities. The first challenge for tricated concepts is that they introduce a vast 
degree of complexity, by contrast to the promise of clarity in the extrication 
process. Since the assumption here is of multidisciplinary and comparative 
engagement, at least two concepts are bringing this complexity with them to the 
table, which may in turn generate an experience of perplexity. The second 
challenge is the sheer size of each disciplinary matrix, requiring a great deal of 
time to learn and then a great deal of space to explain. Together, these challenges 
of high complexity and vast scope can make the project of multidisciplinary and 
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comparative engagement, undertaken in such a way as to avoid the pitfalls of 
incommensurability and reduction, seem more trouble than worthwhile. 
Attaining traction on these challenges requires a way to simplify the conceptual 
range and limit the scope of the material while avoiding becoming simplistic and 
parochial. The best way to do this is by being extremely clear, focused, and 
precise about the topic, method, and scope of inquiry.  
Before attending to topic, method, and scope, however, it is important to 
get clear about the theory of inquiry at play. Wesley Wildman is here again 
helpful in defining inquiry as “a kind of spontaneous interest-driven problem-
solving instinct in organisms.”115 This theory of inquiry arises from the 
philosophical outlook of American pragmatism, especially that of John Dewey 
and Charles Sanders Peirce, but stretches beyond philosophy as a discipline by 
making inquiry fundamental to nature and life. Inquiry is a basic orientation of 
life forms, and at the heart of what keeps life alive. Disciplinary methods, then, 
are more specific strategies for carrying out inquiry, sometimes in order to 
address a particular domain of problems, and in other instances to get at a 
domain of problems from another angle. For example, Xunzi develops his 
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concept of ritual as a response to the problem of sociopolitical disintegration in 
Warring States China, which is a rather particular domain of problems. Western 
social scientists, by contrast, develop their concepts of ritual in order to explain a 
cross-culturally prevalent phenomenon that otherwise appears arbitrary, 
ineffectual, and wasteful, which is getting at the problem of explaining these 
behaviors from an angle that does not simply write them off.  
The topic of inquiry, then, refers to the problem a given line of inquiry is 
trying to solve. The topic is usually best identified in terms of a question. For 
example, “How does Xunzi understand ritual?” is a topic of inquiry, and not just 
any topic of inquiry but a recursive topic that inquires about another inquiry; 
such recursive topics are typical in philosophy generally and especially in 
religious philosophy. Being clear about the topic is important because when 
concepts are being left embedded in their intellectual ecosystems it is very easy 
to wander off into lengthy digressions about related concepts beyond the needs 
of the topic of inquiry at hand. For example, ritual for Xunzi is embedded deeply 
in his whole system of thought, and so it would be easy to spend a great deal of 
energy exploring his concept of heaven (tian 天) beyond what is needed for 
understanding ritual. Furthermore, ritual for Xunzi is an important part of 
addressing the sociopolitical disintegration China was undergoing in his time, 
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but ritual does not address every aspect of that disintegration in his thought, and 
so aspects beyond what ritual addresses for him do not fall under this topic of 
inquiry. Maintaining focus on the topic of inquiry helps prevent complexity from 
turning into perplexity. 
The scope of inquiry refers to the range of places where the topic of inquiry 
manifests; that is, the scope of inquiry is the locus of the problem the inquiry 
seeks to address. Whereas the inquirer can constrain the topic of inquiry by 
adjusting the question the inquiry seeks to address, the scope of inquiry is 
determined much more by the ecosystem of whatever is being inquired into. For 
example, Mencius’ understanding of ritual plays less of a key role in the system 
of his thought, and that system of thought is less extensively caught up in 
alternative systems of thought in play at the time as is that of Xunzi. Thus, the 
scope of inquiry into Xunzi’s understanding of ritual is much broader than that 
of Mencius. In order for the scope of inquiry into Xunzi’s understanding of ritual 
to remain tractable, the extent to which the alternative systems of thought are 
considered must precisely adhere to the standard of the extent to which they 
impinge on his understanding of ritual. For Western social scientific approaches 
to ritual, the scope is massively vast because ritual pops up in virtually every 
social context in one form or another. The result is that ritual has been addressed 
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from virtually every social scientific discipline, especially anthropology, 
sociology, and psychology, but also economics and political science, although 
none of these disciplines takes ritual to be its exclusive or even primary topic of 
concern. Determining the extent of the scope of inquiry is far more art than 
science, as the very notion of being embedded means that everything impinges 
to some degree, and determining which degrees are significant can never be as 
methodologically precise in philosophy as in statistics. 
The method of inquiry, then, is the particular process or set of processes for 
evaluating what is within the scope of inquiry with respect to the topic of 
inquiry. Determining which methods are most appropriate can be quite 
challenging. For example, is Chinese philosophy best inquired into via 
philosophical methods, historical methods, or some combination thereof? 
Different methods of inquiry will necessarily produce different results, and every 
method of inquiry necessarily distorts the data it interprets in various ways and 
to various degrees, but there is no inquiry without a method, so some degree of 
distortion must be tolerated and even accepted. This is yet another argument for 
multidisciplinary approaches to inquiry: the method each discipline brings to a 
domain of problems can help counteract the distortions introduced by the others. 
Furthermore, comparative approaches can open up entirely new methodological 
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toolkits that were hitherto unavailable. However, careful adherence to 
methodological norms is important prior to moving to multidisciplinary and 
comparative approaches in order not to magnify the existing and necessary 
distortions.   
Clarity, focus, and precision with regard to topic, scope, and method of 
inquiry thereby provides traction on the challenges of complexity and scope for 
multidisciplinary and comparative projects while also skirting the problems of 
incommensurability and reduction. While it is possible to imagine comparative 
projects that avoid the challenge of disciplinary disjunction, such projects must 
nevertheless be few and far between. This is because extricated concepts are by 
definition tradition incommensurable and so must engage in trication to an 
extent that is quite likely to stray into the disciplinary remainder on one side of 
the comparison or the other. In addition to highlighting the wide scope of the 
relevance of this methodological discussion, the extensive and necessary overlap 
between multidisciplinary and comparative programs requires the elaboration of 
a particular method by which their integration is to be achieved. 
Method for Multidisciplinary Comparison 
There are at least five trajectories of inquiry in any multidisciplinary 
comparison: the trajectory of the first side of the comparison, the inquiry into the 
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trajectory of the first side of the comparison, the trajectory of the second side of 
the comparison, the inquiry into the trajectory of the second side of the 
comparison, and the trajectory of the inquirer against which the sides of 
comparison are measured. In the terms of the present project of comparative 
ritual theory, there is the inquiry Xunzi undertakes to arrive at his theory of 
ritual, the inquiry into Xunzi’s inquiry, the inquiries Western social scientists 
undertake to arrive at their theories of ritual, the inquiry into their inquiries, and 
the inquiry that drives the comparison. The result of the comparison is a novel 
ritual theory, which then itself becomes the first side of a new multidisciplinary 
comparison between ritual and language. The first four inquiries in each case 
will be addressed in the respectively relevant chapters (chapters two through 
five), but the inquiry that drives the comparison in each case benefits from some 
consideration here.  
If it is in fact the case that inquiry is at the root of life in nature, then all 
intellectual activity is a form of inquiry. Furthermore, inquiry implies purpose, 
so all intellectual activity is purposive. This means that multidisciplinary 
comparisons are not undertaken arbitrarily, throwing together disciplines and 
traditions willy-nilly just for the fun of it. Rather, they are undertaken to achieve 
something greater than what the disciplines and traditions in question can 
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achieve on their own. What is it that an inquirer undertaking multidisciplinary 
comparison is attempting to achieve? What is being inquired into? What is the 
present inquiry, that the multidisciplinary comparison is being invited to inform? 
These questions can be answered in terms of the topic of inquiry as described 
above, zoomed out to the wider frame of multidisciplinary comparison. The 
topic of a multidisciplinary comparison between Xunzi’s concept of ritual and 
Western social scientific ritual theories might be articulated as the question, 
“how can the concept of ritual as elaborated by Xunzi enhance, refine, and 
render more precise ritual theory as developed in Western social science?” The 
topic of a multidisciplinary comparison between the resulting novel theory of 
ritual and an inquiry into language might be articulated as the question, “what is 
the relationship between language and ritual and what results from their 
relationship to one another in this way?” 
The five trajectories of inquiry involved in a multidisciplinary comparison 
provide a great deal more traction with regard to the complexity and scope of 
tricated concepts than any of the trajectories can achieve otherwise on their own. 
This is because the overall inquiry of a multidisciplinary comparison is very 
precisely defined by the intersections among the five trajectories: The place 
where the five trajectories intersect, or some subset thereof, is the locus of 
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greatest value for the multidisciplinary comparison. The fifth trajectory, that of 
the inquirer undertaking the multidisciplinary comparison, is most important 
because it is the final aim of the inquiry, and so where the other four trajectories 
intersect with the fifth is much more significant than where they might otherwise 
intersect with each other. In this way, the scope of the multidisciplinary 
comparison is constrained by the intersections of the trajectories.  
Nevertheless, the fifth trajectory also introduces a whole extra realm of 
complexity and scope all its own. Consider the inquiry into ritual under the 
aspect of method. Xunzi pursued his trajectory of inquiry using the methods of 
Chinese philosophy as conceived in the Warring States period. The inquiry into 
his trajectory is undertaken historically. Western social scientists pursue their 
trajectory of inquiry using the methods of Western social science. The inquiry 
into their trajectory may also be undertaken historically, but benefits primarily 
from theoretical explication. The inquiry guiding the multidisciplinary 
comparison, however, is pursued philosophically by means of comparison and 
construction. A similar analysis applies to the inquiry into ritual and language. 
The novel theory of ritual resulting from the first comparison is developed 
historically and theoretically, while the inquiry into this comparison is further 
delimited for the sake of this new comparison to purely theoretical elaboration. 
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The inquiry into language proceeds according to the methods of linguistics, 
analytic philosophy, continental philosophy, and semiotics, and the inquiry into 
these inquiries proceeds by theoretical elaboration. The inquiry guiding the 
multidisciplinary comparison between ritual and language proceeds primarily 
by means of theoretical and semiotic integration. Each of these methods must be 
pursued fully and carefully with regard to its particular trajectory so as to avoid 
the pitfalls of incommensurability. However, the methods themselves must be 
appropriately tricated so as to make transparent the distortions introduced by 
each in hopes of reducing the overall distortion. 
The value of multidisciplinary comparison lies primarily in its ability to 
correct the distortions necessarily introduced by individual disciplines and 
traditions when left to their own methodological devices. In this sense, far from 
exacerbating the problems of incommensurability and reduction, 
multidisciplinary comparison is actually the mechanism to correct distortions 
produced by individual disciplinary and traditional methods. If 
multidisciplinary comparisons insist upon extricating concepts in order to 
compare them, however, they are then merely magnifying these distortions 
instead of correcting them. Concepts must be tricated, that is, embedded in the 
matrix of theory, method, norms, categories, concepts, texts, figures, etc., from 
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which they arise. The resulting complexity and vast scope of material becomes 
manageable through processes of inquiry and especially through the particular 
type of inquiry that is multidisciplinary comparison. Instead of heralding the end 
of comparative philosophy, incommensurability between traditions and 
disciplines and their inherent tendency toward reduction to one or the other is 
instead its very justification.  
A Cross-Cultural History of the Problem of Religious Language 
As has already been stated, the problem of religious language is hardly 
new. Neither is the problem unique to a Western philosophical and theological 
context. While the particular way of going about addressing the problem will 
take Western consideration of language in linguistics, philosophy of language, 
logic, and hermeneutics as its point of departure, the end result will be a theory 
of language that upends the whole of that project. As a dissertation, this project 
seeks to make an original contribution to scholarship, but the originality of the 
conclusion may only be determined as it relates to other ways of addressing the 
problem. Since part of what makes this dissertation original is that its way of 
addressing the problem requires first reframing it, it is important to emphasize 
how the problem of religious language has been framed across cultural and 
historical contexts in the past. Of course, it is impossible to give an exhaustive 
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account in this regard, as doing so would be a dissertation in its own right, and 
one in a particularly historical mode of religious philosophy at that. Instead, 
what follows provides some highlights of the history and development of the 
problem of religious language in a variety of epochs and modes of thinking that 
provides particular attention to the intersection of the ontology of divinity and 
linguistic reference in each case. The last subsection turns to bringing the various 
insights of different traditions of thought regarding the problem of religious 
language into a broader set of conversations in religious philosophy regarding 
ultimate realities, religious truth, and the human condition. If nothing else, this 
section aspires to demonstrate that the problem of religious language may at first 
glance appear arcane, but is in fact deeply humane, transcending culture, time 
and place. At the same time, neither the construal of the problem nor the 
solutions advanced by various thinkers are in any way approaching unity. 
Platonism and the Abrahamic Traditions 
Western approaches to the problem of religious language are given 
nascent articulation in Plato and then flower among the neoplatonists and the 
Augustinian theological tradition. While Plato (ca. 429-347 BCE) articulates the 
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problem in a number of places,116 the text that became of central interest to those 
exploring the problem of religious language is Parmenides: 
Therefore the one in no sense is. It cannot, then, ‘be’ even to the extent of ‘being’ one, for 
then it would be a thing that is and has being.  Rather, if we can trust such an argument 
as this, it appears that the one neither is one nor is at all. And if a thing is not, you cannot 
say that it ‘has’ anything or that there is anything ‘of’ it. Consequently, it cannot have a 
name or be spoken of, nor can there be any knowledge or perception or opinion of it.  It is 
not named or spoken of, not an object of opinion or of knowledge, not perceived by any 
creature.117 
In reflection on this passage, the neoplatonist Plotinus (ca. 205 – 270) 
distinguishes between the inability to state “the one,” one of the Platonic terms 
for ultimate reality, and the ability to speak about it by reference to its effects: 
If we are led to think positively of The One, name and thing, there would be more truth 
in silence: the designation, a mere aid to inquiry, was never intended for more than a 
preliminary affirmation of absolute simplicity to be followed by the rejection of even that 
statement: it was the best that offered, but remains inadequate to express the nature 
indicated.  For this is a principle not to be conveyed by any sound; it cannot be known on 
any hearing but, if at all, by vision; and to hope in that vision to see a form is to fail of 
even that. We do not, it is true, grasp it by knowledge, but that does not mean that we are 
utterly void of it; we hold it not so as to state it, but so as to be able to speak about it.  
And we can and do state what it is not, while we are silent as to what it is: we are, in fact, 
speaking of it in the light of its sequels; unable to state it, we may still possess it.118 
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Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430) echoes this concern with the human capacity to 
grasp, and thus in the platonic tradition to state, anything directly about God: 
Perhaps it was hard even for Moses himself, as it is much also for us, and much more for 
us, to understand what was said, “I am who I am” and “He who is has sent me to you.” 
And if by chance Moses understood, when would they to whom he was being sent 
understand? Therefore the Lord put aside what man could not grasp and added what he 
could grasp. For he added and said, “I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac and 
the God of Jacob.” This you can grasp. But what mind can grasp, “I am who I am”?119 
Notably, Plato had located the problem of religious language in “the one” itself 
as a problem of the metaphysics of “oneness” such that language cannot apply. 
By the time of Augustine, the problematic has shifted to epistemology as a 
problem of human reason conceiving the essence of divinity, which is taken as 
prerequisite for the applicability of language. Certainly, this transition is 
prefigured in Plato, but it is the epistemic turn that is picked up when Aristotle is 
brought back into the picture in the medieval period. 
Jewish, Muslim, and Christian philosophical theologies exemplify the 
intersection of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic thought in articulating the terms of 
the problem of religious language for the medieval period. The central issue of 
debate is the proper understanding of the relationship between concepts, 
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expressed in language, and God, which relationship is termed “predication.”  
Maimonides (ca. 1135 – 1204) claims “that every attribute predicated of God 
either denotes the quality of an action, or–when the attribute is intended to 
convey some idea of the Divine Being itself, and not of His actions–the  negation 
of the opposite.”120 One problem left open, however, is how an action can be 
distinguished from the qualities or attributes thereof, which for Islamic thinkers 
are identified with the names of God. The Islamic philosopher Ibn ‘Arabî (1165 – 
1240) resolved this problem with the concept of the barzakh, which 
“simultaneously divides and brings together two things, without itself having 
two sides, like the ‘line’ that separates sunlight and shade.”121 The names or 
attributes of God function in the human imagination to both distinguish 
humanity from God and to bring humanity together with God. Thomas Aquinas 
(1225 – 1274) in a sense gives logical expression to the barzakh in his articulation 
of an analogical relationship between God and divine qualities and the world 
and mundane qualities:  
Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any "genus," its effect will still more 
distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness 
of the agent's form according to the same specific or generic formality, but only according 
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to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created things, so 
far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being.122 
The logic is that God is to divine qualities as the world is to mundane qualities 
such that the qualities applied to both the world and God both distinguish God 
from the world and relate God to the world. Aquinas’ employment of analogical 
predication of concepts to God contrasts with the insistence on univocal 
predication of concepts to God, such that concepts are applied to God and the 
world in the same sense, by John Duns Scotus (ca. 1266 – 1308).123   
South Asian Trajectories 
If the western traditions can be said to start with the nature of God and 
wonder about the applicability of language, the South Asian trajectories, both 
Vedic and Buddhist, start with language and wonder if there is anything to 
which it might refer. For example, the Vedic Mīmāṃsā school begins with the 
eternality of the Vedas such that they are understood to be authorless, relying on 
neither divine nor human authority. Furthermore, the author of the founding text 
of the Mīmāṃsā school, Jaimini (ca. 200 BCE), roots the authorlessness of the 
Vedas in the inherent meaningfulness of the Vedic Sanskrit language: “Certainly 
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there is eternal connection between the word and its meaning.”124 The Vedic 
Naiyāyikas disagreed, claiming instead that the authority of the Vedas rests in 
their divine authorship, and that God establishes the meanings of Sanskrit 
words.125  These claims become three of the proofs for the existence of God 
argued by Udayana (ca. 960 - 1050) in his Nyāyakusumāñjali: from human usages 
(Padāt), from authoritativeness or faith (Pratyayataḥ), and from the sacred 
scriptures (Shrutéḥ).126 The argument from human usages is that the meaning of 
words can only come about by divine will; without God, words would have no 
meaning, and since they have meaning, there must be God.127 The argument from 
authoritativeness or faith is that since the Vedas are true, truth can only come 
from infallible omniscience, and since only God is infallibly omniscient, then 
only God can be the author of the Vedas, which in turn thereby proves God’s 
existence.128 Finally, the argument from the sacred scriptures is that the Vedas 
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speak of God as existing, and since the Vedas are authoritative, they prove that 
God exists.129  
Both Vedic trajectories arise in response to criticism of the authority of the 
Vedas and their author(s) by Buddhist and Jain interlocutors. Nāgārjuna 
exemplifies a particularly philosophic angle on the Buddhist challenge to the 
Vedic approaches to language by identifying language with Pratītyasamutpāda, 
dependent arising, and therefore negligent of the truer reality, emptiness: 
Whatever is dependently co-arisen 
That is explained to be emptiness. 
That, being a dependent designation 
Is itself the middle way.130 
Jay Garfield comments on this saying that “whatever is dependently co-arisen is 
verbally established. That is, the identity of any dependently arisen thing 
depends upon verbal conventions. To say of a thing that it is dependently arisen 
is to say that its identity as a single entity is nothing more than its being the 
referent of a word.”131 Language is thus constitutive of Duḥkha, suffering, the 
primary Buddhist understanding of the human condition. In principle, then, 
																																																								
129 Chemparathy, 98–99, 125–27. 
130 Jay L. Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995), XXIV.18. 
131 Garfield, 305. 
	 	80 
language could never refer to the ultimate reality of emptiness, thus giving rise 
to Nāgārjuna unsaying even the word “empty” via the concept of the emptiness 
of emptiness. 
Another set of contentions emerging in the South Asian context regarding 
the problem of religious language is the dispute regarding the relationship 
between language and metaphysics undertaken among Bhartṛhari (ca. 400 CE), 
Dignāga (ca. 480 – 540), and Dharmakīrti (ca. 550 – 640). Radhika Herzberger 
summarizes Bhartṛhari on this point: “words do not designate objects in the 
external world directly, but indirectly through the intervention of universals 
which are mental, and which reside in words. Universals which are thus 
intimately connected with language and mind, on the one hand, and with the 
Great Plenum of Being, on the other, constitute the basis for our knowledge of 
the external world.”132 By contrast, Dignāga argued that language is neither 
eternal nor an independent source of truth, but rather “a construct which shares 
structures with inference:” “Knowledge derived from words is not a separate 
means to truth from inference; for a name signifies its own object by excluding 
what is other in the same way as [the Reason] ‘being an artifact’ [establishes what 
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is to be proved]” (Pramāṇa-samuccaya 5.1).133 If for Bhartṛhari language is eternal, 
universal, and a priori, and for Dignāga language is temporal, artificial, and 
conventional, for Dharmakīrti language is “a beginningless habit energy or 
propensity,” a fiction that becomes useful when coordinated with phenomenal 
reality by constituting knowledge thereof.134 With respect to the problem of 
religious language, for Bhartṛhari language and ultimate reality verge on 
identity, whereas for Dignāga they are separated by an impassible chasm; 
Dharmakīrti allows for a bridge, although it is ultimately an illusion.135 
Chinese Expressions 
Of the Chinese expressions of the problem of religious language, that of 
the Daodejing 道德經 is decidedly the most recognizable: 
Way-making that can be put into words is not really way-making, 
And naming that can assign fixed reference to things is not really naming. 
The nameless is the fetal beginnings of everything that is happening, 
While that which is named is their mother.136 
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This enigmatic passage has been the subject of many and diverse interpretations. 
On one hand, it is the primordial Chinese creation myth that receives further 
outworking in the cosmological developments especially of the Neo-Confucian 
synthesis from the Tang through the Ming dynasties (618 – 1644). On the other 
hand, it contests a central project of rival contemporary Confucians, namely the 
rectification of names. Xunzi articulates the goal of rectifying names in terms of 
establishing and maintaining socio-political order: “Because fixed names keep 
objects distinguished and because when [a True King’s] Way is practiced his 
goals are universally understood, he takes pains to produce uniformity [in 
regard to names and his Way] among the people.”137 The means of accomplishing 
this project is through investigating “(1) the purpose for having names together 
with (2) what is the basis for distinguishing the similar from the different and (3) 
the crucial considerations for instituting names.”138 Whereas for Xunzi it is crucial 
for language to reflect the natural distinctions among the objects that make up 
reality so that order may be established and maintained in harmony with those 
distinctions, the processual view of the Daodejing denies that any natural 
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distinctions are permanent enough to be so named. For the Daodejing, naming is 
a way of participating in the process, rather than controlling it. Notably, this way 
of construing the problem of religious language focuses on the possibility of 
language to orient speakers toward reality, which proper orientation is at the 
heart of Chinese ways of being religious.  
A very different sort of Daoist than those of the Daodejing community, 
Zhuangzi 莊子 (ca. 315 – 225 BCE) is nonetheless similar in his ambivalence 
toward language connecting up with reality: 
Ziyou said, “So the piping of the earth means just the sound of these hollows. And the 
piping of man would be the sound of bamboo panpipes. What then is the piping of 
heaven? 
Ziqi said, “It gusts through all the ten thousand differences, allowing each to go its own 
way. But since each one selects out its own, what identity can there be for their 
rouser?”139 
Invoking here the three anchors of Chinese cosmology: heaven, earth, and 
humanity, Zhuangzi indicates that the wind of heaven blows through the diverse 
pipes of humanity resulting in contradictory sounds, indicating that language is 
at best ambiguous with respect to reality. However, Zhuangzi also sought to 
avoid articulating this ambiguity in terms of the metaphysical monism 
characteristic of the earlier thinker Hui Shi 惠施 (ca. 380 – 310 BCE), a 
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representative of the School of Names (Mingjia名家), such that all distinctions 
are ultimately reducible.140 Instead, he offers something like a democratization of 
the rectification of names: “Now courses have never had any sealed borders 
between them, and words have never had any constant sustainability. It is by 
establishing definitions of what is ‘this,’ what is ‘right,’ that boundaries are 
made.”141 For Zhuangzi, then, the problem of religious language is less figuring 
out how language correlates with reality than it is of how to go about 
participating in the natural process of way-making. 
Modern Western Philosophical Approaches 
Since the western modes of analytic and continental philosophy have 
largely dominated the global philosophical scene in the modern period, and 
defined the terms of critical reflection, they are the primary orientations for 
considering contemporary engagement with the problem of religious language. 
The emergence of the analytic approach might be traced back to the logical 
positivists of the Vienna Circle, whose theory of meaning, adopted from the early 
Wittgenstein, insisted that only logically consistent statements with reference to 
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empirically verifiable reality may be considered true.142 The force of this 
verification program against religious statements is that it does not even bother 
to claim that religious statements are false, but rather that they are meaningless 
and so not even worthy of being put through the process of analysis. Similarly, 
the inverse of verification, or falsification, likewise renders religious statements 
meaningless on account of their inability to demonstrate the grounds of their 
own potential disproval.143 A related debate regarding religious language has to 
do with whether religious statements should be understood as cognitive, that is, 
they express a proposition that can be true or false, or non-cognitive, i.e. non-
propositional. Richard Hare, with his notion of “bliks,” demonstrates that 
religious statements may be meaningful by influencing human behavior even if 
they are non-cognitive.144 Basil Mitchell, alternatively, argues that religious 
people may hold their religious statements to be cognitively true in spite of 
evidence to the contrary because different people differ in the amount of 
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evidence necessary to prove to them that a statement is false.145 Much greater 
nuance is introduced via the theory of meaning in the later Wittgenstein that 
words have multiple meanings determined by how they fit within the language 
game in which they are being played within the context of a form of life.146 Under 
the rubric of religion as a form of life, different religions and divergent sub-
traditions thereof deploy language in various ways according to the rules of the 
language game of the religion or sub-tradition in question, which rules are then 
the basis for evaluating the meaning of particular religious statements. The work 
of philosophy, then, is the work of clarifying, rendering consistent, and making 
logically rigorous religious statements within the ordinary language of a 
religious community in the wider context of societal and cultural rules for 
language use. Notably, this way of construing the project leaves philosophy 
entirely concerned about the sense of religious language but not its reference.147 
As a result, addressing issues of reference remains a live and sensitive problem 
among analytic philosophers of religion. 
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On the continental front, the emergence of structuralism demurs from 
approaching religious language propositionally in order to interrogate how the 
symbols that make up a given statement (i.e. words) are positioned by the 
structure of language and the analogous structures of human culture. This is a 
significant shift away from the classical understanding of the speaker/author as 
the source of meaning for statements/texts, toward seeing meaning as generated 
by the interactions among speakers/authors and hearers/readers via 
statements/texts.148 Post-Structuralism then shifts from this synchronic mode of 
interpretation to reintroduce the diachronic mode of history, but this time on the 
side of the hearer/reader such that the primary questions have to do with the 
formation and biases of the hearer/reader. This means that statements, including 
religious statements, have no fixed meaning but rather the meaning varies with 
the interpreter.149 Hans Georg Gadamer (1900 – 2002), alternatively, locates 
meaning at the intersection of the historical and linguistic horizons each of text 
and interpreter such that the fusion thereof results in understanding not so much 
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of the text as of the world in which text and interpreter mutually participate.150 
Similarly for Paul Ricœur, “there is no self-understanding that is not mediated by 
signs, symbols, and texts; in the final analysis self-understanding coincides with 
the interpretation given to these mediating terms.”151 The implication is that 
engagements with texts contribute to the constitution of the interpreter in such a 
way that the interpreter does not become what they interpret but becomes their 
ongoing process of interpretation.152 At least for some within the continental 
approach, then, religious language does not transmit epistemic content about a 
religious object (i.e. God), but rather contributes to the very being (ontology) of 
the interpreter. Furthermore, communal interpretation involves the becoming of 
communities out of various discourses, including religious discourses, which 
Jurgen Habermas identifies as requiring translation into publicly accessible 
reasons.153 
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A Problem Among Problems 
While the problem of religious language has a number of articulations, 
trajectories, and expressions across cultures and historical epochs, it also registers 
among other problems and categories of theological interest. Elaborating these 
registrations briefly with respect to three core categories identified by the 
Comparative Religious Ideas Project hosted at Boston University from 1995 to 
1999 provides a wider frame of context for the particular problem at hand.  
The problem of religious language connects up with the category of the 
human condition first and foremost because language is a fundamentally human 
phenomenon. The human condition includes needs for a sense of environmental 
coherence, a sense of human contingency, a sense of the value of life, and a sense 
of causation and transformation, in addition to conceptions of personal identity, 
of obligations to norms, of a human predicament, and of ways of relating to one 
another.154 It is a result of human contingency and the human predicaments 
frequently understood to result therefrom that leads to the suspicion that human 
language is somehow inadequate for expressing the unconditioned and perfect. 
Moreover, it is the persistence of human failure to meet our obligations that 
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makes human speech untrustworthy, not merely because language fails but 
because speakers cannot be taken to be authoritative. Of course, all of these 
senses and conceptions are necessarily articulated in language, which if 
understood to be fallible may leave these needs only contingently fulfilled. This 
is a significant expansion of the problem of religious language beyond the usual 
parameters of its articulation in Western philosophy and theology. In fact, it is 
the South Asian trajectories that most directly emphasize the problem of 
religious language arising from the realities of the human condition.  
The problem of religious language connects up with the category of 
ultimate realities because if language is understood to be incapable of correlating 
with ultimate reality, and religious philosophy is expressed in linguistic forms, 
then the whole project becomes moot with respect to ultimate realities. Ultimate 
realities may be understood as “that which is most important to religious life 
because of the nature of reality.”155 Two things are notable with regard to this 
definition with respect to the problem of religious language. First, since ultimate 
realities are most important to religious life, it is hard to imagine that they would 
not be spoken about, or how it would be that they are most important if they are 
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not spoken about. Second, if ultimate realities are taken to be ultimate precisely 
because of the nature of reality, then the nature of reality also becomes an 
important point of discussion for religious philosophy. As several of the 
engagements between language and ultimate realities elaborated above reveal, it 
is not only ultimate realities themselves but also the nature of reality itself that is 
frequently called into question with respect to the capacity of language to 
correspond therewith. The Abrahamic traditions primarily locate the problem of 
religious language at the intersection of language and the category of ultimate 
realities, and it is this lineage that gives rise to the articulation of the problem in 
Western philosophical and theological discourse. 
That the problem of religious language should connect up with the 
category of religious truth may seem obvious, as expressing truth is a 
fundamental goal of linguistic expression. However, religious truth need not be 
understood to address issues of reference, meaning, and interpretation only, but 
also pertains to the authority of scripture and other religious texts and objects, 
and to the achievements of spiritual cultivation and embodiment.156 This is yet 
another expansion of the problem of religious language beyond the typical 
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bounds of classical Western theologies. The problem of authority in many cases 
shifts the problem of religious language to ask about the linguistic capacities of 
what is taken to be ultimate (i.e. God) and the human capacity to hear and 
understand divine speech. Religious truth understood as the achievement of 
cultivation and embodiment presses analyses of religious language beyond 
questions of propositional statements and includes questions of ritual 
enactments of language and analysis of the propriety of language use. Chinese 
expressions of the problem of religious language particularly focus on the 
connections between the epistemic questions regarding the capacities of 
language and their implications for cultivation and embodiment. 
Stating the Problem 
This historical analysis enables a more precise statement of the problem of 
religious language as it will be addressed in this dissertation: The problem of 
religious language inquires about the adequacy, capacity, correlation, and 
propriety of language, speech, texts, and their enactments, on one hand, and 
ultimate realities as they relate to the human, cosmic, and environmental 
dimensions contingent thereon, on the other. The primary focus will be on 
religious philosophy as inquiry into how to live in light of God, but as this 
historical survey demonstrates, such focus must inevitably gloss over into the 
	 	93 
related inquiries into God and the relationship between God and the world. 
Because the primary focus is on how to live in light of God, the lived element is 
the point of departure, in this case language. This dissertation is properly a 
theological dissertation, insofar as religious philosophy is a form of theology, but 
due to this focus on language, God will only be directly addressed in the latter 
part of the final chapter. The contours of the path to reach that discussion is the 
topic of the final section of this chapter. 
Chapter Outline 
As was indicated in the prologue to this chapter, the course of the inquiry 
to be undertaken in the remainder of this dissertation first requires unscrewing 
the hermeneutical spiral with regard to the problematic it seeks to address. The 
problematic, of course, is religious language, but because the approach of the 
project privileges the question as one of how to live in light of God, the 
problematic shifts to language itself when the hermeneutical spiral is backed out 
even just a half turn. This is because language is the domain of life at issue by 
which humans seek to live in light of God with regard to the problematic of 
religious language. The second chapter of the dissertation, then, addresses the 
contours of how language has come to be understood under the several 
incarnations of the linguistic turn in modern philosophy and linguistics. These 
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perspectives on language serve as the norm to be reconstructed even as they are 
systematized by their comparative engagement with a novel theory of ritual itself 
comparatively derived from Western social scientific and Confucian ritual 
theories in chapters three and four. The fifth chapter renders this twofold 
comparison in order to give a systematic account of language as ritual, the 
subjunctive character of which then enables consideration of how language 
engages God in chapter six. 
Language 
While the modern project under the influence of the linguistic turn may be 
characterized with a preoccupation with language, the various approaches to 
language carried out under its auspices are remarkable principally for being 
incomplete, inconsistent, and far from settled. This is particularly troubling given 
how influential the various considerations of language under the linguistic turn 
have been across a wide array of academic disciplines, including in the very 
conception of disciplinarity. This chapter seeks to give an account first of the 
linguistic turn itself, in its various guises, and then charts the contours of how 
language has come to be understood in linguistics, philosophy of language, logic, 
and hermeneutics under its sway. Of particular interest are the influences of 
Ferdinand de Saussure and his notion that all structures are analogous to 
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linguistic structure, and of the causal linkages between language and thought as 
conceived both by linguistic relativists and advocates of the theory of universal 
grammar. Each linguistic level, from phonology through pragmatics, is 
presented with respect to a framework of analysis at that level and then the 
theoretical approaches that predominate in the respective fields. Another 
subsection presents the issues of linguistic universality, variation, change, and 
relation to mental and cognitive functions. Logical strategies for formalizing 
language structures and functions are first presented in turning to philosophy of 
language, with subsequent subsections addressing issues of reference and 
meaning, and the philosophical problem of universals. Hermeneutics shifts from 
the meaning of language at the point of generation to the interpretation of 
language that has been generated. The presentation proceeds in something of a 
spiral, turning from theories of interpretation proper to theories of effective 
language use in rhetoric and then the abandonment of aspiration to universality 
in critical theory and criticism. The final two subsections shift from theory to 
practice in the analysis of style in stylistics and valuational principles for 
approaching the art of translation. The chapter concludes with a turn to 
semiotics, first presenting the development of the study of signs in medieval 
Europe and then turning to a metaphysical interpretation of the semiotics of 
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American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce. The chapter concludes by setting 
up the interpretation of language as ritual to be fully elaborated in chapter five 
by pointing to some inadequacies in the theory of language advanced by 
Terrence Deacon in The Symbolic Species. 
Western Ritual Theory 
Rather than attempting a comprehensive review of the ritual theory 
literature, which has already been accomplished by others, chapter three sets out 
to construct a systematic theory of ritual in dialectical engagement with a range 
of theories at play in that literature, largely emerging from the social sciences. It 
begins by laying out what an adequate theory of ritual should involve in 
dialogue with Ronald Grimes, and then proceeds to systematically develop such 
a theory under nine aspects: definition, origins, structure, process, function, 
performance, sincerity and efficacy, communication, and semiotics. Each aspect 
is developed theoretically especially in conversation with Roy A. Rappaport 
(1926 – 1997) in his seminal work, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, 
and then also with other relevant ritual theory literature. The theory is then 
applied to a ritual generally accepted as such in order to demonstrate its 
adequacy, namely The Great Vigil of Easter at Washington National Cathedral 
on April 4, 2015 as encoded in a video recording supplemented by the service 
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bulletin and other liturgical materials. A concluding section turns to the issue of 
the relationship between ritual and language as they have been interpreted 
together in various ways in the ritual theory literature. The options for 
construing their relationship include ritual as a species of language, ritual and 
language as each species of another genus, i.e. “rule-governed activities,” or 
language as a species of ritual. This last, which was universally panned following 
its promotion by Edmund Leach (1910 – 1989), is the approach advocated 
through the remainder of the dissertation, especially chapters five and six. 
Confucian Ritual Theory 
The principal comparator for the Western ritual theories explored in 
chapter three is the Confucian ritual theorist Xunzi 荀子, a third century BCE 
Chinese thinker who prescribed ritual as a solution to the violent conflicts of the 
Warring States period. Alas, the literature regarding Xunzi, while rapidly 
becoming more profuse, is mutually contradictory in its interpretations of Xunzi 
and his texts, and so the chapter spends a great deal of time setting Xunzi in his 
proper socio-political, intellectual, and textual context. This chapter is notable for 
being the first attempt to interpret Xunzi in dialogue with the developmental 
history of the Analects as reconstructed by Bruce and Takeo Brooks. Three 
doctrines distinguish Xunzi from the other most prominent Confucians of the 
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Warring States period, namely his doctrines of human nature, heaven/nature, 
and ritual. This careful historicizing, in continuity with the historicism of 
religious philosophy, makes it possible to interpret Xunzi within the literature 
that has accrued about him in English. This interpretation then further enables 
the derivation of three key aspects of a theory of ritual that are adopted into the 
theory that had been elaborated in the previous chapter, namely that ritual is 
pervasive, conventional, and transformative. The chapter concludes with a 
summation of the whole theory of ritual as developed over the course of chapters 
three and four and its application to the Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius at the 
Confucius Temple in Tainan, Taiwan as video recorded by Thomas A. Wilson 
and Brooks Jessup. 
Language as Ritual 
The purpose of the fifth chapter is to interpret together the theory of ritual 
developed over the course of chapters three and four together with the various 
perspectives on language engaged in chapter two in order to make the case that 
language is best understood as a species of ritual. After a review of the semiotic 
theory in which language as ritual is grounded, the interpretive work of the 
chapter moves in two directions in succession. First, language is interpreted as it 
registers in each aspect of the theory of ritual. Then, more provocatively, each 
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dimension of language is reinterpreted as the ritual theory would construe it, 
transforming the whole apparatus of the linguistic turn as it has played out 
across a wide variety of disciplines along the way. Since this chapter is more 
properly philosophical, hypothetical examples are employed, rather than the 
empirical examples employed in the previous two chapters, which are normal in 
the social sciences whence ritual theory has largely arisen. Overall, the chapter 
seeks to interpret linguistic meaning among the ellipse defined by reality, mind, 
and society, as Hillary Putnam demonstrates that it must, and shows how 
language as ritual accomplishes this when so many other theories fail. Moreover, 
the ellipse of meaning is itself identified as a subjunctive space, which notion is 
spelled out in detail in chapter six. Chapter five, meanwhile, concludes by 
engaging the theory of language as ritual with three alternatives: the project of 
rectifying names as elaborated by Xunzi, Wittgensteinian language games, and 
the universal grammar of Noam Chomsky.   
Subjunctive Ritual and Religious Language 
Meaning is taken to depend on the subjunctive space among language, 
reality, mind, and society as discussed in chapter five. The purpose of chapter six 
is to interrogate the notion of subjunctivity and show how it enables a solution to 
the problem of religious language. In the end, it turns out, the subjunctive 
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character of meaning means that even a God as indeterminate as the one 
elaborated above in this chapter registers as meaningful on the same terms as 
anything else. This is to say that the problem of religious language falls out as 
properly problematic. The chapter begins with consideration of the notion of the 
subjunctive as it emerges in linguistics, social theory, and logic, and the allergies 
to this notion in modern and postmodern philosophy and theology. This notion 
of subjunctivity is then brought into engagement with the theory of language as 
ritual so as to render it consistent with the metaphysical semiotics that underlies 
the theory and to itself ground a particular form of critical realism, i.e. 
subjunctive realism. The following section shows how subjunctivity enables 
language to engage minds in society with a range of sorts of elements of reality, 
building up from description of simple objects and then conversation about them 
through the linguistic constitution of community through subjunctivity and 
engagement with indeterminate realities. This analysis enables the development 
of a typology of religious language in which metaphysical language hews to the 
pole of reality, liturgical language to that of society, and mystical language to the 
mental pole such that each is meaningful in its own way but becomes more so as 
it moves toward the others. The conclusion, then, is that all of the types of 
language, and indeed all language, is poetic, which is to say that language is 
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transformative of the reality it engages, including divinity. This theory of 
religious language, rooted in the subjunctivity of language as ritual, is contrasted 
with theories of religious language as metaphor and model, and then the project 
concludes with a theopoetic postscript. 
Original Contribution to Scholarship 
The goal of any dissertation is to make an original contribution to 
scholarship, and indeed the project, by definition, stands or falls on having done 
so. This dissertation makes several contributions to scholarship. It develops a 
novel theory of ritual via comparative engagement between modern social 
scientific ritual theories and that of the Warring States Confucian thinker Xunzi. 
As was noted, it is the first attempt to interpret Xunzi in dialogue with the 
development of the text of the Analects as reconstructed by Bruce and Takeo 
Brooks. It develops a theory of language out of its novel theory of ritual that 
seeks to correct a number of distortions that have come about under the 
dominance of the linguistic turn. It counters the view that signification is 
arbitrary and all structures are analyzable on analogy to linguistic structures as 
claimed by Ferdinand de Saussure. It also rejects the causal connections between 
language and mind presumed from language to mind by linguistic relativists 
and from mind to language by advocates of the theory of universal grammar. 
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Instead, it seeks to locate linguistic meaning among the poles of reality, mind, 
and society as suggested by Hillary Putnam. The dissertation begins to develop a 
theory of mind as ritual, in parallel to the theory of language as ritual, and 
identifies ritual as a properly metaphysical category, but a systematic philosophy 
of mind and metaphysical semiotics await further development. The project 
would also benefit from engagement with South Asian philosophies of language 
and ritual, and a comparative logic remains on the horizon. Nevertheless, the 
central contribution of the project as it stands is to provide the first philosophy of 
language based in a view of reality as pervasively in process such that the 
problem of religious language, which has plagued philosophers across cultures 




One way of going about solving the problem of religious language 
involves finding a set of moves in philosophy of language (broadly construed) to 
articulate the special ways in which language is meaningful with respect to 
religious realities.157 In fact, this is the most commonly employed strategy in the 
religious language literature. William P. Alston (1921 – 2009) employs arguments 
advanced by Saul Kripke against descriptive reference158 in order to argue for 
direct reference to God.159 Ernst Cassirer (1874 – 1945) elaborates the insight that 
language as an instrument of reason is more reflective of the creative work of 
imagination in mythmaking than of the discursive logic of rationalization. So, 
theories of knowledge and mind should attend carefully to the genesis of human 
conception in language and myth as they are then embodied in symbolic 
expression.160 Edward Cell appreciatively engages a number of positions in the 
history of analytic philosophy of language but ultimately largely abandons them 
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in favor of a Tillichian existentialist argument for the meaningfulness of 
linguistic statements with regard to divine action.161 Malcolm L. Diamond (1924 – 
1997) and Thomas V. Litzenberg, Jr. (1933 – 2018) present a variety of responses 
to the philosophical challenges posed by the verificationist project of the logical 
positivists with regard to the meaningfulness of theological language.162 Gerhard 
Ebeling (1912 – 2001) diagnoses a problem for Christian theology rooted in the 
linguistic intervention of the “Word of God” when the power of language to 
transform becomes suspect in the wider culture. He prescribes critical appraisal 
of theological vocabulary and creative yet faithful interpretation toward mutual 
agreement with wider cultural linguistic usage.163 Frederick Ferré (1933 – 2013) 
goes to great lengths to carve out space in the midst of contrary philosophical 
trends, which he spells out in exquisite detail, for the logic, hermeneutics, and 
metaphysics of theological discourse, but in the end relies on something like a 
Kierkegaardian leap of faith to instantiate personal theism.164 Garth L. Hallett 
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advocates a Wittgensteinian “Principle of Relative Similarity” whereby truth is 
determined by degree of resemblance to established uses of words as opposed to 
any other word in order to recover everyday uses of language for theology, as 
opposed to metaphysical uses.165 Similarly, Kevin W. Hector focuses on 
pragmatics in developing an account of language as historically conditioned and 
evolving but stabilized by a commitment to prior uses in relevant respects, which 
he prescribes as therapy for grief at the loss of metaphysical assumptions about 
the correspondence between language and reality.166 D. Stephen Long advocates 
for a metaphysics subordinated to the doctrine of the incarnation as inoculation 
for the ills of the linguistic turn such that language might be understood to 
signify in the same way as the humanity of Christ.167 John Losee turns to 
scientific paradigms as he draws an analogy between religious language and 
quantum theory in order to explain a type of complementarity between 
rhetorical frames of divine immutability and rhetorical frames of divine 
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participation in dialogue with humanity.168 John Macquarrie (1919 – 2007) argues 
that religious or theological language is a mode of discourse that seeks to bring 
its recipient into “encounter with holy Being.”169 Felicity McCutcheon returns to 
the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in order to argue, against most Wittgensteinian 
philosophy of religion, that religious language makes coherent metaphysical 
claims within the realm of meaningful language rather than attempting to escape 
that realm, as Wittgenstein rightly admonished.170 Sallie McFague describes 
religious language as metaphorical, identifying abstract realities by their likeness 
to concrete ones, and sophisticated metaphors become stabilized as models, 
which are the building blocks of theologies.171 John Milbank seeks to unite a 
Thomistic understanding of linguistic analogy with a contemporary 
understanding of the social construction of the humanly meaningful world via 
language in order to contextualize the metaphysical claims of religious language 
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within this realm of the humanly meaningful.172 Ian T. Ramsey (1915 – 1972) 
construes the varieties of language for God as models of cosmic disclosures with 
a common referent, and thus, in principle, capable of being rendered coherent 
with one another.173 The contributors to God in Language, edited by Robert P. 
Scharlemann and Gilbert E. M. Ogutu, approach the problem of religious 
language from multiple religious traditions and vantage points but are united by 
the Gadamerian hermeneutical insight that language is a tool and medium 
between meanings and things.174 James K. A. Smith argues that the incarnation of 
God in the person of Jesus Christ provides the basis for a phenomenology that 
bridges the gap between the finite and the infinite by being divine speech and so 
compelling a response so as to make this revelation visible.175 Janet Martin 
Soskice elaborates an interanimative account of metaphor as irreducibly 
figurative language about one thing that suggests another in order to ground the 
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conceptual possibility of religious language having real reference.176 Dan R. 
Stiver largely chronicles the history of late modern developments in the 
philosophy of religious language, but then heralds a paradigm shift toward 
understanding language as a frame in a widow of translucent or colored glass 
through which we understand our world. He considers that different people and 
communities will have different colors and degrees of opaqueness of their 
respective glass.177 Paul M. van Buren (1924 – 1998) positions religion at the 
farthest frontier of language, expressing as much as could possibly be said, and 
so seeking to circumvent debates between theism and atheism as of little interest 
or value for Christianity.178 Finally, Roger M. White strives to rehabilitate the 
doctrine of analogy for rendering religious language meaningful between the 
Scylla of anthropomorphism an the Charybdis of agnosticism.179  
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The main problem with this approach to the problem of religious 
language is that the orientation adopted within philosophy of language is 
inevitably quite narrow, even as language itself is an exceedingly broad 
phenomenon, which contrast begs the question of the adequacy of such 
approaches. The present project avoids myopia by pursuing multiple approaches 
to language arising from various disciplines, which together achieve something 
like breadth.180 Instead of developing a distinctive theory of language, the 
approach in this chapter is to explore various vantage points on the phenomenon 
of language, which, if they were to be made coherent and systematic, could then 
constitute a singular theory of language, which will be the task of chapter five. 
Moreover, the present project rejects the tendency in the literature to turn to a 
single feature of language, or a single level of linguistic analysis, for the key to 
unlock the mysteries of particularly religious language. Instead, as will be 
elaborated in chapter five, the various aspects of and perspectives on language to 
be articulated in this chapter may be rendered coherent and systematic when 
language is understood as itself a species of ritual. It is capacities inherent in the 
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broader realm of ritual, then, and especially ritual subjunctivity as elaborated in 
chapter six, that reveal instances of religious language to be part and parcel of 
common linguistic activity. Language, it turns out, simultaneously picks up on 
and misses important aspects of the realities it purports to depict. 
After considering what is frequently referred to as the “linguistic turn” in 
modern philosophy, this chapter turns to the various foci of the contemporary 
scientific approach to language, namely linguistics, which are deeply interrelated 
with issues philosophically explored in the subsequent section on philosophy of 
language and logic. The chapter then takes up questions of interpretation of 
language, or hermeneutics, which includes approaches to language most 
common in continental philosophy. Finally, semiotics provides a perspective on 
language that abstracts from the phenomenon of words to the more general 
category of signs. 
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The Linguistic Turn 
Richard Rorty popularized the notion of the linguistic turn in 
philosophy,181 citing Gustav Bergmann as the progenitor of the phrase.182 Rorty 
describes the linguistic turn as the latest, as of 1967, philosophical revolution in a 
long history thereof, oriented around the view that “philosophical problems are 
problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language, or 
by understanding more about the language we presently use.”183 Historically, the 
nascent expression of the linguistic turn may be ascribed to Gottlob Frege (1848 – 
1925), who understood his own project to be an analysis of thought, not of 
language.184  
"Although he continued to reiterate that it is inessential to thoughts and thought-
constituents that we grasp them as the senses of sentences and their parts respectively, it 
is unclear that his account of the senses of linguistic expressions is capable of being 
transposed into an account of thoughts considered independently of their expression in 
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words. When philosophers consciously embraced the strategy that Frege had pursued, 
the linguistic turn was thereby decisively taken."185 
Such conscious embrace arrives with the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 – 1951): “All philosophy is a ‘critique’ of language.”186 
The turn then developed in two phases, the first concerned with ideal language, 
which is language constructed from logical principles, and the second concerned 
with ordinary languages, or natural languages, which have developed through 
use in human societies, e.g. English, Hebrew, Greek, Chinese, Sanskrit, etc. 
Ironically, it was just as Rorty was publishing his book on the linguistic turn that 
the turn itself was waning in the mid-1960s as debates about the nature of 
language and meaning, and about philosophical method, deepened. Of 
particular note are the reemergence in analytic philosophy, among many areas of 
inquiry, of metaphysics, the illegitimacy of which was central to the turn itself, 
and of historical philosophical approaches and ideas, even particularly religious 
ideas.187  
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This classic account of the linguistic turn belies the fact that Frege was 
preceded in his interest in language by a number of earlier modern philosophers, 
among them John Locke (1632 – 1704), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 – 1716), 
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714 – 80), and Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767 – 
1835).188 Locke argued that language is made up of signs referring to ideas in the 
mind of the user,189 thereby uniting “the study of language with the study of the 
human understanding, particularly its cognitive capacities.”190 From there, 
Leibniz inaugurated a return to Scholastic conceptions of the underlying logical 
form of natural languages, whereas Condillac carried forward the Renaissance 
interest in language use.191 While von Humboldt made a herculean attempt to 
reunite these two strains, resulting in his being claimed as a progenitor of both 
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linguistic generativism (i.e. innate grammar) and linguistic relativism,192 Michael 
Losonsky persuasively argues that they have in fact remained divided to the 
present.193 The common assumption shared among these earlier thinkers is 
Locke’s insight that language refers to ideas, which is abandoned by John Stuart 
Mill (1806 – 73),194 and in turn by Frege, for linguistic reference to things in the 
world,195 thus signaling what Rorty identified as the linguistic turn. The account 
of language as ritual in this project harmonizes the logical structure of language 
with its varieties of use and shows how language serves to mediate between 
ideas and things in the world. 
The linguistic turn has a wider connotation beyond the scope and field of 
analytic philosophy. Continental philosophy has deep concerns with language as 
well, approached in terms of linguistic and textual interpretation, and so 
hermeneutics became central to its project, as well as to the disciplines in the 
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humanities and social sciences in which continental thought has been 
influential.196 In the continental vein, the linguistic turn encapsulates two related 
theories, to be considered in turn: first, the sociological theory that all 
knowledge, and the realities that depend upon knowledge, are socially 
constructed; and second, the philosophical theory that all knowledge is 
contingent upon and relative to the interpretive frameworks and processes from 
which it arises.197 
The sociology of knowledge operates at the intersection of sociology and 
philosophy, employing the philosophical concepts of “knowledge” and “reality” 
but asking a different set of questions about them. Whereas philosophers ask 
about what knowledge and reality are and how they can be known, sociologists 
of knowledge inquire about the social contexts that make knowledge and reality 
plausible and construct them so, pursuing the inquiry via phenomenological 
analysis of the subjective experience of everyday life in society.198 While Peter 
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Berger (1929 – 2017) and Thomas Luckmann (1927 – 2016), in their seminal text 
for social constructivism, insist on the importance of remembering the subjective 
starting point for their phenomenology,199 too often this is precisely what 
subsequent social constructivists forget, such that reality as that which is 
independent of human interpretation of it becomes confused with reality as that 
which human interpretation constructs. Both conceptions of reality are 
philosophically defensible in their own way,200 but the latter is dependent upon a 
Cartesian and Kantian subjective captivity that makes reality independent of 
interpretation unavailable. Just as analytic philosophers who take the linguistic 
turn rely upon language as the only medium for accessing thought or experience, 
which are the ultimate objects of philosophical reflection for them,201 continental 
thought following its own linguistic turn relies upon language as the primary 
medium for constructing reality.202 The result is that reality in the sense of that 
which is independent of human knowledge or interpretation of it is forgotten, 
which amnesia is the likely culprit for the confusion of the two senses of reality. 
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In the present project, the social construction of humanly significant realities and 
the central role of language in this construction is understood to be valid so far as 
it goes, but without forgetting the alternative sense of reality as independent of 
human programs. To accomplish this, “reality” will be used exclusively in this 
latter sense, while “knowledge” and “interpretation” will be used for socially 
constructed, humanly significant realities. 
Poststructuralism outright rejects the notion of objective realities 
independent of human knowledge and interpretation, including the objective 
reality of subjectivity. Instead, poststructuralists are interested in the processes 
by which individuals, societies, and cultures, largely through the medium of 
language, produce and represent reality as objective, individuals as subjects, and 
theories as universal.203 The poststructuralsit contention is that it is the process 
represented in language, and not the product, that is the primary scope of 
philosophic inquiry, an orientation shared with structuralism. The distinguishing 
feature of poststructuralism is the view that structures are not unconditional but 
rather themselves conditioned by historical and contextual processes, and so are 
never fully determinate but rather dynamic.204 Furthermore, since the 
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conditioning processes of history and context are themselves conditioned, they 
can provide no neutral ground, or foundation, from which to either evaluate or 
adjudicate between the conditioned, dynamic systems and structures that make 
up the life-worlds of individuals, societies, and cultures.205 Hans-Georg Gadamer 
notably claims that hermeneutics, or the process of coming to an understanding, 
is conversational by nature and mediated in language, with the further 
implication that hermeneutical experience and language are universal, albeit as 
general categories for explaining human experience, not in any of their particular 
occurrences or events.206 The process of a given conversation will both serve to 
further condition the language employed therein and generate a novel 
understanding of the topic of conversation. It is not clear, however, that the novel 
understanding will correspond with what is being interpreted, (usually a text), in 
any sense, since meaning is defined as the generation of the novel 
understanding. Neither is it clear that the novel understanding will be fully or at 
least substantially mutually shared among participants in the hermeneutical 
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conversation. Again, reality as that which is independent of human knowledge 
or interpretation has dropped from view as philosophically, or even humanly, 
available, and now even the socially constructed reality has been destabilized 
vis-à-vis its participants. Language, in the continental perspective, is thus the 
ultimate framework, process, and outcome of the hermeneutic pursuit of 
knowledge and understanding, which is why it may be said that there has been a 
parallel linguistic turn in continental thought. 
A third arena in which a linguistic turn has played out is semiotics,207 
which has become an interdisciplinary field with extensive reach in the academy 
and in the professional world, such as in marketing and communications. 
Semiotics is the study of signs, sign systems, and their interactions. There are two 
trajectories of semiotic inquiry in the modern period, which are, in a sense, 
inversely related to one another. The first, associated with Ferdinand de Saussure 
(1857-1913) as articulated in his Course in General Linguistics,208 seeks to analyze 
signs, sign systems, and their interactions using various modes of linguistic 
analysis. This is to say that this mode of inquiry takes the structure of language 
to be the normative structure for all sign systems. The further implication of this 
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approach is that signs are understood in dyadic relation to what they signify and 
the relationship between a sign and the signified is arbitrary. It is this trajectory 
that gave birth to structuralism in continental philosophy. The second trajectory 
of semiotic inquiry, initially articulated by Charles Sanders Peirce,209 inverts the 
first trajectory by making language but one species of the more general class of 
semiotic systems. According to Peirce, then, there is a triadic relation among 
sign, signified, and interpretant, the last being the effect of taking the sign for the 
signified. Moreover, signs, their objects, and their interpretants mutually 
determine each other, albeit not necessarily causally, in various ways, and each 
element and their relationships are themselves signs of further objects and 
generating further interpretants.210 This second trajectory is the perspective 
adopted in the present project and will be engaged in significant detail in the last 
section of this chapter and in chapter five. For the moment, the important point 
has to do with the linguistic turn, or making language the central object of 
inquiry. While the Saussurean tradition of semiotics and later American 
pragmatists took the linguistic turn, Peirce and the American semiotic tradition 
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more broadly has resisted the linguistic turn and instead understands language 
as a particular sign system among many other systems of signs. Nevertheless, 
this lineage remains a minority report among approaches to language, most of 
which at this point presume the linguistic turn in one or another of its 
incarnations. These majority positions dominate the discussion of language until 
the last section of this chapter. 
A significant limitation of this dissertation is that the literature it engages 
with respect to language lies almost exclusively within the confines of the 
linguistic turn. While antecedent alternatives to the present view in the West will 
be engaged in the final section of this chapter, the project would benefit from 
sustained comparative engagement with alternative conceptions of language and 
logic that have developed in India, but this lies beyond the scope of the 
undertaking at present. Nevertheless, it is important to note that registering such 
an alternative, among other things, would highlight the particularity, 
contingency, and relativity of the view from within the linguistic turn.  
Finally, the linguistic turn has had a dramatic effect on disciplinarity in 
late modern scholarship, which is of particular interest given that the present 
undertaking is so intentionally, carefully, and unrelentingly multidisciplinary 
and comparative. One outcome of the linguistic turn in the academy has been to 
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circumscribe the results of inquiry within the boundaries of the methods and 
frameworks of a given discipline. The knowledge generated from a particular 
inquiry is contingent upon the discipline in which the methods employed are 
taken to be determinative and productive. Disciplines are like languages, and 
their methods the grammar thereof; assertions of disciplinary 
incommensurability, on this analogy, amount to claiming the impossibility of 
adequate translation. It is hardly surprising, then, that disciplines have become 
siloed and inquiries have become increasingly narrow in scope. Given this 
socially constructed reality of academia in the present moment, claims to the 
production of knowledge that merely deny this taken-for-granted knowledge are 
doomed. Instead, multidisciplinary inquiry, as argued in the first chapter, must 
proceed by carefully tricating its concepts in the relevant disciplines in order to 
register within their hermeneutical processes and frameworks. Only then can the 
painstaking work of translation begin, taking account of not only the outcomes of 
various disciplinary inquiries but also the varieties of interpretive frames in 
which those outcomes register. In this way, multidisciplinary inquiry seeks not 
to reject the claim, arising from the linguistic turn, that knowledge is contextually 
situated. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate that contextually situated knowledge is 
not a priori irrelevant to other contexts and situations.  
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Linguistics 
Linguistics is a social scientific discipline that seeks to understand and 
describe the nature of and communication in language. In approaching language, 
linguists assume their object of inquiry to be patterned such that regularities may 
be descriptively generalized as rules governing an unbounded, or infinite, 
signification system. Linguists also assume that language in general is a 
relatively unified phenomenon across specific instances, exhibiting a common 
level of complexity and detail, and displaying similar formal structures.211 With 
regard to this latter assumption, the field is divided among linguists who take 
stronger and weaker views. The strong view, which has been dominant since it 
was inaugurated and epitomized by Noam Chomsky, takes the similarities 
among linguistic structures to be indicative of an innate and universal grammar 
such that the structure of language mirrors the structure of the human mind.212 
The weak view, which is gaining traction and is the perspective espoused in the 
present project, sees language as a cultural tool that varies, or is at least capable 
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of variance, across instances as they are embedded in cultural contexts. 
Similarities are then to be explained by language inevitably arising from, 
describing, and responding to a more or less singular reality.213 Which view is 
taken to be correct does impact linguistic analysis in various ways, which will be 
elaborated in the final subsection, but the goal in the intermediate subsections is 
to become familiar with the main taxonomic categories and interpretive theories 
in linguistics that will be brought into conversation with ritual in chapter five. 
Phonology and Phonetics 
Modern linguistics privileges spoken language as primary, taking written 
language to be parasitic thereon, and so phonetics, the study of the sounds of 
speech, and phonology, the study of speech sound organization into patterns, 
may be considered the most fundamental or basic mode of linguistic analysis. 
Physiologically, the sounds of speech are produced by a continuous flow of air 
from the lungs, maintained by the diaphragm and the musculature that controls 
the rib cage, phonating the vocal chords stretched across the larynx at the top of 
the trachea in the case of voiced sounds. These sounds are then formed into 
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speech by manipulation of various parts of the anatomy found in the vocal tract. 
The frequency at which the vocal chords vibrate determines the pitch of the 
sound, and closure of the vocal chords produces a type of sound referred to as 
“glottal,” but the remainder of what transforms sound into speech results from 
varying configurations of the lips, teeth, tongue, hard palate, soft palate, nasal 
cavity, uvula, pharynx, and epiglottis with respect to one another.214 While the 
actual performance of speech is always elided in a continuous flow, phonetics 
breaks the flow apart into a combinatorial scheme of discrete phonemes. These 
are best represented in writing not by the orthography developed for any 
particular natural language but by either a phonemic or phonetic transcription 
system such as the International Phonetic Alphabet.215 Consonants may be 
classified as either voiced or unvoiced (voiceless), by their manner of articulation 
as stops, fricatives, affricates, nasals, liquids, or glides, and by the anatomical 
location in the oral cavity where articulation occurs as bilabial, labiodental, 
interdental, alveolar, alveopalatal, velar, or glottal.216 Vowels fall under three 
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types: lax (short), tense (long), or reduced (unstressed), and may be further 
classified by the height of the tongue in the mouth, (high, mid, low), and the 
depth in the mouth (front, central, back) where they are formed; dipththongs are 
single sounds that shift from one position in the oral cavity to another.217 
Whereas the English alphabet has twenty-six letters (twenty-one consonants and 
five vowels), phonetic analysis reveals Standard English to have forty phonemes 
(twenty-seven consonants and thirteen vowels). The language with the most 
phonemes is !Xóõ, native to Botswana, with 161 phonemes (130 consonants, 
twenty-eight vowels, and three tones). The languages with the least phonemes 
each have eleven: Rotokas of Papua New Guinea (six consonants and five 
vowels), and Pirahã of Brazil (eight consonants and three vowels). Because 
phonetic analysis involves breaking down a continuous stream of sound into 
constituent parts, there is sometimes disagreement among phonetic linguists 
about which sounds are really distinct from others. For example, the PHOIBLE 
Online phonetic database reports three different counts for the number of 
phonemes in Mandarin Chinese: forty-nine, forty-three, or thirty-two.218  
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Two types of approaches dominate phonological analysis at present. The 
earlier of the two, inaugurated by Noam Chomsky and Morris Halle in The Sound 
Pattern of English in 1968, fits into the category of generative grammar associated 
with the strong view of linguistic structures as innate and universal grammar.219 
This approach begins by identifying the distinctive features available for 
constructing the phonemes of a language: syllabic, consonantal, sonorant, voiced, 
continuant, nasal, strident, lateral, distributed, affricate, labial, round, coronal, 
anterior, high, back, and low for consonants; syllabic, high, back, low, round, and 
tense (long) for vowels.220 Groups of phonemes that share a small number of 
distinctive features are amenable to formulating rules describing phonological 
regularity called natural classes.221 Observing the patterning of phonemes in 
natural classes and then formulating rules that describe phonological regularity 
in terms of distinctive features is the means by which this approach analyzes the 
internal organization of speech sounds.222 The external organization of these 
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sounds specifying the allowable sequences of phonemes is analyzed based upon 
the basic structural unit of the syllable, made up of an onset consonant, a nucleus 
vowel, and an optional coda consonant, with rules specifying which phonemes 
are capable of combination in which ways.223 Syllables are then organized by 
patterns of prominence or stress into unary, binary, or ternary feet, which may in 
turn stand alone, be linked together, or be preceded by an “unfooted,” 
unstressed syllable to form words.224 The goal of phonology, on this paradigm, is 
to properly code the basic units of language sounds and then identify the rules 
by which the units combine to form acceptable, meaningful words. 
An alternative approach to phonology emerged in the 1990s called 
Optimality Theory (OT).225 Instead of applying rules to phonemes, this approach 
takes lexical entries as inputs and feeds them into a generator (GEN) module that 
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elaborates a potentially infinite set of possible outputs in varying degrees of 
correspondence with the given input.226 These possibilities are then passed on to 
the evaluator (EVAL) module, which selects a “winner” based on a module 
containing a set of universal constraints (CON) ranked in different ways by 
particular languages. Much of the research in OT phonology concerns precise 
formulation of the universal constraints and their proper ranking in particular 
languages, but in general there are two types of constraints: “Markedness 
constraints evaluate the structure of the output form, while Faithfulness 
constraints evaluate its relationship to other forms.”227 The application of ranked 
constraints is represented in a tableaux with the input in the upper left cell, 
candidate outputs from the generator in the first column, the ranked constraints 
listed in the first row, and violations of a constraint by a candidate output 
marked with an asterisk in the respective cell.228 While there are certainly plenty 
of proponents of universal and innate grammar, that is, formalists, among 
phonologists using the OT approach, it has proven especially attractive to 
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functionalists who see language generally as a cultural tool and who explain the 
universality of constraints in terms of human physiological limitations in 
articulation and perception of speech sounds.229 
Morphology  
If the basic parts of speech sounds are called phonemes, then the basic 
parts of words, incapable of further analysis into meaningful parts, are called 
morphemes, and so the study of the internal structure of words and the 
relationships among word constituents is called morphology.230 A simple word is 
made up of a single morpheme, such as “dog,” while complex words are made 
up of multiple morphemes, such as “dogs,” (dog + s).231 Free morphemes stand 
alone as independent words, by contrast to bound morphemes that must be 
attached to another morpheme. Some bound prefixes operate as affixes, (prefixes, 
suffixes, or infixes), while others are bound bases such as “cran-“ in cranberry, 
and still others are appended contractions of other words such as “will” being 
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contracted and appended to “they” to become “they’ll” meaning “they will.”232 
The process by which morphemes join together to form words is called 
concatenation; non-concatenative words result from operations on a single 
morpheme.233 Thus formed, words may then be classified as parts of speech such 
as nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, and many more, some of 
which classifications are not common across languages.234 These parts of speech 
themselves may be distinguished as open-class, which are unlimited in size, may 
be added to relatively easily, and contain content words, or closed-class, which 
are smaller and mostly fixed, and contain grammatical or function words.235 
Many words can take on a variety of forms, and so the forms “live,” “lives,” 
“lived,” and “living” are word forms, or concrete instantiations, of the abstract 
core meaning expressed by the lexeme “LIVE;” related word forms are inflections 
of one another, while lexemes may be related to one another by derivation.236 
New words added to the lexicon, (neologisms), especially in the open classes, 
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may arise by genuinely new coinage of terms, formation of acronyms (e.g. AIDS), 
abbreviation (e.g. “Dr.” for Doctor), blending of two or more words (e.g. 
education + entertainment = “edutainment”), generification (e.g. “to google” 
from GoogleTM), or direct or indirect borrowing from another language.237 Also, 
new meanings may become associated with existing words by changing their 
part of speech, metaphorically extending them to a new domain, broadening or 
narrowing their scope, or their meanings may drift over time, or even fully 
reverse.238 Finally, new words may be generated through the derivational 
processes of compounding words of the same or different parts of speech (e.g. 
landlord or underdog), or adding derivational affixes (e.g. “-able” added to read, 
break, or wash), which may generate phonological, part of speech, and semantic 
changes.239 This derivational morphology, or the study the formation of new 
words, should not be confused with inflectional morphology, or the study of 
word forms within a category, which is limited in English but includes plural 
and possessive suffixes on nouns, person, tense, progress, and participle markers 
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on verbs, and comparative and superlative suffixes on adjectives.240 Languages 
fall on a continuum from more analytic, the extreme of which is termed isolating, 
to more synthetic, the extreme of which is termed polysynthetic, according to the 
extent to which they employ morphological changes to express different 
meanings, as opposed to using another word.241 What makes morphological 
analysis interesting are all of the irregular cases in which words either do not 
behave as the taxonomy would have it or they do not mean what the interpreter 
would expect based on the analysis. 
There are three main theoretical perspectives that guide approaches to 
morphological analysis. The morpheme-based model approaches its task by 
analogy to syntax with the goal of developing a relatively rigid set of rules for 
word formation by concatenation, i.e. morpheme combination.242 This is a 
reasonable approach given that concatenation is the most common mode of word 
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formation, and like syntax, morphology exhibits a hierarchical structure, but it 
does struggle to accommodate non-concatenative word forms.243 Lexeme-based 
morphology is derivative from the morpheme-based approach, and so has the 
same strengths and weaknesses, but locates the rules within the lexical entries of 
morphemes such that the rule is effectively inherent to the morpheme rather than 
of a separate order to be applied to the morpheme.244 The word-based model 
abstracts word-schemas from lexical entries of sets of words, replacing 
differences among the words with variables and expressing the common features 
with constants, and then describes morphological correspondences among sets of 
schemas.245 This approach has the advantage of easily describing word 
formations that the morpheme and lexeme-based approaches struggle with, such 
as non-concatenation, backformation, and cross-formation. Alas, it does so at the 
expense of restrictiveness, thus making generalization from languages to 
language more difficult, and requiring a morphological system-external 
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explanation for concatenative dominance.246 Since restrictive architecture is 
necessary for generalizing morphological rules across languages, which is in turn 
requisite for demonstrating parallels between mental and linguistic structures, 
the morpheme or lexeme-based models are generally preferred among 
proponents of innate grammar. Proponents of the view of language as a cultural 
tool, in turn, prefer the word-based model because it in fact demands a system-
external, i.e. cultural, explanation for why certain possible word forms are 
infrequently realized in particular instances of natural languages. 
Syntax  
Whereas phonology analyzes the structure of speech sounds, and 
morphology the structure of words, syntax analyzes the structure of language at 
the level of the sentence. Syntactic typology classifies the ways in which various 
languages allow parts of speech247 to be ordered.248 Noun phrases may be 
identified as core types of agents (e.g. subjects), patients (e.g. objects), or sole 
arguments (with intransitive verbs), as oblique types begun with prepositional 
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phrases, or as external to the clause structure.249 In clauses with verbal predicates, 
the verb controls the form of the predicate, (e.g. case, transitive vs. intransitive, 
etc.), whereas nonverbal predicates, either adjectival, nominal, or locative, are 
connected to their subject by an explicit or implied copula.250 Most languages 
distinguish declarative, interrogatory, and imperative sentence types, which 
accomplish different types of speech acts.251 Passive constructions derive 
predicates from their active counterparts with an alternative argument structure 
serving to foreground sentence elements as topics that had been 
deemphasized.252 Indeed, the intelligibility of discourse depends upon the 
information in a given sentence conveying a conceptual event being packaged 
such that it achieves a coherent whole as a structured series against the 
background of precedent and wider sociocultural knowledge.253  
Sentences may become complex when their elements join with other 
elements of the same type via conjunctive (i.e. “and”), disjunctive (i.e. “or”), 
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adversative (i.e. “but”), or causal (i.e. “for”) coordination, maintaining the same 
sematic relations with the rest of the sentence elements.254 Sentence complexity 
also increases by complementation, or the addition of predication to a single 
argument of the main verb,255 and by the addition of genitive or possessive 
constructions, adpositional phrases, and relative clauses to noun phrases.256 Thus, 
sentences are made up of variously interrelated words and clauses strung 
together in order to encode particular notions about their relationships, although 
these semantic elements are not necessarily expressed in a one-to-one 
relationship with the surface elements that make them up.257 
Syntactic theories seek to articulate the rules by which sentences in a given 
language may be adjudicated as “well formed,” or conforming to patterns 
encountered in other well-formed sentences and phrases in the language.258 A 
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diversity of theoretical perspectives arises from the need to account for259 
irregularities of sentence formation within a given language,260 irreconcilable 
differences in sentence formation across languages,261 and conflicts between 
discerned rules of syntax and other aspects of linguistic analysis,262 (e.g. 
semantics, pragmatics, etc.). Generative grammar theories attempt to articulate a 
precise canon of rules that generate well-formed sentences, by contrast with 
constraint-based grammars that articulate a precise canon of constraints beyond 
which anything goes in sentence formation.263 Transformational grammars, a 
subset of generative grammar,264 posit a universal grammar as innate in human 
minds265 to distinguish the surface structure of the grammatical rules of a 
particular language (e-language) from the deep structure of the inner language of 
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the mind (i-language).266 The paradigm is called transformational grammar 
because it articulates a set of transformations, (i.e. rules), by which statements in 
the deep structure of the inner language are rendered in the surface structure of a 
given language.267 Whereas transformational grammar analyzes sentences 
according to the terms of the constituency relation between subjects (noun 
phrase [NP]) and predicates (verb phrase [VP]),268 dependency grammars 
analyze sentences as a series of dependencies between a dominant head and 
subordinate dependent with the top-level head, the main verb, ultimately 
controlling all of the subsequent dependents.269 Both types of grammar may be 
given to grammatic formalisms such as categorial grammars, wherein sentence 
elements combine according to functions expressed in mathematical 
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formalisms.270 By contrast, constraint grammars are more given to the formalisms 
of statistical grammars that take a probabilistic approach to determining well-
formedness.271 Word grammar, a type of dependency grammar, makes the 
further claim that constituency relations are redundant because they are more 
basically contained in the dependency relations among words,272 and sees the 
network of linguistic concepts as reflecting the same general cognitive network 
as all other areas of knowledge.273 By contrast with these formalisms,274 
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functionalist theories275 subordinate syntactic structures, (i.e. “constructions”),276 
to their communicative functions, thereby acknowledging that grammar itself 
has symbolic meaning,277 although formalist and functionalist approaches need 
not necessarily be mutually exclusive.278 
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Graphemics and Orthography 
The linguistic study of writing systems is called graphemics,279 (also 
grammatology280 or graphology281), which includes orthography,282 or the 
formulation of rules for writing in a given natural language, itself including 
spelling, capitalization, punctuation, word breaks, etc. Modern linguistics 
privileges speech because all humans speak, whereas only humans in societies of 
sophistication sufficient for civilization have writing,283 and writing is an 
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important component of making civilization possible.284 Writing is 
distinguishable from language as a sign system referring to the sign system of 
language when language is conceived as a mental faculty.285 When language is 
instead conceived as a cultural artifact or tool, however, as in the subsection 
below on relativity, typology, cognition, and history below, then writing may 
better be understood as another aspect of the artifact or an alternative use for the 
tool.286 It is also possible to conceive writing as prior to speech, as the contents of 
mind that are then articulated in speech,287 and there is a palpable influence of 
writing even on modern linguistics that takes speech as primary.288 
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Descriptively, writing systems may be distinguished functionally in terms 
of the orthographies of natural languages, stenographies of shorthand, 
cryptographies of codes, pedographies of literacy aides, and technographies of 
linguistic metalanguages.289 Typologies of writing systems must at least cope 
with the various ways in which writing may refer to the semantic, 
morphological, and phonetic dimensions of language.290 The only purely 
semantic writing system is the invented291 Bliss system,292 which most 
prominently became a pedography,293 and the only purely phonetic writing 
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systems are technographies such as the International Phonetic Alphabet,294 
whereas the writing systems associated with all natural languages are 
glottographic, transcribing combinations of morphemes and phonemes.295 Some 
typologies of writing systems are hierarchical, first distinguishing, for example, 
between moraic (referring to parts of syllables) and segmental systems, and then 
further distinguishing the segmental systems into those that refer only to 
consonants and those that refer to all language sounds (i.e. alphabetic).296 Others 
locate writing systems among a variety of dimensions such as amount of 
morphography, type of phonography, orthographic depth, and graphic 
arrangement.297 Overall, the privileging of spoken language in linguistics has 
resulted in a relative poverty of linguistic research in graphemics and 
orthography, although movements toward preservation of endangered 
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languages provide some hope for increased interest in at least documenting 
writing systems.298     
Semantics 
Whereas the linguistic arenas of phonology, phonetics, morphology, and 
syntax analyze and theorize the elements and structures of language, “semantics 
is the study of meaning communicated through language.”299 Not only a 
subspecialty of linguistics, semantics as the study of the meaning of particularly 
linguistic signs is also a subdiscipline of semiotics,300 the study of the meaning of 
signs in general, and is closely related to and intertwined in issues in philosophy 
of language, philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive science.301 At the 
level of the word, lexical semantics interprets the meanings of individual words 
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and their components, and how these meanings are interrelated.302 At the level of 
sentences, logic evaluates that individual sentences that are tautologies are 
necessarily true and those that are contradictions necessarily false. Also, pairs of 
sentences are logically evaluable as to their truth if they have the semantic 
relations of synonymy, contradiction, entailment, or presupposition.303 Logic 
alone cannot, however, account for the ways in which sentences construe 
situations304 with regard to situation type (e.g. static/dynamic, durative/punctual, 
telic/atelic),305 tense, aspect,306 modality (including mood),307 or evidentiality.308 
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Neither can logic alone cope with how sentences construe participants309 into 
thematic roles,310 (i.e. vague categories),311 with respect to the main verb, and then 
further allow different roles to be foregrounded or backgrounded through 
varieties of voice, (i.e. active, middle, passive).312 Moreover, assessing the 
meaning of a sentence often requires recourse to implied inferences assumed 
cooperatively313 between producers and receivers of language so as to optimize 
relevance.314 Determining meaning also requires contextual knowledge in order 
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to evaluate the reference of deictic expressions315 and nominals,316 and 
background knowledge of the language, specific context, and wider culture.317 
Three theoretical approaches to semantics may be distinguished. 
Componential approaches318 derive a semantic metalanguage of meaning 
components from the words in the lexicon319 and then compose the particular 
meanings of sentences by combining the components according to rules,320 
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functions,321 or a semantic syntax.322 Strong versions of this approach locate these 
semantic components or primitives in the human cognitive structure.323 Rather 
than focusing on linguistic representations of internal concepts, formalist 
approaches324 assess the fit between language and external reality by evaluating 
their correspondence and articulating their truth conditions by recourse to the 
metalanguage of logic325 correlated with mathematical models of reality.326 What 
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gets left out, however, are the subjective intentions of language producers and 
receivers, and the dynamics of language use in context, although formalists have 
made efforts to account for these aspects of meaning.327 Cognitive semantics328 
rejects formalism for functionalism, grounding meaning in the embodied mental 
categories derived from experience in the physical world and social convention, 
and then expressed in language. Language, on this view, is part and parcel of the 
whole cognitive apparatus,329 and relies on more general capacities for 
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constructing mental spaces330 and on mental manipulation for integration and 
blending.331 
Pragmatics 
“Pragmatics studies language and its meaningful use from the perspective 
of language users embedded in their situational, behavioral, cultural, societal 
and political contexts, using a broad variety of methodologies and 
interdisciplinary approaches depending on specific research questions and 
interests.”332 Admittedly, a number of such contextual factors have already been 
incorporated in the above subsection on semantics, a situation reflecting ongoing 
debates as to the contours, relationship, and boundary between semantics and 
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pragmatics.333 Indeed, as the youngest subdiscipline of linguistics,334 pragmatics 
emerged as a dramatic turn away from the assumption of a perfect language user 
in a community of likewise perfect users of the same language,335 toward 
describing language as social action.336 Internally,337 the social dimension operates 
on language by constraining semantic content by recourse to implicated 
conversational principles of economy of information, adherence to truth, 
maintaining relevance, and privileging clarity.338 Externally, language operates 
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on the social dimension by not only describing but intentionally acting on and in 
the social order,339 and by participating in the semiotic process of establishing 
and maintaining that very order.340 Moreover, deixis refers to how certain words 
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and linguistic constructs function indexically341 to refer to features, aspects, and 
contents of their context of use: situationally distinguishing among people, 
articulating social roles and relationships, establishing actions at points in time or 
temporality generally, and construing things and actions spatially, or 
discursively referring to prior (anaphora) or future (cataphora) referents, and 
transposing among various modalities.342  
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In addition to the biological and evolutionary bases of communication,343 
and the culturally coded linguistic expression of cognitive concepts,344 
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pragmatics bleeds into sociolinguistics via interest in the linguistic dimension of 
everyday social interaction,345 and in the encoding of political identities and 
ideologies in language.346 Conversation Analysis is a robust framework for 
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understanding human capacities to anticipate and predict the flow of a 
conversation, such as turn-taking, based on prior sequences of actions in the 
context of social interaction measured against a system of conversational 
norms.347 On the political front, Basil Bernstein developed a theory of linguistic 
coding, in which “restricted” codes rely heavily on shared context and are 
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common in economically disadvantaged communities, whereas “elaborated” 
codes make meaning linguistically explicit by recourse to specific referents and 
are common in middle and upper-class communities. This distinction gives rise 
to the “deficit hypothesis” that disparities in educational achievement resulted 
from innate deficiencies of poor students.348 William Labov was the standard 
bearer of the alternative view, based in a more rigid structuralism,349 that no 
language is deficient because all languages are functionally equivalent and so 
merely different.350 This view won the day and remains the dominant 
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educational philosophy to present,351 although it is not clear that the two 
positions are actually or necessarily as far apart as purported.352 
Relativity, Typology, Cognition, and History 
As promised in the introduction to this section on linguistics, this final 
subsection addresses the nested issues of linguistic universality and variation, of 
language situated among cognition, culture, and reality, of the relationship 
between language structures and mental structures, and of the history and 
evolution of language, minds, and culture.  
The relationship between language and thought is hardly a recent point of 
contention,353 but it does take shape in the contemporary literature largely with 
reference to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity, that language 
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structures thought, and so the structure of language constrains cognition and 
thus worldview.354 The strong version of the hypothesis is linguistic determinism, 
which reduces thought to the syntax of the language of the speaker, and has been 
discredited.355 It was likely operative, however, for the interpreters of Basil 
Bernstein, and perhaps Bernstein himself, who instituted compensatory 
education for poor students who were taken to have an intelligence deficit 
because of their linguistic expression in a restricted code.356 Linguistic relativists 
find support for their view in the findings of linguistic typology,357 which as a 
subfield is positioned either without358 or at least with minimal359 theoretical 
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orientation, and provides empirical evidence of a great deal of structural 
diversity among languages.360 
The opposite end of the pendulum from linguistic determinism is the view 
advocated by Noam Chomsky that there is a universal language faculty innate in 
the human mind, in its initial conception containing a whole set of syntactic 
rules,361 but more recently reduced to the capacity for recursion.362 The structure 
in this faculty then gets specified somewhat variously in different languages. 
Linguistic typology also provides empirical credence to this innate grammar 
view,363 especially in the findings of universality of linguistic demarcation of the 
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color spectrum.364 Given the claim of a universal language faculty, proponents of 
innate grammar seek the origins of language in evolutionary genetics,365 which 
has thus become an important part of the research program in biolinguistics.366 
The challenge for the innate grammar view is that proposals for language 
structures that inhabit the language faculty keep getting shot down for not being 
truly universal. Even the minimalist proposal of recursion, (the nesting of 
clauses), as the only universal upon which all of language is based has been 
challenged by the counterexample of Pirahã and possibly Riau.367 This has 
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created an opening for a weak form of linguistic relativism developed in 
conversation with cognitive science such that language influences or guides but 
does not absolutely determine or structure thought.368 The basic architecture of 
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this program identifies language as part and parcel of general human cognitive 
capacities, and so while cultural (contextual) constraints on language do limit the 
cognitive capacities language users actually employ, they do not limit the 
availability of the full range of capacities in mind potentially.369 
Two such forms of weak linguistic relativism are of particular interest for 
the present project, taking language to be a socially constructed cultural artifact 
or tool that human minds are uniquely equipped to employ. Daniel Everett 
emphasizes the cultural molding of language, and the whole of human 
experience, around the particularities of reality as a given society encounters it, 
which is then appropriated by the almost infinitely malleable and adaptable 
cognitive apparatus.370 Terrence Deacon starts on the other side of the equation, 
richly elaborating the neurological developments that make symbolic thinking 
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possible, which cognitive capacity then coevolves with the cultural artifact of 
language into an almost infinite dexterity of conception to guide action.371 Everett 
lacks a robust account of mentality and cognition, and so risks being read as a 
linguistic determinist. Deacon neglects to link language and thought back up 
with reality as the measure of conception; he also runs the risk of symbolic 
thinking being read as the language faculty of universal grammar. Notably, both 
give accounts of the evolutionary origins of language, each of which helps to 
address their respective deficiencies.372 One goal in chapter five will be to explain 
how the concept of ritual helps to clarify and amplify this account of the 
relationships among language, mind, culture, and reality. 
Philosophy of Language and Logic 
As already mentioned, philosophy of language in the modern period has 
developed to theorize the meaning of language along the divergent tracks of 
focusing on the formal structure of language and focusing on how language is 
used in context. This section elaborates the various philosophical positions that 
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have developed on each track with respect to language meaning as reference or 
otherwise. It also addresses the metaphysical problem of universals as it 
impinges on linguistic meaning. Before all of that, however, the formal structure 
track relies heavily on logic for its articulation and analysis, and so it is profitable 
to consider briefly the nature of logic, problems of logic that pertain to language, 
and some of the varieties of logic that have emerged in the Western philosophical 
tradition. This project would benefit from bringing Western philosophy of 
language and logic into conversation with especially South Asian philosophical 
approaches to these topics,373 but such a comparison exceeds the scope of the 
endeavor at present. 
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Logic 
The track in philosophy of language that focuses on the structure of 
language readily turns to the formalizations of logic in order to articulate and 
analyze that structure. “One aims, in formalizing, to generalise, to simplify, and 
to increase precision and rigour.”374 Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) famously 
claimed that the study of logic was complete with Aristotle,375 but the late 19th 
and 20th centuries would see a flourishing of logical development and debate,376 
beginning with the work of Gottlob Frege, instead along the lines of predicate 
logic developed from the propositional logic of the Stoics.377 Logic aspires to 
develop a minimally extensive vocabulary so as to articulate the form of 
arguments such that their validity may be ascertained. Validity is achieved 
syntactically by deriving the conclusion from the premises according to the 
axioms and rules of the system, or semantically by verifying the truth of the 
premises, and ideally both, in which case the argument is both valid and 
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sound.378 The relationship between logic and language becomes clear when 
natural language is understood to make informal arguments: 
Formal logical systems aim to formalise informal arguments, to represent them in 
precise, rigorous and generalisable terms; and an acceptable formal logical system ought 
to be such that, if a given informal argument is represented in it by a certain formal 
argument, then that formal argument should be valid in the system just in case the 
informal argument is valid in the extra-systematic sense.379 
Logical formalisms may vary with regard to their systems of notation, the 
constants they take to be primitive, whether they rely on axioms or deduce based 
solely on rules of inference, and which axioms or rules they include.380 Thus, it is 
more appropriate to refer to “logics” than to “logic,” and the elaboration of 
several logical systems and families, emphasizing what is at stake when choosing 
among them, is the goal of the remainder of this subsection. 
Classical logics, (e.g. 2-value sentence calculus, predicate calculus), 
evaluate premises in the form of either sentences of natural languages, 
statements of the content of sentences, propositions expressing the common 
meaning of synonymous sentences, or compounds thereof. Premises may be 
evaluated as either true or false such that conclusions drawn of the same form 
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may be either true or false assuming their argument is valid.381 Logical 
arguments are expressed in terms of variables conjoined by connectives such as 
“¬“ (negation, “not”), “Ú” (disjunction, “or”), “Ù” (conjunction, “and”), “®” 
(material implication, “if…then…”), or “º” (material equivalence, “if and only 
if”), and modified by quantifiers such as “$” (existential, “at least one”) or “"” 
(universal, “for all”).382 Connectives383 are usually thought to be logical 
theorems,384 meaning that they are derived solely from the rules of inference 
and/or axioms of a given logic.385 That said, the relationship between the logical 
connectives and their meanings in natural language,386 and the adequacy of 
logical connectives to express the full range of meanings of natural languages, 
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especially conditionals,387 are unsettled matters. Quantifiers388 are generally 
considered concepts applied to concepts,389 but some logicians take them to be 
names.390 The objectual interpretation takes quantifiers to apply to the objects, 
(i.e. variables), in an argument as their values either in a delimited domain, i.e. 
the “model-theoretic” approach, or universally, i.e. the “absolute” approach. By 
contrast, the substitutional interpretation takes the quantifiers, notated “Õ” for 
universal and “å” for existential, to apply not to objects but to “expressions of an 
appropriate syntactic category in the initial language” that make up a 
substitution class.391 
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Alternative logics emerge from concern regarding the application and 
interpretation of the formalism of classical logic, and questions as to the 
adequacy of classical logic to represent certain natural language constructions.392 
In response to the objection that classical logic inadequately accounts for 
temporality, i.e. tense,393 Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000) seeks to maintain 
the formalism of classical logic by adding temporal qualifiers to untensed verbs 
such that variables range over “epochs” of space-time.394 Arthur Norman Prior 
(1914 – 1969) instead extends classical logic by adding tense operators “F” 
(future) and “P” (past) with attendant axioms;395 the former reflects an intent for 
logic to be adequate to science, whereas the latter views logic as prior to 
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science.396 In response to the reality that natural language admits varying degrees 
of vagueness, Rudolf Carnap (1891 – 1970) advocates any vagueness be 
regimented by a process of “precisification.”397 The emergence of fuzzy logic 
represents “a radical challenge to the traditional conception of the scope and 
aims of formal logic”398 by abandoning precision and admitting a range of 
degrees of value reflecting vagueness instead of insisting on the binary of truth 
and falsity.399 Whereas classical logic holds to the principle of deductive 
explosion that from contradictory premises absolutely any conclusion at all may 
be inferred, paraconsistent logics deny that explosion is a necessary outcome of 
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contradiction.400 Relevance logics emerge from concern that in classical logic 
conclusions need not necessarily have anything to do with their premises, and 
with the paradoxes of material and strict implication, and so make adjustments 
in the forms of extensions and restrictions on the classical apparatus to 
compensate.401 By contrast, free logics extend their application beyond the scope 
of their stated domain to address singular and general terms that either denote 
something external to the domain or do not denote at all in order to expand the 
scope of logic beyond the ontological assumption of the existence of terms.402 
Modal logic is a family of logics, including some already addressed, 
developed to express modality in language such as the linguistic constructions 
that express tense, aspect, mood, conditionality, probability, and evidentiality,403 
although it was initially developed to express the epistemic alethic modality of 
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truth.404 Different modal logics include, emphasize, or exclude different 
modalities as they “aspire to represent what is vital to reasoning about 
possibility and necessity while ignoring inessential features of modal discourse 
in ordinary language.”405 Generally speaking, modal logics expand on classical 
logic with the addition of modal operators to express the modality in play in a 
given argument: 
Logic  Symbol  Expression 
Modal  □  It is necessary that… 
  ◇  It is possible that… 
Deontic  O  It is obligatory that… 
  P  It is permitted that… 
  F  It is forbidden that… 
Temporal G  It will always be the case that… 
  F  It will be the case that… 
  H  It has always been the case that… 
  P  It was the case that… 
Doxastic Bx  x believes that…406 
Moreover, the concept of necessity enabled C.I. Lewis, the founder of modal 
logic, to add the connector “⥽” (strict implication, “strictly implies”) in an 
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attempt generally evaluated unsuccessful to overcome the paradoxes of material 
implication.407  
Given the fundamental goal of logic as developing complete and sound 
systems for establishing the validity of arguments, modal logic immediately runs 
into trouble giving an account of its truth conditions. Addressing this problem 
necessitates the deployment of possible world semantics such that the truth-
value v of a modal proposition p is relative to a possible world w, notated v(p,w), 
and so may differ from that in an alternate world w’; a proposition may be 
possibly true in at least one world or necessarily true in every world.408 
Predictably, solving the semantic problem provokes a metaphysical problem as 
to the nature of possible worlds.409 One answer to the problem is to posit concrete 
physical realism, in which the actual world is the physical universe we inhabit 
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and possible worlds vary from this one to varying degrees and actually exist.410 
Another is conceptualist abstractionism, in which possible worlds are all of the 
other ways, down to exquisite levels of detail, the actual world could be 
imagined to be other than it is.411 For combinatorialism, possible worlds are 
rearrangements of metaphysical simples, universals and particulars, so as to 
achieve maximal consistency with the actual world.412 
As this discussion makes clear, logicians shape their formalisms in 
relation to metaphysical and epistemological orientations and to their theory of 
truth, among other considerations. An important metaphysical issue at the level 
of philosophy of logic has to do with the relationships among all of the different 
types of logic.413 Logical monists see the diversity of logics “as making rival 
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claims about what formalism correctly represents extra-systematically valid 
arguments/logical truths.”414 Logical pluralists allow that multiple logics could be 
correct, with global pluralists taking the view that different logics represent the 
truth of the same arguments in different senses, and local pluralists taking 
different logics to apply in different situations and areas of discourse.415 Logical 
instrumentalists deny that correctness is an appropriate category for logic, 
arguing instead that logics can be more or less useful than one another, mapping 
neither to language nor reality such that truth and validity are system 
restricted.416  
So too epistemologically at the level of philosophy of logic, logicians must 
decide if they understand themselves to be fallible with respect to their own 
beliefs and their logics to be at least potentially methodologically fallible, 
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possibly as a result of their own fallibility.417 Most contemporary logicians 
embrace some form of fallibilism, but arguments against fallibilistic 
interpretations of logic include positing the necessity of logical laws, the idea that 
logical propositions are self-evident, and the case that since logical truths are 
analytic they are therefore manifest.418 Also, just as the relationship between 
language and thought may be construed in several configurations, the 
relationship between logic and thought has been construed in three ways: strong 
psychologism (Kant), where logic describes how we do or must think; weak 
psychologism (Peirce), where logic prescribes how we should think; and anti-
psychologism (Frege), where logic has nothing to do with thought.419  
Theories of truth may be distinguished between those that provide a 
definition of truth, that is, they give a “meaning of the word ‘true,’” and those 
that provide a criterion of truth, that is, they give a “test by means of which to 
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tell whether a sentence (or whatever) is true or false.”420 Correspondence theories 
define truth by relation to the world, whereas coherence theories define truth by 
relations among sets of beliefs. Pragmatist theories tend toward the 
correspondence theory but hold coherence as a means of testing and 
confirmation.421 Alfred Tarski (1901 – 1983) instead offers a semantic, 
conventional criterion for truth such that a sentence “φ” in a logic L is true if and 
only if φ, (the state of affairs described by “φ”), and a recursive definition of 
truth that satisfies the conventional criterion.422 Whereas Tarski demurred from 
the application of his procedure beyond formal logic to natural language, Donald 
Davidson (1917 – 2003) set out to do just that, largely on the basis of the 
generative grammar of Noam Chomsky, by developing a non-representational 
semantic holism in the vein of pragmatism.423 Finally, deflationist theories reject 
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truth as a metaphysical principle and so understand talk of truth and truth 
conditions to be redundant because the proposition that “’φ’ is true” is just an 
assertion that, and so means, φ.424 
Reference 
Philosophy of language may best be understood to be generally concerned 
with the meaning of language and an intuitive notion of meaning has to do with 
the reference of words and phrases to things and states of affairs in the world. 
However, many words do not refer to actual objects, more than one word or 
phrase may refer to the same object, and language is rather obviously more than 
just a list of names anyway.425 On the other hand, clearly quite a few words, 
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which logicians refer to as “singular terms,”426 do at least seem to refer directly 
to, or name, objects, and so the problem of reference persists in philosophy of 
language. Bertrand Russell (1872 – 1970) argues to the contrary that at least the 
class of singular terms called definite descriptions, such as “The author of this 
dissertation,” do not denote a particular person because the article “the” is 
functioning as a quantifier. Instead, the phrase is properly understood generally 
as “at least one person authored this dissertation” and “at most one person 
authored this dissertation.”427 P.F. Strawson (1919 – 2006) rejects this analysis 
from the perspective that language itself does not refer, rather humans refer 
using language. In this conception, a contradictory definite description such as 
“the many authors of this dissertation,” attempts but fails to refer for this 
dissertation having only one author even before it has the opportunity to be true 
or false. Strawson also points out the context dependence of many definite 
descriptions, such as “the dissertation,” which according to the second conjunct 
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of Russell’s analysis entails that there is only one dissertation in the entire 
universe.428 Keith Donnellan (1931 – 2015) chastises both Russell and Strawson 
for failing to distinguish attributive from referential uses of definite descriptions. 
Consider the statement, “her dissertation is well written,” i.e. “the ø is Y.” The 
claim may fail in attribution if the dissertation in question is written by someone 
other than her, (“if nothing is the ø then nothing has been said to be Y”). Yet it 
may succeed in referring to the dissertation at hand, (“the fact that nothing is the 
ø does not have this consequence”).429 Saul Kripke disputes Donnellan with a 
distinction between speaker reference, or the object a speaker intends to identify, 
and semantic reference, or the object linguistically encoded in a given expression. 
Kripke insists that truth only applies to semantic reference no matter whether the 
speaker reference manages to successfully communicate anyway.430 Alfred F. 
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MacKay adds a third term, the “actual” referent, to indicate the object ultimately 
taken to have been referred to, which may turn out to be either the speaker 
referent, or the semantic referent, or in extreme cases, something else entirely.431 
Gareth Evans (1946 – 1980) notes that Russellian treatment of anaphoric direct 
descriptions, which inherit their meaning from another, usually antecedent, 
expression, “fails when the antecedent is a quantifier phrase or an indefinite 
description.”432 
Russell extends his description theory from definite descriptions to proper 
names by arguing that proper names are merely abbreviated definite 
descriptions. This view contradicts the direct reference theory classically 
elaborated by John Stuart Mill (1806 – 1873) that names introduce particular 
things they designate into discourse.433 John R. Searle expands the description 
																																																								
431 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, 29–30; Alfred F. MacKay, “Mr. Donnellan and Humpty Dumpty 
on Referring,” The Philosophical Review 77, no. 2 (1968): 197–202, https://doi.org/10.2307/2183320. 
432 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, 31–32; Gareth Evans, “Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative 
Clauses (I),” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, no. 3 (September 1977): 467–536, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40230703. 
433 Lycan, Philosophy of Language, 37–40; Russell, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism”; Mill, A 
System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, 1843; Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, 
1843; Ruth Barcan Marcus, “Extensionality,” Mind 69, no. 273 (1960): 55–62, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251588; Ruth Barcan Marcus, Modalities : Philosophical Essays (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993); David Kaplan, “How to Russell a Frege-Church,” The 
Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 19 (1975): 716–29, https://doi.org/10.2307/2024635; Nathan U. Salmon, 
Reference and Essence, 2nd ed. (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005). 
	 	185 
theory to encapsulate a “sufficient but vague and unspecified number” of 
“standard identifying statements” that form a cluster to which a given name 
refers. Notably, the theory emerges in response to concerns regarding the one-to-
one correspondence of name and description and the variety of descriptions 
different speakers could legitimately associate with a given name in the 
Russellian account.434 Saul Kripke overturns the description theory of reference in 
part by recourse to arguments within the classical logic of Russell and Searle435 
but also significantly by shifting the frame to modal logic and possible world 
semantics. This shift allows him to argue that the same name may refer to the 
same individual in different possible worlds and yet that individual will need to 
be described differently according to the alternate actualizations at play in their 
world.436 Kripke replaces the description theory with a semantic theory of names 
as rigid designators of the same object across all possible worlds437 and a causal-
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historical theory of reference such that a given use of a name to designate an 
individual relies upon a repetitive sequence over time in a community of the 
name being used to refer to the same individual.438 Kripke and Hilary Putnam 
(1926 – 2016) independently extended the project to natural kind terms, and 
Putnam demonstrated by recourse to a thought experiment involving a “Twin 
Earth” that linguistic meaning arises at the intersection of thoughts and ideas, the 
conventions of communal use, and the reality of the world.439  
Meaning 
If reference is inadequate as a theory of meaning, at least on its own, as it 
seems to be, then an adequate theory of meaning will have to navigate the 
intersection Putnam maps among individual minds in communities and societies 
interacting with the real world via a complex, nested, and multivalent medium. 
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One set of meaning theories takes meanings to themselves be individual actual 
entities. John Locke (1632 – 1704) posits that meanings are content bearing ideas, 
thoughts, beliefs, images, or mental states, and so language may be understood 
as meaningful when it expresses one of these.440 Aside from the typical objections 
raised to the ideational theory among philosophers of language largely on logical 
grounds,441 it also has the disadvantage of so privileging the contents of 
individual minds that their existing in society, responding to a common reality, 
and expressing in a complex medium all but fail to register. Gottlob Frege turned 
from idea entities to proposition entities,442 but neither he nor Russell443 nor G.E. 
Moore (1873 – 1958),444 the principal proponents of proposition theory, manage to 
define propositions beyond their role in the theory except to say that they are the 
general contents of expressions rather than of ideas. Nevertheless, as abstract 
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entities, propositions do have the advantage of shifting away from the contents 
of mind without losing track of the role of the individual so as to be situated 
intersubjectively, (i.e. socially), and also of better coping with the complexities 
and ambiguities of the linguistic medium.445 However, since proposition theories 
do not claim that propositions necessarily address states of affairs in reality, it is 
unclear why propositions themselves are not merely formalizations of natural 
language into a more restricted domain, and so function as a metalanguage. 
Neither is it clear how propositions abstracted from reality could influence either 
social or individual action.446 
An alternative to entity theories of meaning is to theorize meaning as 
arising from language use. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 – 1951) and J.L. Austin 
(1911 – 1960) independently inaugurated use theories of meaning as arising from 
individual moves made in the social context of rule-governed conventional 
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behaviors and practices.447 Wittgenstein analogizes language, at least in part, to 
the playing of games such that the meaning of a word or a sentence is relative to 
the rules of the language game being played, i.e. the classroom game, the family 
game, the church service game, the dissertation defense game, etc., and is 
constituted by the function of what it accomplishes in being played.448 Wilfrid 
Sellars (1912 – 1989) develops the notion of language games to account for the 
social dimensions of inferring such that validity arises from following the rule-
governed activity of inference rather than universal truth conditions.449 Robert 
Brandom presses this inferentialism into a systematic account of meaning. He 
argues that in many language games, assertions are made and rendered explicit 
in logical vocabulary that the language user is then committed to defending 
against objections and challenges by recourse to reasons drawn by inference 
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from other assertions according to rules, and that entitle the user to derive 
further inferences, which together constitute a form of scorekeeping.450  
Austin develops a use theory of meaning in the idiom of performance 
rather than games such that language performs different sorts of speech acts 
governed by rules. Linguistic performances not only assert descriptions or 
propositions as locutions but also almost always accomplish outcomes by 
illocutionary force and sometimes even change the minds of their hearers by 
perlocutionary force.451 The ideational theory identified meaning primarily with 
ideas in the mind to the exclusion of the social, linguistic, and real-world 
dimensions. Likewise, use theories swing the pendulum to the role of the social 
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in constructing and maintaining meaning to the exclusion of any role for 
individual intentions while struggling to address linguistic complexity and 
leaving off any discussion of the real world. 
H. Paul Grice (1913 – 1988) attempts to strike a balance between personal 
and social meaning by distinguishing speaker-meaning from expression-
meaning, which may nevertheless be derived from the former, in context of a set 
of rules that govern cooperative conversation that he called “conversational 
implicature.” First, he articulates a psychological theory of speaker-meaning 
rooted in the communicative intention of language users to convey beliefs and 
other psychological states, which contrasts with the stable (timeless) meaning 
that resides within an expression itself. Thus, expression meaning (E), which is 
timeless, may be formalized as “E means that p,” whereas speaker meaning (S), 
which is contextual, may be formalized by “S means that p by E,” and they may 
be expressed together (SE) as “E means that p if and only if ‘people’ (vague) 
mean that p by E.” While a number of objections, both sympathetic and 
otherwise, have arisen to this derivation of meaning from language user 
intention, there is general agreement that accounting for intent is critical for a 
theory of meaning, perhaps by bringing Grice into the orbit of Davidsonian 
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semantics.452 Second, Grice recognizes that the intentions of language users must 
be expressed in conformity with the cooperative social norms that determine the 
success of communication in a conversational setting. He articulated these norms 
as a single cooperative principle and four categories of conversational maxim: 
Cooperative principle: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the 
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in 
which you are engaged. 
Four Maxims: 
Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required but no more so. 
Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false or that for which you lack adequate 
evidence. 
Relation: Be relevant. 
Manner: Avoid obscurity of expression and ambiguity; be brief and orderly.453 
These norms function to implicate meanings that derive from the conversational 
context and so transcend and even contradict expression meanings;454 
conventional implicatures rely not on context but on words that press the 
meaning of the statement beyond its truth value.455 This approach has the 
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advantage of navigating more of the landmarks Putnam demarcated: taking 
seriously the complex medium of language in expression meaning, highlighting 
the role of individual intent in speaker meaning, and codifying the social context 
in conversational implicature. The possibility of connecting this theory up with 
Davidsonian semantics, as will be seen, is promising for connecting up with the 
real world as well. 
Among the perspectives presented thus far, the connection between 
language and the real world is the landmark of linguistic meaning Putnam 
identifies that is most consistently neglected, attention to which was the one 
thing going for the reference theories. Truth conditional theories directly address 
that connection, in part by turning back to something like a reference theory, 
addressing linguistic complexity through a form of semantic atomism and 
syntactic compositionality, although they struggle with language user intention 
and social context. Truth condition theories are historically preceded by the 
verification condition theories at the heart of logical positivism, like that of A.J. 
Ayer (1910 – 1989). Verificationist theories locate meaning in the impact of 
sentences on future experiences, and so are epistemic accounts seeking to 
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establish an evidence base in empirical sense data.456 Willard Van Orman Quine, 
following Pierre Duhem (1861 – 1916), challenges the verification program on the 
basis that the immediate verification conditions assume certain empirical 
conditions and so themselves must be established empirically, resulting in an 
infinite regress. Combined with his attack on the analyticity of sentences, this 
infinite regress argument results in Quine denying that there is any such thing as 
meaning vis-à-vis individual sentences in his thesis of the “indeterminacy of 
translation.” Quine concludes that absolute knowledge of the totality of 
empirical reality would not be sufficient to adjudicate whether one translation of 
a claim about reality is more or less correct than another.457 This skepticism about 
sentence meaning derives from Quine adopting semantic holism, as does Donald 
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Davidson, such that the meaning of all words are interdependent to the extent 
that changing the meaning of one word changes the meanings of all of the 
others.458 This in turn leaves Davidson in the position of having to harmonize 
holism with compositionality, or the idea that the meaning of a sentence is made 
up of the meanings of the words that make it up.459 Whereas the verification 
program seeks to establish an epistemic basis for knowing when a statement is 
true, the truth conditional theory Davidson develops rejects epistemology and 
simply identifies meaning with the set of conditions under which a sentence 
would be true. These truth conditions are also compositional and so describable 
in terms of symbolic logic of a Tarskian variety when disentangled from the 
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surface grammar.460 Two variations on truth conditional theories include game 
theoretic semantics461 and perspectival semantics,462 whereas recourse to 
intensional logics and Kripkean possible worlds semantics enables extension of 
truth conditional theories to include not only actual but also hypothetical 
referents and the Fregean sense of a term.463  
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Clearly, the truth conditional theories go the farthest in terms of linking 
language up with the world as the measure of linguistic truth, and of adequately 
addressing the complexity of language by harmonizing compositionality with 
holism. Thus, there is good reason to hope that a Davidsonian truth conditional 
program, extended to incorporate modality, might be integrated with a Gricean 
program that centers language user intention and conversational implicature in 
order to adequately address all four of the landmarks Putnam demarcated for a 
theory of meaning. One goal in chapter five is to show how conceiving language 
as ritual achieves just that. 
Universals 
The philosophical problem of universals, arising with Plato (~428 – 348 
BCE) and Aristotle (384 – 322  BCE) and then reaching a pinnacle of contestation 
in the Medieval period in the West, ranges across the philosophical fields of 
metaphysics, epistemology, logic, philosophy of language, and philosophy of 
mind.464 A basic construal of the problem is whether or not individual things and 
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the general properties that inhere across a variety of instantiations in individual 
things have independent metaphysical status.465 Realists argue that both things 
and properties do have such status independent of the mental or linguistic 
representations of them such that ideas, words, and sentences at least have the 
possibility of evaluation as true or false; reality is anything, both things and 
properties, that we could be wrong about.466 Nominalists deny independent 
metaphysical status to properties (universals or abstract entities), instead 
understanding them as part and parcel of the linguistic apparatus functioning as 
means of comparison and contrast among objects (particulars or concrete 
entities), and so shift universals from metaphysics into philosophy of language.467 
Idealists or conceptualists are similarly anti-realist, but instead of understanding 
universals as inhering in language, they take universals to be fundamental 
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mental categories that organize objects in experience, and so shift universals 
from metaphysics into epistemology and philosophy of mind.468 Notably, these 
three positions identify universals with three of the four landmarks Putnam 
identified: realism with reality, nominalism with language, and idealism with 
individual minds (intentions). Social scientists, but not philosophers, have 
discussed cultural or social universals, such as language, cognition, myth, ritual, 
aesthetics, technology, and society itself, as communally held concepts, norms, 
patterns, or institutions that organize relationships. This approach, in a 
philosophical mode, would presumably similarly reject metaphysical status to 
properties and instead shift them into ethics and political philosophy. In fact, this 
is effectively what has happened in postmodern and other forms of post-
structuralist philosophy, seemingly without ever actually discussing universals. 
Of course, this possibility circles back around to the debates about linguistic 
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relativity at the end of the previous section.469 An argument to be made in 
chapter five is that the social scientific concept of ritual, rendered philosophical 
in conversation with Confucian ritual theory, has the capacity to address 
universals holistically amongst the four landmarks of mind, society, language, 
and reality by rendering a more robust account of critical realism.470 
Hermeneutics 
In interrogating linguistic meaning, philosophy of language generally 
privileges the perspective of the language user at the point of generating 
meaning in language. By contrast, hermeneutics as developed in continental 
philosophy generally comes at meaning from the perspective of the language 
interpreter who must make sense of the linguistic material received. Whereas 
philosophy of language, like linguistics, privileges speech, hermeneutics 
privileges texts. Nevertheless, there are numerous loci of common interest and 
overlap between them, and this distinction should not at all be taken as 
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determinative.471 Moreover, hermeneutics may be taken to connote a set of 
domains in continental philosophy concerned with language, in a sense 
analogous to philosophy of language within analytic philosophy, in addition to 
its narrower use with respect to interpreting language, especially texts. This 
section begins by directly addressing the latter and then ranges over the domain 
of the former, all the while largely abiding in philosophical as opposed to biblical 
or scriptural hermeneutics. 
Hermeneutics 
The very word “hermeneutics” derives from the name of the Greek god 
Hermes and appears in the title of Aristotle’s treatment of interpretation in Περὶ 
Ἑρµηνείας (Peri Hermeneias, On Interpretation) but remained largely a set of 
normative guidelines within various interpretive disciplines until much more 
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recently.472 Developed largely in Germany, the advent of philosophical 
hermeneutics may be construed as a gradual drawing together of universalizing 
threads from disciplinarily defined hermeneutic guidelines into a unified theory 
of the role of interpretation as grounding the human condition. The domain of 
hermeneutics is variously oriented around three key terms: Verstehen 
(understanding), Auslegung (interpretation), and Erkennen (knowledge).473 
Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768 – 1834) may be said to have 
inaugurated philosophical hermeneutics by adopting the Kantian notion of 
understanding as the very capacity of reason and experience such that 
understanding is no longer the result of interpretation but is rather its source and 
that to which interpretation returns, and is fundamentally linguistic at that.474 
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Wilhelm von Humboldt develops the idea of the linguistic nature of 
understanding by identifying Sprachkraft (linguistic competence) as the 
intersection between the reference and structure of language and the individual 
mental processes of language users. This connection with the mental as the locus 
of meaning results in a conception of linguistic relativity very much like that of 
Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897 – 1941).475 Johann Gustav Droysen (1808 – 1884) 
continued this turn back toward viewing understanding, which he identified 
with historical knowledge, as resulting from interpretation, and to the linguistic 
nature of understanding he added expressive intent, i.e. psychological, 
emotional, and spiritual meaning.476 August Boeckh (1785 – 1867) situated 
interpretation as arising from understanding in four modes: grammatical (i.e. 
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linguistic), historical, generic, and individual (i.e. expression), and so generating 
understanding as “knowledge of what is known” or “knowledge of what has 
been produced by the human spirit.”477 Wilhelm Dilthey (1833 – 1911) makes a 
significant shift away from taking understanding to be linguistic, instead 
identifying the basis of understanding in the Erlebnis (lived experience) of social, 
cultural, relational, and physical ecologies, which interpretation makes manifest 
in the form of Lebensäußerung (life expression).478 Edmund Husserl (1859 – 1938) 
likewise develops a rigorous program for identifying the common ground for 
understanding in human intentional activity, linguistic and otherwise, that 
enables intersubjective meaning such that hermeneutics is possible as the 
elaboration of the Lebenswelt (lifeworld).479 
																																																								
477 Mueller-Vollmer, Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the 
Present, 20–23; August Boeckh, On Interpretation and Criticism, trans. John Paul Pritchard 
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968); Niall Keane and Chris Lawn, The Blackwell 
Companion to Hermeneutics (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2015), chap. 40. 
478 Mueller-Vollmer, Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the 
Present, 25–28; Wilhelm Dilthey, Understanding the Human World, vol. 2, Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected 
Works (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Wilhelm Dilthey, The Formation of the 
Historical World in the Human Sciences, vol. 3, Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Works (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2010); Wilhelm Dilthey, Hermeneutics and the Study of History, vol. 4, 
Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Works (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); H. A. Hodges, 
Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey (London: Routledge, 2013); Jos de Mul, The Tragedy of Finitude: 
Dilthey’s Hermeneutics of Life (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004). 
479 Mueller-Vollmer, Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the 
Present, 28–30, 165–66; Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, ed. Dermot Moran, trans. J.N. 
Findlay, vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 2012); Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, ed. Dermot 
Moran, trans. J.N. Findlay, vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 2013); Edmund Husserl, Cartesian 
	 	205 
Hermeneutics fully flowers as fundamental philosophy in the twentieth 
century by both advancing inherited ideas and making important breaks 
therewith so as to achieve universality via a type of semantic holism. This 
approach is best articulated in terms of the hermeneutic circle identified by 
Friedrich Ast (1778 – 1841) and summarized by Schleiermacher as the principle 
that “the understanding of the whole is not only conditioned by that of the 
particular, but also, vice versa, that of the particular by that of the whole.”480 
Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976) translates the hermeneutical circle into the 
domain of ontology, thereby collapsing phenomenology into hermeneutics, in 
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order to explicate the interpretation of Sein (being) by Dasein (being-there). 
Dasein, for Heidegger, means authentic human existence as intentionally 
involved in the world as a contingent and changing self: “The ‘circle’ in 
understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is 
rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein—that is, in the understanding 
which interprets. An entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an 
issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure.”481 Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900 – 
2002) alternatively explicates the hermeneutical circle in terms of the Vorurteil 
(prejudice) arising from the Wirkungsgeschichte (effective history) in which 
interpreter and object relate, which is revised when language enacts 
Horizontverschmelzung (fusion of horizions) of interpreter and object to achieve 
a renewed understanding.482 Ray L. Hart insists that the notion of a hermeneutic 
spiral, in which interpretation of what is given enriches cognition so as to attain a 
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point above where it started, is more appropriate to hermeneutics so transposed 
onto the domain of ontology than a circle. This is because semantic holism is 
inappropriate for interpreting the simultaneously hidden and revealed 
phenomena that appear in being.483 Agreeing with Gadamer that hermeneutics 
prevents language from becoming hermetically sealed by constantly renewing 
and refining it, Jürgen Habermas is nevertheless initially concerned about the 
oppressive potential enabled in granting primary authority to tradition, and that 
the universality of hermeneutics belies a creeping Kantian idealism. That said, 
Habermas later abandons his own predilection toward Marxist idealism for an 
ethic grounded in the ongoing social process toward achieving linguistic 
agreement, and thus re-universalizes hermeneutics.484 These concerns will return, 
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however, in the subsection below on theory and criticism, following 
consideration of the flip side of the hermeneutic coin, namely, rhetoric. 
Rhetoric 
Despite its tarnished reputation,485 the redemption of rhetoric becomes 
obvious when it is understood as the inverse and reflex of hermeneutics, with 
which it shares in linguistic universality.486 Rhetoric organizes and structures 
language, signs, and discourse on the basis of how the result may be expected to 
be interpreted such that meaning will be communicated so as to have 
influence:487 “We can define the art of rhetoric as follows: The systematic study 
and intentional practice of effective symbolic expression. Effective here will mean 
achieving the purposes of the symbol-user, whether that purpose is persuasion, 
clarity, beauty, or mutual understanding.”488 Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 – 43 
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BCE) distinguishes five rhetorical stages leading up to and delivering such an 
expression: inventio (invention) – developing arguments and collecting evidence; 
dispositio (arrangement) – organizing arguments an evidence logically and by 
importance; elocutio (make eloquent) – ornamenting with stylistic devices; 
memoria (memory) – retain the preceding; actio/pronunciatio (pronouncement) – 
style of delivery including modulation of voice and coordination of gesture and 
expression.489 Aristotle elaborates three modes of effective expressions: ἦθος 
(ethos, character) – appealing to the authority of the rhetor, either inherently or 
by adopting the mantle of another; πάθος (pathos, suffering) – appealing to the 
emotions of the audience, including by aesthetic effect; and λόγος (logos, logic) – 
appeal to the reason of what the expression presents.490 Indeed, Hugo Mercier 
and Dan Sperber argue that human reason evolved precisely “to devise and 
evaluate arguments intended to persuade.”491 Instead of construing the resulting 
relationship between rhetor and audience as necessarily agonistic, Kenneth 
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Burke (1897 – 1993) insists that successful persuasion requires identification so as 
to achieve “consubstantiality” of interests, property, or motivation, although he 
is at pains to acknowledge that such identifications need not necessarily be 
true.492 
Classically, rhetoric is anti-positivist in that it specifically and directly 
addresses contingent matters that do not admit of a straightforward delineation 
of truth or falsity.493 Rhetorical theorist Lloyd Bitzer (1931 – 2016) puts it this 
way: “rhetoric applies to contingent and probable matters which are subjects of 
actual or possible disagreement by serious people, and which permit alternative 
beliefs, values, and positions.”494 As a result, rhetoric is constitutive for a number 
of social functions such as testing ideas, drawing attention to issues, making facts 
commonly available, giving shape to knowledge, and establishing and 
maintaining community.495 This last will become especially important for 
bringing language into conversation with ritual theory, so it is worth noting here 
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that “communities are largely defined, and rendered healthy or dysfunctional, by 
the language they use to characterize themselves and others,” and thus are 
“living creatures, nurtured and nourished by rhetorical discourse.”496 Moreover, 
“rhetoric is the primary – indeed, the only – humane manner for an 
argumentative culture to sustain public institutions that reflect on themselves, 
that learn, so to speak, from their own history.”497 Thus, hermeneutics is 
grounded in individual human understanding, whereas rhetoric moves outward 
to cultivate the common ground of sociality. 
Theory and Criticism 
Hermeneutics, especially with the likes of Gadamer at the tiller, eschews 
the particularity of method for the universality of truth, whereas theory, which 
forms the basis for criticism, (hence, “critical theory”), revels in the derivation of 
method from theory as a critique of universality. This contrariness to 
hermeneutics is driven home by the figurehead of critical theory, Karl Marx 
(1818 – 1883), notably well before the advent of twentieth century philosophical 
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hermeneutics: “the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; 
the point, however, is to change it.”498 This goal of the program is confirmed by 
one of its progenitors in the Frankfurt School of social theory, Max Horkheimer 
(1895 – 1973): “to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave 
them.”499 Theory and its application in criticism emerge distinctly but relatedly in 
the arenas of the social sciences and literature from a range of stances at play in 
the humanities, especially philosophy. They seek to be reflexively aware of their 
conditioning by the particularities of their historical, cultural, social, political, 
and economic context, and take liberation, emancipation, and transformation as 
their telos.500 If this program seems to make more sense with respect to social 
science than to literature, consider  
that literature does not exist in the sense that insects do, and that the value-judgements 
by which it is constituted are historically variable, but that these value-judgements 
themselves have a close relation to social ideologies. They refer in the end not simply to 
private taste, but to the assumptions by which certain social groups exercise and 
maintain power over others.501 
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The remainder of this subsection presents first modern and then postmodern 
theories frequently employed in social and literary critique, and then considers 
the particular project of critical discourse analysis, but there are a few 
perspectives that cut across all of them, albeit in various ways and to differing 
degrees: “Politics is pervasive, Language is constitutive, Truth is provisional, 
Meaning is contingent, Human nature is a myth.”502 Chapter five will show how 
ritual copes with each in turn. 
In a narrow sense, critical theory refers to socio-cultural critiques based on 
the theory of economic determinism advanced by Marx and his colleague 
Friedrich Engels (1820 – 1895). They argued that the economic infrastructure of 
production, distribution, and exchange is determinative of the socio-cultural or 
ideological superstructure, including language, resulting in class-based struggles 
to attain and maintain power, from which oppression of inequality they seek to 
provide emancipation and liberation.503 This program was taken up, pursued, 
																																																								
502 Peter Barry, Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory (London: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 38–39; Brian Russell Graham, “Resistance to Recurrent Ideas in Critical 
Theory,” Anglo-Files, no. 180 (May 2016): 88–97, https://vbn.aau.dk/en/publications/resistance-to-
recurrent-ideas-in-critical-theory. 
503 Barry, Beginning Theory, chap. 8; James Bohman, “Critical Theory,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall, 2016, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/critical-theory/; Marx and Engels, Marx & 
Engels Collected Works, 2010, 5:19ff; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Marx & Engels Collected 
Works, vol. 6 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2010), 477–519; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
	 	214 
and developed by the theorists of the Frankfurt School,504 but eventually ran 
afoul of historicist skepticism and philosophical relativism in the wake of 
critiques of Enlightenment reasoning such as those advanced by Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1844 – 1900) and Sigmund Freud (1856 – 1939).505 This resulted in a 
reformulation of critical theory by Jürgen Habermas in a pragmatist, fallibilist, 
naturalist, and empirical mode in greater sympathy with Gadamerian 
hermeneutics.506 Grappling with internal inconsistencies also opened the door to 
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a wider sense of critical theory that includes perspectives from hermeneutics. 
Some more recent theorists address the phenomenology of Husserl between pure 
intentional consciousness and the essences of objects in the world as they appear 
before it irrespective of language. They also explore the existentialism of 
Heidegger cheering the striving of human existence via language to surpass the 
concrete situation of the social and natural world that can never be fully 
objectified as a singular reality. Some embrace the hermeneutics of Gadamer at 
the fusion of past and present horizons mediated by their common tradition 
toward an unfolding future of possibility.507 Whereas Marxist theory seeks to 
expose the implicit ideology behind the social and psychological frameworks of 
language and society, phenomenology attempts to address them as they are 
given head on, and hermeneutics interprets them against the backdrop of 
received tradition and present interests. All of these theories are implicated, 
positively and negatively, in structuralism, extrapolated from the study of 
linguistic structure by Ferdinand de Saussure. Structuralism takes the meaning 
of an element of a system, such as a word in a language, to be defined by its 
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relations to all of the other elements as determined by the structure of the system, 
which structures constitute the meaningful world in which humans live and 
interact.508 It is somewhat unsurprising that the subsequent backlash in the form 
of post-structuralism reflexed the structuralist insight into the arbitrariness of 
signs with respect to their objects onto the structures themselves. As a result, for 
poststructuralists, meaning becomes capricious to the whims of contingent 
power as instantiated in metaphysical systems that ground transcendental 
meaning because they necessarily could be otherwise. Power systems therefore 
require ideological deconstruction in order to overcome the oppression of 
difference rooted in contradictions necessarily internal to any structure so as to 
liberate their surplus of meaning.509 
Thus, post-structuralism elides over into postmodernism characterized by 
“incredulity toward metanarratives” according to Jean-François Lyotard (1924 – 
1998). Signs that had been taken to stand for something real are instead 
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recognized as merely referring to other signs in the system, which becomes a 
hyperreal “simulacrum,” i.e. metanarrative, in which surface and depth, reality 
and illusion become indistinguishable.510 The liberative framework of earlier 
paradigms survives the shift to postmodernism but the post-structuralist 
challenge to normativity means that there is nothing that those liberated from 
oppression are emancipated to: the eschatology of liberation falls out. The 
typology of the so-called “waves” of feminism,511 itself a critique of all of the 
above theory with the goal of liberating women,512 demonstrates this shift at 
play, with the caveat that the typology is both historically and theoretically 
overdrawn.513 The first wave, up through the 1950s, was focused on women’s 
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suffrage, and though ideologically diverse over its century-and-a-half course, in 
part drew on Marxist theory toward “equity and equal opportunities for women 
and men.”514 The radical part of the second wave “was theoretically based on a 
combination of neo-Marxism and psychoanalysis”515 in ways that opened up 
powerful critiques of patriarchy at the intersection of gender, race, and class.516 
Another trajectory in the second wave begins with a liberal feminism that takes 
the social value and experience of white, middle-class, Western women as equal 
to that of men and normative for all women.517 That trajectory provokes a shift 
toward structuralism to form difference feminism on the basis of standpoint 
theory to account for gender differences,518 and then transitions to identity 
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feminism to account for differences among women on the basis of race, class, 
sexuality, nationality, etc.519 European feminists including Hélène Cixous, Luce 
Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva are explicit in their shift to post-structuralism as they 
employ structuralist analysis to diagnose the “phallogocentrism” of Western 
culture. They diagnose this social malady as arising from dualisms that not only 
distinguish difference but also assign value to one side over the other, and then 
demand its deconstruction in order to subvert the unintentional support of 
hegemonic conceptualities by the difference discourses.520 This post-structuralist 
or postmodern shift also marks the advent of the third wave who take up the 
vocation of deconstruction: “It criticizes earlier feminist waves for presenting 
universal answers or definitions of womanhood and for developing their 
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particular interests into somewhat static identity politics.”521 Third wave theorists 
like Judith Butler advocate an “understanding of gender as a discursive practice 
that is both a hegemonic, social matrix and a ‘performative gesture’ with the 
power to disturb the chain of social repetition and open up new realities.”522 As 
Nancy Fraser points out, however, these postmodern demands for recognition of 
individual performances fall far short of providing a positive vision for ethics or 
politics, that is, of a theory of justice, to guide the socio-cultural flows of power 
and resources,523 although Butler has more recently taken a step in this 
direction.524 Similar narratives of theoretical development could be offered for 
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other critical theories, such as critical race theory,525 queer theory,526 postcolonial 
theory,527 etc., all of which intersect with feminist theory, but the extent to which 
feminism has itself been theorized as an historical phenomenon makes it most 
amenable for present purposes. A fourth wave of feminism, perhaps underway, 
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seems to be employing frameworks of affect528 and intersectionality529 in the 
context of social media in order to identify, challenge, and rally support against 
persistent, global, oppressive violence against women.530 
While language is intimately bound up both in these theoretical 
paradigms themselves and in what they are often directed to critique, critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) is explicit in connecting theory with language 
understood as a form of social practice, i.e. discourse,531 and draws a number of 
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theories together.532 CDA brings linguistic analysis to bear on texts in order to 
elucidate how those “texts as elements of social events have causal effects – i.e. 
they bring about changes” by constructing, reconstructing, or deconstructing 
social realities, especially those pertaining to power relationships and dynamics 
in the form of ideologies.533 Norman Fairclough advocates using the Systemic 
Functional Linguistics developed by Michael Halliday (1925 – 2018) and others to 
map the choices available in a language system in order to uncover the 
ideologies that motivate making a given linguistic choice rather than another.534 
Analysis of a given text understood as a social event begins by taking account of 
the speech acts performed therein, other textual events it may be related to and 
																																																								
532 Terry Threadgold, “Cultural Studies, Critical Theory and Critical Discourse Analysis: 
Histories, Remembering and Futures.,” Linguistik Online 14, no. 2 (2003): 5–37, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.13092/lo.14.821. 
533 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse, 7–10. 
534 Fairclough, 5–6; Halliday, Matthiessen, and Matthiessen, An Introduction to Functional 
Grammar; Michael Alexander Kirkwood Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan, Language, Context, and Text: 
Aspects of Language in a Social-Semiotic Perspective (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991); 
Ruqaiya Hasan, Ways of Saying: Ways of Meaning: Selected Papers of Ruqaiya Hasan (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2015); Lynne Young and Claire Harrison, Systemic Functional Linguistics and Critical 
Discourse Analysis: Studies in Social Change (London: Continuum, 2004); Robert Ian Vere Hodge 
and Gunther R. Kress, Language as Ideology, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993); Robert 
Hodge and Gunther Kress, Social Semiotics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Gunther 
R. Kress and Theo Van Leeuwen, Multimodal Discourse: The Modes and Media of Contemporary 
Communication (London: Arnold, 2001); Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, Discourse in 
Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 
1999). 
	 	224 
how, ways in which it addresses and copes with difference, genres to which it 
conforms, and existential, propositional, axiological, and ideological assumptions 
it makes.535 Semantic analysis helps to unpack the rhetorical strategy of the text in 
terms of the ordering of the argument, the ornamenting devices employed to 
enhance persuasiveness, and the ways in which, and degree to which, the world 
and things in it are discursively represented.536 Stylistic analysis, to be elaborated 
in greater detail in the next subsection, helps tease out the attitudes and intents 
of text producers, and commitments to truth and expressions of value encoded in 
the text.537 In a very real sense, CDA brings the discussion of hermeneutics full 
circle, having begun with concern about proper methods for interpretation, and 
now arriving back as a full blown methodology for social science research.538 In 
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so doing, and especially by so intertwining language and ideology, though, it 
raises the specter of linguistic relativity that had been lurking in hermeneutics 
since von Humboldt.539 
Stylistics 
Just as critical discourse analysis properly belongs to social science, 
stylistics properly belongs to linguistics but might be understood as the linguistic 
method of interpretation and so fits just as well in this section on hermeneutics:  
Stylistics has been defined as a sub-discipline of linguistics that is concerned with the 
systematic analysis of style in language and how this can vary according to such factors 
as, for example, genre, context, historical period and author… Analysing style means 
looking systematically at the formal features of a text and determining their functional 
significance for the interpretation of the text in question.540 
Stylistics ultimately traces its lineage back to classical rhetoric, surveyed above, 
and poetics,541 but emerges from the Russian formalist approach to literary 
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criticism adopting structuralism.542 Russian formalism sought to understand the 
techniques employed in literature to “defamiliarize” the familiar, in part via 
strategies of foregrounding and backgrounding, as a means of distinguishing 
literary from non-literary texts.543 More recently, stylistics has made the 
interdisciplinary turn to apply a wide range of theories and methods to a body of 
texts that include both linguistic and non-linguistic elements, but as a subfield of 
the science of linguistics, it still adheres to principles of rigor, objectivity, and 
empiricism.544  
Whereas the linguistic subfields explored above tend to privilege form 
over function and leave off their analyses at the level of the sentence, stylistics is 
interested in how syntactic and semantic forms or concepts accomplish various 
functions. Such functions include representing the world (transitivity), mediating 
between people (modality), establishing continuity across a text (cohesion), 
presentation, opposition, and negation, above the level of the sentence.545 Also, 
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theories and modes of analysis from pragmatics such as conversational analysis 
and implicature, and speech act theory, enable stylistics “to reveal the source of 
interpretive effects deriving from discourse” and interaction, such as notions of 
politeness.546 Moreover, whereas the rest of linguistics tends to privilege the 
perspective of the language user, stylistics is also interested in the ways in which 
language receivers comprehend texts according to schemas that synthesize their 
knowledge of the world. This allows them to make value judgments about the 
relative importance of various elements and relate them according to 
axiologically prioritized and blended similarities.547 Stylistics is also interested in 
how receivers process texts by forming and transitioning among text worlds to 
navigate the narrative, keeping track of the narrative elements by organizing 
them in contextual frames. Last, stylistics explores how language receivers 
become personally involved in the narrative by mentally shifting themselves to 
the center of the deictic fields the text establishes.548 Notably, this focus on texts 
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as opposed to language per se, and the increasing willingness in the field to 
address nonlinguistic texts, dislocates stylistics somewhat from linguistics. 
Coupled with its concomitant allergy to being associated too closely with literary 
criticism while leaning into the social scientific realm of critical discourse 
analysis, stylistics ends up being increasingly disciplinarily untethered. 
Translation 
As should be expected by this point, many of the positions outlined thus 
far in this chapter come to bear in different conceptions of the work of 
translation, the movement between at least two languages privileging, in some 
sense, the preservation of meaning among them. Natural equivalence theories 
assume a realist account of meaning existing independently of any linguistic 
instantiation such that, in principle, any two languages must be able to express 
the same meaning. This view is incompatible with strong linguistic relativity and 
structuralism at the level of whole languages and so accommodates these 
predilections by shifting either to a reference theory of truth (to ideas or to the 
world), to componential analysis, to a common logical formalism, or to equating 
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meaning with markedness.549 Directional equivalence, by contrast, is nominalistic 
because meaning is tied to particular language systems resulting in an 
asymmetric relation between the start text and target text. As a result, the 
translator must make choices, in part based on differing contextual assumptions 
between the two, that result in varying degrees of conformity to the form of the 
source language.550 Purpose theories tip the scale from privileging the form of the 
source language to privileging the goals the translation seeks to fulfill in the 
target text, thus positing a variety of possible translations correlated to particular 
goals and requiring the translator to anticipate the needs of the reader.551 
Descriptive theories likewise privilege the target text, but rather than prescribing 
how the translation process should proceed, they empirically analyze actual 
translations and the impact of translations on the target culture through 
structuralist method. This allows them to identify translation shifts, or 
“patterned differences” between start and target texts, so as to derive norms of 
translation practice, identify universals that distinguish translations from non-
translations, and articulate laws connecting universals to the society, culture, and 
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cognition of the translator.552 Post-structuralism and postmodernism enter the 
ring in the form of uncertainty theories wherein at least the stability of meaning 
in the start text is questioned, if not the very possibility of all meaning being 
deconstructed, and so the viability of translation is called into question.553 Yet, the 
existence of actual translations demands recourse to conceptions of translations 
in several ways: provoking recollection of common experience (Augustine), 
stabilizing via dialogue (Locke), arising from the interpretations of the translator 
(Ricœur), being just as constructed by the translator as the start text 
(constructivism), deriving from a series of determining decisions (game theory), 
resulting from application of non-linear logics, or contributing to an ongoing 
process of perpetual interpretation (Eco).554 Localization as a theory introduces a 
third locus of meaning, “internationalization,” to the process in order to facilitate 
translation from a single start text to multiple target texts in different languages, 
resulting in the imposition of a strict paradigm that constrains both source and 
target meanings so as to effect standardization across the board.555 Finally, 
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translation may be abstracted from texts in much the same way that critical 
discourse analysis abstracts social dynamics from language use such that 
translation describes processes of socio-cultural interaction, i.e. cultural 
translation, and the role of translator is to mediate such engagements.556 
Radical translation is a thought experiment elaborated by Willard Van 
Orman Quine in Word and Object to illustrate his claim as to the indeterminacy of 
translation by reducing translation to its purest form.557 The thought experiment 
situates a linguist in a jungle attempting to derive a translation manual for an 
isolated and previously unknown language based solely on empirical data of 
language use.558 Upon associating the word “gavagai” in the jungle language 
with the presence of rabbits, the linguist might make a lexical entry of “gavagai 
® rabbit,” but there is in principle no way to distinguish that translation from 
“there is the incarnation of rabbithood” or “there is a collocation of rabbit parts” 
based solely on the empirical evidence, and translating “gavagai” thus would 
have no practical import. The result is the indeterminacy or inscrutability of 
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reference, (also called “ontological relativity”): “some sentences can be translated 
in more than one way, and the various versions differ in the reference that they 
attribute to parts of the sentence, but not in the overall net import that they 
attribute to the sentence as a whole.”559 A second aspect of the indeterminacy of 
translation, which Quine called holophrastic indeterminacy, picks up these 
empirical concerns regarding reference and adds semantic concerns about the 
fixation of meaning in whole language systems. In this case, the 
underdetermination of meaning on the basis of evidence combined with the 
multiplicity of meanings construable in language systems results in multiple 
translations with different meanings all being correct, at least in some sense: 
“There is more than one correct method of translating sentences where the two 
translations of a given sentence differ not merely in the meanings attributed to 
the sub-sentential parts of speech but also in the net import of the whole 
sentence.”560 Moreover, multiple meaningful, accurate and yet incommensurate 
statements may be rendered regarding an event even within a single language, 
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hence Quine’s denial of the analytic/synthetic distinction on the basis of its 
circularity.561 Yet, since the world underdetermines meaning, this explains how 
two people who think they are communicating may in reality be talking past one 
another.  
Donald Davidson, in his related project of radical interpretation, shifts 
fully into the semantic realm with the goal of “interpreting the linguistic 
behaviour of a speaker ‘from scratch’ and so without reliance on any prior 
knowledge either of the speaker's beliefs or the meanings of the speaker's 
utterances.”562 He accomplishes this by recourse to a notion of contextual holism 
precipitating the principle of charity563 such that interpreters should assume the 
subject of their interpretation is at least attempting to be coherent in their beliefs 
and takes their beliefs to correspond with reality.564 We should do so because 
“disagreement and agreement alike are intelligible only against a background of 
massive agreement,”565 echoing Duns Scotus’ (c. 1266 – 1308) dictum that “every 
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denial is intelligible only in terms of some affirmation.”566 This then grounds the 
Tarskian interpretive procedure of taking the subject speaking language L and 
saying sentence “s” in L in proximity to s happening at time t as evidence that 
“s” is true in L when spoken by the subject at t if and only if s happens in 
proximity to the subject at t and so the subject speaking L believes (holds true) 
“s” at t if and only if the subject is in proximity to s at t. Davidson takes this to be 
a valid inference solving for meaning by holding belief constant.567 At least in this 
case, by contrast to Quine, the ongoing dialectic between belief and meaning 
holds out the hope that agreement might be achieved in the infinite long run, 
although indeterminacy is neither entirely eliminable for Davidson either.568 
Semiotics 
That language is semiotic is verging on tautologous. Language is made up 
of signs: words, standing for objects: things. Semiotics is the study of signs, 
signification, and sign processes, i.e. semiosis, in general, of which language is 
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one specification, and a particularly human one at that.569 As was noted in the 
above subsection on the linguistic turn, the two principal modern semiotic 
theorists, Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles Sanders Peirce, articulate inverse 
perspectives on the relationship between semiotics and language: Saussure views 
the structure of language as a model for the structure of all sign systems, while 
Peirce views language as a particular species of the semiotic genus.570 That said, 
while semiotics has been the primary paradigm for discussing language, at least 
implicitly, in the West for quite some time,571 the development of nonlinguistic 
semiotics remained largely neglected until the work of Thomas Albert Sebeok 
(1920 – 2001) and John N. Deely (1942 – 2017).572 This section charts the historical 
trajectory of semiotics vis-à-vis language, elaborates contemporary semiotic 
accounts of language in greater detail, and then articulates the logic of semiotics 
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beyond the linguistic frame in preparation for the extensive use of semiotics in 
chapter five to not only describe but explain language. 
Antique and Medieval Western Approaches 
Consideration of signs first arose in Western philosophy among the pre-
Socratic philosophers of ancient Greece and was developed in both Platonic and 
Aristotelian lineages,573 along with the Stoics, the skeptics, and in Greek 
medicine,574 before being codified in late antiquity by Augustine of Hippo (354 – 
430 CE)575 and Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (ca. 475 – 526 CE).576 
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Elaborating the development of the Augustinian theory of signs in some detail is 
worthwhile as it “is based on a definition of the sign that, for the first time, 
intends to embrace both the natural indexical sign and the conventional 
linguistic sign as species of an all-embracing generic notion of sign, thus marking 
a turning point in the history of semiotics.”577 While authorship is unsettled, De 
Dialectica would have been an early work of March and April in 387 CE578 in the 
Platonic lineage drawing heavily on Stoicism qualified by skepticism.579 At this 
stage Augustine says that “A sign is something which is itself sensed and which 
indicates to the mind something beyond the sign itself.” What the sign indicates 
is a thing: “A thing is whatever is sensed or is understood or is hidden.”580 Thus, 
Augustine articulates signification for the first time as a triadic relation: “a sign is 
always a sign of something to some mind.”581 Thus, the sign merely serves to 
remind or suggest to the interpreter the thing signified582 such that “some things 
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can be taught without the use of signs, and that we were wrong in thinking a 
little while ago that nothing at all can be taught without signs.”583 By ten years 
later, in De Doctrina Christiana, having abandoned skepticism, Augustine changes 
his tune: “All teaching is teaching of either things or signs, but things are learnt 
through signs,”584 which is reflected in his redefinition of sign as “a thing which 
of itself makes some other thing come to mind, besides the impression that it 
presents to the senses.”585 He goes on to make the classic distinction between 
natural signs as “those which without a wish or any urge to signify cause 
something else besides themselves to be known from them,” and given or 
conventional signs as “those which living things give to each other, in order to 
show, to the best of their ability, the emotions of their minds, or anything that 
they have felt or learnt.”586 In composing De Trinitate in the first quarter of the 
fifth century,587 Augustine builds on this understanding of conventional signs by 
identifying natural language as a system of such signs referring to an inner 
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language of thought: “the word which sounds without is a sign of the word that 
shines within, to which the name ‘word’ more properly belongs. For that which 
is produced by the mouth of the flesh is the sound of the word, and is itself also 
called ‘word,’ because that inner word assumed it in order that it might appear 
outwardly.”588 Augustine also derived from Greek philosophy this notion of 
mental language expressed not only in natural language but in all human 
behavior and bequeathed it all the way down to contemporary philosophy of 
language, philosophy of mind, and psychology.589 Notably, in his influential 
translation into Latin as De Interpretatione and commentaries on Aristotle’s Περὶ 
Ἑρµηνείας in the early sixth century, Boethius follows this Augustinian 
conception of signification as bearing the object signified into mind rather than 
the Aristotelian conception of signification as applying thoughts expressed in 
signs to things such that ideas and not signs refer to things.590 
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Further developments in semiotic theorizing would have to wait until the 
late eleventh and early twelfth centuries with Anselm of Canterbury (1033 – 
1109) and Peter Abelard (1079 – 1142). Anselm makes two primary contributions 
to semiotic theory. First, in De Grammatico he distinguishes signification as 
having to do with bearing meaning from appellation as having to do with 
reference to an object. Thus, calling someone a “grammarian” or “expert-in-
grammar” refers to a particular person upon whom the title has been designated 
by appellation but means that said person has the quality of expertise in 
grammar.591 Second, in the Monologion he more clearly distinguishes two aspects 
of mental language implicit in Augustine: mental words “are natural and are the 
same for all races,” i.e. are innate in the human mind, and “No expression of 
anything whatsoever approximates an object as closely as does that expression 
which consists of words of this kind; and in no one's reason can there be 
anything else which is so similar to an object, whether already existing or going 
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to exist,” i.e. mental images are likenesses of their objects.592 Abelard maintains 
the Augustinian semiotic principles that language is a species of the genus of 
signs and that signs bear their objects into mind. He does so by identifying 
meaning with intension as distinct from extension and elaborating a quadratic 
process of signification “using ‘significare’ to refer to the intellectus generated in 
the mind of the hearer, ‘nominare’ for the referential function, and… ‘designare’ 
and ‘denotare’ for the relationship between the word and his definition or 
sententia,” only the last of which constitutes meaning per se, and the latter two 
depending on the first.593 He also develops a fourfold classification of signs as an 
image of the object, as imposed by convention on the object, as associated by 
repeated conjunction with the object, or as causally or qualitatively related to the 
object.594 These Augustinian tendencies in medieval semiotics are reified by the 
author of The Commentary on “Priscianus Maior” ascribed to Robert Kilwardby in the 
																																																								
592 Meier-Oeser, “Medieval Semiotics,” sec. 3; Anselm, “Monologion,” in Complete Philosophical 
and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury, trans. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson 
(Minneapolis, MN: Arthur J. Banning, 2000), chaps. X, 21. 
593 Eco, “Signification and Denotation from Boethius to Ockham,” 7–9; Meier-Oeser, “Medieval 
Semiotics,” sec. 3; Peter Abelard, Dialectica: First complete edition of the Parisian manuscript, ed. 
Lambertus Marie de Rijk (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1970); Peter Abelard, Peter Abaelards 
Philosophische Schriften, ed. Bernhard Geyer (Münster, Germany: Aschendorff, 1919), 
http://archive.org/details/peterabaelardsph00abel. 
594 Meier-Oeser, “Medieval Semiotics,” sec. 3; Jean Jolivet, Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard 
(Paris, France: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1982), chap. 2. 
	 	242 
later thirteenth century who first advances the notion of a science of signs by 
claiming that “every science is about signs or things signified.” Further, linguistic 
signs, by virtue of their signification of mental language, are the particular topic 
of the rational science of signs.595 
Contemporaneous with Pseudo-Kilwardby, an extensional semantics 
emerged alongside intensional semiotics as the notion of supposition, dating at 
least from Priscian in the early sixth century, merged with the Anselmian notion 
of appellation to render the medieval theory of supposition.596 Supposition, from 
supponere meaning “acting as subject,” “became the major property of an 
occurrence of a term in a proposition…, distinguishing what in particular was 
being spoken of on some occasion of utterance by some particular use of a word, 
from that word's general property (signification) of meaning.”597 The theory was 
hardly stable, however, as William of Sherwood (ca. 1200 – 1272) distinguishes 
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among signification, supposition, copulation, and appellation,598 whereas 
Lambert of Auxerre and Peter of Spain (both mid-thirteenth century) subordinate 
the properties of terms to signification because, as Lambert explains, 
“signification is, as it were, the fulfillment of a term.”599 Alas, Roger Bacon (ca. 
1214 – 1292), the medieval thinker who discussed signs most extensively, follows 
Bonaventure (1221 – 1274) in breaking with both the Aristotelian and 
Augustinian lineages. Bacon extends the trajectory of Sherwood by collapsing 
signification into the extensional semantics of supposition as denotation such 
that signs refer to objects without mental mediation.600 Umberto Eco (1932 – 2016) 
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contradicts most of the literature on Bacon that focuses on his emphasizing the 
importance of the interpreter contra Bonaventure and the theologians. Eco 
instead highlights the extensional character of the sign-object relation for Bacon, 
thus critiquing him as at least a proto-nominalist for failing to recognize the 
independent reality of the sign as a relation. Eco thereboy rightly renders the role 
of the interpreter in Bacon as secondary to the object in the process of 
signification, perhaps thus necessitating such insistence.601 The realist alternative 
to this creeping nominalism was the speculative grammar of the Modists, 
epitomized by Thomas of Erfurt (early fourteenth century). Erfurt sought to fold 
metaphysics, logic, and grammar together by positing structural parallels among 
the mode of being of the object, the mode of understanding of the interpreter, 
and the mode of signifying of the sign that are common to all of reality, all 
human interpreters, and all natural languages, respectively.602 Nominalism 
																																																								
601 Eco, “Signification and Denotation from Boethius to Ockham,” 14–17. Standard accounts of 
Bacon, and references to wider literature, are available in Jeremiah Hackett, “Roger Bacon,” in 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring, 2015, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/roger-bacon/; Meier-Oeser, “Medieval 
Semiotics,” sec. 4.2. Alas, even Eco’s close collaborator Constantino Marmo seems to have 
neglected this treatment of Bacon in Sara G. Beardsworth and Randall E. Auxier, The Philosophy of 
Umberto Eco (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 2017). 
602 Meier-Oeser, “Medieval Semiotics,” sec. 5; Eco, “Signification and Denotation from Boethius to 
Ockham,” 18; Louis G. Kelly, The Mirror of Grammar: Theology, Philosophy, and the Modistae 
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2002); Thomas von Erfurt, Grammatica Speculativa, ed. G. L. Bursill-
Hall, The Classics of Linguistics 1 (London: Longman, 1972); Jack Zupko, “Thomas of Erfurt,” in 
	 	245 
would ultimately win the day, though, in the form of the entirely extensional 
theory of signification elaborated by William of Ockham (ca. 1287 – 1347). In 
Ockham, supposition and signification are collapsed together as mental signs, i.e. 
concepts, and linguistic signs each signify things in the world but are not 
otherwise connected to one another, resulting in the dissipation of one side of the 
Augustinian semiotic triad.603 
Although the nominalist strain of thinking about signs would remain 
dominant into the modern period,604 a minority report focused around John Mair 
(ca. 1467 – 1550) in Scotland and Paris maintained the fullness of the Augustinian 
semiotic triad in which signification was understood as “to represent something, 
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or some things, or somehow to a cognitive power by vitally changing it.”605 An 
emphasis on mental signs, though, contra Augustine, arose from concern about 
an infinite regress of signification when signs are both universal, i.e. “anything in 
the world is a sign,” and external, whereas grounding signification in the mental 
would prevent such an “abyss in signifying.”606 It is this lineage that is 
transmitted into the Iberian peninsula, codified especially by Domingo de Soto 
(1494 – 1560), and inherited by the Conimbricenses, i.e. the Jesuits at the 
University of Coimbra in Portugal, especially John Poinsot (1589 – 1644; also John 
of St. Thomas).607 Poinsot made the signal contribution, to be independently 
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developed anew by Peirce two-and-a-half centuries later,608 of overcoming the 
dichotomies of subject and object and of nature and culture by identifying the 
being of signs as relations, i.e. ontological relations, and irreducibly triadic 
relations at that:609 
For the sign, Poinsot has shown, considered in its proper being as sign, is neither an 
object nor a thing, but a relation irreducibly triadic, inasmuch as it is by one single relation, 
not two or any combination of twos, that the sign through its vehicle attains both directly 
its signified and indirectly its interpretant. All three – sign vehicle, object signified, 
interpretant – are thereby together unified under or through the one single triadic 
relation “constituting the mode of being of a sign,” as Peirce put it, and this triadic 
relation “is the proper and formal rationale of the sign,” as Poinsot put it. (Or as Ketner, 
not glossing over the interpreter/interpretant distinction, summarized: “A sign is the 
entire triadic relation whereby Something is represented by Something to Something.”)610 
There are two primary aspects of this doctrine of signs. First, Poinsot 
distinguishes transcendental relations as the things related together with their 
conditions from ontological relations as the relation itself as such and identifies 
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the latter with the nature of signs.611 Second, the relation itself is irreducibly 
triadic among the sign vehicle, the signified, and the interpretant, the relations 
among which are the sign itself. Thus, a triangle is inappropriate as a model for a 
sign as it represents dyadic relations among the three elements; a tripod of all 
three elements intersecting in the center is more adequate.612 It is only less than 
sixty years later that John Locke, in the final chapter of his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, would dub the doctrine of signs “Σηµειωτικὴ”613 and 
thereby launch the modern consideration of semiotics epitomized in the 
theorizing of Peirce. 
Peircian Metaphysical Semiotics  
As has already been noted, for the account of semiotics rendered by 
Peirce, language is one particular instance of a specific type of sign system, as 
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opposed to the prime structural example of any possible sign system as in the 
school of Saussure; indeed, the relationship between Saussure and Peirce may 
best be read as that of part to whole.614 The challenge then becomes the 
notoriously difficult task of rendering a responsible interpretation of Peirce given 
that his thought was in a constant state of development and change, he 
frequently found himself despondent of giving a systematic accounting of his 
grand aspirations and left all of his large scale projects unfinished, and his 
writing style “is so bizarre that the reader tends to cling for dear life to those few 
doctrines which, like pragmatism, have an aura of reasonableness about them.”615 
Among philosophers who have engaged him range a variety of interpretations, a 
majority of which, especially of the most recent, take his semiotics to be primarily 
if not exclusively phenomenological or rooted in philosophy of mind, that is, 
describing the appearance of reality before the mind in experience. This is the 
understanding carried over into the extensive appropriation of his semiotics well 
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beyond philosophy.616 To be sure, the vagaries of his corpus and his thought 
make such readings at least justifiable, but the interpretation to be offered here 
adheres to an older and minority view of Peirce as fundamentally and 
irreducibly a systematic metaphysician, at least in aspiration.617 This perspective 
is at least as defensible, if not more so, than the phenomenological one, although 
proving this to be the case lies beyond the scope of the present endeavor, as does 
teasing out every twist and turn of development across his vast corpus. Instead, 
the account provided here is best read as Peircian, that is, as itself an interpretant, 
and so itself a sign to its readers, of the effect in the author of taking semiotics as 
articulated by Peirce in his writings to be a sign of reality. 
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It is the case that the metaphysical status of semiotics was more of an 
aspiration than an achievement for Peirce, who boldly claimed “that all this 
universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs.”618 
Alas, he then tossed a “sop to Cerberus,” abandoning the universality of 
signification, by adjusting his definition of sign as determining the effect of its 
object “upon a person.”619 The metaphysics he lays out in an address to the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1867 entitled “On a New List of 
Categories” proceeds in a Kantian manner on the grounds that his three 
categories are necessary not only to unify experience within a given individual 
but to unify anything that could possibly count as experience. Already his 
nascent semiotics is derived therefrom as the logic of such experience.620 Twenty 
years later Peirce is ready to make A Guess at the Riddle, having softened in his 
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Kantianism, in the form of a metaphysical hypothesis of three categories 
“intended to go down to the very essence of things:” 
The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind 
anything. The Second is that which is what it is by force of something to which it is 
second. The Third is that which is what it is owing to things between which it mediates 
and which it brings into relation to each other. 621 
The categories are perhaps better rendered as qualities since any given thing 
participates, at least potentially, in all three: firstness is the indeterminate being 
of things, secondness is the qualified existence of things, and thirdness is the 
relational aspect of things as matrices unifying constituent elements. These 
categories are intended as the fundament of logic, but whereas much of the 
literature on Peirce takes the resulting logic to be the logic of knowledge, i.e. the 
logic underlying epistemology, Peirce clearly intended them to function rather as 
the logic of absolutely everything. Thus, they are best understood as 
architectonic categories, equally applicable if not most of all to metaphysics, as 
demonstrated by his intent to demonstrate in the outlined third chapter of the 
Guess.622 
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Being architectonic, the categories are equally applicable to signs. In his 
first attempt at application, just after drafting the Guess, Peirce claims that “a sign 
is a third mediating between the mind addressed and the object represented.”623 
It is his inability to escape the gravitational pull of mental representation, which 
must inevitably draw him into the black hole of epistemology, that induces him 
to throw the sop to Cerberus, or at least to Lady Welby. Later he would more 
precisely apply the categories in order to distinguish three types of sign vehicles: 
Firstly, there are likenesses, or icons; which serve to convey ideas of the things they 
represent simply by imitating them. Secondly, there are indications, or indices; which 
show something about things, on account of their being physically connected with 
them… Thirdly, there are symbols, or general signs, which have become associated with 
their meanings by usage.624 
Eventually he would standardize his usage of icon, index, and symbol as the 
terms for these three types. Like Poinsot, Peirce understands the action of signs, 
which he terms semiosis, to be irreducibly triadic625 such that a sign is “anything 
which determines something else (its interpretant) to refer to an object to which 
itself refers (its object) in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, 
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and so on ad infinitum.”626 This triad too is built on the three categories where the 
being (firstness) of the object is rendered existent (secondness) for the 
interpretant by the mediation (thirdness) of a sign. Peirce only distinguishes the 
object according to two of the three categories: as it is in the sign relation, i.e. the 
“immediate object” or secondness, and as it is in itself, i.e. the “dynamical object” 
or firstness;627 but the interpretant may be understood as the effect of the object, 
i.e. the final object or thirdness.628 Moreover, whereas the late scholastics 
grounded their semiotics in the mental in order to prevent the “abyss of 
signification” they otherwise feared, Peirce revels in infinite semiosis and so in 
principle need not ground his concept of signification in the mental. Indeed, his 
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definition of the interpretant as the “proper significate effects”629 of signs, or “all 
that is explicit in the sign itself apart from its context and circumstances of 
utterance,”630 makes no mention of mentality. This notion of the interpretant as 
effect is what makes semiosis, or the action of signs, the proper subject matter of 
semiotics, and not merely the ontology of signs.631 Of course, the interpretant too 
can be analyzed according to the categories: the “immediate interpretant” is the 
abstract possible or anticipated effect of the sign, i.e. firstness, the “dynamical 
interpretant” is the actual effect, i.e. secondness, and the “final interpretant” is 
the effect that would pertain if the dynamical object were to be fully realized in 
any possible interpretation, i.e. thirdness.632 Notably, the final interpretant 
orienting back toward the dynamic object converts the dynamical interpretant to 
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yet another sign of the object constitutes an internal drive and the interpretant 
also being the final object constitutes an internal drive that together power 
semiosis. 
His inability to escape the mental vortex in articulating his semiotics was 
clearly frustrating to Peirce. The cause of the entrapment has to do with his 
commitment to semiotics as a conception of final causation in the Aristotelian 
sense of a teleological motivation on the part of the object for undertaking the 
action at all, and may be expressed as the reason for the action at issue for 
explanation.633 The problem is that while teleology, or purposiveness, can be 
stretched from human animals (anthroposemiotics) to other living things 
(biosemiotics), final causality is seemingly impossible to attribute to the wider 
physical world, thus resulting in an internal contradiction to the aspiration of 
conceiving the universe as “composed exclusively of signs.”634 John Deely solves 
the problem by widening the lens from final causation: 
There is a more general causality at work in the sign than the final causality typical of the 
vital powers. This more general causality specifies vital activity but specifies also the 
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causality at work in chance interactions of brute secondness. It is this causality, not final 
causality, that is the causality proper to the sign in its distinctive function of making 
present what it itself is not.635 
He does not name this general causation, but he does say that it “need not be 
goal-oriented in any intrinsic sense. On the contrary, it needs to be a causality 
equally able to ground sign-behavior in chance occurrences and planned 
happenings.”636 What sort of causation might this be? Whereas Peirce fell afoul of 
attributing final causation to the object in generating the interpretant, the sort of 
causation Deely describes is formal causation in the parlance of Aristotle,637 not 
of the object but of the sign itself in its entirety. The form of the sign causes the 
effect to arise from the object as mediated by the sign-vehicle: “beings and events 
so determined by other beings and events that, in their own activity as so 
determined, they determine yet further series of beings and events in such a way 
that the last terms in the series represent the first terms by the mediation of the 
middle terms.”638 The form may also be stated logically: “a sign will be any A so 
determined by a В that in determining С that С is mediately determined by B. Thus, 
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В determines A, and, precisely in the respect in which В has determined it, A 
determines C. Therefore C, in being immediately determined by A, is at the same 
time mediately determined by B.”639 It is important to remember, from Poinsot, 
that signs themselves are relations among the object, the sign vehicle, and the 
interpretant, and the ontology of the sign cannot be reduced to the haecceity of 
the sign vehicle. Peirce was committed to scholastic realism, i.e. to the doctrine of 
the reality of generals (universals),640 for precisely this reason: the ontology of the 
sign is its form, and it is the form of a process generating the interpretant from 
the object via the sign vehicle. Consider, for example, the sign of a tree canopy 
relating the object of the tree, the sign vehicle of its leaves, and the interpretant 
that raindrops are diverted from their gravitational trajectory such that things 
under the canopy stay (relatively) dry. The leaves of the tree are “so determined 
by” the tree that “in determining” the trajectory of the raindrops, said trajectory 
“is mediately determined” by the tree. The canopy, which is the sign itself, is the 
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form of the leaves as determined by the tree such that raindrops are diverted, 
that is, the canopy is the form of the process of diverting raindrops that would 
otherwise fall at the foot of the tree. 
An important corollary of the relational ontology of signs is that it is 
neither necessary that the sign itself nor any of its elements – object, sign vehicle, 
or interpretant – be a physical thing; any or all of them may be ideas. This is the 
inversion of the claim that the object and interpretant “need not be persons”641 
that results in both his scholastic realism such that generals, e.g. relations, are 
real on the pragmatic basis that they have effects,642 and his objective idealism 
such that physical laws are arbitrary albeit adventitious regularities.643 Together 
these form conditional idealism, “that truth’s independence of individual 
opinions is due (so far as there is any ‘truth’) to its being the predestined result to 
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which sufficient inquiry would ultimately lead.”644 Indeed, while logic for Peirce 
“concerns itself as directly with the outward, as with the inward 
representations,” that is, with relations among things in the world as much as 
with relations among things as represented in mind by signs, “reasoning is 
essentially of the nature of a representation or sign” and “can only be performed 
by a mind more or less like that of man.”645 Reasoning is a particular form of 
thought: 
‘Thinking’ is a fabled ‘operation of mind’ by which an imaginary object is brought 
before one’s gaze. If that object is a sign upon which an argument may turn, we call it a 
Thought… The ‘operation of the mind’ is an ens rationis… All necessary reasoning is 
diagrammatic; and the assurance furnished by all reasoning must be based upon 
necessary reasoning. In this sense, all reasoning depends directly or indirectly on 
diagrams.646 
A diagram is a mental icon of a metaphysical sign of pure relation, “a 
representamen which is predominantly an icon of relations and is aided to be so 
by conventions:”647 “The pure diagram is designed to represent and render 
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intelligible the form of relation merely. Consequently, diagrams are restricted to 
the representation of a certain class of relations; namely, those that are 
intelligible.”648 Being so general, diagrams are applicable across a wide range of 
instances to evaluate whether the relations pertaining among the matters under 
consideration are intelligible. One of the diagrams in which intelligible forms 
have been encoded is language. The subsection on semiotics in chapter three will 
make the case that while Peirce was at the forefront of a diagrammatic 
movement in logic,649 ritual is a more robust theoretical framework for explaining 
and encoding the processes involved in reasoning with signs, including not only 
representation but also reflexivity and recursion. It will then be left to chapter 
five to show how the particularly linguistic semiotic system participates in 
reasoning so as to connect up the human organism with the reality of the world 
in which it lives. 
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Semiotics and Language in Deacon 
The most influential interpretation of language in terms of Peircian 
semiotics at present is that rendered by Terrence W. Deacon in The Symbolic 
Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain.650 Deacon is attempting to solve 
the problem in evolutionary anthropology of why no animals other than humans 
have language and why there is such a large gap between the cognitive and 
linguistic abilities of humans and the next highest capable animals.651 He 
hypothesizes that the mental capacity for symbolic reference652 necessary for 
language use initially appeared in humans as an advantageous trait and then 
evolved rapidly through a dialectical process with the complexification of 
language, which he calls “co-evolution.”653 In adopting the Peircian 
nomenclature of icon, index, and symbol, Deacon takes himself to be hewing to a 
set of semiotic insights as Peirce elaborated them, and does so in terms of 
construing semiosis as a process rather than a state, but misconstrues Peirce by 
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representing the three modes of reference as downwards reducible.654 The closest 
Peirce comes to articulating a hierarchy of signs is in his ten classes of signs,655 
but he is clear that while indices “involve a sort of icon,” “it is not the mere 
resemblance to its Object, even in these respects, which makes it a sign, but it is 
the actual modification of it by the Object.” Likewise, while symbols indirectly 
involve indices, it is not “by any means true that the slight effect upon the 
symbol of those instances accounts for the significant character of the symbol.”656 
Hence, symbols are not reducible to indices and indices are not reducible to 
icons;657 each type of sign is a distinct category for Peirce, which Deacon 
misinterprets. As a result of this misinterpretation, there is a great deal of 
linguistic complexity and mental capacity packed into symbolic reference for 
Deacon that does not necessarily map onto what Peirce means by symbolic 
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signification. Admittedly, Peirce offers a number of definitions of symbol, but a 
particularly relevant one is as follows: 
A symbol is a representamen [sign vehicle] which refers only to such objects and in such 
respects as it might determine an interpretant to refer to those objects in those respects, 
and is hereby alone essentially a representamen, not in virtue of a physical relation or of 
an agreement of characters, but by a relation subsisting only by virtue of a 
representation. There must, therefore, be some general rule which connects the symbol 
with its objects; and it represents whatever that general rule determines it to represent.658 
Thus, if signs in general are considered as irreducibly triadic relations and 
symbolic signs are merely distinguished by the arbitrariness of the sign vehicle 
with respect to the object, correlated by an external rule, then there is a lot more 
at play in the dynamism of language than can be accounted for by symbolic 
reference alone.  
One way to account for the linguistic remainder unaccounted by symbolic 
reference is to distinguish the reference of individual symbols from the symbol 
system in which a set of symbols and their relations are encoded. With such a 
distinction in hand, it is possible to deny the claim that “symbolic reference 
derives from combinatorial possibilities and impossibilities”659 without denying 
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that such combinatorics play an important role in language as determined by the 
symbol system in which the rules that govern symbolic reference are encoded.  
This is to say that symbolic reference determines the intension (reference) of 
language while the symbol system constitutes its extension (sense) such that the 
meaning of a given symbol remains stable and available apart from the presence 
of its object.660 Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that all symbols participate 
in systems. A dog learning the rule that if the owner says “come” they are to 
move from where they are toward the owner is in fact an example of symbolic 
reference, because there is no intrinsic connection between the phonetic 
enunciation of “come” and that particular movement, although there would not 
be any extension for the word “come” in a symbol system for the dog. Language, 
alternatively, clearly does depend on the rules of reference being encoded in its 
symbol system. Thus, conflating the symbol system with symbolic reference ends 
up committing the fallacy of Saussurean structuralism, in which the structure of 
language is taken as normative for all semiotic systems, all over again. While 
Deacon is quite plausibly correct about the co-evolution of language and the 
brain, what is interesting about language and that requires explanation as 
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distinct from other animals is not symbolic reference but the incredibly intricate, 
multi-level, and nested network of signs and relations among signs in the 
system. He describes these as “a kind of tangled hierarchic network of nodes and 
connections that defines a vast and constantly changing semantic space.” 
Furthermore, Deacon is certainly right that “though semanticists and semiotic 
theorists have proposed various analogies to explain these underlying 
topological principles of semantic organization (such as +/- feature lists, 
dictionary analogies, encyclopedia analogies), we are far from a satisfactory 
account.”661  The present project makes the case that the best account of the 
linguistic symbol system is as a species of ritual, which are symbol systems an 
sich, a possibility Deacon himself suggests in identifying the ritual beginnings of 
symbolic thought.662 
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WESTERN RITUAL THEORY 
A comprehensive review of the Western ritual theory literature was 
published in two volumes in 2006 under the title Theorizing Rituals,663 and 
magisterial summaries of the evolution of ritual theory are available in two 
works of Catherine Bell (1953 – 2008): Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice, and Ritual: 
Perspectives and Dimensions.664 Rather than attempting to summarize these works, 
let alone replicate them, this chapter instead elaborates numerous aspects of an 
original theory of ritual arising from that of Roy A. Rappaport and in 
conversation and comparison with the ways these aspects are presented in a 
variety of alternative ritual theories in the literature. This theory will receive 
further development in conversation with the Confucian ritual theory of Xunzi in 
the next chapter, but this chapter concludes with consideration of the 
relationship between ritual and language in the Western ritual theory literature. 
The construction of a novel theory of language as ritual is delayed for chapter 
five. 
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Given that the goal of this chapter is the development of an original ritual 
theory, something must be said about the nature of theory; the nature of ritual is 
left for what the theory says it is. Ronald Grimes, in The Craft of Ritual Studies, 
interrogates theory particularly as applied to ritual. One definition of theory he 
advances is that “theory is writing that helps you see. Theory consists of 
researchers’ basic, orienting statements about how they plan to see what they 
propose to study.”665 Later he offers an alternative, corresponding definition of 
theory as “any set of generalizations, key concepts, root metaphors, and 
determinative vocabulary that animate the characteristic moves of one’s 
method.”666 For the purposes of this chapter, all of these animating forces are 
understood as “aspects” of a theory of ritual. Furthermore, for Grimes ritual 
theory is a constructive endeavor emerging primarily from the imagination: 
“Imaginative labor is undergirded with data and inferences from data, but in the 
final analysis, a theory is a piece of intellectual handiwork, with no more (or less) 
status than pottery-making.”667 The present endeavor embraces the constructive 
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character of ritual theory, analogous to the constructive character of theology in 
some ways.  
Grimes further notes several criteria for evaluating theory, particularly in 
the humanities and social sciences: “public intelligibility, imaginative 
stimulation, moral accountability, practical utility, internal coherence, and 
comprehensiveness become criteria for adjudicating what is better and worse 
theorizing.”668 Notably, these criteria correspond almost verbatim to the criteria 
outlined by Alfred North Whitehead for speculative philosophy: coherence, 
consistency, adequacy, and applicability.669 This is perhaps less surprising as 
philosophy operates almost exclusively at the theoretical level, and since the 
present project is in fact an exercise in religious philosophy, the original theory of 
ritual to be advanced here seeks to adhere to all of them. Grimes goes on to 
distinguish hypothesis and theory on the basis of comprehensiveness: “Whereas 
a hypothesis concerns the relation between two parts, a theory attempts to lay 
out a whole.”670 As explained in the first chapter, this dissertation operates under 
the method of religious philosophy as multidisciplinary comparative inquiry, 
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and so advances inquiry by developing hypothetical theories. This is to say that 
the various aspects of the theory of ritual advanced here are hypotheses 
regarding the nature, function, and operation of ritual generally, which is 
precisely what makes them accountable to the criteria of good theory Grimes 
outlines. 
Grimes summarizes his argument regarding ritual theory in a way that is 
particularly useful for evaluating the success of the original ritual theory to be 
developed in the course of this chapter and the next: 
Western theories of ritual are constructed largely out of words. Sometimes these theories 
are grounded on actual rites, but just as likely they are based on the words of other 
theories. Beneath theoretical verbalizations are images, analogies, and metaphors. 
Because theorizing is imagination-driven, it is as artistic as it is scientific… Out of 
critically examined and appropriated images, analogies, and metaphors, models can be 
built. For a model of ritual to be adequate, it should enable us to either explain or 
construct a ritual by taking into account its static elements (using, e.g., mechanical 
metaphors), internal dynamics (using, e.g., narrative or dramatic metaphors), interactions 
with their contexts (using, e.g. complex systems, cybernetic, ecological, or cognitive 
metaphors). Any theory that fails to account for all three, regardless of the metaphors it 
uses, is inadequate for ritual studies research.671 
The aspects of a ritual theory to be elaborated below aspire to function as a 
model of ritual. Evaluation of whether the theory is adequate for explaining a 
ritual will take place primarily in chapter five, where the theory is applied to 
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language, but also below vis-à-vis the Great Vigil of Easter, as explained 
forthwith, and in chapter four vis-à-vis the Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius. 
Aspects of a Theory of Ritual 
The ritual theory developed by cultural anthropologist Roy A. Rappaport 
in Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity672 benefits from comparative 
engagement with a range of other contributions to the ritual theory literature to 
develop a novel ritual theory. As Grimes noted above, evaluation as to the 
adequacy of the theory must be based on its capacity to “explain or construct a 
ritual.” Chapter five will explain language using the theory of ritual developed 
here, but language is hardly uncontested as appropriately explained by ritual 
theory, as will be explored in the final section of this chapter. Therefore, the 
discussion of each aspect of the theory of ritual here will include its employment 
for explaining a ritual commonly accepted as such: The Great Vigil of Easter at 
Washington National Cathedral on April 4, 2015 beginning at 8:00 p.m. The 
Great Vigil of Easter is selected because it includes a wide variety of Christian 
ritual practices within it, thereby offering a plethora of opportunities for 
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explanation. The service as celebrated at Washington National Cathedral is 
selected because the cathedral archives its service leaflets and video of their 
services and makes them publicly available on their website,673 thereby 
preserving the material for other researchers who may wish to contest the 
interpretations offered here. In the footnotes referring to the service in the 
remainder of the chapter, the timings in the video recording will generally 
appear first, and then the pages in the service bulletin or other liturgical texts 
where the words being said in the service appear. It could be argued that 
applying the theory to yet another Western, Christian ritual enactment fails to 
demonstrate that the theory in fact delivers the promised breadth and 
robustness. This is a fair critique, but the theory must at least be able to explain 
such a commonly accepted ritual, so the Great Vigil is addressed interpolated 
into the development of the theory and then the theory, modified in conversation 
with Xunzi, is applied to The Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius in the next 
chapter. The Autumnal Sacrifice is also generally acknowledged as a ritual, but 
arises from an East Asian context, thereby providing a contrast with the 
																																																								
673 “Worship Archive,” Washington National Cathedral, accessed July 9, 2015, 
https://www.cathedral.org/worship/worshipArchive.shtml. Service leaflet for the Vigil: “The 
Great Vigil of Easter - Service Bulletin” (Washington National Cathedral, April 4, 2015), 
https://www.cathedral.org/pdfs/GV20150404.pdf. Service video: The Great Vigil of Easter - Video 
Recording, mp4 (Washington, DC, 2015), http://video3.cathedral.org:1755/mp4/HE20150404.mp4. 
	 273 
application of the theory to the Christian Great Vigil of Easter. Like the particular 
instantiation of the Great Vigil of Easter selected for analysis, the Autumnal 
Sacrifice to Confucius from 1997 in Tainan, Taiwan is selected for the public 
availability of video recordings and extensive documentation thereof.674 While it 
would be good to apply the theory to other less-commonly accepted ritual 
expressions, the application to language will have to suffice in that regard for 
present purposes. 
Given the centrality of Rappaport’s theory of ritual for this project, it is 
important to be clear about the situation and aims of his work and the ways that 
work contrasts with the present project. As an anthropologist, Rappaport is 
interested in the process of human meaning making, and within the discipline of 
anthropology he takes an evolutionary view, inquiring into both “the evolution 
of humanity and humanity’s place in the evolution of the world,”675 that is, into 
what makes humans distinctive from other organisms. He further takes religion, 
ubiquitous across human societies, to be central to the meaning making process 
for humans, and the central elements of religion, (i.e. “the sacred,” “the 
																																																								
674 Stephanie Wong and Thomas A. Wilson, “Introduction,” Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius: A 
Study of Confucianism’s Sacrificial Tradition, accessed March 15, 2017, 
http://academics.hamilton.edu/asian_studies/home/autumnalsacrifice/index.html. 
675 Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, 1. 
	 274 
numinous,” “the occult,” “the divine,” etc.), are in turn generated by the 
enactment of the form or structure of ritual. It is important to Rappaport to 
distinguish ritual from the purely symbolic, e.g. language, which is made up of 
“signs related only ‘by law,’ i.e. convention, to that which they signify.”676 This is 
because he wants to insist that ritual ameliorates two vices inherent in symbolic 
language: the lie, and the implicit acknowledgment of alternative orders. Ritual 
does so, he argues, by necessarily generating religion as the logical entailment of 
the ritual form, in turn establishing the “True Word,”677 or “Ultimate Sacred 
Postulates,”678 against which lies and alternatives may be measured as true or 
false, real or unreal, respectively.  
While adopting much of Rappaport’s theory of ritual, the theory of ritual 
developed here rejects this argument both in terms of the necessity of ritual 
generating religion in all cases and in terms of ritual ameliorating lies and 
potential alternatives. Instead, the argument here is that all rituals generate a 
certain taken-for-grantedness, a la the social theory of Peter Berger and his 
approach to the sociology of knowledge. Furthermore and nevertheless, all 
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rituals, including religious rituals, are themselves also lies and imply the 
possibility of alternative constructions of reality, and so are simultaneously the 
grounds and justification for the cognitive dissonance that upends the taken-for-
grantedness they entail, generate, and establish. In this, the present theory 
follows Rappaport in arguing for the universality of ritual across cultures, 
geographies, and time periods, but must draw on other resources to make the 
case for its pervasiveness in human life. Finally, the Peircian semiotic analysis 
Rappaport undertakes to distinguish language from ritual requires correction 
and renovation in order to demonstrate that language is properly understood as 
a species of the ritual genus in the final section of the chapter. 
Definition 
Before turning to definitions of ritual given by theorists, it is profitable to 
consider a more mundane source of definitions, namely a dictionary. The Oxford 
English Dictionary provides the following definitions of ritual as a noun: 
1.a. Freq. with capital initial. A book containing details of the form or order of 
religious or ceremonial rites. Now chiefly hist. 
b. The prescribed form or order of religious or ceremonial rites. 
2.a. A ritual act or ceremonial observance. Also in later use: an action or series of 
actions regularly or habitually repeated. 
b. Psychol. A compulsive act or routine, the non-performance of which results in 
tension and anxiety. 
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3. The performance of ritual acts. Also in later use: repeated actions or patterns of 
behaviour having significance within a particular social group.679 
Several features of these definitions are noteworthy. First, both parts of definition 
one correlate ritual with religion, while the latter definitions demure from any 
association of ritual with religion. Second, definitions two and three emphasize 
the activity of ritual, as opposed to the textual emphasis of the first set of 
definitions. Moreover, these definitions emphasize that ritual actions are 
repeated, and occur habitually, regularly, and by routine. Finally, the third 
definition attests the social aspect of ritual and its significance. 
Jan Snoek recognizes the profound lack of consensus among ritual 
theorists with regard to a definition of ritual, and suggests that finding a way 
forward with this aspect of a theory of ritual requires understanding the concept 
of ritual as a “polythetic class:”  
A class is polythetic if and only if (A) each member of the class has a large but 
unspecified number of a set of characteristics occurring in the class as a whole, (B) each of 
those characteristics is possessed by a large number of those members, and (if fully 
polythetic) (C) no one of those characteristics is possessed by every member of the 
class.680 
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This notion of a polythetic class is equivalent to the concept of “vagueness” 
advanced by Charles Peirce: “anything … is vague in so far as the principle of 
contradiction does not apply to it.”681 This is to say that some elements of a vague 
category may have mutually contradictory characteristics. The advantage of 
polythetic classes and vague categories is that they do not miss the forest for the 
trees by sacrificing scope for specificity.682 The disadvantage is that members “do 
not in all cases possess any specific features that could justify the formulation of 
general propositions about them.”683 Thus, rather than pointing to a resolution of 
contention regarding definitions of ritual, conceiving them as vague or polythetic 
merely calls into question the sufficiency of any definition. It is for this very 
reason that a model of ritual incorporating a variety of aspects is necessary, 
including a definition but not limited thereto. 
The definition Roy Rappaport offers of ritual is “the performance of more 
or less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by 
the performers.”684 Notably, Rappaport aspires in his definition to fulfill the 
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requisites for a definition of ritual set by Bruce Kapferer, which are quite 
properly vague in their own right, while demurring from the definition Kapferer 
then gives.685 Furthermore, Rappaport goes to great pains to insist that his 
definition of ritual is a formal or structural definition as opposed to a functional 
or substantive definition, on which point he feels he has frequently been 
misinterpreted.686 The import of this distinction is that he intends his definition to 
articulate ritual as a form in which a variety of different elements relate to each 
other according to the form, as opposed to defining rituals based on what they 
do. This is not to say that he does not understand the ritual form to have 
particular effects or consequences, which he does and calls “logical 
entailments,”687 and which will be explored under the subsection on function 
below. 
Two other definitions of ritual are noteworthy for purposes of 
comparison.688 First, Victor Turner (1920 – 1983): “By ‘ritual’ I mean prescribed 
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formal behavior for occasions not given over to technological routine, having 
reference to belief in mystical beings or powers.”689 The element of prescription 
in this definition correlates to the activity of ritual not being entirely encoded by 
the performers in Rappaport. Furthermore, Rappaport and Turner are in full 
agreement regarding the formality of ritual. However, Turner seeks to exclude 
technological routine from the domain of ritual, while Rappaport insists that 
ritual has outcomes that arise necessarily from its form;  for Turner ritual is 
commentarial and ornamental, whereas for Rappaport it is socially 
constructive.690 Moreover, Turner indicates that religion, and more specifically 
religious belief, is the primary referent of ritual, which Rappaport rejects. This is 
unsurprising since the central thesis Rappaport advances is that religion is what 
ritual generates, not one of its elements or contents.  
Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah (1929 – 2014) further considers the relationship 
between religion and ritual in his definition: 
Ritual is a culturally constructed system of symbolic communication. It is constituted of 
patterned and ordered sequences of words and acts, often expressed in multiple media, 
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whose content and arrangement are characterized in varying degree by formality 
(conventionality), stereotypy (rigidity), condensation (fusion), and redundancy 
(repetition).691 
For Tambiah to say that ritual is culturally constructed is roughly equivalent to 
Rappaport claiming that ritual is not entirely encoded by the performers; that is, 
that the encoding of ritual takes place at the cultural, as opposed to the personal, 
level. Even though Tambiah and Rappaport disagree with regard to the symbolic 
character of ritual, they agree on ritual as a form of communication, and in the 
end are closely aligned in seeking to stake out a middle ground between the neo-
Tylorian school of ritual and the semiotic school: 
The neo-Tylorians (e.g. Horton) conceive the critical feature of religion, and therefore of 
(religious) ritual, as being belief in, and communication with, the “supernatural” world 
or a “transtemporal” other world. In contrast, the semiotic school views the category 
ritual as spanning sacred–secular, natural–supernatural domains, and as having as its 
distinctive feature a tendency toward certain forms and structures of 
“communication.”692 
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Notably, Victor Turner develops a definition of ritual approaching the 
orientation of the semiotic school as well: ritual is “symbolic behavior” that 
“’creates’ society for pragmatic purposes;”693 presumably communication would 
be among or involved with these pragmatic purposes. The ritual theory under 
development here seeks to press back upon too close an association between 
ritual and religion, and thus will seek to problematize the neo-Tylorian project.  
The definition of ritual Rappaport offers is adopted wholesale for present 
purposes: ritual is “the performance of more or less invariant sequences of 
formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the performers.”694 What it 
means that ritual is fundamentally a performance will be discussed below in the 
subsection under that title, but for the moment performance may be understood 
as enactment. The constituents of ritual performances include both acts and 
utterances, which means that rituals deploy both language and motions, 
suggesting at least the possibility of artifacts such as texts to be read and objects 
to be moved.  
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In The Great Vigil of Easter, the ritual begins with the lighting of new fire 
and the bishop prays a prayer from a book with her hand extended over the fire, 
and then she makes the sign of the cross.695 This performance of language and 
motion is ordered and patterned, as Tambiah describes them, which is what 
Rappaport means by their being formal.696 The sign of the cross is a pattern that 
recurs frequently throughout the Great Vigil of Easter and connects this 
particular ritual with the enactment of this motion in other rituals. The formality 
of such acts and utterances, which is what Rappaport is referring to in calling 
them formal, should not be confused with the ritual form overall and its 
entailments, which is what the definition in totum is intended to articulate. In 
order to be ritual, formal acts and utterances must be performed in more or less 
invariant sequence. When the bishop makes the sign of the cross, she first raises 
her hand to about the level of her forehead, brings it down to the level of her 
chest, brings it up and to her left roughly aligned with her shoulder, then crosses 
at the same vertical level to the right shoulder, moving her hand back to the 
center of the cross she just outlined before moving her hand back to the starting 
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point. She follows the same pattern in the same sequence in subsequent 
enactments of this ritual form, although with somewhat different reference 
points depending on what she is making the sign of the cross over. For example, 
when making the sign of the cross over the Eucharistic elements, the motion is 
transposed from the vertical to the horizontal plane.697 Finally, for the acts and 
utterances that constitute ritual to be ritual they cannot be entirely encoded by 
their performers, which means that the participants in rituals do not simply 
make them up as they go along. In the case of The Great Vigil of Easter, the 
bishop did not invent the sign of the cross but rather performed it as it has been 
performed by many Christian clergy over the centuries. She also did not make 
up the words of the prayer but rather said words from the Book of Common 
Prayer, which are said by many other Episcopal clergy at The Great Vigil of 
Easter in many different places each year. That said, she was involved somewhat 
in encoding her performance of the ritual in that her voice sounds different than 
other clergy, along with many other particularities having to do with the context 
of the space, her own physiology, and more. 
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A definition is merely a starting point for developing a theory of ritual. It 
is important for providing an initial orientation, but alone a definition could 
never fulfill the criteria for evaluation of a good theory outlined above, let alone 
provide sufficient inspiration to animate a method for fully analyzing any given 
ritual. Other aspects of a theory of ritual help to clarify and elaborate the 
definition even as they move beyond the definition to articulate the features, 
range, scope, context, means of operation, capacity, and power of ritual. On its 
own, the definition of ritual as “the performance of more or less invariant 
sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the performers” 
(Rappaport, 24) does not indicate that very much is at stake in attending to or 
neglecting ritual. As the other aspects of the theory of ritual under development 
here come into view, the case will be made that a great deal is at stake indeed. 
Origins 
The question of the origins of ritual was a central concern of the earliest 
ritual theorists. As Catherine Bell puts it: 
The study of ritual began with a prolonged and influential debate on the origins of 
religion that gave rise to several important styles of interpretation—evolutionary, 
sociological, and psychological—from which new fields of scholarship emerged. The 
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simple question at the heart of this productive controversy was whether religion and 
culture were originally rooted in myth or in ritual.698 
Exhaustive arguments were made on both sides of the debate, on the one hand 
arguing that belief (myth) emerges from practice (ritual), which argument was 
characteristic of the myth and ritual school, and on the other hand that practice is 
inspired and generated out of the groundwork of belief, which argument 
characterizes the phenomenologists of religion. For the myth and ritual school, 
the origins of ritual lie in the cycle of seasons dramatized in narratives of death 
and rebirth.699 For the phenomenologists, ritual is the particular ordering of 
universal experiences of the sacred contained in myths and symbols, which are 
the irreducible source of the rituals that seek to order them.700 Ultimately, the 
arguments of both sides are caught in the chicken or egg trap even as they fall 
afoul of the sin of essentialism. Arguing that ritual is primary makes the 
dramatization of the seasonal cycle the essence of all of culture, while arguing 
that myth is primary requires a common religious reality as the essence of 
diverse religious expressions. Both theories thereby effectively become myths in 
their own right: “A myth – like a ritual – simultaneously imposes an order, 
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accounts for the origin and nature of that order, and shapes people’s dispositions 
to experience that order in the world around them.”701 Such perennial 
philosophies as the myth that ritual is the fountainhead of culture or the myth 
that a common sacred reality is the fountainhead of religion remain popular, 
likely because they point to an underlying unity behind the diversity of human 
ways of being and experiencing the world.   
As questions regarding the structure and function of religion became 
more prominent, the issue of origins receded among the next generation of ritual 
theorists. The origins issue reemerges as central with the work of Kimberley 
Patton in Religion of the Gods: Ritual, Paradox, and Reflexivity.702 Patton does not set 
out to address the question of ritual origins, but rather the question of why many 
different religious traditions depict and represent various deities participating in 
ritual, particularly sacrifice, since the deities themselves are the ones to whom 
sacrifice is offered. After extensive, detailed, careful, comparative presentation of 
the phenomenon of divine participation in ritual across a number of traditions, 
Patton concludes that, “religious action ought to be understood as an attribute 
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and reflex of the divine, not simply as the projection of human ritual obligation, or 
as paradigmatic showcase for right action.”703 Patton primarily identifies 
reflexivity with self-reference, and she cites Barry Sandywell to explain that 
something is reflexive “to the degree that it possesses the capacity to turn back 
upon its own organization and operations in order to perform work on itself as a 
routine practical feature of its functioning.”704 This reflexivity explains the origins 
of religious ritual: 
We take for granted that humans originate worship; but from traditionalist perspectives, 
the gods, the recipients of religious activity, are its logical originators. This is “ideal 
worship,” but it is more. It is the source of worship and the reason for worship. God or 
the gods are plainly portrayed as participating in ritual activity, in cult. This is because 
they are its source; practiced religion belongs to them.705 
Patton takes this divine reflexivity, which grounds ritual practice, as a 
phenomenological category appropriate to the field of history of religions and an 
alternative to the prevalent “projection” hypotheses that impute “specific forms 
of human behavior to the constructed ‘divine.’”706 In this sense, Patton sides with 
the phenomenologists of religion over the myth and ritual school, but she does so 
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without succumbing to the temptation to essentialize belief or religion. She 
accomplishes this feat in large part by adhering closely to the ritual instantiations 
of her category and thereby attending to both historical explanation (etic) and 
theological interpretation (emic).707  
This divine reflexivity hypothesis addresses the question of the origins of 
particularly religious ritual, but not of ritual more generally. Situating the 
hypothesis in a broader semiotic theory of ritual, however, as will be detailed in 
subsequent sections, allows the question of origins to collapse into the rationale 
of a given ritual such that its reflexivity plays an important role in generating its 
entailments, particularly sincerity. Moreover, as Patton further notes, citing 
Rappaport, ritual as a phenomenon is “intensely reflexive” throughout, 708 and 
not merely with respect to its origins. Notably, Patton is giving what might be 
called a metaphysical account of the origin of ritual, that is an account of the 
ontology of ritual, as opposed to a historical account, even though she offers this 
explanation as an important contribution to the history of religions discipline. 
																																																								
707 Patton, 308. 
708 Patton, 173; Roy A. Rappaport, “Concluding Comments on Ritual and Reflexivity,” Semiotica 
30, no. 1/2 (1980): 181–93, https://doi.org/10.1515/semi.1980.30.1-2.181. 
	 289 
A recent ritual theory tending more toward the myth and ritual school, 
although also avoiding essentialisms, is Rappaport himself, who finds ritual at 
the very origins of humanity, since ritual generates religion and, he claims, 
“religion emerged with language. As such, religion is as old as language, which is to say 
as old as humanity.”709 This historical, temporal identification of the origin of all 
ritual comes in the context of his explanation of ritual and religion as an adaptive 
solution to the problem of the lie, although it is the particularly religious 
entailments of ritual that yield this solution, so this is still not an account of the 
origins of ritual generally. Also addressing particularly religious ritual, but with 
greater potential for explaining the origins of ritual generally in an evolutionary 
frame, is costly signaling theory, which, like for Rappaport, views religious ritual 
as adaptive. For costly signaling theory, ritual is adaptively advantageous 
because it enables cooperation by fostering trust among those willing to pay the 
cost of participating in rituals requiring behavior contrary to self-interest, thereby 
signaling social commitment.710 For example, religious groups requiring ritual 
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circumcision for membership can be relatively confident in the commitment to 
the religious group of those willing to undergo the ritual because the pain of the 
ritual would deter those who are not truly committed. Of course, not all rituals 
are so costly, and those that are not generate lower levels of trust because they 
demonstrate lower levels of commitment. For example, while symbolizing death 
and rebirth, the risk of actual death in a modern infant baptism is quite low, and 
indeed the level of commitment among baptized children, or even of the parents 
and godparents who sponsor their infant children for baptism, is quite low. The 
costly signaling theory of the origins of religious ritual opens the door to an 
explanation of the origins of ritual generally because presumably nonreligious 
rituals also signal solidarity with those sponsoring or performing the ritual in 
proportion to the cost of participation therein. Costly signaling theory will be 
addressed again in the section below on communication.  
The theory of ritual under development here resists the essentializing 
tendencies of the myth and religion school and the phenomenologists of religion 
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by insisting that religion is one form among others that provide organizing 
principles for the content of culture, although perhaps not the justification for 
culture, which may in fact be a particularly religious function. For example, The 
Great Vigil of Easter includes the ritual of baptism,711 which organizes the 
content of Christian culture with respect to membership. It is not the only form 
that pertains to membership in the Christian community, however, as members 
go through a process of educational formation prior to baptism called the 
catecumenate, and members are expected to serve in various organizational roles 
and contribute financially to the institution of the church, perhaps prior to but 
certainly following baptism. Thus, education, religion, politics, and economics 
are all forms for organizing the content of culture. All of these forms engage with 
the ritual form in various ways, and although the full elaboration of these 
engagements is beyond the scope of the present project, gestures will be made in 
their direction when considering the pervasiveness of ritual. 
The emerging theory of ritual here takes the internal explanation of the 
reflexive origins of ritual developed by Patton to be connected to the external 
explanation of the adaptive advantage ritual generates by engendering trust in 
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costly signaling theory. One result of the account of ritual origins as reflexive is 
that rituals are ultimately self-contained, internalizing even the rationale 
justifying their structure and content. This reflexive self-containment is reflected 
in the sacrament of baptism during the prayer over the water that will be used to 
baptize the candidates, connecting water and divine activity, including divine 
participation in the rite itself:  
We thank you, Almighty God, for the gift of water. Over it the Holy Spirit moved in the 
beginning of creation. Through it you led the children of Israel out of their bondage in 
Egypt into the land of promise. In it your Son Jesus received the baptism of John and was 
anointed by the Holy Spirit as the Messiah, the Christ, to lead us, through his death and 
resurrection, from the bondage of sin into everlasting life.712 
Reflexively grounded self-containment means that a given ritual wholly 
determines the signals identifying a ritual performer within the locus of 
solidarity circumscribed by that ritual. In the ritual of baptism, the water does 
not bring about any effects beyond the outcomes entailed by the ritual. The very 
fact of this determining power over the signaling process at the ritual level 
amplifies the trust generated from the singular act of paying the cost precisely by 
introducing that trust into the intensely reflexive environment of the full scope of 
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the ritual such that cooperation may not only be established but maintained. This 
is why the ritual of baptism brings about membership in the Christian church, 
not only for the time of the ritual in which the baptism takes place, but, at least 
according to the theology governing the practice of the instance of the ritual 
under consideration here, permanently. A full account of ritual origins thus 
includes both ontology and history and is intimately connected with the ritual 
process and the ritual feature of objectification, both covered in greater detail 
below.  
Structure 
The aspect of structure arises in multifarious ways in the ritual theory 
literature, and so it is important to locate the present project among them. One 
approach to ritual with respect to structure is that of the functionalists, who were 
primarily concerned with the effects of ritual on the social structure and the 
location and role of the ritual participants therein. Émile Durkheim (1858 – 1917) 
investigates the ways in which ritual generates the moral and cognitive 
structures of society by having members participate in a common action, in turn 
generating a passionate commitment to the social group as something larger than 
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and beyond themselves to which they belong.713 This trajectory of inquiry is 
developed into a robust functionalism by Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown (1881 
– 1955), in terms of ritual generating social structures, and by Bronisław 
Malinowski (1884 – 1942) in the direction of generating individual psychological 
structures.714 Still considering the function of ritual vis-à-vis social structure, 
Arnold van Gennep (1873 – 1957), and later Victor Turner, investigated the ways 
in which the ritual process facilitates transition from one part of a social structure 
to another.715 
Shifting from functionalism, the structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss 
(1908 – 2009) interprets social manifestations such as ritual as communicative 
impositions of symbol systems, which mirror the symbolic structures of the 
mind, rooted in the brain, in order to impose order and control. In the particular 
case of ritual, such imposition has the effect of resynthesizing the analytic 
elements of myth into a coherent, consistent whole.716 While structuralism is 
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distinguishable from functionalism, several theorists who employ the 
structuralist approach do so to functionalist ends. Mary Douglas (1921 – 2007) 
develops a structuralist theory of societies as exhibiting degrees of “grid” and 
“group” characteristics: “[Grid] is order, classification, the symbolic system. 
[Group] is pressure, the experience of having no option but to consent to the 
overwhelming demands of other people.”717 Ritual is to be found in societies with 
strong grid and/or strong group as the communicative mechanism for restraining 
social behavior to conform with the norms of the society. Edmund Leach (1910 – 
1989), by contrast, investigates the role of the ritual process, a la van Gennep and 
Turner, in transforming elements belonging to one part of the symbolic structure 
of a society into a second, distinct part of the structure while maintaining the 
distinctiveness of the categories that make up the structure such that it 
successfully organizes reality.718   
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Other theorists demurred from the biological foundations Lévi-Strauss 
attributed to symbol systems, instead locating syntactic systems of symbols such 
as language and ritual in the semantic field of culture. Clifford Geertz (1926 – 
2006) defines religion as 
(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting 
moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the 
moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.719 
Ritual, then, both establishes and maintains the indicative “conceptions of a 
general order of existence” as a “model of” the social structure in cultural terms, 
and facilitates transformation of social structures toward the subjunctive “moods 
and motivations” that are a “model for” the cultural ideal of how society should 
be.720 Nancy D. Munn more precisely identifies ritual as a message system 
communicating between culture and society that “consists of all the forms and 
rules governing these forms that pertain to the ritual process as a mode of 
expressive communication.”721 It is only with this cultural symbolist orientation, 
and not among the functionalist or structuralist approaches, that the structure or 
																																																								
719 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 90. 
720 Geertz, 93, 142–46. 
721 Nancy D. Munn, “Symbolism in a Ritual Context: Aspects of Symbolic Action,” in Handbook of 
Social and Cultural Anthropology, ed. John J. Jonigmann (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1973), 579–
612. 
	 297 
form of ritual itself, and not principally of society, comes to the fore. 
Nevertheless, these theorists are less interested in considering a general form or 
structure of ritual than, on one hand, interpreting the meaning of particular ritual 
instantiations, e.g. Turner and Geertz, or on the other investigating particular 
ritual forms for their respective communicative effects, e.g. Leach and Munn.722 
A group of theorists that have been interested in investigating and 
articulating a general form or structure of ritual are those who may be associated 
with the symbolic interactionist perspective in sociology. Harold Blumer (1900 – 
1987) expounds three premises of symbolic interactionism:  
that human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for 
them…, that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the social 
interaction that one has with one’s fellows…, and that these meanings are handled in, 
and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the 
things he encounters.723 
Erving Goffman (1922-1982) identifies the social interactions that give rise to 
meanings, ranging from formal or ceremonial interactions all the way down to 
day-to-day interactions, as ritual.724 He distinguishes the form or structure of 
such interaction rituals as exhibiting (1) situational co-presence, (2) focused 
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interaction, (3) entrainment, conformity, and social solidarity, (4) honoring of 
what is socially valued, and (5) moral uneasiness in the face of ritual 
impropriety.725 Randall Collins identifies a similar ritual form and adds 
dynamism via a reflexive feedback loop between a “mutual focus of attention” 
on a “common action or event (including stereotyped formalities)” and a “shared 
mood” or “shared emotional/cognitive experience” intensified by “rhythmic 
entrainment.”726 A Durkheimian “collective effervescence” is the outcome of 
participating in the ritual form and is characterized by experiences of “group 
solidarity,” “emotional energy,” intense association with symbols or “sacred 
objects,” and the feeling of moral righteousness of the in-group constituted by 
the ritual.727 Collins goes on to describe the totality of social encounters as “a 
market for interaction rituals of varying degrees of intensity” with the goal of 
maximizing the emotional energy generated by participating therein.728 In this 
case, the structure of ritual does not govern the social structure directly, but 
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rather participates in the social structure by generating the currency of the social 
market. 
Terence S. Turner (1935 – 2015) applies something like symbolic 
interactionism in an anthropological understanding of ritual structure, which is 
the “form and dynamic of the ritual process,”729 analyzable according to three 
rubrics: structure, frame, and trope. Drawing on the work of Gregory Bateson 
(1904 – 1980) and Goffman, Turner considers ritual as activity in a frame, which 
is its “schema of activity that also serves as a schema for the interpretation of that 
activity in a certain way.”730 While all framing objectifies what it frames, ritual 
framing does so “in a way intended to produce an effect beyond the limited 
frame of the action as such,”731 and “thus intrinsically involves a transformative 
relation between frames.” It does so by “framing the process of objectification so 
that it becomes foregrounded as itself the object of control in the ritual 
performance.”732 Thus framed as objective, the ritual then extends its frame to 
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encompass everything it projects to effect beyond the immediate context of the 
ritual via a pivoting construct embodied in a symbolic act or element.733 Tropes, 
(e.g. metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, etc.), mediate and connect elements and 
levels of the ritual structure, and are “modes of identity and contrast between 
entities.” They also “can be understood as patterns of activity (in other words, 
schemas), that bring into association or transform relations among the elements 
of ritual action.”734 Nevertheless, even though ritual is transformational via the 
application of tropes and the shifting of frames to its symbolic elements, it is 
itself a unified structure of that transformation that constrains the constituent 
tropic relations to abide by an invariant form regardless of the scope of the 
frame. Turner’s approach to ritual may thus be categorized as a structural holism 
in which “the structure is the form of the process and the process directly 
consists of the structure.”735 Hence, the meaning of either symbolic elements or 
rituals as a whole cannot be interpreted without reference to the structure of the 
ritual process in question. 
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Roy Rappaport theorizes five features of ritual that together constitute the 
ritual form or structure. First, ritual performers do not encode the ritual orders 
they perform themselves but relatively punctiliously follow orders established, at 
least ostensibly, by others, except in the rare and fraught cases of ritual 
innovators. Second, ritual behavior tends to adhere to a high degree of formality, 
i.e. “adherence to form,”736 which operates much like the feature of “framing” 
does for Terence Turner and Goffman. Just as Rappaport recognizes that rituals 
may in fact fall almost anywhere on a spectrum of formality from punctilious to 
spontaneous, he also recognizes that the invariance entailed by formality, which 
is the third feature of ritual form, must be tempered. At baseline, this recognition 
necessitates the caveats that “imprecision is unavoidable,”737 rituals do change 
over time, and no ritual could possibly be specified absolutely. Moreover, 
invariance is substantively relativized by the fact that rituals often involve 
participants making intentional choices and decisions with regard to their 
performance, including whether or not to perform them at all. Fourth, ritual 
orders only become ritual when they are enacted, which is to say performed: 
“The act of performance is itself a part of the order performed, or, to put it a little 
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differently, the manner of ‘saying’ and ‘doing’ is intrinsic to what is being said 
and done.”738 Ritual performances can be distinguished from related 
performances such as theater and sport. In a ritual, everyone present participates 
in the ritual in one or another performing role, whereas theatrical performances 
distinguish performers from audience and athletic performances distinguish 
athletes from supporters. Also, rituals establish orders, (cosmic, social, etc.), 
whereas dramas reflect on orders, and so rituals affect the world by construing it 
in one way or another, whereas theater affects the world by inspiring the 
audience to inhabit or undermine the already established order. Athletic 
performances are further from ritual than theater because their rules but not their 
performance of the rules are invariant, and because sport distinguishes winners 
from losers whereas ritual conjoins its participants into a social unity. Finally, the 
fifth feature of ritual is that it is not instrumental or physically efficacious: “If 
ritual (in contrast to technique) does anything at all it doesn’t do it by operating 
with matter and energy on matter and energy in accordance with physical laws 
of cause and effect, but by focusing agencies or forces of another sort upon 
whatever is to be affected.”739 Indeed, it is the emotional power of ritual and the 
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ordering capacity of language in ritual that effect the emotional and cognitive 
states of ritual participants. 
The present project moves primarily in the direction of the symbolic 
interactionists and their ilk, including Collins, Goffman, Rappaport, and Terence 
Turner. Rituals have an analytically distinguishable structure or form that orders 
their elements, including ritual participants themselves, and as the form of a 
process transforms these elements to accord with the structure. The functions, i.e. 
the outcomes or entailments, of the ritual structure is the topic of the next 
subsection, and the process that generates these functions is that of the 
subsequent subsection, but the form of the process that generates those functions 
requires detailing here. Notably, the form of ritual is semiotic on the order of the 
semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce, not that of Ferdinand de Saussure, upon 
whom most of the symbolic interactionists engaged above, with the exception of 
Rappaport, rely. As a result of these caveats, what will be said here about the 
ritual form or structure will become clearer upon engaging further aspects of the 
ritual theory under development and so may bear returning to after cycling 
through the rest of the aspects. 
First, rituals are made up of elements; elements are the stuff of ritual. 
Notably, this stuff is usually taken for granted in ritual theories except insofar as 
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it appears as the background for the ritual form, structure, process, etc. It is a 
significant contribution of the present project to put the stuff of ritual on equal 
footing in the aspect of ritual structure with other features thereof. Ritual 
elements include not only objects, such as vestments, candles, water, bread, wine, 
etc., but also the words spoken, the actions taken, and most notably, the 
participants in the ritual themselves. Significantly, each ritual element is a sign in 
a semiotic sense, and it is at least potentially so in multiple ways: (1) it is a sign of 
itself to itself; (2) it is a sign of its role in the ritual to itself; (3) it is a sign of itself 
to other elements in the ritual; (4) it is a sign of its role in the ritual to other 
elements in the ritual. Rappaport refers to the first and third ways of ritual 
elements being signs as “self-referential,” because they “transmit information 
concerning their own current physical, psychic or social states to themselves and 
to other participants.” The second and fourth he calls “canonical,” because their 
role is encoded not by themselves but by the ritual order and their given modes 
of reference therein.740 The elements of a ritual, as signs, accomplish each of the 
ways in which they are a sign by referring to each other in one or more of three 
modes of reference identified by Peirce: iconic, indexical, and symbolic,741 and it 
																																																								
740 Rappaport, 52–54. 
741 Peirce, The Essential Peirce 2, 2:4–10. 
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is this mutual reference that constitutes the elements together as a system. 
Notably, Terence Turner interprets the modes of reference as “tropes,” which  
“function as connectors between elements and between levels of structure by virtue of 
their construction as modes of identity and contrast between entities, rather than as 
individual units like symbols. Tropes can be understood as patterns of activity (in other 
words, schemas), that bring into association or transform relations among the elements of 
ritual action.”742  
Tropes for Turner are roughly analogous with diagrams for Peirce as discussed 
in chapter two. Thus, reference not only articulates a static relationship among 
ritual elements but is also the very process of their transformation. 
The analysis of the structural features of the Great Vigil of Easter in this 
section restricts itself to the Eucharistic liturgy within the wider vigil743 for the 
sake of keeping the analysis to manageable proportions while also 
demonstrating the explanatory capacity of the theorized features. The elements 
of the Eucharistic ritual are myriad, beginning with a number of objects: chalices, 
patens, cruets, ciborium, bread (wafers), wine, water, candles, candlesticks, 
corporal, palls, purificators, etc. Also, some participants wear special clothing, 
such as albs, cassocks, surplices, stoles, chasubles, etc. Texts, meaning particular 
																																																								
742 Turner, “Structure, Process, Form,” 238–39. 
743 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:56:50-2:11:45; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 13–15. 
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words read and spoken, and not merely the books in which they are printed, and 
variations therefrom, although those as well, are also elements of the ritual. In 
this instance, the printed elements include the service bulletin,744 the Book of 
Common Prayer,745 and Enriching Our Worship 1.746 Music, including texts, their 
settings, and purely instrumental music, are elements of the ritual. Numerous 
gestures and other movements are elements as well, such as the lifting of hands 
to the orans position,747 lifting of objects like bread and paten or wine and chalice, 
turning to various segments of the congregation, and making the sign of the 
cross, among many others. Finally, the participants in the ritual are also elements 
of the ritual, including not only the bishop, dean, clergy, vergers, lay Eucharistic 
ministers, ushers, musicians, and other leaders, but also every lay person who 
attends and participates, which participation cannot be limited to ingesting the 
Eucharistic elements of bread and wine. In fact, those who watch the service 
later, or even just read over the service bulletin, are participants as well, although 
in varying manners and senses, and with different effects than those physically 
																																																								
744 “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service Bulletin.” 
745 Book of Common Prayer. 
746 Enriching Our Worship: Morning and Evening Prayer, The Great Litany, and The Holy Eucharist, vol. 
1 (New York, NY: Church Publishing, 1998), 60–62. 
747 John N. Wall, A Dictionary for Episcopalians (Providence, RI: Cowley, 2000), 89. 
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and temporally present. The issue of participation will be addressed in the 
section below on performance.  
It is instructive to consider several different elements, from different 
classes, with respect to the various ways in which each is a sign. First, the bishop, 
who in the context of the Eucharistic liturgy is serving in the role of the celebrant, 
is a participant element in the ritual. She is a sign of herself, as a person and a 
participant in this ritual, to herself. She is also a sign of herself as a bishop and 
the celebrant of the Eucharistic liturgy to herself. She is a sign of herself as a 
person and a participant in this ritual to other elements of the ritual. And finally, 
she is a sign of herself as a bishop and the celebrant of the Eucharistic liturgy to 
other elements of the ritual. By contrast, the bread used in the Eucharistic liturgy 
is an object element of the ritual. The bread is a sign to itself of itself as bread, but 
an object being a sign to itself is rather trivially significant for the purposes of 
analysis in most cases. More significant is that the bread is a sign to other 
elements of the ritual of itself as bread. This is significant for the paten object 
element, for example, because it means that the bread can easily rest and remain 
on the paten relatively securely, unlike wine. The bread signifying itself as bread 
is even more meaningfully significant to participant elements in the ritual who 
may ingest it, and who may, for example, have varying physiological responses 
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to its ingredients, e.g. gluten. That the bread signifies itself as the body of Jesus 
Christ to itself is relatively trivial unless operating in a theological framework in 
which the salvific activity of Jesus is with respect to the whole created order. 
However, it is perhaps centrally significant to the Eucharistic liturgy that the 
bread signifies itself as the body of Jesus Christ to participant elements of the 
ritual, although not necessarily so to other classes of elements. Textual elements 
are distinctive from object elements and participant elements in this ritual. For 
example, the celebrant says, while making the sign of the cross over the bread 
and wine, “Pour out your spirit upon these gifts that they may be the Body and 
Blood of Christ.”748 This textual element is utterly trivial as a sign of itself as the 
vocalization by the celebrant of words printed on a page, even insofar as those 
vocalizations are interpretable to have propositional meaning, to itself, and only 
perhaps marginally less trivially as a sign of itself so to other elements of the 
ritual. It is, however, highly significant as a sign of its role as epiclesis, or 
invocation of divinity in mundane elements, not to itself but to both the object 
elements it purports to transform, i.e. bread and wine, and to the participant 
elements who anticipate feasting on divine flesh and blood, not mere bread and 
																																																								
748 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:00:39-2:00:45; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 14. 
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wine. Notably, even though this project addresses the topic of ritual and 
religious language, such textual elements in unmistakably religious ritual are not 
central analytic concerns of the project, although it does aim to include them 
within its explanatory framework. 
Second, ritual elements are arranged according to an order specific to that 
ritual; there is no ritual order in general, which is why identifying and defining 
ritual as a genre is so difficult. The order of a given ritual is constituted by the 
network of references among the elements in each of the ways that each element 
is a sign. Nevertheless, as Rappaport rightly insists,749 the elements do not encode 
the order by referring to themselves and each other in each of the ways they do, 
but rather they refer to themselves and each other in the ways they do so as to 
accord themselves with the encoded order of the ritual. This is what is meant by 
a sign referring to itself or other elements according to its “role;” the role is 
enacted by the element according itself with the order, or diagram in the idiom of 
Peirce. The acts of the elements referring to themselves and each other according 
to the encoded order of the ritual is the performance of the ritual, which is also 
the realization of the elements in accord with the order as ritual. This is to say 
																																																								
749 Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, 32. 
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that Terence Turner is right about the ritual order being the “form of a process,” 
so that the order of the ritual does not lock the ritual elements into a static 
scaffold but guides the speech and other actions of the elements and their 
resulting motions and effects on each other.  
In the Great Vigil of Easter, the order of the ritual initially has the bread, 
wine, and sacred vessels uncovered on the corporal, in turn on the altar. The 
celebrant stands with her hands in the orans position while the co-celebrants 
stand with their hands clasped before them. As the liturgy unfolds, the order of 
the ritual guides the order of the words spoken, and the call and response 
between celebrant and congregation of certain parts of the text. The order also 
guides motions, such as the celebrant and co-celebrants bowing over the altar 
during the singing of the Sanctus750 and making the sign of the cross during the 
Benedictus.751 Some ritual variants are guided by the order, such as replacing 
“day” with “night” such that the preface concludes “And so this night we join 
with Saints and Angels…”752 Other ritual variants are delineable as encoded by 
																																																								
750 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:58:00. 
751 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:58:32. 
752 Enriching Our Worship 1, 1:60. Similarly, the saints included in the blank left in the written text, 
Enriching Our Worship 1, 1:62., are those who appear in the gospel reading for the day and the 
patron saints of the church. See “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service Bulletin,” 12. 
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the performers by their variation from the given order. For example, the given 
Eucharistic prayer in Enriching Our Worship 1 has the celebrant say all of the 
epiclesis,753 but in the service bulletin for the Great Vigil of Easter and in the 
recorded practice, the whole congregation says the second part of the epiclesis 
beginning with “Breathe your Spirit over the whole earth.”754 This choice reflects 
a theology that the invocation of the Holy Spirit is a function of the priesthood of 
all believers and not of the clerical priesthood alone, which may not be shared by 
everyone who enacts this ritual, i.e. all Episcopalians. Notably, it is the ongoing 
mutual reference among the elements of the ritual according to the order that 
allow the ritual to flow seamlessly, with all of the elements able to participate 
without confusion as to what is going on or debating how to do things. 
Participant encodings of the ritual order that do not interfere with this flow are 
generally more tolerable to all elements involved in the ritual than participant 
encodings that do interrupt the flow as they allow the taken-for-grantedness of 
the ritual as a whole to be maintained. In fact, the maintenance of taken-for-
grantedness is what is meant here by flow. 
																																																								
753 Enriching Our Worship 1, 1:62. 
754 “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service Bulletin,” 14; The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 
2:00:49. 
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The third feature of the ritual structure is the frame: the “terms of the 
organization of experience”755 or “schemata of interpretation” that allow each 
element to “locate, perceive, identify, and label”756 one another and elements of 
the world beyond the ritual itself. It is the frame that makes a ritual that ritual, 
(and not some other or something other than ritual entirely), and that constrains 
the orientation and reference of the ritual elements such that they achieve 
coherence according to the ritual order. The elements of the frame are also 
elements of the ritual but they have the particular role of articulating and holding 
the elements accountable to the code of the ritual that, as Rappaport so strongly 
insists, is not entirely encoded by the elements themselves. The ritual frame is 
dynamic, first in that it requires the cooperation of all of the elements of the ritual 
to establish and maintain,757 and then also in that it is the frame of the ritual 
process and so in a sense articulates the coherence of change. It is important to 
emphasize that the ritual frame is the frame of the ritual elements as a group, 
which may be contrasted with the interpretive, experiential frames brought to 
																																																								
755 Goffman, Frame Analysis, 10–11. 
756 Goffman, 21. 
757 Francesca Polletta and M. Kai Ho, “Frames and Their Consequences,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Contextual Political Analysis, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 190. 
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the ritual by any given individual element thereof in the form of “norms, habits, 
and expectancies.”758 The ritual frame, then, exerts downward causation759 on the 
ritual elements’ individual frames, which are brought into resonance760 with the 
ritual frame via frame alignment processes.761  
The frame of the Eucharistic liturgy in the Great Vigil of Easter is what 
makes this an enactment of the Eucharist instead of some other ritual such as 
baptism, which occurred earlier. The initial element that signals the arrival of the 
Eucharistic liturgy is the call and response between the celebrant and the 
congregation known as the Great Thanksgiving.762 This is followed, in order, by 
																																																								
758 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions,” The 
Journal of Business 59, no. 4 (1986): 257, http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.bu.edu/stable/2352759. 
759 This notion of downward causation derives from emergence theories in philosophy of science. 
See Clayton and Davies, The Re-Emergence of Emergence, 35–52. 
760 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology Frame Resonance and Participant 
Mobilization,” International Social Movement Research 1 (1988): 197–217. 
761 David A. Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement 
Participation,” American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–81, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2095581. 
762 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:56:50-57:03; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 13. 
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the preface,763 the Sanctus and Benedictus,764 a recitation of salvation history,765 
the words of institution,766 an offertory acclamation,767 the epiclesis,768 
intercessions,769 a doxology,770 the Lord’s Prayer,771 the fraction,772 invitation and 
communion,773 and a post-communion prayer.774 These framing elements, in this 
																																																								
763 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:57:03-57:54; Enriching Our Worship 1, 1:60. 
764 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:57:55-58:50; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 14. 
765 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:58:52-59:37; Enriching Our Worship 1, 1:61. 
766 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:59:37-2:00:21; Enriching Our Worship 1, 1:61. 
767 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:00:22-2:00:39; Enriching Our Worship 1, 1:62. 
768 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:00:39-2:00:55; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 14. 
769 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:00:55-01:12; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 14. 
770 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:01:12-01:27; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 14. 
771 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:01:30-02:11; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 14; Book of Common Prayer, 336. 
772 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:02:11-02:59; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 14. 
773 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:03:00-11:10; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 14. 
774 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:11:10-11:45; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 15. 
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order, closely follow both historical precedent775 and ecumenical consensus776 for 
Eucharistic liturgy, which is constitutive for their effectiveness in the framing 
function. It is easy to imagine, watching the easy flow of the liturgical enactment 
in the video recording, that had one of these framing elements been enacted out 
of order, dropped out, substantively changed, or some other element added, that 
flow would be disrupted, potentially to the point of ritual failure.777 Thus, 
disruption of framing elements puts the entire ritual process and thereby its 
entailments at risk, whereas relatively minor infelicities such as occurred and 
was corrected in the doxology778 may be glossed over by the overarching flow of 
the framing elements. The dynamism of the ritual frame is responsible for 
transforming bread into flesh and wine into blood both by the invocation of 
Jesus’ words at the Last Supper as recounted in the words of institution and by 
the invocation of the Holy Spirit in the epiclesis with the words “that they may 
be the Body and Blood of Christ.” Participation in these framing elements thus 
																																																								
775 Cheslyn Jones, The Study of Liturgy (Oxford University Press, 1992), sec. III. 
776 World Council of Churches, Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry, Lima Text, Faith and Order Paper 
No. 111 (Geneva, Switzerland: World Council of Churches, 1982), 13–14. 
777 Ronald L. Grimes, Ritual Criticism: Case Studies in Its Practice, Essays on Its Theory (Columbia, 
SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1990); Ute Hüsken, When Rituals Go Wrong: Mistakes, 
Failure and the Dynamics of Ritual (Leiden: Brill, 2007). 
778 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:01:12-01:24. 
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has the effect of transforming the frame of participant elements from expecting 
bread to be bread and wine to be wine to understanding bread to be flesh and 
wine to be blood in order to align with the frame of the ritual. 
Fourth, the ordered elements of ritual in their frame effect a 
transformation of at least some of the elements. This feature begins to get at the 
function and process of ritual to be detailed in subsections below, but in a 
discussion of the aspect of structure it is important to articulate the relationship 
between transformation within the ritual structure and physical efficacy or 
material change. Rappaport quotes George C. Homans (1910 – 1989), that, “ritual 
actions do not produce a practical result on the external world – that is one of the 
reasons we call them ritual.”779 This conclusion relies upon a distinction made by 
Edmund Leach between technique and communication: “Technique has 
economic material consequences which are measurable and predictable; ritual on 
the other hand is a symbolic statement which ‘says’ something about the 
individuals involved in the action."780 The problem is that this distinction relies 
upon the premise that ritual relies upon purely symbolic reference, but 
																																																								
779 Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, 46; George C. Homans, “Anxiety and 
Ritual: The Theories of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown,” American Anthropologist, New Series, 
43, no. 2 (April 1, 1941): 164–72, http://www.jstor.org/stable/662949. 
780 Leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma, 13. 
	 317 
Rappaport makes a strong case for indexical and even iconic reference in ritual, 
thereby opening the door to technique, even though he wants to limit the 
availability of indexical reference to the self-referential ways of being signs.781 
While the emotional energy generated by Goffman and Collins’ interaction 
rituals would still fall under the category of the “occult efficacy” of ritual in 
Rappaport,782 not all ritual primarily guides human social interaction but rather 
guides human interaction with the material environment. Some rituals exist to 
encode those acts that lead to consequences that are measured and/or predicted 
to be most beneficial, which is the important conclusion of Rappaport’s earlier 
work published in Pigs for the Ancestors.783 Thus, it is better to understand the 
feature of transformation broadly, and the particular form of social 
transformation via speech act as a narrower specification that needs to be 
accounted for but should not dominate the understanding of the feature. 
The Eucharistic liturgy of the Great Vigil of Easter is oriented around 
effecting two transformations. First, as has already been discussed, the words of 
																																																								
781 Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, 54–68. 
782 Rappaport, 47–50. 
783 Roy A. Rappaport, Pigs for the Ancestors: Ritual in the Ecology of a New Guinea People (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967). 
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institution, epiclesis, and surrounding gestures and acts, serve to transform 
bread and wine into the body and blood of Jesus, respectively. According to the 
Thomistic doctrine of transubstantiation, this transformation is material, but such 
a theological position is not adopted by the Episcopal Church, preferring instead 
a vaguer doctrine of Real Presence.784 As a result, the extent to which the 
transformation should be understood to be material in the context of the present 
analysis remains indeterminate. The second transformation is that of the 
participant elements who ingest the bread/body and wine/blood. The epiclesis, 
which was part of effecting the transformation of the bread and wine, also 
indicates the intended transformation of those who consume the transformed 
elements of body and blood into a “new creation, the Body of Christ given for the 
world you have made” (the second person pronoun referring here to God).785 
Notably, this transformation is intended to last beyond the span of the ritual 
enactment. Consumption of the flesh and blood of Jesus, in the forms of bread 
and wine, are understood to have a healing, restorative, renewing effect on the 
spirit as signaled by the language of new creation. Sacrament, theologically, is a 
																																																								
784 Don S. Armentrout and Robert Boak Slocum, eds., An Episcopal Dictionary of the Church: A User-
Friendly Reference for Episcopalians (New York, NY: Church Publishing, 2000). 
785 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:00:39-2:00:55; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 14. 
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technology of the soul with measurable and predictable consequences on the 
participant elements of the ritual. This is not quite the “practical results on the 
external world” that Rappaport and Homans distinguished from ritual action, 
which must wait for the comparative engagement of the next chapter. Yet, it does 
press beyond the tendency of much of the ritual theory literature to limit ritual 
transformation to socially constructed realities. Also, it takes seriously the emic 
understanding of the Episcopal Church of its Eucharistic liturgy, which is 
otherwise precluded by a staunch methodological secularism, naturalism, and 
materialism in the social sciences. 
Fifth and finally, the elements of ritual being ordered in their frame so as 
to effect the transformation of at least some of the elements achieves 
objectification. This is to say that rituals, their constituent features, and their 
entailments become “available”786 to themselves and to the broader society for 
further ritual engagement as more or less real, true, good, legitimate, reliable, or 
beautiful. This availability results from a given ritual, its features, and its 
entailments drawing constitutively from and contributing constructively to 
ongoing processes of ordering, of framing, and of transforming elements to 
																																																								
786 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 49. 
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accord with framed orders. Terence Turner describes two sides of ritual 
objectification: “the act becomes its own object,” and “the objectified action 
becomes separated from its performers and takes on the character of a self-
existing schema.”787 This is to say that rituals organize themselves and then 
contribute to wider processes of organizing otherwise chaotic experience, 
thereby constituting reality as such.788 It is important for two reasons, however, 
to remember that the self-organization of ritual is not arbitrary. First, as has just 
been said, a ritual must both draw from and give back to ongoing ordering 
processes in order to register in the first place, and to be relevant so as to be 
worthy of establishment and maintenance in the end, respectively. Second, 
harking back to the aspect of ritual origins, ritual order derives itself from an 
ideal external to the order itself, reflexes upon itself in the ritual frame, order, 
and process, and aims itself toward generating trust and thereby social cohesion 
and differentiation. This is all to once again affirm, with Rappaport, that ritual 
orders are “not entirely encoded by their performers.” Moreover, these 
externalities that encode rituals are what make the ritual orders, frames, and 
																																																								
787 Turner, “Structure, Process, Form,” 236. 
788 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, 65–70. The present project advances 
upon that of Berger and Luckmann by detailing the generation, establishment, and maintenance 
of socially constructed reality by ritual forms and processes. 
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transformations convincing as real on the order of natural or brute reality when 
objectified. 
The objectification of three particular elements of the Eucharistic liturgy in 
the context of the Great Vigil of Easter demonstrate the objectification process 
and highlight challenges to it. First, the celebrant of the Eucharistic liturgy, in this 
case the bishop, is standing in the place of Christ in the ritual enactment. (In the 
case of a priest serving as celebrant, the priest is standing in the place of the 
bishop who stands in the place of Christ).789 This is significant because the result 
is that Christ sacrifices Christ-self on behalf of the participant elements in the 
ritual performance, a highly reflexive act on the part of the divine. This reflexive 
divine self-sacrifice790 is the encoding of the ritual order of the Eucharistic liturgy. 
It also makes the celebrant a participant in divinity as a vessel thereof, and so a 
transmitter of divine authority in the community that is real, good, true, 
legitimate, reliable, and beautiful, and therefore trustworthy. The bishop who 
stands in the place of Christ as celebrant in the Eucharistic liturgy is also the 
representative of the authority of Christ in the community beyond the scope of 
																																																								
789 Armentrout and Slocum, An Episcopal Dictionary of the Church, 416. 
790 Patton, Religion of the Gods, 241–47. 
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the ritual performance.791 This extra-liturgical authority ultimately derives from 
the objectification of divine authority in the celebrant in the ritual frame. 
Similarly, the bread and wine are objectified as Christ’s body and blood, vessels 
of Christ’s presence and healing, saving power in the community, beyond the 
scope of the ritual performance such that it is important that any remaining 
bread or wine either be consumed or given back to the earth after the ritual is 
over. So too, the participant elements in the ritual, having consumed the 
bread/body and wine/blood, are transformed into a “new creation, the Body of 
Christ given for the world.” This transformation is objectified in the participants 
themselves, represented by the “Blessing of Easter” after the Eucharistic liturgy 
itself that enjoins the congregation to “Go forth this night in peace and joy.”792 
Thus, the engagement of the congregation with the wider world is guided and 
ordered by that sense of peace and rejoicing at an experience of resurrection. In 
this way the Eucharistic seeks to give back to wider and ongoing ordering 
processes in the societies from which its participants come.  
																																																								
791 Armentrout and Slocum, An Episcopal Dictionary of the Church, 47. 
792 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:11:45-2:12:03. Note that the blessing continues to 
refer beyond the ritual frame, effecting a frame extension: “and may the blessing of God 
almighty, Creator, Christ and Holy Spirit, go with you and remain with you this night and 
always.” See Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement 
Participation.” 
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At least two challenges arise in terms of the capacity for the transformed 
ritual elements being appropriated. First, the celebrant, who is transformed into a 
vessel of divine authority in the ritual, is unlikely to have that authority 
appropriated either by a wider society that does not recognize divine authority, 
and particularly the authority of Christ, or by participant elements in the ritual 
who are ambivalent about the enactment of divine authority in the wider society. 
Second, in order for objectification to be successful there must be a certain degree 
of frame alignment between the ritual, the participant elements, and the wider 
society. While the ritual frame exerts some downward causation on the frames of 
participant elements, it exerts no direct influence on the framing elements of the 
wider society except through the participant elements, and participant elements 
may bracket their personal frame so as to limit the extent to which they accept 
the ritual frame beyond the ritual context. Given the disparity between the 
framing elements of the Eucharistic liturgy, derived mainly in medieval Europe, 
and the late modern frames of participant elements and the wider society in 
which the Eucharistic liturgy is being enacted, the likelihood of robust frame 
resonance793 among them is limited. Thus, while the transformed ritual elements 
																																																								
793 Snow and Benford, “Ideology Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization.” 
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are available to the elements and the wider society beyond the ritual enactment 
itself in principle, they are in actuality unlikely to be appropriated as they only 
draw from and give back to the ongoing ordering processes in society to a 
limited extent. 
Process 
The ritual theory literature on ritual process has largely focused on rites of 
passage, that is, rituals that mark the transition from one stage of life to another, 
from one natural season to another, or from one social arrangement to another, 
following Arnold van Gennep’s cross cultural study thereof.794 Van Gennep 
identified a three stage process for such rituals: a separation stage, a “marginal,” 
liminal, or transitional stage, and an “aggregation,” or reincorporation stage.795 
Victor Turner developed Van Gennep’s model to distinguish the liminal stage as 
a distinct domain of “anti-structure” in which the hierarchy and differentiation 
of structured society is suspended in order to enable an experience of comunitas 
marked by radical equality.796 Terence S. Turner corrects Victor Turner’s 
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795 van Gennep; Turner, “Structure, Process, Form,” 212. 
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identification of anti-structure with the term meta-structure, indicating that the 
liminal stage of the ritual process operates at a higher logical level that facilitates 
transformations from one state to another, which would be mutually exclusive at 
the level of social binaries.797 A main difference between the two Turners’ views 
is that for Victor Turner the experience of the liminal stage verges on euphoria as 
structural barriers between people fall, whereas Terence Turner acknowledges 
that liminal experience is more one of disorientation and ambiguity; Victor 
describes wonder, Terence recognizes awe.798 Ronald Grimes seems to lean more 
toward Terence Turner when he says that “ritual knowledge is rendered 
unforgettable only if it makes serious demands on individuals and communities, 
only if it is etched deeply into the marrow of soul and society.”799 In each of these 
cases, the limitation of discussion of ritual process to the narrower class of rites of 
passage is problematic because it ignores the transformative work of ritual 
beyond that particular class. The present theory takes the aspect of process to 
																																																								
797 Terence S. Turner, “Transformation, Hierarchy, and Transcendence: A Reformulation of Van 
Gennep’s Model of the Structure of Rites de Passage,” in Secular Ritual, ed. Sally Falk Moore and 
Barbara G. Myerhoff (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1977), 53–70; Turner, “Structure, Process, 
Form,” 211–15. 
798 Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, “Approaching Awe, a Moral, Spiritual, and Aesthetic 
Emotion,” Cognition & Emotion 17, no. 2 (2003): 297–314, https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930302297. 
799 Ronald L. Grimes, Deeply Into the Bone: Re-Inventing Rites of Passage (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 2002), 6. 
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apply to all ritual, as indicated by transformation being included as a feature of 
ritual structure in the above subsection on ritual structure and by the emphasis 
on ritual transformation in the comparative engagement with Xunzi in the next 
chapter. 
The ritual process is the means by which the ritual form transforms at 
least one of the ritual elements from one location, status, state, or condition to 
another. Ritual being a semiotic system, the process of ritual transformation is 
one of semiosis, or the process by which a sign referring to an object generates an 
interpretant. In a ritual, the ritual process detaches a sign from its object and 
either assigns the sign to a new object or attaches a different sign to the object, in 
either case generating a new interpretant; ritual is a semiotic process of 
reassignment. As Van Gennep noted, there is a period of liminality as the ritual 
process takes place that is devoid of any signification at all. The awful 
interpretation of the ritual process offered by Terence S. Turner is to be preferred 
over the wonderful interpretation of Victor Turner because the process of being 
denuded of sign vehicles or objects generates anomie in which the element being 
transformed is utterly alone, not in utterly equal fellowship with all the other 
elements.  
	 327 
It is prevalent in the semiotics literature, and not without recourse to 
Peirce, to understand semiosis as fundamentally phenomenological such that it 
only occurs in “the presence of an interpreting mind.”800 This interpretation is to 
be resisted in the present project, as was addressed in chapter two, instead 
drawing from Peirce to sustain a metaphysical account of semiotics and semiosis 
reflecting the ongoing rejection of nominalism for realism herein. The importance 
of this for understanding the ritual process in terms of semiosis is that neither the 
interpretant an element generates at the start of the ritual nor the interpretant 
generated as a result of the ritual process depends on the transformation having 
a particularly cognitive effect on any given element. Instead, the interpretant is 
any effect, whether cognitive, social, physical, or otherwise, of the whole ritual 
system taking the new sign to stand for the object or the sign to stand for a new 
object and not the old.  
Since the aspect of ritual process has been almost exclusively addressed in 
the ritual studies literature with respect to rites of passage, the theory of ritual 
process just elaborated is applied here both to a rite of passage and to an 
ordinary rite. Ordinary rites are rituals that are performed regularly as opposed 
																																																								
800 Winfried Nöth, Origins of Semiosis: Sign Evolution in Nature and Culture (Berlin: Walter de 
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to marking a particular transition. The rite of passage that takes place in the 
Great Vigil of Easter is the rite of baptism:801 
This is full initiation by water and the Holy Spirit into Christ’s Body, the church. God 
establishes an indissoluble bond with each person in baptism. God adopts us, making us 
members of the church and inheritors of the Kingdom of God. In baptism we are made 
sharers in the new life of the Holy Spirit and the forgiveness of sins. Baptism is the 
foundation for all future church participation and ministry.802 
In the baptism ritual, there is a process of removing the signs of life outside the 
church and adding the signs of life inside the church to the participant elements 
being baptized. It begins in the examination of the candidates for baptism who 
make three renunciations: 1) of “Satan and all the spiritual forces of wickedness 
that rebel against God;” 2) of “the evil powers of this world which corrupt and 
destroy the creatures of God;” and 3) of “all sinful desires that draw you from 
the love of God.”803 Once these signs of life outside the church have been 
renounced, the candidates then take up new Christological signs, which generate 
the interpretant of being inside the church as they: 1) “turn to Jesus Christ and 
accept him as your savior;” 2) “put your whole trust in [Jesus’] grace and love;” 
																																																								
801 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:11:45-2:12:03; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 8–9; Book of Common Prayer, 301–3, 306–8. 
802 Armentrout and Slocum, An Episcopal Dictionary of the Church, 36. 
803 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:02:40-1:02:55. Note, the bishop omits the third 
renunciation. Book of Common Prayer, 302. 
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and 3) “promise to follow and obey [Jesus] as your Lord.”804 A congregational re-
renunciation of evil and re-appropriation of the signs of being in the church 
follows in the form of the responsive recitation of the Baptismal Covenant.805 
After intercessory prayers for the candidates, the prayer of thanksgiving 
sanctifies the water “that those who here are cleansed from sin and born again 
may continue for ever in the risen life of Jesus Christ our Savior.”806 The liminal 
stage of the ritual proceeds with the bishop pouring water three times over each 
candidate, symbolizing their “cleansing,” which is the removal of the signs of 
being outside the church, while at the same time saying, “I baptize you in the 
Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit,” the three persons of 
the trinity being signs of life inside the church.807 A further sign of life inside the 
church is given in chrismation, as the bishop makes the sign of the cross on the 
baptizand’s forehead with holy oil while saying, “You are sealed by the Holy 
																																																								
804 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:02:55-1:03:14; Book of Common Prayer, 302–3. 
805 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:03:15-1:06:13; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin”; Armentrout and Slocum, An Episcopal Dictionary of the Church, 37. 
806 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:09:38-1:10:01; Book of Common Prayer, 307. 
807 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:10:10-10:19; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 9. 
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Spirit in Baptism and marked as Christ’s own for ever.”808 Finally, each candidate 
is given a sign of their status in the church to carry with them into the world in 
the form of a lit candle, accompanied by the words, “Receive the light of Christ 
and carry it into the world.”809 This liminal stage is followed by a reincorporation 
stage as the bishop invites and the congregation receives the newly baptized, 
saying all together: “We receive you into the household of God. Confess the faith 
of Christ crucified, proclaim his resurrection, and share with us in his eternal 
priesthood.”810 The realist account of semiosis is extremely important for 
properly understanding what has happened here. It is not expected that each 
baptizand will carry the new signs of divine names, holy oil, and a lit candle with 
them everywhere they go for the rest of their lives so that everyone will be able 
to interpret them correctly as being members of the church. Instead, the 
interpretant of the baptism ritual is their new status in the church, allowing the 
baptizands to assume various offices, and their new orientation to how they live 
their lives day by day. While it is the work of the ritual to change the signs by 
																																																								
808 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:10:20-10:29; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 9. 
809 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:10:31-10:50; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 9. 
810 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:12:55-13:14; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 9. 
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which the participant elements are signified, the interpretant is the fullness of 
being of the participant element having been so changed. 
The principal ordinal rite in the Great Vigil of Easter is that of the 
Eucharist, and this ritual too exhibits transformative processes, both of the 
elements of bread and wine and of the participant elements who consume the 
bread and wine. These transformative processes have already been described in 
detail above in the discussion of the structural feature of transformation in the 
subsection on ritual structure, but it remains for the present to articulate them in 
terms of semiosis. The separation stage of the Eucharist with respect to the bread 
and wine actually takes place before the Eucharistic liturgy proper in the 
presentation of the gifts, including also monetary gifts for the support of the 
mission of the church.811 After the bread and wine have been processed to the 
altar, the bishop then censes the altar, that is, swings a thurible (censer) with 
incense burning inside over the altar and the bread and wine. “Censing may 
express honor, respect, blessing, and celebration in a liturgy.”812 Both the 
procession of the bread and wine and their censing serve to separate these 
																																																								
811 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:54:33-56:50; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 13. 
812 Armentrout and Slocum, An Episcopal Dictionary of the Church, 79. 
	 332 
elements from their normal status as food and drink. The liminal stage of the 
ritual begins in the words of institution later in the Eucharistic prayer where the 
bread and wine are associated with the bread and wine Jesus ate with the 
disciples at the Last Supper, and which Jesus identified as his body and blood, 
respectively.813 The liminality continues as the bread and wine, along with the 
participant elements, are sacrificed on the altar: “Now gathered at your table, O 
God of all creation, and remembering Christ, crucified and risen, who was and is 
and is to come, we offer to you our gifts of bread and wine, and ourselves, a 
living sacrifice.”814 This sacrifice negates the reference of the bread and wine by 
the signs of food and drink even as they are offered to God and so divinized. The 
epiclesis that follows invokes the Holy Spirit to transform the sacrificed bread 
and wine into the body and blood of Christ, investing the work of transformation 
in the phrase “that they may be.”815 The bread and wine are then quite literally 
reincorporated into the participant elements by ingestion.816  
																																																								
813 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:59:38-2:00:21; Enriching Our Worship 1, 1:61. 
814 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:00:21-2:00:39; Enriching Our Worship 1, 1:62. 
815 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:00:39-2:00:45; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 14. 
816 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 2:02:59-2:11:13. 
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The transformative process with respect to the participant elements in the 
ritual both overlaps and intersects with the transformative process with respect 
to the bread and wine. In the case of the participant elements, the separation 
stage of the process begins with the exchange between the bishop and the 
congregation in the Great Thanksgiving. The exchange invokes God on the 
congregation and the bishop, symbolically lifts the spirits (hearts) of the 
participant elements to be separated from the mundane realm and commune 
with the divine spirit, and then declares righteous this communion in gratitude 
and praise.817 The liminal stage occurs earlier for the participant elements, 
beginning in the proper preface with the establishment of connection between 
God and humanity in the activity of the former making the latter in the image of 
the former, but then humanity rebels, only to be gathered back “time and 
again.”818 The liminality continues in the recounting of salvation history with its 
ongoing oscillation between the ongoing fall of humanity and the everlasting 
grace of God, and intensified in the recounting of God’s paradoxical self-sacrifice 
																																																								
817 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:56:50-57:03; “The Great Vigil of Easter - Service 
Bulletin,” 13. 
818 The Great Vigil of Easter - Video Recording, 1:57:23-57:42; Enriching Our Worship 1, 1:60. 
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and glorification.819 Following the words of institution, the transformation 
processes of the bread and wine and the participant elements intersect as both 
are sacrificed together on the altar, in juxtaposition with God’s self-sacrifice.820 
The epiclesis that transformed bread and wine into body and blood also invokes 
the Holy Spirit to transform the participant elements, and all of creation, into the 
body of Christ, a sort of resurrection of the sacrificed body of Christ.821 Here the 
signs of Jesus are now made to refer to the participant element objects such that 
the interpretant of divinization is generated. The reincorporation brings this 
divinization process to fulfillment as the participant elements ingest God, which 
the bread and wine have been transformed into in the same ritual process. 
Notably, both the signs and he interpretant of the bread and wine and of the 
participant elements that results from the ritual process is God. Mundane signs 
are stripped away from mundane realities of bread, wine, and human beings, 
and divine signs are then made to refer to those realities in order to generate God 
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in even greater fullness. The Eucharist, then, is the ultimate ritual process, 
transforming material elements and participant elements into God. 
Function 
The function of ritual, as an aspect of a theory of ritual, addresses the 
products, outcomes, or entailments generated by the ritual structure and process 
being enacted. The enactment of the ritual structure and process is itself the topic 
of the next subsection on performance. Something has already been said in the 
above subsection on ritual structure about the functionalist trajectory in ritual 
studies that seeks to understand the effect of ritual on social structures, that is, on 
the organization and operation of society as a whole. By contrast, also noted 
above, structuralist interpretations of ritual demure from claims about causal 
effect on society, instead considering the meaning of rituals for their participant 
elements. That ritual should generate as products either social organization or 
personal meaning, however, is not necessarily a strict dichotomy. For example, 
Edmund Leach asserts that ritual, “serves to express the individual’s status as a 
social person in the structural system in which he finds himself for the time 
being.”822 In this case, then, ritual generates the personal meaning of being in a 
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particular location or role in the social organization detailed by the ritual. 
Furthermore, the strong causal link between ritual and social structure in the 
functionalist trajectory are nuanced in what Catherine Bell calls “neofunctional 
systems analyses.” In these approaches, ritual interacts with a number of other 
cultural systems, including ecological, economic, genetic, and physiological 
conditions, among others, to produce its effects. Ritual, then, serves to regulate 
how humans interact with their environment, including their personal ecology 
(genetics).823 
Among the neofunctional systems analysts, Bell includes Roy Rappaport, 
for whom it is important that ritual form or structure does something, which is 
likely why he has often been interpreted as a functionalist, much to his own 
chagrin.824 In making the case that the entailments of ritual are a result of its 
form, Rappaport is clear that while form and substance are indistinguishable in 
the practice of ritual, they are analytically distinguishable.825 With this distinction 
in hand, he makes a four step argument: 1) ritual form adds something to the 
																																																								
823 Bell, Ritual, 29, 33. 
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825 Rappaport, 30. 
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substance of ritual; 2) if the ritual form is universal, then the entailments of that 
form, i.e. what it is that the ritual form adds to the substance, are plausibly 
universal; 3) if these entailments only emerge from the ritual form and nowhere 
else, then ritual is without equivalent or satisfactory alternative, which explains 
the ubiquity of ritual; and 4) if these entailments are nontrivial, but rather 
“requisite to the perpetuation of human social life,” then ritual is “the social act 
basic to humanity.”826 The import of this argument for Rappaport is that 
participation in the ritual form is what makes human beings human; another 
way of saying this is that ritual makes humans humane. In doing so, ritual is 
evolutionarily advantageous because it overcomes the twin problems of the lie 
and the alternative. Finally, he relies upon the Aristotelian distinction between a 
formal and final cause, the latter of which he associates with functionalism, to 
distinguish himself therefrom.827 While Rappaport may well be absolved from 
the strict functionalism he rejected, the fact that he argues for evolutionary 
advantage from ritual and its entailments, and that he makes the production of 
these entailments so central to his analysis, does seem to locate him in the 
neofunctional systems analysis camp Bell identifies. That said, what ritual entails 
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for Rappaport is “the establishment of convention, the sealing of social contract, 
the construction of the integrated conventional orders we shall call Logoi…, the 
investment of whatever it encodes with morality, the construction of time and 
eternity; the representation of a paradigm of creation, the generation of the 
concept of the sacred and the sanctification of conventional order, the generation 
of theories of the occult, the evocation of numinous experience, the awareness of 
the divine, the grasp of the holy, and the construction orders of meaning 
transcending the semantic.”828 Some of these entailments, like the establishment 
of convention and the sealing of social contract, clearly have to do with social 
organization, but others, such as encoding these orders with morality and 
constructing orders of meaning beyond the semantic, have more to do with 
meaning making. Ultimately, then, Rappaport may best be interpreted as a 
neofunctional neostructural systems analyst. 
Rappaport conceives a number of ritual entailments, which may be 
divided into three classes: temporal, cosmological, and theological, all of which 
he understands to be religious in the sense of pertaining to “The Holy” and its 
four elements: “The Sacred,” “The Numinous,” “The Occult,” and “The 
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Divine.”829 The temporal class of entailments may further be broken down into 
what he calls three “dimensions:” the sequential, the simultaneous, and the 
hierarchical.830 Ritual generates the sequential dimension of temporality, that is, 
the distinctions among past, present, and future, due to the clarity of its 
occurrence, in turn resulting from its formality, which imposes “on natural 
processes discontinuities much sharper than those intrinsic to the natural 
processes themselves.”831 By contrast with the digital logic of sequential time and 
its periods, simultaneous time within the ritual frame is intervallic and exhibits 
many of the characteristics of comunitas or anti-structure as articulated by Victor 
Turner, which is an experience of eternity, and which arises from the tempo 
changes encoded in a ritual performance.832 Within the simultaneity of ritual, the 
ritual form establishes a hierarchy of successive orders capped by “Ultimate 
Sacred Postulates” expressed in terms of “cosmological axioms” enacted as rules 
of conduct applied to understandings of the world beyond the ritual frame.833 
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832 Rappaport, 216–19, 222–25, 230–33. 
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Similarly, the cosmological class of entailments are made up of the sacred, the 
sanctified, and their orders of relations.834 The sacred are unquestionable 
Ultimate Sacred Postulates, not what they postulate, established by the 
metaperformativeness of canonically invariant ritual forms, that is, by the 
performative establishment of the conventions that the postulates are and that set 
the terms for any and all conventional effects and states of affairs.835  The 
sanctified, then, are conventional effects and states of affairs that derive from a 
given Ultimate Sacred Postulate and that derive their sanctity therefrom 
according to their degree of approximation thereto;836 the degree of sanctity is 
thus the degree of unquestionableness, which in turn enables the stabilization of 
conventions in societies.837 The order of relations among the sacred and the 
sanctified are thus established as a “True Order” in ritual, which is in turn 
“imposed upon the world by the performance of the liturgical order that is its 
representation.”838 The certainty ritual imbues in, and the agreement ritual 
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demands not to question, immaterial discursive Ultimate Sacred Postulates 
combine with their inverse, namely material, (physical and psychic), 
nondiscursive numinous experiences of comunitas to ground the 
unquestionableness of the True Order and the notion of the divine, which is the 
theological class of ritual entailment.839 Rappaport concludes poetically: 
The unfalsifiable supported by the undeniable yields the unquestionable, 
which transforms the dubious, the arbitrary, and the conventional 
into the correct, the necessary, and the natural.840 
Two other issues need to be addressed with respect to the aspect of 
function. First, as was mentioned above with regard to the transformation 
feature of the ritual form, many ritual theorists reject the technical capacity of 
ritual to act on the material world. Rappaport argues that, while maintaining his 
emphasis on the formality of ritual as opposed to its functionality, or physical 
efficaciousness, a hard and fast distinction between the communication achieved 
by ritual formality and functional efficaciousness must ultimately break down.841 
This also puts him in good company with ethologists, who Bell also categorizes 
as neofunctionalist system analysts, and who identify ritual action as inherently 
																																																								
839 Rappaport, 372–73, 396–99, 404. 
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communicative and promoting of efficiency such that intraspecies damage or 
killing is limited and sexual and social bonding are facilitated.842 Furthermore, 
biogeneticists have emphasized how ritual “enables the individual, or the 
animal, to solve problems of adaptation that would otherwise be unyielding,”843 
which accords with Rappaport’s argument for the adaptive benefit of ritual 
overcoming the linguistic challenges of the alternative and the lie. Notably, these 
ritual techniques are not the cognitively intended techniques espoused by many 
ritual practitioners, who may, for instance, take the ritual of the Eucharist to 
produce the effect of turning bread and wine into body and blood. Nonetheless, 
as Rappaport pointed out in his earlier work, the slaughter of pigs may 
simultaneously serve as propitiatory sacrifice and means of regulating the 
quantity of pigs in the community such that ecological stability is maintained.844 
Again, the harmony of the functional and the structural is a distinctive 
contribution of Rappaport’s approach to ritual overall, and is why his systems 
approach is adopted for the purposes of the present project.  
																																																								
842 Bell, Ritual, 31. 
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Second, there is a significant strain of ritual theory that denies any 
meaning to ritual. The most notable proponent of this view is Frtiz Staal (1930 – 
2012), who argues that ritual “is pure activity, without meaning or goal,” because 
it is “for its own sake,” “without function, aim, or goal, or also that it constitutes 
its own aim or goal,” by contrast with ordinary activity that does have an aim or 
goal.845 Both ritual and ordinary activity, he claims, are rule governed activities, 
which means they both have syntax, but ordinary activity also has aims and 
goals, and thus meanings or semantic content, whereas ritual is only about 
following the rules.846 More will be said below in the section on ritual and 
language regarding Staal’s understanding of the relationship between the two, 
but for now what is notable is that he envisions ritual as exhibiting perfect aseity, 
existing in an entirely enclosed state in and for itself. Caroline Humphrey and 
James Laidlaw are far less polemical than Staal, in part out of their consideration 
of ritual as a mode of activity rather than a class of action, but nevertheless 
concur that ritual is not inherently meaningful, and therefore is neither 
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communicative in itself nor informative regarding its performers.847 Their 
interpretation is particularly nominalistic, relying exclusively on the meaning 
that participants bring to and/or receive from the ritual enactment to determine 
that the diversity thereof excludes meaning from ritualized action. A realist 
account would be better able to distinguish the meaning of the ritual from the 
meaning either ascribed to or derived from the ritual by the participants and 
other elements. Notably, both of these theories of ritual meaninglessness derive 
from analyses of South Asian ritual practices, the Vedic Agnicayana (fire ritual) 
for Staal and the Jain daily morning puja (veneration; worship; prayer) for 
Humphrey and Laidlaw. It is beyond the scope of the present project to 
adequately explore whether particularities of South Asian ritual development, 
theory, and practice contribute to this rejection of meaning in ritual, but there is 
reason from among Indologists to be skeptical of their claims.848 Regardless, the 
approach taken in this project rejects a hard distinction between ritual and 
ordinary activity, preferring instead the interlocking continua of ritual and 
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spontaneity, and cognitive and taken-for-granted. Furthermore, this project 
rejects nominalism for realism, insisting that ritual is not only activity taken 
alone or in groups of individuals but is properly activity of human social units. 
For both of these reasons, the emerging ritual theory here must reject claims of 
ritual meaninglessness on the terms of Staal, Humphrey, and Laidlaw, and 
instead articulate ritual as both inherently and productively meaningful. 
Like the neofunctional systems analysts, the present project understands 
ritual to be a cultural system, and thus a semiotic system, that enables ritual 
elements to interact meaningfully, efficiently, and effectively. Unlike the 
neofunctional systems analysts, however, the present project takes ritual to be 
more basic than any of the more particular cultural systems such as economic 
systems, political systems, religious systems, or language. This shift in the 
schematic location of ritual in the present project arises from the expansion of the 
understanding of ritual beyond the context of religion. Rather, ritual is the form 
that generates cultural systems, facilitates their interaction with natural systems, 
distinguishes foreground from background realities in given contexts, and 
transforms cultural elements and systems with its inherent processes. It is 
cultural systems, then, and their many elements, realities, and activities, that are 
the functions or products of ritual. This is very different than the classical 
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functionalist accounts of ritual, in which ritual produces certain social or 
psychological contents or experiences, instead generating full socio-cultural 
systems themselves, although also their particular contents and experiences. This 
is to say that ritual operates at many levels of life and experience, providing form 
to interactions and transforming its constituent elements in ways large and small. 
This is also to say that a theory of ritual must remain extremely general in order 
to account for the many and various instantiations of ritual from the cultural all 
the way down to the personal levels. This generality may be considered a 
weakness of the present project, abstracting to the point of meaninglessness. One 
counterargument is that earlier, narrower theories of ritual missed important 
interconnections among cultural domains and processes due to failure to pick up 
on the commonality among them of the ritual form. Another is that proclaiming 
weakness at this stage is premature anyway; this general theory is as strong as its 
ability to robustly describe and explain a wide variety of particular 
instantiations, and so its evaluation should await such application. 
While the ritual process has to do with removing signs from objects and 
assigning those objects new signs so as to generate new interpretants, the 
function of ritual is the interpretants. This is another reason that the 
phenomenological interpretation of semiotics is to be resisted in favor of a 
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metaphysical interpretation. The phenomenological interpretation would register 
the function of ritual as only an affair of mental representation of the ritual 
interpretants. A metaphysical interpretation, on the other hand, registers the 
interpretants of rituals as cultural systems, elements, and activities themselves, 
that is, as realities independent of knowing minds as opposed to impositions of 
rational order on otherwise chaotic reality. The ritual process adjusts the 
relationships among signs and objects in order to generate these new 
interpretants, be they cultural systems, interpersonal interactions, or even the 
physical location of a ritual element. One of the reasons some reject meaning in 
ritual is the assumption that meaning is inevitably cognitive, which the present 
theory rejects for a metaphysical understanding of meaning as an independent 
reality that may or may not be known. Similarly, those who distinguish ritual 
outcomes from technique assume that ritual can have only either technical or 
nontechnical products, the latter including both social and psychological effects. 
The present theory rejects the reducibility of ritual to the binaries either between 
cognitive or noncognitive meaning and between technical and social-
psychological effects. A ritual means what it means, which is to say it generates 
its outcomes, independent of whether its elements, including its participant 
elements, understand that meaning. Thus, the intentionality of ritual elements in 
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their ritual enactment is held in abeyance, yielding to the priority of the ritual 
form and process in generating the ritual functions. The aspect of function is 
properly metaphysical while the phenomenology of ritual, which is to say the 
interpreted meaning of a ritual in a mind, properly belongs to the aspect of 
communication. 
Another function of ritual is facilitation of the transition of the interpretant 
from foreground to background, or from an intentional to a taken for granted 
production from the perspective of the ritual elements, by virtue of repetition of 
the ritual. Notably, rites of passage are not usually repeated, as are ordinary 
rituals, and so are not good examples of this ritual role in facilitating transition 
from the cognitive to the taken for granted. Ritual interpretants, and the ritual 
processes that generate them, are fundamentally solutions to a problem the ritual 
is designed to solve. Charles Sanders Peirce, in line with the American 
pragmatist tradition in philosophy more generally, understands problem solving 
as the basic motivation for all human behavior. Problems that generate surprise 
sufficient to overcome tenaciously held beliefs thereby irritate doubt that can 
only be resolved by a process of inquiry.849 “Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied 
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state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief; 
while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid, or 
to change to a belief in anything else.”850 The ritual process and interpretant are 
the results of inquiry that resolve doubt, and as the process is repeated, the 
interpretant is repeatedly generated such that its presence may be taken to be 
reliable and belief is thus sustained. This reliability in turn relies on the repetition 
of the ritual, and so over time, as the ritual is repeated, both the problem and the 
ritual process and interpretant that together constitute its solution move from the 
foreground to the background of attention.851 The greatest achievement for a 
ritual, then, is to become taken for granted852 as reliable and merely part of the 
way of things are, rather than being either the subject or object of cognitive 
attention. In this way too, then, in addition to the metaphysical as opposed to 
phenomenological categorization of interpretants, the present theory rejects 
theories of ritual that in turn reject meaning in ritual. It does so on the basis that 
many of those theories are based on the testimonies of ritual practitioners who 
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may very well be taking the meaning of the rituals they perform for granted. 
Indeed, taking rituals for granted is precisely the point. At the same time, 
reliability should not be taken to indicate necessary causation, which is to say 
that the ritual process does not necessarily generate the interpretant of a given 
ritual one hundred percent of the time as they are enacted in a probabilistic 
world. Rituals that have greater technical efficacy do have higher probabilities of 
generating their interpretants, but many social rituals, and perhaps especially 
religious rituals, generate their interpretants reliably but at a relatively low rate 
of replication. 
The functions of the baptismal and Eucharistic rites within the Great Vigil 
of Easter have already been analyzed above with respect to their generation via 
the ritual process in the subsection above on process. Notably, these functions, 
namely ecclesial membership, transformation of bread and wine into body and 
blood, and transformation of participant elements into divinity, are all 
generations of metaphysical, as opposed to phenomenological, interpretants. 
There is nothing that other participant elements could sensorially perceive with 
respect to the baptizands that would indicate that they are now members of the 
church. Rather, the baptizands have been metaphysically transformed from the 
state of being outsiders to the state of membership. Similarly, the bread and wine 
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are not detectibly body and blood,853 and those who ingest the body and blood 
are not detectibly divine.854 On one hand, their transformation does have to do 
with their status among the rest of the ritual elements, but the change of status is 
brought about more fundamentally by the transformation of their state of being 
in and of themselves; the change of status is a further function of their change of 
state. Rappaport similarly relates the phenomenological effects to the 
metaphysical outcomes: “the indexical nature of acts signaling conventional 
states is a consequence of their accomplishment of whatever it is that they 
indicate.”855 These states of being, then, are solutions to problems that the rituals 
that generate them are designed to solve. Baptism solves the problem of 
identifying and establishing a boundary between who and what are inside and 
outside the church. The Eucharist solves the problem of who and what is saved 
or redeemed by God. Membership in the church is therefore signaled to other 
participants in the baptism ritual by virtue of the fact that the ritual accomplishes 
membership. Similarly, divinization is signaled to other participants in the 
Eucharist by virtue of the fact that the Eucharist accomplishes divinization. 
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Nevertheless, in both cases, the fact that those who did not participate in the 
ritual will not necessarily have any indication of the transformed state of the 
baptizands or the Eucharistic participants, respectively, does not mean that the 
ritual did not accomplish the transformation or that the transformation has been 
reversed. 
The ultimate claim of Rappaport’s elaborate conception of ritual 
entailments is that ritual establishes and maintains the most basic conventions by 
which human beings perceive, interpret, and engage each other and everything 
in the world, including the world itself. This claim correlates to Immanuel Kant’s 
categorical scheme of time, space, and causality,856 but whereas Kant took these 
categories to be inherent to human rationality, Rappaport conceives them as 
socially constructed by the ritual form. The present project fundamentally 
affirms the insight that these basic conventions, and perhaps others, are ritually 
established and maintained, and makes the insight programmatic by 
characterizing ritual as pervasive in the comparative engagement undertaken in 
the next chapter. In so doing, Rappaport is found deficient for having limited his 
conception of ritual to religious ritual. It should be emphasized that ritual 
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generates a wide range of interpretants, including these most basic conventions 
but also ranging far beyond to social, cultural, interpersonal, and even physical 
norms insofar as they are established by convention. 
Nevertheless, the analysis Rappaport provides of how ritual generates the 
conventions of human knowing and doing benefits from some tweaking. First, 
the correction Terrence Turner offers to Victor Turner in the consideration of the 
aspect of process above provides entrée into a more systematic account of the 
periods and intervals of sequential and simultaneous time. Rather than 
extempore intervals interrupting and standing apart from the regular periodicity 
of time, as Rappaport conceives, it is better to invert the conception such that the 
intervals of ritual transformation demarcate periods of time by constituting the 
present at a different logical level than the past or the future. This is to say that 
the present as a mode of time is constructed by the ritual form transforming its 
elements through the ritual process. The past, then, is the imposition of 
periodicity on completed transformations, and the future is the anticipation of 
potential transformations yet to be realized; all three modes of time together 
constitute eternity,857 as opposed to eternity being equated with the interval as 
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Rappaport schematizes. This also explains why the present is so heavily 
characterized by consciousness, given that, on a pragmatist account, 
consciousness is a tool for solving a problem, which the disorientation of liminal 
experience surely must be.  
Second, the repetition of ritual, which Rappaport assumes in his 
understanding of invariance, allows the interpretant of a given ritual, over the 
course of multiple, and in most cases many, repetitions, to shift from being a 
conscious to a taken for granted process. This is not the same as the 
unquestionable character of the ritual entailments that Rappaport concludes. For 
a ritual process and its resulting interpretants to become taken for granted is a 
further outworking of their being reliable to some extent, still allowing for a 
certain level of doubt and recognition of the conventionality of the ritual, as 
opposed to the more absolute terms Rappaport employs of “the correct, the 
necessary, and the natural.”858 This ability to take the interpretants of the ritual 
for granted even under the conditions of doubt is an important element of the 
subjunctive aspect of ritual. Whereas Rappaport considers rituals to take place 
one at a time, the present project understands rituals to themselves be made up 
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of rituals, acknowledges that rituals overlap, and recognizes that the Ultimate 
Sacred Postulates that cap different rituals may at times be mutually exclusive. 
This is to say that there is a radical pluralism among the many rituals any person 
is performing at any given point in time, and that pluralism is rarely, if ever, 
entirely homogenized by the sort of totalizing sacred canopy859 Rappaport would 
have to hypothesize in order to attain the coherence he claims to achieve.  
Consideration of the Eucharist in the context of the Great Vigil of Easter is 
less helpful here, given that it only recurs annually. Instead, Eucharistic practice 
in many Episcopal churches, such as Washington National Cathedral, takes place 
at least weekly, on Sundays, sometimes more regularly for feasts, festivals, and 
holy days, and in some cases daily. Each enactment of the ritual of the Eucharist, 
then, constitutes a present moment demarcating the past from the future on an at 
least weekly cycle. The week, in a very literal sense, would not exist except for 
the demarcation by Eucharistic worship on Sunday. Furthermore, each 
enactment of the Eucharist involves the enactment of many smaller rituals. One 
set of such smaller rituals, one level down from the ritual of the Eucharist in 
total, would include the various parts of the Eucharistic liturgy, such as the Great 
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Thanksgiving, the Proper Preface, the Sanctus and Benedictus, the Words of 
Institution, etc. Each of these smaller rituals, in turn, is made up of smaller rituals 
down to rituals of language and of movement. Even at the level of the parts of 
the Eucharistic liturgy, however, there are discrepancies among the Ultimate 
Sacred Postulates of each part, which themselves may vary with the prayer texts 
selected for use in a particular instantiation. For example, the proper preface of 
the Eucharistic prayer used in the Great Vigil of Easter at Washington National 
Cathedral in 2015 takes its Ultimate Sacred Postulate to be something like, 
“God’s love for creation is ever faithful.”860 The words of institution, in the same 
liturgy, however, has an Ultimate Sacred Postulate focused on Jesus’ self-sacrifice 
to atone for human sin.861 In the very next paragraph, the anamnesis, or 
remembrance, God now requires not only Jesus’ self-sacrifice but also the 
sacrifice of gifts – bread and wine – and of the participant elements themselves.862 
None of these postulates is entirely coherent with the overall Ultimate Sacred 
Postulate of the Eucharistic liturgy as a whole, which is something like, “Those 
who consume God become God.” Notably, each and all of these postulates might 
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very well be questioned, doubted, or practiced for the sake of upholding 
convention by any given participant element, if they are not taking them for 
granted. Nevertheless, the interpretants of the Eucharistic ritual and its sub-
rituals are reliably generated by the ritual performances, which reliability results, 
over time, in their becoming taken for granted even in the absence of certainty. 
Performance 
While the theory of ritual emerging here conceives ritual as the form of a 
process generating a range of functions, ritual does not exist as a form, but only 
as it is performed. Indeed, the word “performance” was historically used to refer 
to ritual itself,863 although more often it refers to the execution or interpretation of 
the ritual form and process.864 More generally, performance has to do with action, 
execution, or operation, involving carrying out, discharging, accomplishing, or 
fulfilling a command, a promise, a duty, a purpose or a responsibility.865 
Similarly, the word “practice” and the related word “praxis” refer to the action, 
doing, undertaking, or proceeding of something, the “application or use of an 
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idea, belief, or method, as opposed to the theory or principles of it,” and both 
words may also mean performance.866 By contrast, however, “practice” may also 
refer to “the habitual doing or carrying on of something; usual, customary, or 
constant action or performance; conduct.”867 All three terms have been given 
extensive theoretical treatment, especially since the latter part of the 20th 
century,868 and those theoretical elaborations are instructive for understanding 
ritual enactment. In general, “the study of ritual as practice has meant a basic 
shift from looking at activity as the expression of cultural patterns to looking at it 
as that which makes and harbors such patterns.”869 
An initial consideration with regard to ritual performance has to do with 
the relationship between the practice or performance of a ritual and its form or 
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structure, which is symbolically encoded. Talal Asad demarcates a sharp 
distinction between understanding rituals as enactments of symbol systems and 
recognizing them as performed practices: “Symbols, as I said, call for 
interpretation, and even as interpretative criteria are extended, so interpretations 
can be multiplied. Disciplinary practices, on the other hand, cannot be varied so 
easily, because learning to develop moral capabilities is not the same thing as 
learning to invent representations.”870 This strict demarcation leads to rejection of 
ritual as a form of communication: “While I take it for granted that 
communicative discourse is involved in learning, performing, and commenting 
upon rites, I reject the idea that ritual itself encodes and communicates some 
special meaning.”871 Roy Rappaport also recognizes the primacy of the 
performance of a ritual over the abstractions of ritual rules, texts, or symbols that 
make up their form, but understands the relationship between form and 
performance as dialectical,872 rather than oppositional, and so retains the 
conception of ritual as a mode of communication. “There are things ‘said’ by all 
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liturgical rituals that cannot be said in other ways. They are in part expressed by 
the special relationship between the liturgical order performed and the act of 
performing it.”873 Furthermore, “to perform a liturgical [ritual] order … is 
necessarily to conform to it,”874 that is to the form or structure of the ritual. Indeed, 
Rappaport would agree with the characterization of ritual as “disciplinary 
practice” by Asad, the performance of which results in the “self-restructuring of 
contradictory religious subjectivities” by reorganizing “the basis on which 
choices were to be made.”875 In the idiom of Rappaport, “Liturgy preserves the 
conventions it encodes inviolate in defiance of the vagaries of ordinary practice, 
thereby providing them with existence independent of, and insulated against, the 
statistical averages which characterize behavior.”876 Asad would rightly critique 
Rappaport for failing to adequately account for the power differential between 
those who discipline and those disciplined via ritual. Yet, the ability of 
Rappaport to derive the moral capacities877 Asad identifies at the heart of ritual 
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practice from the very symbolic interpretation of ritual that Asad claims is 
inadequate to the task, calls into question the adequacy of the analysis Asad 
provides on the grounds that the existence of a thing proves its possibility. 
Another area of literature pertaining to ritual performance focuses around 
distinguishing ritual performances from other types of performance, such as 
dramatic performance, athletic performance (i.e. sport), musical performance, 
etc. For example, Richard Schechner distinguishes the goal of ritual performance 
as transformation from the goal of dramatic performance as transportation.878 He 
calls “performances where performers are changed ‘transformations’ and those 
where performers are returned to their starting places ‘transportations’—
‘transportation,’ because during the performance the performers are ‘taken 
somewhere’ but at the end, often assisted by others, they are ‘cooled down’ and 
reenter ordinary life just about where they went in.”879 Schechner relies for his 
conception of ritual transformation on the ritual theory of Victor Turner, who 
views the outcome of a performance of the ritual process being a change in social 
status or role; theatrical performance does not change the social status or role of 
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the performer. Ritual for Schechner, then, generally falls at the efficacy end, and 
theater at the entertainment end, of an efficacy-entertainment continuum.880 This 
is to say that what distinguishes a ritual performance from a dramatic 
performance is that ritual performances have functions, as in the subsection on 
ritual function above, whereas dramatic performances do not. Thus, ritual is 
decidedly instrumental for performance theorists, by contrast with the 
structuralist and cultural symbolist approaches, in which lack of instrumentality 
is fundamental to the ritual phenomenon. Despite this distinction between 
effective ritual performances and entertaining theatrical performances, Schechner 
nevertheless understands various types of performance to belong to one another 
in a “unifiable realm of performance,” while remaining theoretically 
distinguishable.881 Indeed, this typology of performance, as developed by 
Schechner, is a detailed explication of what Roy Rappaport refers to as the 
“extended family of performance forms,” but assesses “the matter too 
complex”882 to elaborate in his own project.  
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In another vein, James W. Fernández distinguishes performance from 
persuasion as the establishment and maintenance, respectively, of the human 
roles, relationships, and orientations that make for a meaningful life. He notes 
that humans “are required to invent ways of being – from rules and plans to 
world views and cosmologies – more or less appropriate to any of the diverse 
milieus in which we have installed ourselves. We endlessly argue over the 
appropriateness of those rules, plans, and world views.”883 The role of 
persuasion, then, is “to preserve our place and our gratifying performances and 
hence the world in which these things are lodged and to persuade others to 
recognize that place, that performance, and that world.”884 While persuasions 
may proceed via formal argument hewing to the demands of logic, more often 
both they and performances proceed by metaphoric predication of one domain 
upon another to surprising and creative effect. Indeed, Fernández defines 
metaphor as “a strategic predication upon an inchoate pronoun (an I, a you, a 
we, a they) which makes a movement and leads to performance.”885 To 
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surprising effect, he then predicates persuasive and performative metaphor on 
ritual: “rituals are the acting out of metaphoric predications upon inchoate 
pronouns which are in need of movement.”886 Thus, the performative character 
of ritual has to with enacting a role within a worldview, while the persuasive 
character has to do with distinguishing that role and worldview from others. 
Ritual theorists have also been concerned with the very notion of 
performativity as it applies to ritual. The issue of performativity, as derived from 
the philosophical work of J.L. Austin,887 has to do with the mechanism by which 
words do things, the instrumentality of words, or the sense in which something 
is accomplished via language. Austin distinguishes locutions, or the words 
themselves, from illocutions, or the subjective intentions of a speaker to 
accomplish a goal, (e.g. an order, a command, a promise, etc.), and from 
perlocutions, or the objective effects of the speaker having spoken, (e.g. an insult, 
a persuasion, etc.).888 An illocutionary act, then, brings about an alternative state 
of affairs by the performance of an illocution such that the speech itself effects the 
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change for those who hear it and thereby establishes the change as a 
conventional norm; the change is not a consequence of the speech but 
concomitant and coterminous with it.889 Whereas Austin recognizes the need for 
the audience to be able to recognize a given locution as a particular illocution, 
which he refers to as the need of a speaker to secure the “uptake” of the 
hearer(s),890 Jacques Derrida (1930 – 2004) shifts the emphasis from the subjective 
intention of the speaker to the conventional context of the hearer in determining 
illocutionary effect. He asks, “Could a performative utterance succeed if its 
formulation did not repeat a ‘coded’ or iterable utterance, or in other words, 
if the formula I pronounce in order to open a meeting, launch a ship or a 
marriage were not identifiable as conforming with an iterable model, if it were 
not then identifiable in some way as a ‘citation’?”891 Judith Butler presses this 
point by saying that the success of a performative utterance “is not because an 
intention successfully governs the action of speech, but only because that action 
echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force of authority through the repetition or 
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citation of a prior and authoritative set of practices.”892 It is, however, not clear that 
the shift in emphasis introduced by Derrida is actually a “critical reformulation 
of the performative,” as Butler claims,893 since Austin himself makes the 
conventional context constitutive of performative success: “(A.1) There must 
exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, 
that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in 
certain circumstances, and further, (A.2) the particular persons and 
circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the 
particular procedure invoked.”894 While Austin may emphasize the role of the 
performer, he is clearly deeply aware of the dependence of the success of the 
performance on the conventional context in which it takes place. 
Roy Rappaport argues that it is the role of ritual to bring about these 
conventions and render them acceptable. It is worth quoting him at some length 
on this point as it will become crucial to the argument that language is a type of 
ritual: 
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To establish a convention – a general public understanding, a regular procedure, an 
institution – is both to ascribe existence to it and to accept it. The two are hardly distinct, 
as Austin895 understood, for the existence of a convention, given the meaning of the word, 
is a function of its acceptance.896 To perform a liturgy is at one and the same time to 
conform to its order and to realize it or make it substantial. Liturgical performance not only 
recognizes the authority of· the conventions it represents, it gives them their very existence.897 
According to Rappaport, then, the performance of ritual establishes and 
maintains conventional orders against which all acts and utterances are 
measured as intelligible or not, which intelligibility is requisite for their being 
effective. Marshall Sahlins presses this point further, arguing that practices such 
as the performance of ritual are the sites of conjuncture between the conventions 
of culture and the contingent circumstances of life, which conjunctures constitute 
history as such.898 Pierre Bourdieu (1930 – 2002) is also interested in the 
conjunction of cultural convention and contingent circumstance in practice, but is 
more skeptical of starting from the abstractions of history and structure as 
Sahlins does. Like Sahlins, Bourdieu emphasizes the role of ritual in negotiating 
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these conjunctions, albeit in more systematic and sociological fashion. Habitus, 
according to Bourdieu, is the set of dispositions an individual agent has as result 
of appropriating the cultural conventions of the various fields in which they 
engage socially.899 Doxa, in turn, is the situation in which the cultural 
conventions of a society become taken for granted or unquestioned as a result of 
the habitus of each social agent being in harmony with the conventions of the 
various fields that make up their society.900 The task of ritual, then, is to 
incorporate contingent circumstance that contradicts convention into the habitus 
of each social agent without disrupting the doxa of a given society. “Rite must 
resolve by means of an operation socially approved and collectively assumed – 
that is, in accordance with the logic of the taxonomy that gives rise to it – the 
specific contradiction which the primal dichotomy makes inevitable in 
constituting as separate and antagonistic principles that must be reunited in 
order to ensure the reproduction of the group.”901 The performance of ritual, 
then, establishes and maintains the conventional order as such, and is the 
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mechanism for managing the conjunction of cultural convention with contingent 
circumstance without generating cognitive dissonance.  
Moreover, it is the success of ritual in avoiding cognitive dissonance when 
contingent circumstance strikes that makes ritual performance ripe as a locus of 
contestation. This is to say that the trade-off for maintaining the doxa of a 
community is that ritual must also become the vehicle for altering balances of 
power and resources in that community.902 This is what Bourdieu means when he 
says that rituals and other communicative practices contain a “structural 
ambivalence which predisposes them to fulfil a political function of domination 
in and through performance of the communication function.”903 He gives the 
example of overwhelming generosity in a ritual of gift exchange, which thereby 
dishonors the receiver who is unable to reciprocate. In turn, Maurice Bloch notes, 
ritual is also the means of legitimizing a successful domination, which is an 
achievement of power, as a part of the conventional order.  
Ritualizing power means that the achieved power is transformed into ritual rank by 
rituals, but it also means that in the process rank becomes separated from its origin, i.e. 
the acts of power, and any direct feedback is ruled out by the very process of rituals. In 
this way rank will inevitably become disconnected from power. Power produces rank 
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through ritual but this gives rank independence, a ‘realism’ which results in greater time 
persistence. Then power will change but the rank it has produced will stay.904 
None of these power games are part of the ritual structure or are entailments of 
the ritual form and process per se, but are instead entailments of ritual 
performance, or opportunities that arise in the actual practice of ritual, which are 
nonetheless unavoidable. Ritual, then, inevitably insofar as it hews to its process, 
schematizes the new power dynamic as part and parcel of the natural order such 
that it becomes taken for granted as not merely a new habitus but one in 
inexorable continuity with the old. 
Bloch, Bourdieu, and Asad may all be rightly criticized for reducing ritual 
to a locus of legitimization of power plays and the exercise of domination, even 
as their recognition of the role ritual plays in these regards is an important 
corrective to ritual theories that treat ritual as almost benign and banal. Rather 
than reduction, a better strategy is to locate the negotiation of power dynamics as 
an entailment of ritual performance, a tack that has been taken in more recent 
literature in ritual studies. In their edited volume, Negotiating Rites, Ute Hüsken 
and Frank Neubert note that “two important discussions prepared the ground 
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for this book: a mature debate on the performativity of ritual, and reflections on 
culture as process and negotiation.”905 The volume makes the case that 
“negotiations—understood here as processes of interaction during which 
differing positions are debated and/or acted out—are ubiquitous in ritual 
contexts, either in relation to the ritual itself or in relation to the realm beyond 
any given ritual performance.”906 Of the three ways the volume construes the 
relationship between ritual and negotiation, the first two are most relevant to the 
present project: 
(1) Sharing a World 
a   In the eyes of many participants and insiders to a tradition, rituals negotiate their 
relationship with what is perceived to be the transcendent (gods, ghosts, ancestors, etc.). 
b   In the eyes of observers and participants, rites negotiate the relationships of 
participants among each other and with outsiders. 
(2) Getting It Straight 
The performance, meaning, structure, and contents of rituals are matters of constant 
negotiation among participants, specialists, and outsiders.907 
One of the risks in focusing on the negotiations undertaken among ritual 
participants as they perform a given ritual is that, while doing so highlights 
individual agency in the ritual frame, it also obscures the social context the ritual 
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constructs and in which that agency is exercised. Thus, as Grant Potts notes in his 
contribution to Negotiating Rites, “The negotiation of ritual is not merely between 
social actors, but between different representations of the social experience for 
those actors and for their interpreters.”908 Moreover, ritual does not necessarily 
favor the representations of the participants whose habitus coincides with the 
hegemonic doxa of the given social context. Jean Comaroff points out that “black 
religious innovation in southern Africa has likewise sought to wrest the Christian 
‘message from the messenger;’ and its history has been peppered with battles 
over the control of master symbols, such as the ‘right’ to baptize or dispense 
communion.”909 The point to keep at the forefront of consideration, however, is 
that it is specifically in the performance or practice of ritual, not ritual itself in all 
its aspects, that enables “a struggle for the possession of the sign which extends 
to the most mundane areas of everyday life.”910 That is, the negotiation enabled 
by ritual performance generates entailments in the ritual context which are then 
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themselves given over as elements to the ritual process, as encoded by the ritual 
structure, and so themselves thereby contribute to the overall ritual function. 
Taken together, these dynamics of ritual performance generate feedback 
loops on ritual participants individually and collectively, and on the ritual form 
itself; that is, the performance of ritual is a highly reflexive undertaking. To be 
sure, the concept of reflexivity is highly contested in ritual theory,911 so it is 
important to be clear as to what it means and to the extent and manner of its 
application. At its most basic, reflexivity refers to a subject taking itself as an 
object; expressed logically, any relation R is reflexive “if, and only if, (For all x) 
(xRx).”912 Thus, according to George Herbert Mead (1863 – 1931), an individual 
human being “becomes a self in so far as he can take the attitude of another and 
act toward himself as others act,”913 that is, insofar as she can take herself as an 
object and thus relate to herself in thought. Ritual reflexivity, in this sense, refers 
to ritual as the relation of subjective attunement to objective self, which is a stark 
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contrast to the conception of reflexivity as automatic, habitual, and unthinking 
that have in fact often been used to describe ritual.914 Applied to an action, 
reflexivity “means that every sequence of the action constitutes a part of the 
framework for its continuance.”915 Since the performance of a ritual is an action, 
any given ritual performance is reflexive insofar as it regulates future 
performances. Furthermore, reflexivity is a characteristic of semiotic systems 
including thought, language, and ritual, each of which has the capacity “to turn 
back upon itself, to become an object to itself, and to refer to itself.”916 This 
common semiotic nature of thought, language, and ritual is central to the 
argument about language as ritual in chapter five, and the reflexivity of semiotic 
systems is important for the argument regarding subjunctivity in chapter six. For 
the moment, it is enough to recognize that the reflexivity of ritual performance is 
the mechanism by which ritual, by virtue of its repetition, feeds back into its own 
form and process.  
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Also, ritual performance constitutes a reflexive relation for personal and 
communal reflection on self and society, thereby enabling self-regulation at the 
individual and social levels. At the individual level, personal reflexivity in ritual 
is a component of the aspect of sincerity to be dealt with below. Roy Rappaport 
notes how the personal and communal aspects of ritual reflexivity are 
inextricable: 
 In contrast to journal writing, in performing a ritual one participates in it. To participate 
is, by definition, to become part of something larger than the self. When one performs a 
ritual, one not only constructs oneself but also participates in the construction of a larger 
public order.917 
In fact, it is possible for the aspect of personal reflection to be minimized to the 
point of being undetectable, as in the case of Caroline Humphrey and James 
Laidlaw’s study of Jain daily ritual,918 and yet they may still have profound 
meaning at the communal level. Indeed, “precisely the fact that attributions of 
sense are not very individual, but rather of a collective nature, is the reason for 
their social relevance.”919 Notably, the reflexivity of ritual is a function of the 
performance of ritual and is not itself an entailment of the ritual form or process 
as elaborated above. Performance theorists of ritual such as Rappaport and 
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Richard Schechner thus emphasize that “reflexivity is part of the very logic of 
performance of each and every ritual that is based on some sort of script or 
prototype”920 because it is the script or prototype, as compiled over repetitions of 
ritual performance, that a given ritual performance is reflecting upon. 
For the present project, the performance or practice of ritual refers to the 
enactment of the ritual form so as to render the ritual process and thereby 
generate the ritual functions. As will be demonstrated in the comparative 
engagement at the end of chapter four, virtually all human activity is the 
performance of one or another ritual. Ritual performances are means of 
cultivating and exercising power, of negotiating roles, relationships, and ways of 
being in the world, and of personal and social reflection and feedback into 
persons, societies, and the rituals thereof. The performative aspects of 
cultivating, exercising, negotiating, and reflecting refer to the ways in which the 
participants play the ritual. These variations in manner of play are the reason 
that rituals are “more or less invariant” sequences. Indeed, ritual performances 
generate the entailments of the ritual process as conditioned by the particularities 
of the participants and their manner of play, and these entailments are what is 
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fed back into the participants, society, and the ritual form and process 
themselves. The entailments are in turn available as ritual resources (elements) 
for the next iteration of the ritual or for other rituals via their uptake by 
individuals and societies. While ritual forms and processes are generally resistant 
to change, the accretion of entailments that vary due to the conditions of play 
may in fact cause changes in the form or process of the ritual over multiple, and 
likely a great many, iterations of performance. Thus, the ongoing performances 
of many interwoven rituals construct, maintain, and adjust the cultural 
conventions of a society, and are the means of their adoption into the individual 
lives of the people of that society. Doxa, or taken-for-grantedness, is the state of 
the manner of play of the participants corresponding more or less precisely with 
the form and process of the ritual in question. In this situation, adjustment is 
minimal because the feedback being passed through the feedback loops is 
limited. It is not the case that rituals communicate a meaning interpreted by 
abstraction from the ritual form. Rather, rituals construct the conventions of self, 
society, and themselves by communicating their entailments as generated 
through the ritual form and process in performance. It is only by virtue of the 
relative stability of ritual forms and processes, however, that the many 
conventions of culture may be understood substantively as culture. Under the 
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conditions of modernity, and especially late modernity, it is no longer obvious 
that such a substantive understanding is warranted. 
With respect to the ritual of the Great Vigil of Easter at Washington 
National Cathedral on Saturday, April 4, 2015 at 8:00 p.m., the articulation of the 
ritual form of which this enactment is a performance is derived principally from 
The Book of Common Prayer921 and the supplemental Enriching Our Worship 1922 as 
elaborated in the bulletin923 published for the service. The performance itself is 
what is made objectively available via the video recording of it,924 although it 
should be emphasized that the video is not the performance itself; the 
performance was completed and is over as of April 5, 2015. It is notable that the 
Enriching Our Worship series of liturgical texts, deployed in this performance 
especially in the Eucharistic liturgy, is a collection of entailments generated as a 
result of variations in the play of liturgies from The Book of Common Prayer: “The 
liturgical texts reflect the influence of the prayer experience of women, and a 
desire to honor that experience while remaining faithful to the norms of liturgical 
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prayer as received by the Episcopal Church.”925 Those entailments from previous 
performances of the Eucharistic liturgy have been incorporated into this 
performance. For participants in this particular performance, there is likely little 
awareness of the incorporation of this material, other than by those responsible 
for organizing the ritual, and so for the majority the performance reflects the 
doxa of the community.  
This performance of the Great Vigil of Easter also exemplifies the 
performative aspects of cultivating, exercising, negotiating, and reflecting. For 
example, the celebrant, who is the principle leader of the service, is the Right 
Reverend Mariann Edgar Budde, the Diocesan Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese 
of Washington.926 While Washington National Cathedral, also known as the 
Cathedral Church of Saint Peter and Saint Paul, is the cathedral church of the 
Episcopal Diocese of Washington,927 and thus the seat of the bishop of that 
Diocese, the day to day operation of the cathedral is largely left to the Cathedral 
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Dean, who at the time of this service was the Very Reverend Gary R. Hall.928 The 
decision of the bishop to serve as celebrant at “the liturgy intended as the first 
(and arguably, the primary) celebration of Easter,”929 which is itself the “principal 
festival of the church year,”930 is a reminder to the Cathedral congregation and its 
leadership of the true power structure of the Cathedral regardless of the regular 
delegation of that power to the Dean. Notably, this cultivation, exercise, and 
negotiation of power is unlikely to register cognitively with the vast majority of 
members of the congregation gathered for the service, and perhaps even with its 
leadership, but is nonetheless a ritual instantiation of the hierarchy of the 
Cathedral and the Diocese in the frame of another ritual, the Great Vigil of 
Easter. 
The most obviously reflexive part of the Great Vigil of Easter, where the 
congregation is explicitly invited to consider the meaning of the ritual for 
themselves, their lives, and their relationships, is the sermon. The preacher in the 
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service under consideration was the Reverend Canon Gina Gilland Campbell,931 
the canon precentor for worship at the National Cathedral at the time. She 
reminds the congregation of the unsettling strangeness of resurrection, which the 
Great Vigil of Easter as a whole remembers and celebrates, but which often 
instead ignites a propensity to flee and to “rely upon our technology and our 
medicine to save us.”932 Campbell is distinguishing between the transformative 
work of the ritual under way, which is rooted in the concept of resurrection, or 
rising again after death, from the sorts of transformation sought in technology or 
medicine, which has to do with avoiding death in the first place. Indeed, she 
notes later in the sermon that, despite popular sentiment to the contrary, “death 
is something; a period at the end of life; a sealing stone.”933 Thus, it is only after 
technology and medicine have failed to stave off death that “quietly, behind the 
stone; in the dark, airless, stinking, sealed off places of death; God begins God’s 
mysterious work of resurrection.”934 In this sermon, Campbell is poking at the 
doxa of the community, which is founded, in the Eucharist as it is performed at 
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least weekly, and perhaps especially in the Great Vigil of Easter, on the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. In so doing, she is reflexing what is 
taken for granted on the members of the community individually, to be able to 
better recognize moments of resurrection and possibilities for resurrection in 
their lives, and on the community as a whole. She invites the community to 
recognize and more deeply instantiate themselves as a community of 
resurrection not in spite of death but out of death. 
Sincerity, Subjunctivity, Efficacy, and Play 
The aspect of ritual sincerity pertains to the dispositions of ritual 
participants that may impact the manner in which they play the ritual in 
question. A sincere disposition involves the intent and desire to conform to the 
ritual form and process as established by previous performances. Concerns about 
sincerity in ritual involvement have a long history among religious practitioners 
understandably concerned about potential ritual disruption and maintaining the 
sanctity of their rituals, to say nothing of their efficacy. The aspect of the ritual 
subjunctive, by contrast, pertains to the quality of the environment ritual creates 
in and through its performance and to the mutual impact of that environment 
vis-à-vis the sincerity of the ritual participants. The ritual environment can be 
contrasted with the extra-ritual environment by virtue of its having elements or 
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relationships construed in ways discontinuous therewith and yet available for 
participants to encounter and engage. An important debate within the ritual 
theory literature regards whether it is necessary to become sincere in order to 
participate in ritual, or instead the subjunctive character of the ritual 
environment contrasts with the extra-ritual sincerity of the participants. 
The first way that the relationship between ritual and sincerity may be 
construed is on the Augustinian theological stance that a ritual participant must 
become sincere in order to authentically participate in the ritual.935 In this case, 
sincerity has largely to do with confession, contrition, repentance, compunction, 
humbling of self before at least God and often the wider community, and 
receiving forgiveness. A person becomes sincere when their self-perception 
aligns with the omniscient perception of the divine and the perception of the 
community on the terms set by the ritual. For example, either self-examination or 
confession and absolution prior to Eucharistic participation are required in many 
Christian communities.936 In the case of a secular ritual, political debate 
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participants might refrain from shaking hands if they do not share an 
appropriate level of mutual trust and respect. The looming threat in the case of 
insincere participation is ritual failure or at least ineffectiveness. If a 
communicant receives the sacrament without first confessing and receiving 
absolution, the sacrament may not be valid for fulfilling spiritual obligations. If a 
politician demurs from a handshake, it may be a sign to the other debater and to 
debate observers that the usual topical and stylistic norms of political debate are 
not necessarily in play.937 In the context of reformed theological interpretation, 
especially of a Calvinist bent, the ritual form becomes rather empty and hollow 
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by contrast with the spiritually important internal work of achieving sincerity.938 
Here again, the ritual is understood to be arbitrary whereas the human will and 
the soul are essential and necessary, and thus the objects of spiritual focus. This 
sincerity is the prerequisite for ritual participation, in order to keep the ritual 
pure and efficacious. Ritual does not contrast with sincerity, but rather depends 
upon it. 
In their recent book Ritual and Its Consequences, Adam Seligman et al shift 
the relationship between sincerity and ritual so as to juxtapose them. “We thus 
analyze ritual and sincerity as two ‘ideal typical’ forms of framing experience, 
action, and understanding that exist in all societies, in tension with one 
another.”939 While they hew closely to Rappaport’s definition of ritual, Seligman 
et al further introduce a Durkheimian conception of ritual generating social 
norms and relations as if they are objective realities.940 As they say, “the 
subjunctive creates an order that is self-consciously distinct from other possible 
social worlds.”941 The purpose of these ritually established subjunctive social 
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realities is to enable humanity to cope with an otherwise ambiguous, ambivalent, 
and intractable world. By behaving as if the conventional world established by 
ritual is objective, ritual participants are constantly holding their sincere selves at 
bay for the sake of social harmony. Nevertheless, “the subjunctive world created 
by ritual is always doomed ultimately to fail—the ordered world of flawless 
repetition can never fully replace the broken world of experience.”942 Sincerity, 
by contrast, seeks to instantiate “categories that grow out of individual soul-
searching rather than the acceptance of social conventions.”943 The sincere mode 
is identified with Protestantism, which derives from an Augustinian theological 
vision, and so it is unsurprising that this conception of sincerity is continuous 
with the view from the first construal of the relationship between sincerity and 
ritual: “The sincere mode of behavior seeks to replace the ‘mere convention’ of 
ritual with a genuine and thoughtful state of internal conviction.”944 Thus, for 
Seligman and company, on one side of the dichotomy is the subjunctive ritual 
space, and on the other is both the sincere self of the ritual participant and the 
extra-ritual world. The subjunctive world is both whole and illusory, while the 
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“real” world is broken and fragmented such that the sincere self is the self as it 
inhabits the “Hobbesian world of the war of all against all.”945 Ritual, in this 
view, is a form of escapism from the harshness of reality. Like other forms of 
performance, ritual “simply and elegantly sidetracks the problem of 
understanding to allow for the existence of order without requiring 
understanding.”946 While the sincere self “disappears when emptied of its social 
characteristics – age, gender, status, roles, and all the distinctions of social 
convention,”947 it is by virtue of this very disappearance that the person is most 
real, that is, fragmented off from others. Alas, the refuge of ritual, and thus social 
life, is merely illusory, artificial, and thus, arbitrary. 
The construal of sincerity vis-à-vis the subjunctive space created by ritual 
also pertains to issues of ritual efficacy, which include both the effects a given 
ritual purports to produce, and the empirical effects of a ritual on its participants, 
their community, the wider society, and the world.948 Roy Rappaport has already 
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been noted for his warning not to confuse the efficacy of ritual for 
instrumentality.949 Instead, ritual efficacy has to do with establishing and 
maintaining social conventions, which he takes to be quite real, as opposed to the 
illusionary status of convention as described by Seligman et al. “Ritual's words 
do, after all, bring conventional states of affairs, or ‘institutional facts’ into being, 
and having been brought into being they are as real as ‘brute facts.’”950 The 
means by which rituals establish and maintain convention is by illocutionary 
force, which they have by virtue of their performances being illocutionary acts. It 
is not the case, however, that the purported effect of the ritual according to direct 
statements within the ritual is itself illocutionary with respect to the conventions 
established. Emily Martin Ahern has demonstrated that in most cases, rituals that 
linguistically purport to be strong illocutionary acts frequently fail on the terms 
of the verbal illocution.951  
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Instead of individual statements within a ritual, the proper level of 
analysis of the illocutionary force of a ritual act is the ritual in total. Jørgen 
Podemann Sørensen calls this analysis the rhetoric of ritual: 
The thoughts and the religious ideas represented in ritual should be studied not as 
explanations of or reasons for the action, but as the means it employs to establish itself as 
ritual, that is, as rhetorical means towards that formal efficacy which, since Hubert and 
Mauss, has been the very criterion of ritual.952 
With respect to the illocutionary force of rituals, the rhetoric of ritual notes that 
“some rituals obviously are illocutionary acts, a few straightforwardly pretend to 
be, and the vast majority employs a rich religious symbolism so as to establish 
themselves as such.”953 Disregarding the characterization of the symbolism as 
“religious,” this means that the rhetoric of ritual studies the full range of semiotic 
activity taking place in a given ritual in order to determine what conventions the 
ritual is establishing. This study is of the transition from the subjunctive to the 
indicative mood, because ritual is “an activity formally situated at that point zero 
where every move and every word become efficacious because they deal with 
things in their ‘state of not yet being.’”954  
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According to Rappaport, acceptance of the conventions established by 
ritual implies obligation to the norms so established and is the first instance of 
ritual efficacy.955 He goes on to note that both “the formal characteristics of 
ritual” and the mystification of their conventionality “enhance the chances of 
success of the performatives they include.”956 Again, the notion of the 
mystification of conventionality enhancing the efficacy of the ritual contrasts 
with the idea in Seligman et al that the subjunctive order enacted by ritual is self-
consciously distinct from other possibilities. Instead, the mystification of 
conventionality demands the acceptance of obligation and presses it toward 
belief so as to improve the rate of conformity to the obligatory ritual form by 
giving it the air of authority. “Authority is closely related to efficacy, of course, 
and that the fundamental and ultimate is more authoritative than that which is 
contingent upon it seems too obvious to require comment.”957 In this way, the 
mystification of conventionality leads to the ritual form becoming part of the 
doxa of the society that practices it, that is, the conventions the ritual enacts 
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become taken for granted such that the obligation to the conventional norms is 
no longer cognitive. At this stage, the habitus of a given ritual participant is 
sincerely in accord with the conventions established by the ritual. In this 
framework, then, sincerity is the outcome of ritual participation, neither its 
prerequisite nor its contrast. 
The same cannot be said of play. The ritual theory literature includes a 
robust engagement with theories of play, perhaps foremost among them the 
strong claim made by Johan Huizinga (1872 – 1945) as to the roots of ritual, as 
well as language, in play,958 which he defines as “an action accomplishing itself 
outside and above the necessities and seriousness of everyday life.”959 Huizinga 
notes that ritual and play both establish subjunctive spaces, that is, they “are 
temporary worlds within the ordinary world, dedicated to the performance of an 
act apart. Inside the play-ground an absolute and peculiar order reigns.”960 
Influenced by Huizinga and Romano Guardini (1885 – 1968), Hans Georg 
Gadamer sees ritual, or festival, as a type of play, and defines play as “a self-
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movement that does not pursue any particular end or purpose,” which for 
humans is subjunctive because of “the self-discipline and order that we impose 
on our movements when playing, as if particular purposes were involved.”961 
Roger Caillois (1913 – 1978) identifies six characteristics of play, the second and 
last of which together indicate its subjunctivity: 
1. Free: in which playing is not obligatory; if it were, it would at once lose its attractive 
and joyous quality as diversion; 
2. Separate: circumscribed within limits of space and time, defined and fixed in advance; 
3. Uncertain: the course of which cannot be determined, nor the result attained 
beforehand, and some latitude for innovations being left to the player’s initiative; 
4. Unproductive: creating neither goods, nor wealth, nor new elements of any kind; and, 
except for the exchange of property among the players, ending in a situation identical to 
that prevailing at the beginning of the game; 
5. Governed by rules: under conventions that suspend ordinary laws, and for the 
moment establish new legislation, which alone counts; 
6. Make-believe: accompanied by a special awareness of a second reality or of a free 
unreality, as against real life.962 
 Whereas Seligman et al employ Caillois’ classification of games as a model for 
their own classification of rituals,963 it is in this definition of play that the contrast 
with ritual becomes most apparent. As has already been discussed, ritual 
establishes obligations, and under the social conditions of doxa, participation in 
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ritual may not be so much obligatory as taken for granted, which yet implies a 
type of compulsion. The course of ritual is far from uncertain, but is instead 
prescribed in detail by previous iterations thereof and sometimes in texts. Ritual 
is not unproductive, although it is not principally instrumental, but instead 
produces its entailments, which are the conventions that constitute society, as a 
result of performing its form and process. Indeed, how could ritual be 
unproductive given the intense emic and etic interest in its efficacy? Finally, the 
rules of play may be determined ad hoc and changed ad nauseam, whereas the 
rules of ritual are fixed in advance and only changed iteratively by great effort. It 
is precisely because Caillois is right about play, especially about its being free, 
uncertain, and unproductive, that play is incapable of generating sincerity, as 
ritual does. Hence, the conflation of ritual and play enables the contrast of ritual 
and sincerity. 
Huizinga is regularly criticized for making too strong a claim as to the 
fundamentality of play as more basic than a range of other modes of life. The 
present project will likely be criticized for similarly overplaying the ritual card. 
While the claim being advanced here does locate language as a species of the 
genus ritual, the relationship between ritual and play is to be construed quite 
differently. Both ritual and play enact subjunctive spaces in which alternatives to 
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the initial reality are performed, but play does not generate social conventions 
that last beyond the period of play and so does not result in sincerity with 
respect to its form, with which it may also not necessarily be said to have begun. 
Furthermore, play can never become taken for granted because its lack of 
iterative reflexivity means that there is no possibility of mystification, and so the 
conventionality of the rules of play inevitably remain cognitive. Thus, it is in fact 
play, and not ritual, that is the escapist refuge of arbitrary illusion, albeit an 
important and necessary one. Indeed, as Donald Winnicott (1896 – 1971) notes, it 
is in playing that the truest self, the sincere self in the lexicon of Seligman et al, 
emerges.964 Whereas play exists in a third space between a subjective interiority 
and the external, shared reality of society,965 ritual constructs the conventions of 
that shared social reality. Whereas the subjunctive space of play allows the 
sincere self to enter and let itself go, the subjunctive space of ritual welcomes the 
sincere self and transforms it into a sincerity that accords with the ritual form. 
Play is one way of being in a subjunctive space, which may be put to very 
different ends when inhabited in another way, such as ritual. Neither is a 
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subspecies of the other, but rather both are modalities of inhabiting subjunctivity, 
which is itself a feature of semiotic systems and capacities in general. 
The present project takes sincerity, on one hand, to be a possible but not 
necessary precondition of ritual. On the other hand, sincerity with respect to the 
conventions established and maintained in ritual is the principal and necessary 
entailment of the ritual form and process as it pertains to the participants who 
perform it. Insincere participants become sincere through their acceptance of the 
conventional norms established by the ritual. Sincere participants have their 
sincerity either transformed or reinforced in accordance with the conventions 
that are generated from the performance of the given ritual form and process. 
The efficacy of a ritual is to be determined by analysis of the rhetoric of the ritual 
as a whole to determine the conventions it illocutes insofar as they become taken 
for granted within the society in which the ritual is enacted and with respect ot 
which the participants become sincere. Rituals are efficacious when the 
subjunctive spaces they establish illocute into an indicative mode in life. While 
rituals may include elements of play within them, the frames of the playful 
elements are inevitably inscribed within the form and process of the ritual as a 
whole. These relationships among sincerity, subjunctivity, efficacy, and play will 
be further developed in conversation with the Confucian philosopher Xunzi in 
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the comparative engagement at the end of the next chapter. Also, a great deal 
more can, must, and will be said in chapter six regarding subjunctivity, ritual, 
and language, but an initial stab at this aspect of ritual must be taken here for the 
sake of the completeness of the theory of ritual being elaborated. 
The clearest expression of the interplay among subjunctivity, sincerity, 
and efficacy in the Great Vigil of Easter is in the rite of baptism. After being 
presented to the bishop, the candidates for baptism are invited to declare their 
sincerity as to the ritual form of baptism by responding to a series of questions 
that seek to examine their conscience:  
Do you renounce Satan and all the spiritual forces of wickedness that rebel against God? 
Do you renounce the evil powers of this world which corrupt and destroy the creatures 
of God? 
Do you turn to Jesus Christ and accept him as your Savior? 
Do you put your whole trust in his grace and love? 
Do you promise to follow and obey him as your Lord?966 
Notably, one question prescribed in The Book of Common Prayer was omitted in 
this performance of the rite: “Do you renounce all sinful desires that draw you 
from the love of God?”967 It is unclear whether this omission was intentional or 
whether it was an oversight on the part of the bishop. The examination of the 
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candidates, in the context of the Great Vigil of Easter, is followed by an 
opportunity for the congregation to reaffirm their sincerity to the terms of the 
baptismal ritual form as performed at their own baptisms.968 In this instance, the 
bishop adds a commentarial note before asking the five final questions, saying, 
“these next questions are questions of intention.”969 The comment is likely added 
to serve the pastoral function of assuaging any concern that congregants might 
have that their failure to live up to the answers they give might put the efficacy 
of their baptism, and thus their salvation, at risk. However, by distinguishing the 
answers to the questions as signaling intention rather than obligation, the bishop 
is actually weakening the illocutionary force of the renewal of baptismal vows 
within the wider frame of the rite of baptism.  
The baptismal rite constructs a subjunctive space marked by dualism, 
wherein candidates are invited to choose one side and reject the other; no option 
is given to choose the other. On the side rejected are “Satan,” “spiritual forces of 
wickedness,” “evil powers,” and “sinful desires.” On the side chosen are “God,” 
“Jesus Christ,” “grace,” and “love.” Caught between the two are the “creatures of 
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God” who are in the position of decision. Having chosen God and grace, the 
candidates are prayed over by the congregation who have, in principle, already 
been baptized.970 These prayers invite God to keep them on the side they have 
chosen, which is to say to mystify the conventionality of their choice. In the 
prayer of thanksgiving to sanctify the water for use in the baptism itself, the 
bishop prays “that those who here are cleansed from sin and born again may 
continue for ever in the risen life of Jesus Christ our Savior.”971 This means that 
those baptized in the sanctified water are thereby obligated perpetually to side 
with what they have chosen in the examination: “God establishes an indissoluble 
bond with each person in baptism.”972 The baptism itself, in which the candidate 
has water poured over their head by the bishop who says, “I baptize you in the 
Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit,”973 is a ritual washing 
of the sin that would draw the candidate toward what had been rejected. The 
illocutionary force of this washing is that “God adopts us as his children and 
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makes us members of Christ’s Body, the Church, and inheritors of the kingdom 
of God.”974 The washing of baptism is a spiritual death to all that was rejected 
and a spiritual resurrection into God’s family by adoption: “The inward and 
spiritual grace in Baptism is union with Christ in his death and resurrection, 
birth into God’s family the Church, forgiveness of sins, and new life in the Holy 
Spirit.”975 Juxtaposing this schematic of adoption onto the dualism of the overall 
rite, the implication is that the ongoing obligation of the baptized is to God, the 
head of the household in which they are now members. Notably, the subjunctive 
space of the rite has become crowded with a number of new elements, such as 
“Christ’s body, the Church,” “God’s family the Church,” “forgiveness,” and 
“new life.” These elements are the outcomes of the illocutionary force of the 
baptism rite and both make the indicative the subjunctive space realizes more 
real and viable and connect the baptismal rite up with other aspects of the Great 
Vigil of Easter, in which this rite of baptism is embedded, particularly, and with 
Christian life broadly. The shift from the subjunctive to the indicative is 
represented in the concluding prayer of the rite: “Sustain them, O Lord, in your 
Holy Spirit. Give them an inquiring and discerning heart, the courage to will and 
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to persevere, a spirit to know and to love you, and the gift of joy and wonder in 
all your works.”976 
Communication 
That communication should be an aspect of any late modern theory of 
ritual is unsurprising because, as Günter Thomas notes, one of the hallmarks of 
late modernity is that “communication became the basic concept for describing 
the most elementary units of social life.”977 A number of approaches to ritual as a 
form of communication have already been addressed and incorporated into the 
present project, as appropriate, in the relevant preceding aspects, and the next 
section addresses the semiotics of ritual, which is closely related. Also, the 
relationship between ritual as a form of communication and language as a form 
of communication are dealt with in the last section of this chapter. The goal in 
this section, then, is to grapple with the ways in which ritual communicates and 
the dependence of communication on ritual.  
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Roy Rappaport notes that ritual is more than mere transmission of signals, 
or “saying,” but is also a type of “doing” that is effective by virtue of its 
informing, or bearing form to and imposing form on, its receivers.978 He goes on 
to distinguish two types of messages transmitted in rituals that inform their 
recipients. Self-referential messages have to do with the status of individual 
performers, groups of performers, or the whole group performing the ritual, at 
the time and place of, and in the process of, the ritual as it unfolds. Canonical 
messages, by contrast, are pre-encoded in the form of the ritual and transmitted 
in its performance, and express universal orders that transcend the present 
performance.979 Furthermore, “the canonical stream is carried by the invariant 
aspects or components of these orders, self-referential information is conveyed 
by whatever variation the liturgical order allows or demands.”980 In parallel to 
this distinction, Rappaport distinguishes the canonical as relying exclusively on 
symbolic reference, whereas at least some self-referential messages are indexical, 
and thus substantial. He concludes that the two types depend on each other in 
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complex ways in any given ritual in order to generate confidence in what each 
purport to represent among the ritual participants.981  
Günter Thomas develops a “multidimensional and polycontextual” theory 
of ritual as a form of communication informed by Rappaport but in direct 
conversation with the social and communication theory of Niklas Luhmann 
(1927 – 1998) instead of Peircian semiotics.982 Thomas describes Luhmann’s 
theory of communication as distinguishing between a first act of selecting a 
meaningful unit of information, a second act of uttering the information as 
construed in a medium, and a third act of a receiver understanding the 
information within their own horizon of meaning. Notably, the conception of 
these acts already prescinds from an understanding of communication as 
transmission of information as the first two acts “trigger” the third rather than 
initiating a causal chain. Since the three acts are “not mutually transparent to one 
another,” “no single consciousness can capture or ‘see’ all three.”983 Thomas 
theorizes that the ritual form ameliorates the risks to the success of the 
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communication process resulting from these inherent discontinuities.984 
Communication between perceiving subjects cannot proceed with confidence 
apart from a form, such as ritual, that bridges the gaps among them. Alas, in 
adopting the scheme of communication Luhmann provides, Thomas gives the 
impression that ritual is merely an artificial and insubstantial tool for 
overcoming the isolation of individuals living in a Kantian subjective captivity, 
rather than constitutive of a reality that is liberative by virtue of establishing and 
maintaining the social structures of community. Proper attention to the semiotics 
of ritual is the appropriate treatment for this ailment and will be undertaken in 
the next subsection. 
While Rappaport and Eric W. Rothenbuhler were blissfully unaware of 
one another in their projects due to the simultaneity of their production and 
publication, they are remarkably similar in emphasizing the communicative 
aspect of ritual in semiotic terms. Rothenbuhler specifically sets out to elaborate 
“the roles communication scholars have to play in debates about the most 
general issues of social theory and social life”985 in both the direction of ritual as 
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communication and the direction of communication as ritual. It is the second 
direction that is of greatest moment for present purposes. Rothenbuhler grounds 
the importance of understanding communication as ritual in the attempts by 
both Protestants and positivists to banish ritual in the name of rationalism only 
to construct the ritual of rationalism in the process, thereby demonstrating that 
“ritual is ubiquitous and inevitable.”986 He then turns to an important distinction, 
first made by James Carey, between communication as “transmission of signals 
or messages over distance for the purpose of control”987 and communication as 
ritual: “A ritual view of communication is directed not toward the extension of 
messages in space but toward the maintenance of society in time; not the act of 
imparting information but the representation of shared beliefs.”988 Many of the 
arguments in the ritual theory literature against viewing ritual as communication 
are based on a theory of communication as transmission; even Rappaport seems 
to have this model in mind.989 Notably, Carey’s definition of communication as 
“a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and 
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transformed”990 sounds a lot like the theory of ritual being elaborated here. 
Rothenbuhler critiques the transmission view for distracting attention from the 
meaning and process of communication by focusing instead on effects.991 He also 
takes issue with the neglect of the primary role of communication in expressing 
commonality, which is the basis for community, because the transmission of 
information relies on differentiating the information selected for transmission 
from what is left assumed and unsaid in the background.992 Finally, he lifts up 
Carey’s definition of communication as reality producing and notes that “all 
communication stands in a double relation to the realities of its context: 
constituting and commenting;”993 the transmission view privileges the second 
and neglects the first. 
One robust research trajectory within the cognitive science of religion 
might best be construed as an attempt to articulate the role of ritual 
communication in communal constitution and maintenance from within the 
framework of the transmission view of communication. Costly signaling theory 
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emerges from a hypothesis advanced by William Irons that “religious rituals and 
taboos serve as reliable signals of commitment to in-group members, and thus 
religion can overcome free-rider problems and promote intragroup 
cooperation.”994 The basic problem costly signaling theory seeks to address has to 
do with how members of a community can determine who is authentically a 
member of the community as opposed to those who may be seeking the 
cooperative benefits of communal membership without committing to the 
community. How do community members know who to trust? Costly signaling 
theory holds that “costly displays of devotion to a religious tradition are 
commitment devices because people would never perform them were they not 
genuinely devoted.”995 This is to say that costly ritual practices, such as having a 
lip pierced as part of a ritual marking transition to adulthood, then transmit a 
signal of trustworthiness and in-group status. The theory is excellent so far as it 
goes, and it has been repeatedly empirically tested, verified, and further 
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refined.996 The problem is that the theory analyzes the process of ritual 
communication entirely in terms of effect, as Rothenbuhler rightly critiqued the 
transmission view for doing. Richard Sosis, one of the leading developers of the 
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theory, acknowledges as much when he identifies the two questions regarding 
ritual and communication as what gets communicated and why ritual is effective 
at communicating it.997 What gets missed, then, is that the primary function of the 
costly ritual is constituting the community as a collective of trustworthy 
members by communicating its membership and their communal status in the 
group. This is to say that the ritual is not merely a sign of the underlying 
trustworthiness of participants, but actually makes the participants trustworthy 
members of the community.  
One thing that theorists who link ritual with communication agree on is 
that ritual is to be distinguished from technical activity, “which produces 
observable results in a strictly mechanical way.”998 While insisting that ritual 
communication is more than saying but doing, Rappaport also distinguishes 
ritual efficacy as based in information and authority rather than power or 
technical capacity.999 Just as Edmund Leach took the side of the ethologists to 
include communication in the realm of ritual in addition to the conventionally or 
																																																								
997 Sosis, “Religious Behaviors, Badges, and Bans,” 63. 
998 E. R. Leach, “Ritualization in Man in Relation to Conceptual and Social Development,” 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences 251, no. 772 
(1966): 403, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2416752. 
999 Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, 51. 
	 409 
magically effective behaviors to which anthropologists generally restricted the 
class,1000 the present project extends the site of the ritual tent yet further to also 
include at least certain aspects of technical behavior. The reason for this is that it 
is a mistake to assume that technical behavior is not guided by convention, even 
though it is true that the effects of the behavior are not necessarily due to 
adherence to the convention. Some conventions governing technical behavior 
arise as a means of encoding the most efficient, safe, or otherwise best means of 
accomplishing the task at hand. Others encode technical ways of doing things 
that are culturally normative even though there may be other equally practicable, 
or even in some sense better, ways of accomplishing the same thing. The 
encoding of the convention is conveyed in the canonical messages of the rituals 
that govern the behavior, which are themselves symbolic, as Rappaport 
recognized. In the cases of technical rituals, however, it is the technical 
accomplishment of the task at hand, which is iconic, that substantiates and 
grounds the ritual in reality rather than an indexical self-reference. It is in 
technical rituals that the social construction of reality that arises from ritual 
activity meets up with brute reality, which in turn restrains the social 
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construction process.1001 Such technical rituals would become most empirically 
recognizable were the present theory of ritual to be applied to activities of daily 
life, which remains beyond the scope of the project at present. 
Even within the frame of ritual communication as community constitution 
rather than transmission of information, the questions of sending and receiving 
require some consideration. The senders of ritual communication include the 
participants in the ritual, not only individually but also collectively, and the 
encoded conventions, which performance generates canonical messages; the act 
of sending is coterminous with the performance of the ritual by the participants. 
What is perhaps surprising about ritual communication is that the primary 
receivers are also the individual and collective participants in the ritual and its 
encoded conventions; also, the act of receiving is coterminous with its 
performance. This is because, as Rappaport points out, ritual participants become 
part and parcel with the social order of the community that ritual enacts in its 
performance: “by performing a liturgical order the participants accept, and 
indicate to themselves and to others that they accept whatever is encoded in the 
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canon of that order.”1002 This acceptance is not belief, “a private state, but a public 
act,”1003 and so may be at odds with belief, but this “insincerity does not nullify 
acceptance”1004 because acceptance is performance of the canonical code. 
Acceptance is what was meant above in the subsection on ritual structure by the 
objectification of the transformed ritual elements and participants such that they 
are available as elements of future ritual performances. What becomes available 
is the participant having become obligated to the canonical conventions of the 
performed ritual regardless of whether or not they in fact abide by those 
conventions beyond the ritual frame: “It is not ritual’s office to ensure 
compliance but to establish obligation.”1005 Nevertheless, as discussed above, as 
the conventions established and maintained ritually become mystified and 
increasingly taken for granted, they meld into the doxa of society such that the 
gap between acceptance and belief, obligation and compliance, closes, or at least 
becomes irrelevant, as the habitus of a given participant becomes sincere. It is 
only for rituals that continue to operate at a cognitive level that a gap between 
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acceptance/obligation and belief/compliance persists. Thus, in ritual 
communication, participants send messages to themselves and one another that 
they are obligated to the ritually established order, and then become sincere in 
their belief in and compliance with that order as it is incorporated into the doxa 
of their society and their own habitus. 
Returning to the baptismal rite in the Great Vigil of Easter, the gathered 
congregation renew the promises made at their own baptisms, either made 
themselves or on their behalf, prior to the baptisms of the fresh candidates.1006 
From the perspective of a transmission theory of communication, this call and 
response between the bishop and the congregation is a demand on the part of the 
bishop that the congregation assent to the beliefs of the church as expressed in 
the Apostle’s Creed and behave as the church instructs and teaches. From the 
perspective of ritual communication, by contrast, the bishop and congregation 
together are reinforcing and deepening the reality of a socially meaningful 
symbol system that orients the ritual participants such that they might behave in 
accordance with right action as delineated by the ritual order so constituted. 
Furthermore, the exchange is illustrative of the distinction between acceptance 
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and belief. In the first part of the exchange, participants confirm their belief in 
God and God’s activity on their behalf in the words of the Apostle’s Creed. Their 
declaration of, “I believe,” is in fact an acceptance of the socially meaningful 
symbol system in which God is and God acts on their behalf regardless of any 
doubts they may harbor. The obligations entailed by this acceptance are then 
outlined in the second part of the exchange in terms of commitment to ongoing 
participation in religious practice, regular confession, evangelism, service of God 
and neighbor, and pursuit of justice. As was noted in the previous subsection, 
the bishop clarifies that these later questions are “questions of intention,”1007 
thereby reducing their obligatory force to aspiration. 
The thanksgiving over the water in the baptismal rite provides another 
perspective on the aspect of ritual communication. After the opening exchange, 
the majority of this part of the rite is recited by the celebrant, in this case, the 
bishop.1008 This monologue begins with a rehearsal of the ways in which God has 
acted through water in the biblical narrative and then declares the work that God 
will do through the water as it is used in baptism now: candidates for baptism 
will be buried with Christ in death, share in resurrection, be reborn by the Spirit, 
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and be brought together into fellowship. Next, the celebrant touches the water 
and invokes the Holy Spirit to sanctify it such that candidates are cleansed from 
sin, born again, and continue perpetually in Christ’s resurrection after they are 
baptized in it. This part of the rite communicates, in the sense of community 
constitution, several things of note as a performance of almost exclusively 
canonical messages. First, the connection with the biblical narrative constitutes 
the community as including not only those gathered for the rite being performed 
in the present moment and in the given space but also with all who have ever 
experienced or will ever experience divine grace through water. The second part 
of the monologue explicates the process of what happens in baptism for those 
who undergo it as a transformation from the old life, through death, to 
resurrection. While the sprinkling of water that the actual baptism involves1009 is, 
in fact, an entirely safe undertaking from a medical standpoint, existentially it 
involves what might be construed as the costliest signal imaginable: death. This 
discrepancy between the physical and the existential calls into question the 
extent to which they in fact effectively signal devotion and belief, but the rite is 
nevertheless an example of acceptance of communal commitment with 
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existential significance for those who undergo the process. Finally, at the end of 
the monologue the celebrant asks that those baptized in the water “may continue 
for ever in the risen life of Jesus Christ our Savior,”1010 which serves to indicate 
the ongoing obligation that the baptized have accepted to live out what they 
have chosen in the rite, independent of any guarantee that they will do so. 
Semiotics 
Articulating most of the above aspects of the theory of ritual under 
development has already required a great deal of semiotic terminology and 
analysis, but it deserves a systematic summary in conversation with other 
literature addressing the semiotics of ritual.  
Jens Kreinath rightly decries the fact that “the various concepts of signs 
that are developed in modern linguistics have often been uncritically applied to 
the analysis of rituals” because of the influence of Saussurean semiology taking 
“language as the primary semiotic system, and linguistics as a paradigmatic 
discipline in terms of which all cultural phenomena could be analyzed.”1011 
Unfortunately, Kreinath then misconstrues Edmund Leach as the principal 
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Saussurean villain, largely on the basis of quoting Leach conceiving ritual as “a 
language in a quite literal sense,” but misrepresenting the quotation as it comes 
from an encyclopedia article in the context of Leach describing the ritual theory 
of Claude Levi-Strauss, not his own position.1012 Kreinath goes on to quote what 
he calls “Leach’s famous semiotic premise,” that “The elements of the ritual ('the 
letters of the alphabet') do not mean anything in themselves; they come to have 
meaning by virtue of contrast with other elements,” as evidence of Leach’s 
linguistic structuralism.1013 Alas, he neglects the warning Leach provides 
immediately after his statement of the premise: 
But having made this point I would urge you to treat the analogy between ritual and 
language, or at any rate between ritual and written language, with some caution. 
The heart of my argument is that non-verbal communication is ordinarily achieved in the 
way that the conductor of an orchestra conveys musical information to his listeners, and 
not in the way that the writer of a book conveys verbal information to his readers… we 
must know a lot about the cultural context, the setting of the stage, before we can even 
begin to decode the message.1014 
One of the things that language does is to reduce the need for mutual 
understanding of contextual factors, but here Leach is arguing that decoding the 
semiotics of ritual requires vast understanding of the cultural context. Kreinath 
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would have been better off interrogating Levi-Strauss as his representative of 
structuralism since Leach is actually far closer to the goal Kreinath sets for a 
semiotics of ritual: “It is necessary to specify what kind of sign processes rituals 
are and how they can be distinguished from other forms of action by their 
particular use of signs.”1015 A more adequate presentation of the logic of relations 
between ritual and language for Leach is given in the section on ritual and 
language below. 
Kreinath does a better job of representing the symbolics of Clifford Geertz 
and Victor Turner as failing to live up to their aspiration to theorize the 
pragmatics of ritual for hewing too closely to the syntactic pole of semantic 
analysis.1016 After dispatching Maurice Bloch and Fritz Staal for simultaneously 
taking language too seriously and preemptively decamping from discussions of 
meaning entirely,1017 Kreinath turns to Peircian semiotics as appropriated by Roy 
Rappaport and Stanley Tambiah as a more adequate starting point for theorizing 
the pragmatics of ritual: “Because Peirce's semiotics grasps every act of 
interpretation as a sign process and a starting point for theorization, this allows 
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one to take the specificity of the pragmatic dimension of ritual performances 
more seriously.”1018 Kreinath notes that both Rappaport and Tambiah locate the 
semiotic distinctiveness of ritual in its appropriation of indexicality, as 
distinguished from the symbolic reference of language for Rappaport and as 
ground for ritual efficacy for Tambiah.1019 Unfortunately, in failing to appreciate 
semiotics as developed in Peirce as radically distinct from Saussure, and as 
appropriated by Rappaport and Tambiah, Kreinath is unable to adequately 
interpret the ways that their articulation of ritual communication transcends both 
language and mentality in order to be fully constructive and transformative 
precisely by setting the formal measure by which given performances are 
evaluated as repetitions or variations. Moreover, by reducing symbolic reference 
in Peirce to the nature of language, Kreinath ends up conflating symbolic 
reference with extensionality and indexical reference with intensionality such 
that he concludes that “It is only through (the analytic use of) the concept of the 
index that it becomes possible to carve out the uniqueness of a specific 
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reference.”1020 The result is that the theoretical categories he only briefly 
elaborates are characteristics of form that would have to be symbolically encoded 
in order to generate the entailments he describes.1021 
Rather than approaching semiotics from the perspective of ritual, Robert 
Cummings Neville approaches ritual from the perspective of Perician semiotics. 
In The Truth of Broken Symbols, Neville is principally concerned with religious 
rituals when he hypothesizes that 
the intentional context of a religious community generally requires doubled 
interpretants. On the one hand, the religious symbol is interpreted in a representational 
way so that the meaning is thrown back on the religious object. On the other hand, the 
symbol is interpreted in a practical way so that the implication of the religious object so 
symbolized is drawn out for the practice or activities of the community.1022 
He acknowledges that one interpretant or the other may be more dominant: 
“One may be closer to consciousness, and one may be more powerful without 
being more conscious,” and defines the integrity of meaning as “the proper 
relation between the representational and the practical interpretants.”1023 The 
function of ritual is to “shape imagination,” which for Neville is both a result of 
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its repetition1024 and its performance as ritual “performs the reference to the 
divine as doubly interpreted:”1025 “My hypothesis is that the practical intentional 
contexts such as cultic life make many if not all intentional references with 
religious symbols to be performative as well as representational.”1026 More 
broadly, though also including in ritual, “the transformative point of religious 
symbols is to adjust the interpreters so that they themselves, personally and in 
community, come into better and deeper accord with the religious objects.”1027 
The truth of a religious element of a ritual, then, “consists in its shaping a 
relevant aspect of cultic life so as to be a faithful response to the symbol’s 
referent.”1028 
In more recent work, Neville has articulated Confucian ritual theory in 
semiotic terms: “any habit with a vague meaningful character as defined within a 
semiotic code is a learned ritual.”1029 Ritual in this sense is decidedly not confined 
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to the domain of religion but rather serves as a fundament of social theory: 
“Confucians have known the importance of ritual for defining character and 
better than most other traditions of philosophy have understood the political 
roles of individuals and groups.”1030 Contrary to the reduction of ritual to 
indexical reference by Kreinath, with respect to this pervasive notion of ritual,1031 
“much more is to be learned by understanding the ritual contexts within which 
actions take place, because those ritual contexts supply the semiotic meanings 
and values that lie behind actions.”1032 Deeply engaging the Warring States (453 – 
221 BCE) Confucian thinker Xunzi, as does the present project in the next 
chapter, Neville makes two important points regarding the semiotics of ritual in 
the lineage of Xunzi in consonance with Peirce. First, “Rituals across the 
spectrum are conventions. Conventions are not innate but are signs that need to 
be learned.”1033 This is not to negate the indexicality of particular ritual elements, 
which he also acknowledges,1034 but to say that ritual systems as wholes are 
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symbolic and so governed by conventions, i.e. the form of the ritual, that they 
themselves need to be learned, hence the paired emphasis on ritual and 
education in Xunzi. Second, “rituals as sign-shaped behaviors are vague and 
require individuation or specification in their performance.”1035 While some of 
this specification is tied to particularities specific to a given ritual performance, 
which is what Kreinath is trying to highlight in his emphasis on performance and 
pragmatics, but much of it is also due to overlap with other rituals and the lower 
order rituals that make up higher order rituals constraining one another. This 
theorizing by Neville is the most extensive Peircian semiotic treatment of ritual 
to date and initiates a project to which the present endeavor seeks to make a 
systematic and substantive contribution. 
Acknowledging that ritual makes use of all three modes of reference 
identified by Peirce – iconic, indexical, and symbolic – the present project seeks 
to articulate the contours of the symbol system that governs the relations among 
signs in a ritual context. With the later theorizing by Neville in conversation with 
Xunzi, ritual is taken to be a pervasive dimension of human life, a genus of 
which language is a species, as will be demonstrated in the chapter five. Rituals 
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are made up of elements including objects, words, actions, and participants. Each 
element is at least potentially (1) a sign of itself to itself; (2) a sign of its role in the 
ritual to itself; (3) a sign of itself to other elements in the ritual; (4) a sign of its 
role in the ritual to other elements in the ritual. So too the elements refer to one 
another as icons, indices, or symbols, their mutual reference constituting them 
together as a system. The ritual elements are arranged according to an order 
specific to that ritual within the frame that makes a ritual that ritual. The form 
also constrains the orientation and reference of the ritual elements such that they 
achieve coherence according to the ritual order, thereby effecting a 
transformation of at least some of the elements and achieving objectification. The 
ritual process is the means by which the ritual form transforms at least one of the 
ritual elements from one location, status, state, or condition to another in order to 
generate its functions: new interpretants, be they cultural systems, interpersonal 
interactions, or even the physical location of a ritual element, transition of 
interpretants from foreground to background, or from an intentional to a taken 
for granted production from the perspective of the ritual elements, by virtue of 
repetition of the ritual. Of course, these interpretants are only generated insofar 
as the ritual is performed and the ongoing performances of many interwoven 
rituals construct, maintain, and adjust the cultural conventions of a society, and 
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are the means of their adoption into the individual lives of the people of that 
society. 
It is also helpful to return at this point to the definition of ritual and 
interpret it in explicitly semiotic vocabulary: Ritual is “the performance of more 
or less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by 
the performers” (Rappaport, 24). The ritual form is fundamentally semiotic, in 
which the relation between a sign vehicle and its object – whether by common 
quality, causality, or convention – generates an interpretant. The elements of 
ritual are often functioning simultaneously as signs, objects, and interpretants as 
the ritual is being performed, which is expected given that signs are not states 
but processes of semiosis, although the form, or the symbol system governing 
conventional signs, is only able to constrain the reference of and to transform 
signs that are referring symbolically, i.e. conventionally. Rituals are almost 
always made up of smaller rituals and therefore govern the symbol systems of 
those smaller rituals. The invariance of the sequencing of those smaller rituals is 
what makes a given ritual that ritual, and that particular sequence is encoded in 
its symbol system to be performed invariantly. Three levels of ritual may be 
distinguished: macro rituals that encode the rituals of society, meso rituals that 
encode the rituals of daily life and interpersonal interactions, and micro rituals 
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that encode the rituals that make up the meso rituals. Rituals also overlap with 
other rituals, and so their performers must be able to negotiate between them in 
order to minimize the variance introduced for each, and so invariance is never 
absolute. Thus, rituals are not encoded by their performers, rather the performers 
have the obligation to perform all of the rituals and sub-rituals they are involved 
in so as to harmonize them with minimal variance for each; the various options 
for harmonizing rituals are themselves also rituals. When so harmonized, rituals 
remain relatively taken for granted, whereas spikes in variance generate 
cognitive dissonance, sometimes resulting in ritual rectification. Moreover, there 
is a dipolar tension between the symbol system of the ritual form representing 
the world as it is and constructing the world as it should be according to either 
the ritual form in question or a higher order ritual form in which it participates. 
The representational pole pulls the symbol system toward accordance with the 
structure of reality. The constructive pole pulls the symbol system toward 
accordance with an ideal either intrinsic to the ritual in play, a higher order 
ritual, or even a set of overlapping rituals at the same or a higher order. The 
reason for this tension is that the symbol system of ritual, by virtue of its nature 
as system, privileges unified order and pattern, either identifying it in the world, 
or where it cannot, constructing it. Performers are left to select among the 
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available rituals for harmonizing the multiple rituals at play at various levels 
with minimal variance and for resolving the tension between representation and 
construction, which is their contribution to the ritual encoding. 
The Great Vigil of Easter is a decidedly macro ritual of a religious variety 
that is in turn made up of a number of other macro religious rituals: “The Service 
of Light,” “The Word of God,” “Holy Baptism and Renewal of Baptismal Vows,” 
and “The Holy Communion” as outlined in the service leaflet.1036 Many of these 
rituals are also made up of other macro rituals, such as the five nocturns 
recounting salvation history, each of which begins with a reading, concludes 
with a collect, and has a psalm, canticle, or musical element in between.1037 There 
are also rituals that overlap with the Great Vigil of Easter, such as the sign of the 
cross discussed earlier, which is not intrinsically defined by the symbol system of 
the Vigil but is rather adopted from its own symbolic encoding as expressed in a 
range of liturgical uses and extra-liturgical blessings. It is also not the case that 
absolutely every word or motion that takes place during the Vigil is encoded by 
the ritual of the Vigil itself. For example, the words spoken by the Dean of the 
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Cathedral in invitation to the congregation to provide financial support to the 
mission and ministry of the Cathedral are not prescribed by the ritual itself but 
arise from meso rituals of interpersonal interaction and communication 
developed and refined in the Cathedral community.1038 Also, while the ritual of 
the Vigil assumes that the communion elements will be distributed in some sense 
in good order, it does not prescribe what that order will be, instead relying on 
wider rituals in society to form lines, wait turns, and allow appropriate space.1039 
These rituals, in turn, rely on micro rituals that encode such individualized 
matters as the very manner by which a given person walks, involving all of the 
signs necessary to pick up a foot, move it forward, put it back down, make all of 
those motions flow, and keep them in sync with the parallel motions of the other 
foot so as to achieve a gait. Someone tripping in line would be a relatively 
minimal variance, and so would generate a small amount of cognitive 
dissonance, leaving the ritual mostly taken for granted. Someone grabbing the 
chalice from the server, dumping the contents on the floor, and running out the 
door would be a lot of variance, at least potentially generating ritual failure, but 
these actions too would nevertheless be performances of rituals, namely of 
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rituals of desecration and theft, overlapped with the Eucharist ritual. The tension 
between the ritual representing the world as is and constructing the world as it 
should be according to its form is writ large across the Great Vigil of Easter: the 
world is broken under the weight of sin, and especially in baptism and Eucharist, 
the world is redeemed by the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
Ritual and Language 
For Roy Rappaport, ritual is a solution to two problems inherent in 
language. In order to understand this solution, it is necessary to understand the 
problem. Rappaport argues, following Leslie White, that language entails 
culture, which is in turn “the general way of life consisting of understandings, 
institutions, customs, and material artifacts, whose existence, maintenance and 
use are contingent upon language.”1040 This is to say that language is generative 
for the socially constructed aspects of reality, by contrast to brute, physical 
reality.1041 Furthermore, and again with White, Rappaport considers language to 
be the primary, if not only, manifestation of symbolic thought, which is unique in 
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the world to humanity.1042 However, the relationship between language – and the 
world it constructs socially – and language user is complicated: 
If, as agents, people act, and perhaps can only act, in terms of meanings they or their 
ancestors have conceived, they are as much in the service of those conceptions as those 
conceptions are parts of their adaptations. There is, this is to say, an inversion or partial 
inversion, in the course of human evolution, of the relationship of the adaptive apparatus to the 
adapting species.1043 
Thus, for Rappaport, there is an intimate connection between language and 
thought, which for him primarily refers to symbolic reference in semiotic terms. 
The first problem with language, according to Rappaport, is that it enables 
humans to lie by separating sign from signified temporally and spatially such 
that what signs purport may not accord with reality.1044 This in turn calls into 
question the entire social project: “What is at stake is not only the truthfulness or 
reliability of particular messages but credibility, credence, and trust themselves, 
and thus the grounds of the trustworthiness requisite to systems of 
communication and community generally.”1045 Rappaport argues that, at least 
with respect to socially constructed reality, “aspects of religion, particularly as 
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generated in ritual, ameliorate problems of falsehood intrinsic to language to a 
degree sufficient to allow human sociability to have developed and to be 
maintained.”1046 Notably, while the problem of religious language is a present 
concern, the role of religious ritual in ameliorating the problem of falsehoods 
introduced by the symbolic nature of language is not of central interest because it 
is ultimately what religious ritual generates, namely religion, and not ritual 
generally or itself, that addresses the problem of the lie. 
Of much more interest is the second problem with language, according to 
Rappaport, which is that language enables humans to conceive of alternative 
realities to the present socially constructed order. As Rappaport notes, the ability 
of language to express that “YHVH is God and Marduk is not” entails the 
possibility of the alternative that “Marduk is God and YHWH is not,” a 
phenomenon he explains as emerging from linguistic ordering by grammar.1047 
While this capacity to imagine alternative orders generates an extraordinary 
degree of adaptive flexibility, it concomitantly establishes the grounds of 
disorder.1048 In order to maintain social stability, the present order must be 
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grounded over against possible alternative orders, which is to say that some 
words must be established as “true,” at least in a socially constructed sense, as 
opposed to the “false” alternatives grammar allows.1049 Again, Rappaport offers 
religion and ritual as the means for accomplishing this grounding: 
It is a major thesis of this book that it is in the nature of religion to fabricate the Word, the 
True Word upon which the truths of symbols and the convictions that they establish 
stand. As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I take the foundry within which 
the Word is forged to be ritual.1050 
Since, as described above, not all ritual is religious for Rappaport, it is not 
entirely clear whether it is as necessary as he thinks for particularly religious 
ritual to serve this grounding function, or whether more mundane forms of ritual 
might do just as well. Part of this problem is caught up in the way in which 
Rappaport conceives ritual among other domains of life, but for the moment, it is 
enough to note that this capacity of language to generate alternative possibilities 
is in part what is meant in chapter six by the subjunctive function of language. 
This contrastive view between ritual and language, which gives rise to the 
contrastive view between ritual and sincerity adopted by Seligman et al, echoes 
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in many respects the predominant view in ritual studies that ritual is not 
language. The most provocative proponent of this view is Fritz Staal:  
What I have attempted to demonstrate in my earlier studies of ritual is not that ritual is a 
language, but that it is, like language, a rule-governed activity. Since it is an activity that is 
governed by rules, it becomes important to discover what actual rules, and what kind of 
rules, in fact govern it. In pursuing such questions, I discovered that ritual structures can 
be analysed in syntactic terms not by methods specific to linguistics, but by mathematical 
and logical methods that have also influenced linguistics… I tried to show that a 
syntactic analysis of ritual is not only possible but also fruitful; and that such an analysis 
demonstrates that the assumption that rituals express meanings like language is not only 
unnecessary, but inaccurate and misleading.1051 
Staal is here arguing that both ritual and language are species of the genus of 
rule-governed activities, but that semantic meaning is a unique quality of the 
species language, not of rule-governed activities generally, and so not of ritual. 
Elsewhere Staal is emphatic about this lack of semantic content in ritual: 
A widespread but erroneous assumption about ritual is that it consists in symbolic 
activities which refer to something else. It is characteristic of a ritual performance, 
however, that it is self-contained and self-absorbed. The performers are totally immersed 
in the proper execution of their complex tasks. Isolated in their sacred enclosure, they 
concentrate on correctness of act, recitation and chant. Their primary concern, if not 
obsession, is with rules. There are no symbolic meanings going through their minds 
when they are engaged in performing ritual.1052 
Leaving aside the question of the adequacy of the claim that ritual has no 
semantic content, it is notable that this claim is what enables Staal to articulate 
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the distinctiveness of language as a species of the same genus as ritual and so to 
distinguish the two: “Ritual systems are like language in that they are governed 
by rules, but unlike language in that they do not express meanings.”1053 For Staal, 
syntax is common to all rule-governed activities, but semantics is unique to 
language, or at least is not common between language and ritual. 
The way in which Staal construes the relationship between language and 
ritual is that they are both species of the genus of rule-governed activities, and 
species with rather distinct features and entailments at that. According to this 
schematization, with language and ritual on the same logical level under the 
higher order logic of rule-governed activities, it is equivalent to say that ritual is 
not language and that language is not ritual, because if they were, there would 
be no reason to distinguish them as distinct species. Without addressing the 
adequacy of the conception of “rule-governed activities” as the genus of 
language and ritual, it is possible to challenge the conception of language and 
ritual each being an independent species. Instead, ritual may be conceived within 
Staal’s framework of rejecting semantic content in ritual as the genus of the 
species language, where ritual is defined as syntactically determined and 
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language adds the property of semantic content. Furthermore, Staal’s analysis of 
ritual as lacking semantic content is inadequate,1054 for reasons beginning with 
his explicitly stated underlying assumption that the Vedic Agnicayana is the best 
source material for a theory of ritual because of its size, ornamentation, and 
documentation,1055 none of which characteristics bear directly upon suitability for 
generalization. This being the case, it is even more plausible to hypothesize that 
language, with its distinctive characteristics, whatever they turn out to be, are a 
species of the genus ritual, with its more general characteristics, whatever they 
turn out to be. In this configuration, it would remain true to say that ritual is not 
language, as instantiations of the genus ritual may belong to a species other than 
language, but that language is ritual, as there can be no member of a species that 
is not also a member of the same genus. 
One of the reasons theorists reject understanding ritual as language is an 
increasing skepticism toward Saussurean structuralism: “Due to the broader 
reception of Charles S. Peirce's semiotics in the late 1970s, the paradigm of 
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linguistic signs that had dominated the former approaches to rituals was called 
into question and eventually left behind.”1056 Indeed, more recent work has 
returned to the idea of ritual as a meaningful mode of communication by 
adopting a broadly Peircian stance. 
Ritual communication is an undertaking or enterprise involving a making of cultural 
knowledge within locally variant practices of speech-centered human interaction… is 
artful, performed semiosis, predominantly but not only involving speech, that is 
formulaic and repetitive and therefore anticipated within particular contexts of social 
interaction… In this poetic-pragmatic view of ritual language or ritual communication, 
“meaningfulness” is both a retrospective and a prospective process.1057 
Unfortunately, this more recent work is rather unclear as to the logic of relations 
among ritual, language, communication, and meaning, but is at least clear that 
ritual is not wholly reducible to language. Thus, quite apart from the problematic 
universalizing of Staal, there is good reason to conclude that ritual is not 
language, either construed as a strict equivalence or as ritual being a species of 
the language genus. 
The alternative claim that language is a species of the genus ritual was 
made infamous by Edmund Leach in the publication of his 1966 contribution to a 
symposium on ritualization behaviors in animals and humans in the Philosophical 
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1057 Senft and Basso, Ritual Communication, 1. 
	 436 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences.1058 In the 
published article, Leach compares the consistency of ethologists in their 
understanding of ritual with social anthropologists who cannot agree among 
themselves as to what they mean when they talk about ritual. Not only does he 
critique his fellow anthropologists for making a distinction without a difference 
between behavior that communicates according to a code and behavior that is 
“potent” either in terms of cultural conventions or by invoking occult powers.1059 
Leach also sides with the ethologists in arguing that “speech itself is a form of 
ritual; non-verbal ritual is simply a signal system of a different, less specialized, 
kind.”1060 The ethologists were relying on a theory of ritual derived ultimately 
from the symbolic interactionist program in anthropology but as interpreted 
through the lens of evolutionary biology such that “Rituals (Symbolhandlungen 
German) are behavior patterns which serve the function of communication and 
which undergo changes in the service of this function that enhance their 
communicative value.”1061 Leach concludes that in ritual (1) language and action 
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are indistinguishable, (2) vocabulary is restricted as in mathematics, and (3) this 
does not lead to ambiguity because of reliance on presumed, i.e. taken for 
granted, conventional common knowledge.1062 Meyer Fortes (1906 – 1983) rejects 
this view on the basis that “It is a short step from this to the position that there is 
no such thing as ritual per se, no actions, utterances, ideas and beliefs that belong 
specifically to a domain we can identify by the term ritual, as opposed to 
everything else in social life that is non-ritual.”1063 Even Rappaport, who views 
ritual as communicative, relies on this rejection in order to contrast ritual from 
language: “To say that ritual is a mode of communication is hardly to suggest 
that it is interchangeable with other modes of communication. It is a special 
medium peculiarly, perhaps even uniquely, suited to the transmission of certain 
messages and certain sorts of information.”1064 As a result, theorists have not 
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given serious consideration to the ethologically grounded notion of language as a 
species of ritual since Leach.1065 
Until now. The present project diverges from Rappaport on the issue of 
the relation between ritual and language, siding with Leach and the ethologists 
on the basis of the same Peircian semiotics Rappaport adopts. Rappaport argues 
that language is purely symbolic while ritual retains a wider semiotic capacity 
for its elements, or in Rappaport’s idiom the “contents” or “substance” of ritual, 
to refer indexically and iconically.1066  He makes this claim with ethological 
awareness on the basis that even plants and animals have iconic and indexical 
modes of communication but that only humans are capable of purely symbolic 
communication in which sign vehicles are related to their objects purely by law 
or convention, which sign vehicles are then syntactically combinable into 
infinitely variable semantic expressions.1067 Leaving aside for the moment the 
syntactic combinatorics, Rappaport is here falling into the same trap of mental 
signification that Peirce struggled, and ultimately failed, to escape, in that he is 
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assuming that symbolic reference relies on laws or conventions that are purely 
mental. One of the great achievements of Peircian semiotics, however, as 
recognized in the previous chapter, is that the distinction between physical and 
mental sign elements is irrelevant to semiosis.1068 It is thus not symbolic reference 
that distinguishes humans from animals, plants, and even inanimate things but 
rather the capacities for recursion and reflex that make us aware that semiosis is 
taking place and of our role in its process. Likewise, ethologists recognize that 
linguistic and non-linguistic signifying behavior have the same communicative 
capacity and together form the basis for understanding uniquely human 
capacities for recursive syntax and reflexive semantics: 
The discovery that verbal and non-verbal behavior can substitute for each other as 
functional equivalents bridges the gap between them and also provides a unifying theory 
for the study of a grammar of human social behavior. The basic strategies of social 
interactions indeed prove to follow the same rules whether verbalized or acted out non-
verbally.1069 
Unfortunately, because of the longstanding influence of structuralist approaches 
that take language as the model for all signifying systems, “there is still no 
established set of semiotics concepts for theorizing the pragmatics involved in 
the performance of ritual actions as it is developed in linguistics for analyzing 
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spoken and written languages in terms of syntax and semantics.”1070 A central 
contribution of the present project, then, will be to understand language as part 
of the larger whole of ritual so as to overcome this deficiency and the limitations 
of the contrastive approach to ritual and language as developed by Rappaport. 
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CONFUCIAN RITUAL THEORY 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the ritual theory of Master Xun 
(Xunzi 荀子) in the intellectual and historical context of the Confucian tradition 
with which he identified, and among a wide variety of strains of Chinese thought 
more generally. The chapter presumes minimal familiarity with Confucian 
thought or the broad spectrum of Chinese religio-philosophical families of which 
the Confucian family is one. Indeed, it is only in the Han dynasty (206 BCE – 220 
CE) that those who are now considered Confucians were classified together as 
“Ru 儒,” meaning scholars or classicists, which “indicated not a precise moral 
orientation or body of doctrines, but a professional training with the general goal 
of state service.”1071 Confucius himself is rather like Jesus and Socrates in that he 
never compiled his own text and so is known exclusively through compilations 
of his sayings by his students and followers, whose own agendas filtered the 
articulation, selection, editing, formulation, and codification thereof. Those who 
followed in Confucius’ lineage, therefore, had to be highly creative and 
constructive in their own right. The central such figure for consideration here is 
Xunzi, the great systematizer of early Confucian thought. Against the elder 
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Confucian Mencius (Mengzi 孟子), Xunzi believed that humans have an inborn 
tendency toward excess, which can be curbed and corrected through education 
and ritual. The claim to be made is that there are aspects and features of his ritual 
theory, especially the pervasiveness of ritual in thought and action, that 
emphasize, highlight, press against, and challenge the contemporary Western 
social scientific ritual theories considered in the previous chapter in various 
respects. These aspects and features are particularly salient for making the case 
that language is ritual in subsequent chapters. Further, this chapter explores 
connections between Xunzi’s ritual theory and the Confucian project of 
“rectifying names,” which highlights the importance of common language and 
meaning for a moral and functional society. 
Even before turning to some background in Chinese thought, some 
orientation regarding notation is in order. All dates are presented with the 
contemporary convention of being marked “before the common era,” 
abbreviated BCE, or “common era,” abbreviated CE. With regard to language, in 
the first instance all names, titles, (of people, places, books, etc.), and technical 
terms are provided in translation to English where there is a common convention 
for such and then also in Pinyin (transliteration of Chinese) and Chinese 
characters. In all cases, Pinyin appears without tonal markers. Where there is no 
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sufficient consensus regarding an English translation, or in the case of many 
personal and place names where translation would be inappropriate, then only 
the Pinyin and Chinese characters are provided. There is also some combination 
of English titles and Pinyin names. In all cases, Chinese characters are provided 
immediately following the Pinyin transliteration without parentheses. When 
there is an English translation, then Pinyin immediately followed by Chinese 
characters is provided parenthetically. Subsequent usages will employ only the 
English translation, if available, or the Pinyin, if not. In some cases of subsequent 
appearances of the Pinyin, where more than one meaning is possible, Chinese 
characters may be included again to clarify the intended meaning in the case in 
question. For example, Li 禮 (ritual) does not mean the same as Li 理 (pattern or 
principle), and so the character would be included for the sake of clarity. In all 
cases, the Chinese characters presented are traditional, although in the case of 
technical terms the simplified characters may also be presented, in which case 
they will appear following a forward slash after the traditional characters. Pinyin 
names of people appears in regular font, while names of texts associated with 
said personages appear in italics. For example, Xunzi is a person, while the Xunzi 
is the body of texts associated with Xunzi. 
	 444 
In spite of this extensive notational apparatus, this presentation of ancient 
Chinese philosophy generally, and the Xunzi more specifically, is not Sinological, 
aspiring to expertise in Chinese language, literature, and history, but rather 
philosophical, inquiring into certain Chinese ideas as resources for attaining 
wisdom. As such, it relies not on original source texts in Chinese but on modern 
translations of the texts into English. The issue of translation is acute because the 
translator, of necessity, shapes the meaning of the text for readers by choosing 
words in English that most closely approximate the interpretation they already 
have of the text. As we will see, these interpretations can vary widely, and so as 
much as possible it is important to present the various interpretive frameworks 
of the translators so that the reader can understand the varying meanings 
presented by the different translations of the text in question. Secondary 
literature is thus extremely important for gaining traction on the viability of each 
framework and their attendant meanings, although again, only secondary 
sources in English are under consideration. For the sake of brevity, presentation 
of alternative translations and their attendant interpretive frameworks can only 
be undertaken extensively for texts pertaining directly to the purposes of this 
chapter, namely the understanding of Confucian, and particularly Xunzian, 
ritual theory. 
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Chinese Philosophy and Its Early Milieu 
One of the original contributions to scholarship made in this chapter is 
that it is the first attempt to consider the relationships among various streams of 
thought in ancient China in their sociocultural context according to the timeline 
developed by E. Bruce and A. Takeo Brooks. Using historical-critical methods of 
text analysis common in biblical studies, they hypothesize that the Analects as a 
work was written and compiled over almost a quarter of a millenium.1072 While 
the scholarship that goes into their hypothesis is robust, their methods are not 
without critics.1073 Thus, even as their findings are taken as a strong hypothesis to 
which no better alternative has been advanced, the presentation of the milieu of 
ancient Chinese thought here does not depend on the hypothesis being precisely 
accurate. Rather, their model of the accretions of chapters and passages of the 
																																																								
1072 Confucius, 論語辨 The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His Successors, trans. E. Bruce 
Brooks and A. Takeo Brooks (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998), 1. 
1073 A strong methodological critique is available in John Makeham, “The Original Analects: 
Sayings of Confucius and His Successors, and: The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical 
Translation (Review),” China Review International 6, no. 1 (1999): 1–33, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/cri.1999.0078. Note that he is quite sympathetic to the developmental view 
generally: John Makeham, “The Formation of Lunyu as a Book,” Monumenta Serica 44 (January 1, 
1996): 1–24, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40727082. An alternative chronology is provided in 
Shirley Chan, The Confucian Shi, Official Service, and the Confucian Analects (Lewiston, NY: Edwin 
Mellen, 2004), 221–66. Chan’s alternative chronology is criticized in Keith Nathaniel Knapp, 
“Early Confucianism Reconsidered,” Religious Studies Review 34, no. 3 (September 1, 2008): 161–
64, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-0922.2008.00289.x.   
	 446 
Analects is taken to demonstrate thematic emphases that resonate with thematic 
emphases in other streams of thought at play in the Warring States period. If the 
historical infrastructure of their case for their hypothesis were to crumble, these 
thematic resonances would remain. Furthermore, the Brooks’ hypothesis results 
in the final chapters of the Analects being written while Xunzi was governor of 
Lu 魯, the state where Confucius’ school was established and the text was 
compiled, and so helps maintain focus on Xunzi and his intellectual project. 
Chinese philosophy emerged in the Fifth through Third Centuries BCE1074 
in the midst of socio-political upheaval considered at the time to be the final 
outcome of a gradual decline of Chinese culture from an idealized golden age.1075 
While this upheaval was brutal and tragic socio-politically, it proved 
philosophically fecund, generating myriad intellectual responses among what 
would come to be known as the Hundred Schools (Zhuzi Baijia 諸子百家).1076 
This background is important first because Xunzi was just like all authors, who 
were “products of their times and were involved in the political and social life of 
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their age, and the texts were directed at specific audiences with which they 
interacted. A neglect of the sociopolitical and intellectual settings of a text… 
often leads to speculative attempts to find in the texts alien political or 
philosophical ideas,… which in all likelihood were inconceivable to both the 
authors and their audience.”1077 This leads to the second reason for a thorough 
consideration of the socio-political and intellectual emergence of Chinese 
philosophy: While a precise rendering of Xunzi is most philosophically relevant 
for present purposes, the detection of “synchronic patterns or diachronic 
processes” enabled by contextualization1078 is important for gaining traction on 
debates regarding proper and appropriate interpretation of Xunzi. In particular, 
such traction is most helpful for adjudicating the debate in the literature 
regarding whether to interpret Xunzi as a realist or a constructivist.1079 
Consideration of the early milieu of Chinese philosophy begins with a 
presentation of the prevalent understanding of classical Chinese culture at the 
time said milieu emerged. 
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The Five Classics (Wujing五經) 
 Identifying the Five Classics as the codification of classical Chinese 
culture to which the philosophical movements of the Hundred Schools 
responded is highly anachronistic. The very concept of “classics,” after all, came 
from Xunzi himself,1080 and it was his students who established the Five Classics 
during the Western Han dynasty (Hanchao漢朝) (206 BCE – 8 CE).1081 
Furthermore, many of the Hundred Schools considered other texts of equal 
authority and antiquity.1082 Historically, modern scholarship is skeptical of the 
traditional view that the texts were written in antiquity and then compiled, 
edited, and commented upon by Confucius himself.1083 Nevertheless, these texts, 
in nascent form, were touchstones for most of the Hundred Schools,1084 either as 
sources or as antagonists, and “most of the texts were evolving in oral as well as 
written forms for centuries before they acquired the designation ‘classic’ or 
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‘Confucian.’”1085 Finally, they are particularly relevant for present purposes, 
sourcing, as they do, the Confucian tradition, and particularly Xunzi therein.1086 
They are considered here in the Modern Script order.1087 
The Classic of Poetry (Shijing春秋), or Odes,1088 “existed in some form, oral 
or written, before the time of Confucius,” likely initially compiled no later than 
600 BCE and fixed in its present form at about the start of the Third Century 
BCE.1089 “A collection of what appear to be polished folk songs, sophisticated 
occasional pieces, and solemn dynastic hymns,” the Odes “is the most uniformly 
old compilation of texts included in the Five Classics.”1090 Since the Odes was 
common among elites by the mid- to late Zhou周 period (c. 1046 – 256 BCE), it is 
revelatory of the “material culture, habits, attitudes, and characteristic forms of 
association” in Zhou times that were revered by the Confucians.1091 Knowledge 
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of the Odes was considered an “insignia of culture” and storehouse of social 
graces, which “in turn were what made for an impressive character: the ‘sound 
of virtue’ capable of influencing others for the good.”1092 So too, the Odes both 
“supply apt metaphors for the process of moral cultivation” and exemplify the 
exquisite taste of which moral self-cultivation is a kind such that reciting them is 
a form of ethical training.1093 With respect to language, the Odes “provides the 
appropriate patterned language, no less than the range of social patterns, by 
which kindred spirits might recognize one another.”1094 In Xunzi’s time, the Odes 
were “conceived as wonderful allegories containing the most sublime thoughts 
on the art of government, on the practice of self- cultivation, and on the nature of 
the Way and its Power,” and he cites them frequently in his texts.1095 
The Classic of Documents (Shujing尚書), or Documents,1096 “consists of 
announcements, counsels, speeches, or similar oral reports said to have been 
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made by various rulers and their ministers from the times of the sage rulers Yao 
and Shun down to the early Zhou period,”1097 i.e. from 2500 to 500 BCE.1098 With 
regard to the history and authorship of the text, although it “contains some 
indisputably early material dating from early Western Zhou,”1099 “Confucius 
seems not to have had [it] in hand… because he repeatedly laments his ignorance 
of the pre-Zhou period, the main subject of the early chapters.”1100 Xunzi, 
however, does seem to have had a text similar to the Documents known today.1101 
The value of the documents for Chinese philosophers lies in “its presumed 
ability to shed light on certain central questions of their political existence,” that 
is, of what constitutes a good society and how it should be ordered.1102 Early 
Confucian philosophers, and none more than Xunzi, spent much of their 
intellectual energy reflecting on the five main topics of the Documents: “(1) the 
operation of the Mandate of Heaven; (2) definitions of true kingship; (3) portraits 
of worthy officials; (4) discussions of the relative merits of rule by punishment 
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versus rule by virtue; and (5) explications of the role of ‘those below’ vis-à-vis the 
ruler.”1103 Notably, there was a change in the linguistic extension of the terms Ren
人 and Min民 from “men” and “people” within the ruler’s clan, respectively, at 
the time that at least some of the Documents were written, to “men” and “people” 
generally by the times of Confucius and then Xunzi.1104 This extension shifted the 
locus of power in classical Chinese thought from elites to the whole populace,1105 
which would have significant impact on conceptions of Heaven (Tian天), the 
Mandate thereof (Tianming天命), and the notion of meritocracy. Nevertheless, 
while “Xunzi quotes from the Documents twelve times in his works,” “from these 
quotations and more numerous allusions we cannot develop a ‘school’ of 
interpretation to be associated with him.”1106 
The Rites (Li 禮), understood as one of the Five Classics, is actually a 
compendium of three books: the Book of Rites (Liji 禮記),1107 the Book of Ritual (Yili 
																																																								
1103 Nylan, 136. 
1104 Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire, chaps. 8 & 9. 
1105 Nylan, The Five “Confucian” Classics, 154–55. 
1106 Xunzi, Xunzi: Translation and Study, I: 43. 
1107 The only scholarly translation of this text is James Legge, trans., The Sacred Books of China: The 
Texts of Confucianism Part III, vol. 3, The Sacred Books of the East 27 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 
1885); James Legge, trans., The Sacred Books of China: The Texts of Confucianism Part IV, vol. 4, The 
Sacred Books of the East 28 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1885). 
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儀禮),1108 and the Rites of Zhou (Zhouli 周禮).1109 A sixth classic, the Classic of Music 
(Yuejing樂經), is referred to by Xunzi and other early Ru but is lost by the Han 
dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE), although it may have been incorporated, at least in 
part, as the “Record of Music” (Yueji樂記) within the Book of Rites.1110 According 
to Michael Nylan, it is likely that “much of the Liji was compiled and edited in 
early Western Han by Han court specialists, though parts of it closely reflect 
ideas of the pre-Han classicists, especially Xunzi; certainly the grammar and 
content of the other two Rites canons, the Zhouli and the Yili, cannot date to a 
time much before Han.”1111 John Knoblock (1937 – 2018), translator and 
interpreter of Xunzi into English, disagrees: “It is now clear that substantial parts 
of the texts of both the Zhou li and Yili circulated in Xunzi's time and before… 
What is unclear, and still the subject of much dispute, is when the text reached its 
current form and how far it reflects either actual Western or Eastern Zhou 
institutions and practices or early Zhou notions of how such institutions ought 
																																																								
1108 The only translation into English is John Clendinning Steele, The I-Li, or Book of Etiquette and 
Ceremonial (London: Probsthain, 1917). 
1109 This text has yet to be translated into English. 
1110 Xunzi, Xunzi: Translation and Study, I: 45. 
1111 Nylan, The Five “Confucian” Classics, 175. 
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ideally to function.”1112 Given the overwhelming agreement between Xunzi and 
the Rites texts, the chicken and egg question has minimal philosophical import, 
but is notable nonetheless. Of greater interest is that, taken together, the Rites 
texts “describe a complete ritual system, which encompasses a broad spectrum of 
activities from the courtesies of daily life to the most solemn affairs of state.”1113 
Ru masters prior to the unification of China at the start of the Qin dynasty in 221 
BCE were considered primarily ritual masters,1114 Xunzi among them. Rituals 
were understood as norms for “appropriate and mutually satisfying behaviors 
built upon emotional insights,”1115 which “made it possible to transform oneself, 
to transform others, and to order the cosmos.”1116 Thus, rituals are pervasive, 
conventional, and transformative; spelling this out in detail must wait for 
consideration of Xunzi himself. 
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The Book of Changes (Yijing易經),1117 in spite of the core divinization text 
being the oldest text among the classics, was not included among listings of 
classics until the late Fourth or Third Century BCE.1118 Even then, its inclusion 
had more to do with the advent of the appendices, interpreting the divinization 
text in terms of cosmic correlations and human history, than with its antiquity.1119 
Thus, neither Confucius, nor Mencius, nor Xunzi considered the Book of Changes a 
classic, and none of them referred to it. The core text gives clues to the 
interpretation of a divination method “based on sixty-four hexagrams (six-line 
symbolic diagrams) that were consulted through the casting of milfoil stalks.”1120 
The “Ten Wings,” or appendices, often attributed to Confucius, “allowed all 
components of the many-layered text to be read as one organic treatise of 
considerable sophistication on man’s changing place with respect to the 
																																																								
1117 Three translations of the Book of Changes are notable: Richard Rutt, Zhouyi: A New Translation 
with Commentary of the Book of Changes, New Edition 2002 (London: Routledge, 2013); Richard 
John Lynn, trans., The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi 
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994); Edward L. Shaughnessy, I Ching (New York, 
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experiential world.”1121 While the text of the Book of Changes is not directly helpful 
for interpreting Xunzi,1122 its appendices do articulate a prevalent cosmology of 
the time and a conception of Dao 道,1123 which are important for understanding 
Xunzi as part of his intellectual milieu. 
Mencius first made the case for the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu春
秋), or Annals,1124 being of equal importance to texts such as the Odes, Documents, 
and Rites. It “chronicles major political events affecting the small state of Lu, the 
home state of both the Duke of Zhou and Confucius, and its neighbors … from 
722 to 481 BCE”1125 and was considered “an infallible guide to proper authority, 
its relation to power, and the conditions for timely transfers of power.”1126 
Furthermore, the text is “authentic and early, being based on entries written 
																																																								
1121 Nylan, The Five “Confucian” Classics, 20–21. Note careful choice of masculine terminology in 
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Classic of Changes) and Its Evolution in China (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 
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down not long after the events they record.”1127 Alas, most who encountered the 
text were at a loss for exactly what that guidance was supposed to be,1128 such 
that Xunzi described the Annals as “laconic and their import not quickly 
grasped.”1129 Whereas later Confucians were able to overcome this obstacle by 
reference to commentaries,1130 particularly the Gongyang 公羊, the Guliang 榖梁, 
and the Zuo 左氏,1131 Xunzi put the opacity of the text to work as reinforcement 
for his argument that an excellent teacher is necessary, beyond reading classical 
texts, for the fullness of learning to be achieved.1132 Nevertheless, Xunzi may have 
been aware of the Gongyang and the Zuo, as “it now appears that both … were 
transcribed in the late Warring States period.”1133 Among the Hundred Schools, 
the Confucian orientation depended on the Annals like none of the others: “Since 
they argued that their doctrines represented the true teachings of the sages 
transmitted to Confucius and handed down since his time from master to 
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student to their own times, an accurate record of antiquity and its institutions 
was indispensable.”1134 Indeed, the Annals depict not only the golden age itself 
but also the gradual breakdown of the supposed golden age1135 that sparked the 
entire Chinese philosophical project. 
The Spring and Autumn Period (Chunqiu Shidai 春秋時代) (771 – 453 BCE) 
Confucius lived at the end of the period known as Spring and Autumn, 
after the titles of the Annals that claim to chronicle most of it, and Chinese 
philosophy emerged from there during the Warring States period that followed. 
Understanding something of the Spring and Autumn period is important for 
understanding the emergence of Chinese philosophy because, “for example, 
most of the pivotal terms of [Warring States] discourse, such as Dao (the Way), 
ren (benevolence), and zhong (loyalty), do not occur in Western Zhou texts; 
others, like de (charisma, virtue) and li (ritual), do occur but have different 
semantic meanings. These and other differences suggest that the two and a half 
centuries between the end of the Western Zhou period and Confucius lifetime 
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may be the missing link in the genesis of Chinese thought.”1136 These 
transformations can be described politically and intellectually. 
Politically, the early part of the Spring and Autumn period (771 – 643 
BCE) was marked by the establishment of the Zhou capital in the east resulting 
in a sharp decline in royal power and the rise of the hegemons (Ba 霸), or 
military surrogates for the king, at the start of the middle part (643 – 546 BCE). 
By the later part of the period (546 – 453 BCE), the hegemony was being passed 
around among non-Zhou (by kinship or culture) states in the south and the north 
suffered from “increasing turmoil and pandemic war” due to a leadership 
vacuum.1137 What should be taken from this is that, “first, the major malady of 
the Chunqiu age was the continuous disintegration of political power on the 
international and the domestic level. Second, the major source of social tension 
throughout the Chunqiu period was the strife of the aristocratic lineages for 
power, first against the overlords, and then against the rising shi.”1138  
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During the Western Zhou dynasty (1045 – 771 BCE), a Shi 士 had “the 
status of a common gentleman” in the aristocracy, and would have “nominally 
received an education in six fields: ritual, music, archery, charioteering, writing, 
and mathematics. In principle, shi were prepared to serνe the state in both 
military and civil capacities. They were expected to be not just robust warriors, 
but also gentlemen with good manners and minds.”1139 By the end of the Spring 
and Autumn period, however, these minor aristocrats had achieved significant 
influence, such that Shi came to refer to “a person of excellence, one with high 
capabilities as well as character; it came to refer to a cultural status rather than 
social grouping. This new cultural elite brought a new consciousness of their 
responsibility to serve the world.”1140 Thus, the public interests of the Shi were to 
limit political disintegration and restore social stability, but as a social class they 
also had private interests regarding their own, and their families’, advantage. As 
Yuri Pines notes,  
When the overt aim of restoring stability and order coincided with the private needs of 
the aristocratic thinkers, they obtained impressive intellectual achievements, such as 
elaborating the concept of rule by ritual (li zhi). When, however, the interests of political 
stability were at odds with preserving the exalted position of the aristocracy, as in the 
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1140 Loewe and Shaughnessy, 584. 
	 461 
case of administrative innovations, Chunqiu thinkers were indecisive, and their thought 
was ambivalent.1141  
Resolving this tension was the intellectual project for the period. 
Confucius (Kongzi 孔子) (551 – 479 BCE) 
This background of the Spring and Autumn period is extremely important 
for understanding the orientation and purposes of Confucius, a member of the 
Shi class whose response to the political and intellectual crises of the day would 
inspire many generations of Ru scholars and ministers. Born in the state of Lu in 
the northeast, Confucius traveled to the courts of a number of states seeking an 
office that would allow him to implement his views,1142 but his only post, if later 
biographical accounts are accurate, was as Minister of Crime in his native Lu.1143 
His orientation was quite conservative1144 in the sense that he looked back toward 
the Western Zhou court as the exemplar for governance and social order, but 
quite progressive, and loyal to the Shi, by arguing that noble character was what 
																																																								
1141 Pines, Foundations of Confucian Thought, 6. 
1142 de Bary and Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 41–42. 
1143 Jeffrey Riegel, “Confucius,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
Summer, 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/confucius/. 
1144 Angus Charles Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, 
IL: Open Court, 1989), 9–10. 
	 462 
made the court so, and not noble birth.1145 His purpose, then, was “to promote 
the style and manners of the noble person (junzi) and the efficacy of moral force 
or virtue (de), rather than violence and coercion, as a strategy for rulers.”1146 
Living at the end of the Spring and Autumn period, Confucius’ orientation 
toward the past was what he hoped would allow him to gain favor and currency 
at court even while his ideological loyalty was to his own Shi class. His genius, or 
at least that of the community that followed him, was to thread the needle 
between noble power and Shi values by arguing that it was the embodiment of 
Shi values by prior rulers that made them good leaders, and thus worthy of 
emulation for their ability to bring about social stability. 
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While Confucius did not write or compile the Lunyu 論語, or Analects,1147 
himself, they are nevertheless “the oldest source for his teaching,”1148 and thus 
the most important for understanding his thought, at least as it was received.1149 
“The English word analects, (from the Greek analekta), means ‘a selection,’ while 
the Chinese title Lunyu may be translated as ‘conversations.’”1150 These texts are 
therefore neither reliable nor systematic, and so reading the Analects is not unlike 
reading the Gospels in that doing so responsibly requires keeping in mind that 
the agenda(s) of the later authorial communities are very much in play. Rather 
than a single-authored work, the Analects are better understood as “a history of 
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early Confucianism, compiled from year to year by the Confucians of Lu.”1151 
Indeed, it is likely that only the fourth chapter of the Analects can be attributed to 
the time of Confucius himself, and then only the fifth and sixth before the end of 
the Spring and Autumn period.1152 Further, later material in the texts shows signs 
of response to the sociopolitical challenges that were prevalent more during the 
Warring States period.1153 Thus, only Chapters 4-6 will be considered here in 
order to emphasize Confucian intellectual response to the particular 
sociopolitical challenges of the Spring and Autumn period as outlined above. 
Numbering of the passages here follows that of James Legge.1154 
Four passages from the Analects are particularly instructive for 
understanding the Confucian response to the Spring and Autumn period. 
4:5 The Master said, "Wealth and honor are what people desire, but one should not abide 
in them if it cannot be done in accordance with the Way. Poverty and lowliness are what 
people dislike, but one should not avoid them if it cannot be done in accordance with the 
Way. If the noble person rejects humaneness, how can he fulfill that name? The noble 
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person does not abandon humaneness for so much as the space of a meal. Even when 
hard-pressed he is bound to it, bound to it even in time of danger."1155 
This passage is especially relevant because it brings into relationship three key 
concepts. The first concept is that of the Noble Person (Junzi 君子). “Originally, 
the meaning of the term junzi was ‘son of a lord,’ … Here the junzi is less the 
noble man whose nobility derives from inherited social nobility than the noble 
person whose nobility derives from personal commitment and a developed moral 
power.”1156 Confucius’ political project was to convince the social nobility that 
they should cultivate moral power as it is the most effective form of governance, 
having proven from past experience to generate the greatest social stability. 
Moral Power (De 德) is the ability of the ruler to unify and provide 
direction to society. “Its meaning seems to grow out of a common idiom, in 
which its sense is ‘gratitude’: if I do something for you that causes you to feel 
grateful and compelled to respond favorably, I ‘have de from’ (i.e. in relation to) 
you. You come to feel this compulsion as a psychological force emanating from 
me; this for you is my de.”1157 This moral power emerges from the Humaneness 
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(Ren 仁) of the person, which “is the foremost project taken up by Confucius.”1158 
Humaneness Ren 仁 was the stative verb form of Person Ren 人, “which the 
aristocratic clans of Zhou used to distinguish themselves from the common 
people… The noble, civilized, fully human, pride themselves on their manners 
and conventions, but above all on the virtues which give these meaning and 
which distinguish themselves from the boors and savages who do not know how 
to behave.”1159 Notably, however, “the fact that Confucius is asked so often what 
he means by the expression ren would suggest that he is reinventing this term for 
his own purposes, and that those in conversation with him are not comfortable in 
their understanding of it.”1160 Indeed, what Confucius is about here is the 
meritocratizing of the concept of humaneness such that it is humaneness that 
determines whether or not one is a noble person and not hereditary kinship. 
Passage 4.9 helps clarify this project: “The Master said, ‘Those scholar-
apprentices (shi 士) who, having set their purposes on walking the way (dao 道), 
are ashamed of rude clothing and coarse food, are not worth engaging in 
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discussion.’”1161 Confucius is not talking here to the nobility about humaneness, 
but rather to his own ministerial class, the Shi.  
Humaneness is signified in this passage by the setting of “purposes on 
walking the way,” which is the third concept: Way (Dao 道). Passage 4.5 
“suggests that Confucius had, not without emotional difficulty, come through 
such a trial by distress, and had kept his principles (Dao道, his ‘way’) intact. Ren 
is an at-large virtue; only an individual commitment to it makes it a personal 
dao, or principle, for that person.”1162 This definition of dao as an individual, 
personal, moral principle is important because it is almost precisely inverse from 
the conception future Confucians will have of dao as a cosmological, universal, 
metaphysical principle. “The word dao 道, originally meaning ‘way’ or ‘road,’ is 
used everywhere by the philosophers to mean the way to do something, or the 
(right moral) ‘Way,’ or (later) the ‘Way’ of all nature.”1163 Dao eventually moves 
from an internal principle to more of an external norm, but “for Confucius, dao is 
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primarily rendao人道, that is ‘a way of becoming consummately and 
authoritatively human,’”1164 for nobles or ministers alike.  
Another passage from the fourth chapter of the Analects invokes the 
means of cultivating humaneness as measured against the way in order to 
become a noble person, namely, ritual (Li 禮/礼): “4:13 The Master said, ‘If one 
can govern a state through rites and yielding, what difficulty is there in this? If 
one cannot govern through rites and yielding, of what use are the rites?’”1165 
Notably, this is the only reference to ritual in the fourth chapter, and thus 
traceable to Confucius himself.1166 That said, as evidenced by many later passages 
in the Analects, such as 2.3, 3.18, 3.19, and 11.25,1167 ritual quickly becomes central 
to the Confucian understanding of the most effective means of governing the 
state. The Zuo commentary on the Annals also reflects this view: “Deference is the 
mainstay of ritual propriety. In an ordered age, gentlemen honor ability and 
defer to those below them, while the common people attend to their agricultural 
labors in order to serve those above them. In this way, both above and below 
																																																								
1164 Confucius, The Analects of Confucius, 1999, 46. 
1165 de Bary and Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 49. 
1166 Confucius, The Original Analects, 16. 
1167 de Bary and Bloom, Sources of Chinese Tradition, 44. 
	 469 
ritual prevail, and slanderers and evil men are dismissed and ostracized.”1168 
Most of the interpretations of Confucius’ understanding of ritual involve an 
eisegetical reading of this later understanding of the role of ritual in governing 
back onto this passage.1169 Nevertheless, Confucius does here seem to indicate 
something like “faith in the power of trained manners, customs, and rituals to 
harmonise attitudes and open the inferior to the influence of the superior.”1170 
This definition of ritual at the social level reflects its emergence as a 
systematization of the concept of filial piety (Xiao 孝), meaning “honor and 
obedience to one’s parents.”1171 Not yet a model of governance, ritual is thus for 
Confucius more of a theory of effective leadership. This was his response to the 
crumbling effectiveness in leadership among Spring and Autumn period nobles: 
as “masters of the rites,”1172 Confucius and his students offered not to lead 
themselves but rather to teach the nobles how to lead effectively. 
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Two passages from the sixth chapter demonstrate two other important 
developments in Confucian thought in response to the sociopolitical dynamics of 
the Spring and Autumn period: 
6:20 Fan Chi asked about wisdom. The Master said, "Devote yourself to what must 
rightly be done for the people; respect spiritual beings, while keeping at a distance from 
them. This may be called wisdom." He asked about humaneness. The Master said, "One 
who is humane first does what is difficult and only thereafter concerns himself with 
success. This may be called humaneness." 
6:21 The Master said, "The wise take joy in water; the humane take joy in mountains. The 
wise are active; the humane are tranquil. The wise enjoy; the humane endure."1173 
First, the definition of wisdom as devotion “to what must rightly be done for the 
people” participates in the shift in the understanding of “people” (Min民) from 
the inner circle of the nobility to people generally, as described above. “This is 
the first hint of a concept of popular right, a prelegal social expectation 
amounting to a social obligation.”1174 Second, these passages contrast wisdom, or 
knowledge, with humaneness, which “esoteric pairing of Knowing and (in the 
adept sense) Unknowing”1175 may be a way of advocating for effortless 
leadership by moral force over against the energy depleting activity of governing 
by laws. This would indicate a replacement in Shi values during the latest days 
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of the Spring and Autumn period “of an external warrior ethic by an internal 
personal ethic.”1176 This more mystical connotation of humaneness resulting from 
meditation,1177 along with their focus on ritual mastery,1178 may have had to do 
with the application of the name Ru 儒, meaning “weak” or “pliable,”1179 to 
Confucius and his followers. 
The Warring States Period (Zhanguo Shidai 戰國時代) (453 – 221 BCE) 
The end of the Spring and Autumn and the start of the Warring States 
periods is somewhat fluid but can be set roughly at 453 BCE in association with 
the Partition of Jin (Sanjia Fen Jin  三家分晉) according to the Zuo commentary on 
the Annals.1180 The end of the Warring States period can be assigned more 
decisively with the establishment of the first imperial dynasty in the wake of the 
unification of China by the state of Qin 秦 in 221 BCE.1181 The period itself is 
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centrally characterized by perpetual social and political upheaval and war,1182 but 
this constant state of crisis also provoked intellectual inquiry aimed toward 
socio-political stability.1183 The result was a reconceptualization of rulership, the 
emergence of an educated, elite ministerial class, including an intellectual 
substratum, and envisioning of a political science recognizing “the people as the 
foundation of the polity.”1184 In order to carry out this program, the intellectuals 
had to rethink the entire conceptual system of Chinese culture and society.  
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the reconceptualization of 
rulership during the Warring States period is its continuity with earlier 
conceptualizations, albeit highly nuanced. “The late Western Zhou thinkers 
believed that if the ruler properly performed the ceremonies at court, in the 
temple, and elsewhere, he would become a model for his subjects and thus 
inspire them to follow orderly rule.”1185 Then, by halfway through the Spring and 
Autumn period, “the entire ritual-based sociopolitical order was on the verge of 
collapse, and nowhere was the crisis more evident than in the case of the 
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declining authority of the rulers.”1186 Given the rise of the Shi during this period, 
the possibility of a shift to an aristocratic oligarchy was at least a possibility,1187 
but instead the Shi “sided decisively with the lords in their drift toward 
centralization,”1188 that is to monarchism, during the Warring States period.1189 
While transitional figures, such as Confucius and his Lu-based lineage, looked 
back to the Zhou dynasty for the model of a monarch as the ritual pinnacle of 
society,1190 they innovated by also insisting that the monarch be a moral paragon 
who would be emulated by the people, an idea taken to extreme by Mozi 墨子.1191 
The immediate problem then becomes the disparity between this ideal and 
reality.1192 Two main strategies emerged as to how to resolve this contradiction: a 
strategy of reform or, if necessary, replace during the middle part of the Warring 
States period,1193 and later in the period a strategy of limiting “the ruler’s direct 
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involvement in policy-making, thereby diminishing the potentially negative 
consequences of his ineptitude, while retaining the symbolic importance of his 
position.”1194 The latter strategy, articulated by Xunzi and his student Han Feizi 
韓非子, became the foundation of the political philosophy behind two millennia 
of imperial rule.1195 
The intellectual substratum of the Shi class,1196 which was emerging “from 
the lower segment of the hereditary aristocracy to the ruling elite,”1197 was 
responsible for this reconceptualization of rulership. This emergence was 
accomplished by disassociating pedigree from worthiness and replacing it with 
competence evidenced principally by moral rectitude.1198 Moral rectitude, in turn, 
was constituted by particularly the intellectual Shi identifying themselves as 
“possessors of the Way” Dao 道, and therefore authoritative, autonomous, and 
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morally superior even over rulers.1199 Nevertheless, a key value of the Shi class 
was the imperative to political involvement and service, arising from both 
egoistic and idealistic interests, which enabled them to become “a particularly 
powerful stratum that combined spiritual and political authority to an extent 
barely known elsewhere.”1200 Notably, the intellectual Shi themselves were 
remarkably unsuccessful in actually achieving political office, although a few of 
them had influence through their students. Taken together, it was the intellectual 
Shi and the perhaps less intellectual but instead politically successful Shi whose 
clamboring with respect to rectifying the social disintegration of the Warring 
States period was codified as the so-called “Hundred Schools:”1201 these were the 
“disputers of the Dao”1202 who initiated the lineages of Chinese philosophy. Alas, 
their attempt to resolve the tension between the moral superiority and 
hierarchical servitude of the Shi by reconceptualizing the ruler-minister 
relationship as reciprocal backfired, leading to a wave of anti-ministerial and 
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anti-Shi reaction in the late Warring States period, and their subsequent 
subjugation to the rulers in the imperial regime.1203  
What rulers, ministers, and intellectuals alike, regardless of ideological 
orientation, took for granted was that “the people are the root” (Min Ben 民本) of 
society, and thus the welfare of the people is the responsibility of the ruler and 
the government exists for their sake.1204 During the Western Zhou dynasty, the 
conception of “the people” (Min 民) was of the Zhou clan,1205 which conception 
shifted during the Spring and Autumn period to include “capital dwellers” 
(Guoren 國人), or “male inhabitants of the capital, including petty nobles (shi) 
and unranked commoners.”1206 In the Warring States period, “the assertion that 
the government exists ‘for the people’ became paradigmatic”1207 due to military 
and economic concerns, as well as increased social mobility,1208 and the 
conception of “the people” expanded further to include “All under Heaven.”1209 
																																																								
1203 Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire, chap. 7. 
1204 Pines, 187–88, 204. 
1205 Pines, 189–91. 
1206 Pines, 191–97, quote on 192. 
1207 Pines, 203. 
1208 Pines, 199–201. 
1209 Pines, 203–4. 
	 477 
Nevertheless, the possibility of a participatory polity was never considered, in 
large part because of the assumed moral inferiority of commoners. While in 
principle the juxtaposition of the noble person (Junzi 君子) and the petty person 
(Xiaoren 小人) is purely moral, in practice they “also have explicit social 
connotations.”1210 The immorality of petty people, who de facto include all 
commoners, precludes them from political participation.1211 Of course, there are 
plenty of petty Shi and rulers as well, so the problem becomes ascertaining and 
addressing the best interests of all of these morally compromised people. 
It should be little surprise, then, that early Chinese philosophers would 
“focus their attention on the ideal form of political and social (familial) 
relationships on the one hand, and on the other the qualities a man should have 
to serve in those relationships; and this focus was on political and moral 
philosophy.”1212 Already a number of basic concepts common to those 
participating in this emerging philosophical project are in view: the Way, the 
Noble Person, the Petty Person, Moral Power, Humaneness, and Ritual. One 
other concept that has made an appearance, Heaven (Tian 天), would benefit 
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from further consideration before moving on to consider the various ways these 
basic concepts were conceived and related to one another by various trajectories 
of thought. Fung Yu-lan notes five meanings of Heaven in early Chinese 
writings: 1) material or physical Heaven, which together with Earth (Di 地) 
constitute the physical universe; 2) anthropomorphic ruling or presiding Heaven; 
3) fatalistic Heaven; 4) naturalistic Heaven, or nature; and 5) ethical Heaven.1213 
Heaven is ubiquitous among the trajectories of thought in the Warring States 
period as an element of their cosmologies, even as the nature of Heaven and its 
role and relationship vis-à-vis Earth and Humanity (Ren 人) were deeply 
contested.1214 One way of construing their relationship is in a correlational 
cosmology, “in which entities, processes, and classes of phenomena found in 
nature correspond to or ‘go together with’ various entities, processes, and classes 
of phenomena in the human world.”1215 A highly influential strand of sinological 
research in the West takes correlational cosmology to be “a fundamental 
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commitment of the Chinese sensibility,”1216 but more recent scholarship 
challenges and undermines this assumption.1217 Given the extent to which the 
present project relies on Western sinology, this predilection must remain 
carefully in view and avoided, particularly given the extent to which Heaven is 
involved in addressing the sociopolitical and moral concerns at the heart of 
Chinese philosophy. For example, All Under Heaven (Tianxia 天下), at this time 
meaning “the world,”1218 was instrumental in reconceptualizing “the people.” 
Heaven was also important for the project of reconceptualizing rulership, since 
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the legitimacy and authority of a ruler derived from their having received the 
Mandate of Heaven (Tianming 天命), and thus becoming a Son of Heaven 
(Tianzi 天子). What precisely the Mandate of Heaven is, though, was highly 
contested, in part based on the understanding of Heaven at play.1219 
The Analects and The Hundred Schools (Zhuzi Baijia諸子百家) 
The intellectual movement in the Warring States period is represented by 
the so-called Hundred Schools, although none of these “schools” should be 
conceived as discrete or distinct entity with anything even remotely resembling 
institutional boundaries. Rather, “all the pre-Han and early Western Han 
thinkers seem to have been, in essence, ‘eclectics’ when viewed from the much 
stricter normative models of later times.”1220 This is particularly relevant with 
regard to Xunzi, who was influenced by a number of the trajectories at play in 
his milieu, most of which were represented at the Jixia 稷下 Academy where he 
studied, taught, and led.1221 Ultimately, “ancient Chinese intellectuals–like 
political thinkers elsewhere–should be engaged on their own ground, in terms of 
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their immediate goals and the adequacy of these goals to contemporaneous 
political context.”1222 Nevertheless, the trope of the schools does help to gain 
some traction on the trajectories at play, and so is gainfully employed here 
despite its anachronism. The Records of the Scribe (Shiji 史記),1223 conceived by 
Sima Tan 司馬談 toward the end of the second century BCE and completed by 
his son, Sima Qian 司馬遷,1224 considers six schools of thought during the 
Warring States period. The Seven Epitomes (Qilue 七略) of Liu Xin 劉歆, the 
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curator of the imperial library,1225 includes four more schools. Finally, Yangism 
(Yangzhuxuepai 楊朱学派) had merged with the Daoists by the Han dynasty,1226 
when the schools were identified, and the School of the Military/Strategy (Bingjia 
兵家) was influential among leaders but was nonetheless left out.1227 
As already noted, the School of Scholars (Rujia 儒家), now often referred 
to as Confucians, is characterized by reflection on and with classical literature,1228 
idealization of the height of the Zhou dynasty vis-à-vis excellent sociopolitical 
order and stability, and emphasis on continuity between moral leadership and 
societal flourishing. As a result, thinkers in this school were concerned with 
moral self-cultivation through education and ritual in order to achieve 
humaneness and moral force, and encouraging rulers to participate in this 
program. Some scholars have suggested that their focus on moral self-cultivation 
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meant that Shi in this intellectual trajectory were not focused on government 
service or political activity,1229 but this view does not necessarily hold up under 
scrutiny.1230 Confucius himself has already been presented as responding to the 
sociopolitical situation of the Spring and Autumn period, and Mencius and 
Xunzi, the two other most influential members of this trajectory, will be engaged 
in detail below. Something should be said here, however, regarding the school of 
thinkers who followed in Confucius’ footsteps in Lu during the Warring States 
period, and are quite possibly represented in the Analects in the chapters 
preceding and following chapters four and five.1231 
According to the hypothesis of Brooks and Brooks, the oldest passages of 
Analects chapters seven through nine, written during the Warring States period 
before the time of Mencius, ca. 450 – 400 BCE, were composed under the auspices 
of Zengzi曾子 and his successor in leading the Confucian school in Lu, likely his 
eldest son.1232 Zengzi is known by tradition as “the foremost exponent of the filial 
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virtues (xiao 孝),”1233 “was known for his daily self-introspection (Analects 1.4),” 
and “highlighted the importance of being watchful when one is alone (shendu 慎
獨).”1234 Lacking any actual experience in government, he focused exclusively on 
personal ethics, but later Warring States Confucians would link the filial virtues 
to political merit.1235 The seventh chapter of the Analects, possibly compiled by 
Zengzi in order to share something with Confucius’ school about the founder he 
never knew, “is a portrait of Confucius” that “defines him in terms of the sage” 
(Sheng聖). Sage is “a word absent from earlier chapters, and makes him a 
transmitter of antiquity, not an inculcator of more recent feudal-military values,” 
marking a shift in the school from a period of direct remembrance to a period of 
mythic adaptation.1236 Whereas chapter eight represents Zengzi’s orientation 
toward personal formation, chapter nine, from the period after his death, 
demonstrates “an interest in government, perhaps reflecting an upturn in the 
school’s political fortunes.”1237 Notably, the only reference to ritual in all of the 
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Analects passages of this period is in 9:10 where it is expresses a mode of moral 
formation that “limits” (Yue 約) excessive desires, a meaning that will reemerge 
with Xunzi after a period of including luxury within propriety during the 
intervening century.1238 
Indeed, the next accretion of the Analects, including chapters ten, eleven, 
and the preposed1239 chapter three, would have reframed the entire text as a ritual 
treatise.1240 At this point, ca. 400 – 342 BCE, leadership of the school has been 
returned from the Zeng family to the Kong family, i.e. Confucius’ descendants, 
particularly Confucius’ grandson Zisi 子思, Zengzi’s student who would go on to 
teach Mencius.1241 With this change of leadership comes a change in orientation 
from focusing around the concept of humaneness (Ren 仁) to focusing around 
ritual (Li 禮/礼). Chapter ten is a primer of elite behavior for the non-elite novice, 
and so is a response to the social mobility noted above as characteristic of the 
Warring States period.1242 Chapter eleven is primarily concerned with 
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reevaluating the lineage of Confucius’ disciples according to the interests of the 
new leadership. Chapter three, which by virtue of having been preposed would 
now have been the first, expands the theory of ritual from the propriety 
described in chapter ten to also include state sacrifices.1243 Further, chapter three 
takes positions on a number of dimensions of ritual that are contested between 
other Ru trajectories. Passage 3.8 takes the position that in order for ritual to be 
effective it requires a baseline of proper emotional orientation,1244 which 
orientation further includes inner sincerity (Cheng 誠) of participation in the 
ritual as distinguished from outward belief in what the ritual purports (3.12).1245 
In passage 3.15 Confucius asks many detailed questions about the ritual practice 
in the Great Ancestral Temple as a way of politely critiquing improper practices, 
(i.e. asking rather than telling),1246 but also thereby indicating that proper 
understanding of ritual (i.e. theory) is necessary for proper ritual practice. 
Finally, the series of passages 3.18-20 testifies to the importance of poise and 
balance in the practice of ritual so that the practitioner is not obsequious (18), so 
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that relationships are properly harmonized (19), and so that desire and emotion 
are restrained from either overabundance or insufficiency (20).1247  
The subsequent accretion of chapters twelve, thirteen, and the preposed 
chapter two (326 – 317 BCE) reflects ongoing engagement with a number of other 
trajectories of thought among the Hundred Schools. Furthermore, chapter twelve 
shows significant influence from Mencius, who may have been attendant in Lu at 
the time, with such influence declining in chapter thirteen and seemingly absent 
in chapter two.1248 As a result, it is helpful to consider these intellectual 
movements before returning to the development of the Analects.  
The Mohist School (Mojia 墨家) and its text, the Mozi 墨子,1249 are named 
after the founder of the school, Mo Di (墨翟) (ca. 479 – 381 BCE), about whom 
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very little is known.1250 Whereas Confucius and the Confucians arose from the 
minor aristocracy of the Shi class, the Mohists, and perhaps even Mo Di himself, 
likely arose from a lower class of artisans into the Xie 揳 class of knights-
errant.1251 The Mohist school is characterized by ten doctrines in five pairs: The 
meritocratic emphasis is expressed in the doctrine of “elevating the worthy” 
based on competence and moral merit while “conforming upward” to the moral 
example of superiors expresses the monarchic ideal. “Inclusive care” requires a 
radical egalitarianism and benevolence toward all regardless of family, social, or 
communal affiliation, while the rooting of military aggression in selfish gain, and 
so failing to fulfill inclusive care, requires “rejecting aggression.” In order to 
preserve as many resources as possible for the exercise of care and benevolence, 
luxury goods and useless expenditures must be eliminated (“thrift in utilization), 
and this is particularly pointed toward wasteful spending on extravagant 
funerals (“thrift in funerals”). Heaven and “heaven’s intention” are understood 
rather anthropomorphically as establishing and holding people accountable for 
objective moral standards, and “elucidating ghosts” who dole out rewards and 
punishments advances moral order. Finally, and negatively, extravagant musical 
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entertainment is wasteful, and so the school advocates “rejecting music,” while 
belief in predetermined fate “interferes with the pursuit of economic wealth, a 
large population, and social order (three primary goods that the humane person 
desires for society),” so the school also advocates “rejecting fatalism.”1252 In 
establishing and defending these ten doctrines, the Mohist school deploys a 
threefold mode of argumentation: 
‘Theories must have three criteria.’ What are the three criteria? 
Master Mo Zi spoke, saying: 'There is the foundation; there is the source; there is the 
application. In what is the foundation? The foundation is in the actions of the ancient 
sage kings above. In what is the source? The source is in the truth of the evidence of the 
eyes and ears of the common people below. In what is the application? It emanates from 
government policy and is seen in the benefit to the ordinary people of the state. These are 
what are termed the “three criteria”.’1253 
Notably, the latter two criteria rest on the evaluation of the “common” or 
“ordinary” people, as opposed to elite classes, and so participating in the 
expansion of the concept of “the people,” while the first criteria rests on the 
authority of antiquity and thus participating in the defense of monarchism. 
																																																								
1252 Chris Fraser, “Mohism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
Summer, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/mohism/. To see how different 
Mohist sects interpreted each of these doctrines as expressed within the Mozi, see Graham, 
Disputers of the Tao, 36. An excellent, more extended introduction to the doctrines is available in 
Mo Di, 墨子全譯 The Mozi: A Complete Translation, xxxiv–lxvi. 
1253 Mo Di, 墨子全譯 The Mozi: A Complete Translation, 318–21. An interesting comparison is with 
the three modes of persuasion in Aristotle, On Rhetoric, I.3, 1358a37ff. 
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The overwhelming egoism read into Yangism (Yangzhuxuepai 楊朱学派) 
by its Confucian opponents likely overstates the reality of the views the school 
espoused,1254 which are more charitably articulated in the early Han dynasty text 
Huainanzi 淮南子: “Keeping your nature intact, protecting your authenticity, not 
allowing things to entangle your form: these were established by Yangzi.”1255 The 
first of these three doctrines is of great significance as it introduces the concept of 
human nature (Xing 性) into Chinese discourse.1256 Other schools, including 
Xunzi and the Confucians, would take up the idea that nature is what heaven 
endows humanity, but the distinctive Yangist interpretation is that “nothing 
seems more ‘natural’ for humans than to preserve their own lives and satisfy 
their own desires.”1257 Notably, Mencius indicated that the Yangists were 
influential in his day, although it is unlikely that this influence was broad in 
scope so much as presenting a challenge to his own way of thinking to which he 
																																																								
1254 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 54–55. 
1255 Liu An, The Huainanzi: A Guide to the Theory and Practice of Government in Early Han China, by 
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felt compelled to respond.1258 Nevertheless, the influence of the Yangist position 
would increase with its incorporation into the Daoist perspective of the Zuangzi 
莊子, which becomes more influential among the Lu Confucians in subsequent 
accretions. 
In chapters twelve, thirteen, and two of the Analects, however, the text of 
the Daoists (Daojia 道家) of greatest interest is the Daodejing 道德經1259 
traditionally attributed to Laozi老子, who is purported by tradition to have 
taught Confucius.1260 The text itself is quite ambiguous, with date, authorship, 
																																																								
1258 Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
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York, NY: Jeremy P Tarcher/Penguin, 2003). A syncretic translation is given in Laozi, The Old 
Master: A Syncretic Reading of the Laozi from the Mawangdui Text A Onward, trans. Hongkyung Kim 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2012). See also Livia Kohn and Michael 
LaFargue, Lao-Tzu and the Tao-Te-Ching: Studies in Ethics, Law, and the Human Ideal (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1998). 
1260 Confucius, The Original Analects, 97. 
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and approach to interpretation remaining contested, but nevertheless also 
addresses itself to the sociopolitical challenges of the day,1261 which is of greatest 
interest for present purposes. The primary concept in this regard is Wuwei 無爲, 
which is often translated as “non-action” but might better be translated 
“effortless action.”1262 The idea is that a ruler should not have to act with 
intention because they act according to “naturalness,” which is not here Xing but 
rather Ziran 自然, or “self so; so of its own, so of itself,”1263 and a state without 
desire. When acting according to naturalness, a ruler has moral force as an 
expression of Dao, which in turn inspires the people to act according to 
naturalness. Thus, “the problems of political decline are traced to excessive 
desire, a violation of ziran… If the ruler could rid himself of desire, 
the Laozi boldly declares, the world would be at peace of its own accord (chs. 37, 
																																																								
1261 Alan Chan, “Laozi,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring, 
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Early China (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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57).”1264 The Lu Confucians, Mencius, and Xunzi will each take up these concepts, 
and how they do so is elaborated in the discussion below, but it is important to 
keep in mind that their conception of nature not as Ziran but as Xing requires 
refinement by moral formation through learning and ritual, which is the primary 
site of contention with the Daoism of the Daodejing. 
The conception of the Legalists (Fajia 法家) as a school is the most clearly 
anachronistic Han interpolation on Warring States period thought of any of the 
schools covered thus far.1265 Legalist thinkers might be best identified as those 
who emphasized the need to establish sociopolitical order by external means, 
including rule of law and coercive measures,1266 by contrast with the Confucian 
emphasis on inner transformation by education and ritual to achieve social 
harmony. Early texts affiliated with this intellectual movement include the Book 
of Lord Shang (Shang Jun Shu 商君書)1267 by Lord Shang (Shang Yang 商鞅, aka 
																																																								
1264 Chan, “Laozi”; Xiaogan Liu, Dao Companion to Daoist Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 
48–58. 
1265 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 268. For a strong case that the terms “legalist” and “legalism” 
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‘Legalism,’” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 88–104, 
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School of Law, trans. Jan Julius Lodewijk Duyvendak (Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 1928). 
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Gongsun Yang 公孫鞅; ca. 390 – 338 BCE), the Shēnzi 申子 of Shen Buhai 申不害 
(d. 337 BCE),1268 and the Shènzi 慎子1269 of Shen Dao 慎到 (fl. ca. 300 BCE), the 
latter two having survived in minimal portions.1270 While the legalist strain of 
thought mostly comes to the fore at the end of the Warring States period, the Lu 
Confucians make their position with respect to at least its nascent emergence 
known in Analects 12.13: “The Master said, ‘When it comes to hearing civil 
litigation, I am as good as anyone else. What is necessary, though, is to bring it 
about that there is no civil litigation at all.’”1271 The Confucians thereby disparage 
legal judgment as requiring no special training, skill, or talent, and then insist 
that litigation never arises when society is governed by moral force transforming 
the people such that there are no disputes. Notably, it is two of Xunzi’s students, 
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Li Si (李斯; ca. 280 – 208 BCE)1272 and Han Fei (韓非; ca. 280 – 233 BCE),1273 who 
would codify legalism and implement its sociopolitical vision in the short-lived 
Qin (秦) dynasty (221 – 206 BCE). 
The Miscellaneous School (Zajia 雜家), “often understood as a specific 
intellectual formation with an eclectic or ‘syncretist’ outlook, may simply 
describe a category for books that did not fit anywhere else in the library.”1274 For 
example, the Annals of Lü Buwei (Lüshi Chunqiu 呂氏春秋)1275 of the late Warring 
States period is a summary of the various trajectories of thought at the time 
without attempting to integrate them, and so might better be interpreted as 
eclectic rather than syncretic.1276 Understanding this “school” as a catchall 
category in the classificatory schemes of Han dynasty imperial librarians is an 
important historical advance, but there is nevertheless a body of literature that is 
																																																								
1272 Kenneth J. Hammond, The Human Tradition in Premodern China (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly 
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NY: Columbia University Press, 1964). See also Paul R. Goldin, Dao Companion to the Philosophy of 
Han Fei (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012). 
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self-consciously syncretic in its method of drawing on multiple trajectories of 
thought from the Warring States period. This literature includes the Huainanzi1277 
of the early Han dynasty and the Shizi 尸子1278 by Shi Jiao 尸佼 (ca. 390 – ca. 330 
BCE) of the Warring States period states of Jin 晉 and Shu 蜀. The intellectual 
egalitarianism of the Shizi1279 may have inspired the functioning of the Jixia 
Academy,1280 where Xunzi studied and taught, particularly given the emergence 
of the apparently syncretic Huanglao 黃老 school of thought therefrom.1281 
Mencius (Mengzi 孟子; 372 – 289 BCE) also spent time at the Jixia 
Academy while a minister in the state of Qi 齊 (ca. 314 BCE) after studying with 
the Lu school of Confucians.1282 The text Mencius,1283 likely written either entirely 
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by Mencius himself or with some additions and editions by his immediate 
disciples,1284 is divided into seven books (I-VII), each divided into two parts (A 
and B), with numbered sections of the parts. Two doctrines emerge as both 
contested and of central importance in the Mencius: the role of heaven and 
human nature. With respect to sociopolitical order, Mencius argues that the 
mandate of heaven is expressed through the people:  
[Yao] caused [Shun] to preside over the sacrifices, and the hundred spirits enjoyed them. 
This shows that Heaven accepted him. He put him in charge of affairs, and affairs were 
well ordered, and the hundred surnames were at peace. This shows that the people 
accepted him. Heaven gave it to him; the people gave it to him. This is why I said that 
'the Son of Heaven cannot give the realm to someone.' … The 'Great Declaration' says, 
‘Heaven sees as my people see, Heaven hears as my people hear.’ This is what was 
meant.1285 
The result is that while Confucius sought sociopolitical stability through 
government by ritual, Mencius expects rulers to bring about political and 
economic reforms in order to win over the people who express heaven’s 
mandate.1286 Furthermore, Mencius enters the debate, ongoing among Confucians 
at the time, regarding the nature that heaven endows humanity, and makes the 
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case for the ultimate goodness of human nature. His argument begins by noting 
the innate, natural inclination to do good for the sake of good, and not for any 
personal benefit, as illustrated in the parable of the child falling into the well:  
Now, if anyone were suddenly to see a child about to fall into a well, his mind would be 
filled with alarm , distress, pity, and compassion. That he would react accordingly is not 
because he would hope to use the opportunity to ingratiate himself with the child's 
parents, nor because he would seek commendation from neighbors and friends, nor 
because he would hate the adverse reputation [that could come from not reacting 
accordingly}. From this it may be seen that one who lacks a mind that feels pity and 
compassion would not be human; one who lacks a mind that feels shame and aversion 
would not be human; one who lacks a mind that feels modesty and compliance would 
not be human; and one who lacks a mind that knows right and wrong would not be 
human.1287 
It is from these feelings that Mencius derives the four cardinal virtues: 
humaneness (Ren仁), rightness (Yi義), propriety (Li禮), and wisdom (Zhi智
).1288 Notably, ritual propriety has been converted from outward activity to inner 
virtue. Mencius’ argument for the goodness of human nature continues with the 
claim that the nature of a thing is what the thing would be without injury, 
disruption, or malnourishment: “One's natural tendencies enable one to do good; 
this is what I mean by human nature being good. When one does what is not 
good, it is not the fault of one's native capacities.”1289 Instead, Mencius concludes, 
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doing what is not good is a result of letting lesser natural desires, associated with 
the senses, overcome pursuit of greater natural desire for the good, associated 
with the thinking heart: “One who nurtures the smaller part of oneself becomes a 
small person, white one who nurtures the greater part of oneself becomes a great 
person.”1290 As will be demonstrated, these doctrines of heaven and human 
nature, along with the concept of ritual, undergo a complete reconceptualization 
by Xunzi. 
Returning to the Analects, by the time of the accretion of chapters twelve, 
thirteen, and two in 326 – 317 BCE, according to the hypothesis of Brooks and 
Brooks, the Lu school of Confucians has transitioned from the leadership of Zisi 
through that of Zishang子上 and Zijia 子家 to that of Zijing 子京.1291 The school is 
responding in these chapters to themes important to the Mohists, Daoists, and 
Legalists, and at least chapter twelve seems to be influenced by Mencius.1292 
“[Daoist] ideas tend to be sources of Analects doctrine, whereas Legalist ones 
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1292 Confucius, 89. 
	 500 
cause reactions and reformulations.”1293 Analects 12.22 is particularly notable for 
its relationship to Mohist and Mencian doctrines:  
Fan Chi asked about Goodness.  
The Master replied, “Care for others.” 
He then asked about wisdom. 
The master replied, “Know others.” 
Fan Chi still did not understand, so the Master elaborated: “Raise up the straight and 
apply them to the crooked, and the crooked will be made straight.” 
Fan Chi retired from the Master’s presence. Seeing Zixia, he said, “Just before I asked the 
Master about wisdom, and he replied, ‘Raise up the straight and apply them to the 
crooked, and the crooked will be made straight.’ What did he mean by that?” 
Zixia answered, “What a wealth of instruction you have received! When Shun ruled the 
world, he selected from amongst the multitude, raising up Gao Yao, and those where 
were not Good then kept their distance. When Tang ruled the world, he selected from 
amongst the multitude, raising up Yi Yin, and those who were not Good then kept their 
distance.”1294 
Both the meritocratic motif of elevating the worthy and the redefinition of the 
Confucian concept of humaneness in terms care or love (Ai 愛) betray a Mohist 
influence.1295 The care for others here also reflects Mencius in Mencius 1B1: “If 
Your Majesty simply will share your enjoyment with the people, you shall be a 
true king.”1296 This model of leadership contrasts with the model espoused earlier 
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in 12.10-16 of the more authoritarian, albeit benevolent, transforming sage, which 
accords with the concept of rule by moral force espoused in the Daodejing.1297 
The next accretion, of chapters fourteen and fifteen in ca. 310 – 305 BCE, 
engages with more of the trajectories among the Hundred Schools, which are in 
turn profitably engaged here. 
On one hand, Yinyang (Yinyangjia 陰陽家) is less a philosophical school 
than a scientific cosmology1298 that explores the emergence of reality from 
complementary interactions among contrary forces,1299 giving rise to the 
phenomenal processes of the Five Phases (Wuxing 五行),1300 which are the bases 
for the Daoist alchemical and magical traditions, Feng Shui 風水, and traditional 
Chinese medicine.1301 On the other hand, Yinyang is more of a school than many 
of the others as it has a focal figure in the person of Zou Yan 鄒衍 (ca. 305 – 240 
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1299 Robin R. Wang, Yinyang: The Way of Heaven and Earth in Chinese Thought and Culture 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–40; Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 330–40; 
Xunzi, Xunzi: Translation and Study, I: 221. 
1300 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 340–56. 
1301 Wang, Yinyang. 
	 502 
BCE),1302 who integrated the Yinyang metaphysical theory with the Five Phases 
cosmological theory1303 and whose time at the Jixia Academy would have 
overlapped that of Xunzi.1304 In fact, it may very well have been Zou Yan who 
Xunzi had in mind when he criticized Zisi and Mencius for contaminating true 
Confucian doctrine with the Five Phases cosmology, which they did not actually 
do, and which accusation resulted in Xunzi being labeled a heretic in later 
eras.1305 Apparently, he had cause to be alarmed as Zou Yan was ascendant in a 
number of Warring States courts, including Wei 魏, Zhao 趙, and Yan 燕,1306 as a 
result of the attractiveness of his claim that dynasties rise and fall according the 
order of the Five Phases,1307 and some of Xunzi’s own students may have adopted 
this cosmological theory.1308 When further integrated with the divinization 
scheme of the Book of Changes, the Yinyang and Five Phases theories would 
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constitute China’s correlative cosmology,1309 which has been taken by some 
sinologists as constitutive of Chinese thought generally.1310 While the importance 
of correlative cosmology in Chinese culture should not be downplayed, this 
latter claim is quite dubious on both historical and hermeneutical grounds.1311 
The School of the Military, or of Military Strategy, (Bingjia 兵家), was a 
school of practical philosophy that was well received in many of the Warring 
States courts for its promised advantages in military campaigning, and so was a 
strong competitor to the other schools for influence.1312 The most recognized 
progenitor of the school is Sunzi 孫子, who purportedly lived during the late 
Spring and Autumn period (ca. 544 – 496 BCE) and authored The Art of War 
(Sunzi Bingfa 孫子兵法), which was actually compiled in the Warring States 
period.1313 Sun Bin 孫臏 did live during the Warring States period, may have been 
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Sunzi’s descendent, and compiled his own Art of Warfare (Sunbin Bingfa 孫臏兵
法), which has only recently been rediscovered.1314 While focusing on military 
planning, strategy, and tactics, these texts also consider the economics of warfare, 
qualities of leadership among generals and rulers, and the sociopolitical 
functioning of states that are successful in military campaigning. Notably, the Lu 
Confucians agreed with the militarists that victories should be sought that 
minimize losses. Sunzi argues,  
Therefore, he who is skilled at waging war causes his opponent's soldiers to submit 
without having to fight a battle, causes his opponent's cities to fall without having to 
attack them, and destroys his opponent's kingdom without having to engage in 
prolonged war. Instead, with a comprehensive strategy, he contends before all under 
heaven. Therefore, his soldiers are not worn down, yet his advantages are preserved 
intact. This is the method of attack by stratagem.1315 
Similarly, the Lu Confucians argue for careful planning in Analects 7.11, which is 
likely interposed from the time of Analects 14 in ca. 310 BCE:1316 
Zilu interposed, “If you, Master, were to lead the three armies into battle, who would 
you want by your side? 
The Master replied, “I would not want by my side the kind of person who would attack a 
tiger barehanded or attempt to swim the Yellow River, because he was willing to ‘die 
without regret.’ Surely I would want someone who approached such undertakings with 
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a proper sense of trepidation, and who came to a decision only after having thoroughly 
considered the matter.”1317 
However, only a few years later in Analects 15.1 the Lu Confucians repudiate any 
governmental concern with warfare: 
Duke Ling of Wei asked Confucius about military formations (chen 陳). 
Confucius replied, “I know something about the arrangement of ceremonial stands and 
dishes for ritual offerings, but I have never learned about the arrangement of battalions 
and divisions.” 
He left the next day.1318 
Rather than rejecting warfare outright, Xunzi synthesizes ritual with the 
militarists’ emphasis on planning and restraint. Knoblock summarizes the 
argument of Xunzi 15.4-5:  
In antiquity, the armies of the sage kings, which depended on ritual and moral principles 
to instruct the people and to transform them, were able to make a common effort and 
moved as though with one mind. Thus, their armies were never tested. There were 
punitive expeditions to chastise but no warfare. Thus, wherever the influence of a sage 
king penetrates or knowledge of him reaches, everyone follows him and submits to him, 
stumbling and falling over each other in their rush to be near him.1319 
As will be explained, this difference with the Lu Confucians will be no small 
matter in interpreting Xunzi. 
One of Sunzi’s principles of warfare was that armed combat should be 
reserved as a last resort, achieving the subjugation of other states through 
																																																								
1317 Confucius, Analects, 67. 
1318 Confucius, 174. 
1319 Xunzi, Xunzi: Translation and Study, 218. 
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diplomatic coercion whenever possible,1320 which gave rise to another practical 
philosophy: the school of Diplomats (Zonghengjia 縱橫家). These two schools 
shared a common lineage in the figure Guigu Xiansheng 鬼谷先生, who was 
likely mythical, and was purported to have taught Sun Bin1321 as well as the 
principle advocates of both the Vertical and Horizontal Alliances, Su Qin 蘇秦 (d. 
284 BCE) and Zhang Yi 張儀 (d. 309 BCE), respectively.1322 Guigu was also the 
ostensible author of the Guiguzi 鬼谷子, which concerned itself “with the subject 
of persuasion: how to make someone do what you want them to do while they 
presume they are acting on their own behalf.”1323 The persuasive diplomatic 
accomplishments of both Su Qin and Zhang Yi, along with a number of other 
members of the rhetorically oriented School of Diplomacy, are recounted in the 
Strategies of the Warring States (Zhanguo Ce 戰國策).1324 Notably, according to the 
text, “Su Qin concerns himself with nothing but personal welfare. The authors 
praise this self-interest: this is the way of the world, they say; even family values 
																																																								
1320 Sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, 154–55. 
1321 Sun Bin, Sun Bin, 6. 
1322 Michael Robert Broschat, “Guiguzi: A Textual Study and Translation” (PhD diss, University 
of Washington, 1985), 1, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/15506. 
1323 Broschat, 2. 
1324 James I. Crump, trans., Chan-Kuo Tsʻe (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1970). 
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pale in comparison with career considerations, and the aim of a shi is to attain 
glory and riches.”1325 Xunzi considered both Su Qin and Zhang Yi to have been 
“sham ministers.”1326  
Precious little historical detail exists regarding the school of the 
Agronomists (Nongjia 農家), although Xu Xing 許行, the central figure of the 
school, and his disciples settled in the minor state of Teng 滕 around 315 BCE.1327 
The school took as its progenitor the legendary inventor of agriculture and 
ancient sage king, “the Divine Farmer” Shennong 神農, who ostensibly ruled 
without rewards or punishments and farmed alongside the people.1328 The 
political philosophy of the school is summarized in the Mencius: “The exemplary 
man works alongside the people and eats what they eat. He prepares his own 
meals, morning and evening, while at the same time he governs.”1329 At the same 
time, “the Utopia of Shen-nung appears to be an anarchistic order based on 
mutual trust in small communities, and one may well ask what function is left 
																																																								
1325 Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire, 144. 
1326 Xunzi, Xunzi: Translation and Study, 13.1, 198; 193–94. 
1327 Angus Charles Graham, “The ‘Nung-Chia’ 農 家 ‘School of the Tillers’ and the Origins of 
Peasant Utopianism in China,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London 42, no. 1 (January 1, 1979): 66–100, http://www.jstor.org/stable/614828. 
1328 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 64–70. 
1329 Mencius, Mencius, 3A4, 54–55. 
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for an Emperor and nobles who work with their own hands for a living, and do 
not command, make laws, reward or punish, [or] go to war.”1330 Whereas 
Mencius cited the Agronomist philosophy in order to dispute it, Analects 14.5 is 
more appreciative thereof: 
Nangong Kuo said to Confucius, “Yi was a skillful archer, and Ao was a powerful naval 
commander, and yet neither of them met a natural death. Yu and Hou Ji, on the other 
hand, did nothing but personally tend to the land, and yet they both ended up with 
possession of the world.” 
The Master did not answer. 
After Nangong Kuo left, the Master sighed, “What a gentlemanly person that man is! 
How he reveres Virtue!”1331 
However, by Analects 18:6 the Lu Confucians are less sanguine about the 
Agronomist movement.1332 Xunzi only ever cryptically alludes to the Agronomist 
school, but is overall sympathetic to their goals of rule by moral force without the 
need for rewards and punishments while preferring the Confucian method of 
moral cultivation by ritual and education.1333  
Again with respect to the School of Names (Mingjia 名家), the Han 
classification scheme vastly overstates the coherence among Warring States 
																																																								
1330 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 69. 
1331 Confucius, Analects, 14.5, 155. 
1332 Confucius, 216–17; Confucius, The Original Analects, 174. 
1333 Xunzi, Xunzi: Translation and Study, II: 9; I: 171-72; 3.14, 180-81. 
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period thinkers interested in language, logic, dialectics, and disputation,1334 even 
as these themes and methods were pervasive throughout the period.1335 In 
addition to the figures identified in the Shiji, particularly Deng Xi 鄧析 (d. 501 
BCE), Yin Wen 尹文 (ca. 360 – 280 BCE), Hui Shi 惠施 (ca. 380 – 305 BCE), and 
Gongsun Long 公孫龍 (ca. 325 – 250 BCE), the later Mohists are often considered 
under the rubric of the school even though they were critical of positions taken 
by their predecessors.1336 The rhetorical form of the school, the persuasion (Shuo 
說), disputation, or discrimination (Bian 辯) was “primarily a type of analogical 
argumentation,” which, “like much legal rhetoric, often took the form of citing a 
precedent, analogy, or model (fa, also ‘law’) and explaining why the case at hand 
should be treated similarly or not.”1337 The ideas of the school regarding language 
and logic were addressed above in Chapter Two on “Language and Logic in 
China,” and will be addressed again below as they intersect with Xunzi in the 
program of Rectifying Names as it relates to ritual. For the moment, it is notable 
																																																								
1334 Chris Fraser, “School of Names,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, Winter, 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/school-names/. 
1335 Bao Zhiming, “Language and World View in Ancient China,” Philosophy East and West 40, no. 
2 (April 1, 1990): 195–219, https://doi.org/10.2307/1399228. 
1336 Fraser, “School of Names.” 
1337 Fraser. See also the supplement “Disputation in Context.” 
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that the Lu Confucians were ambivalent regarding the whole project of 
examining language. In Analects 15.41 the community seeks to delimit the 
conversation regarding language to pragmatics: “The Master said, ‘Words 
should convey their point, and leave it at that.’”1338 By the time of Analects 13.3, 
however, which Brooks and Brooks date to ca. 253 BCE, the Rectifying Names 
program is given first priority: 
If names are not rectified, speech will not accord with reality; where speech does not 
accord with reality, things will not be successfully accomplished. When things are not 
successfully accomplished, ritual practice and music will fail to flourish; when ritual and 
music fail to flourish, punishments and penalties will miss the mark. And when 
punishments and penalties miss the mark, the common people will be at a loss as to what 
to do with themselves. This is why the gentleman only applies names that can be 
properly spoken and assures that what he says can be properly put into action. The 
gentleman simply guards against arbitrariness in his speech. That is all there is to it.1339 
While Xunzi pursued the Rectifying Names project, and developed it into a 
sophisticated theory of language, he was outright condemnatory toward the 
disputers of his day who were merely “showing off their rhetorical skills.”1340 
Two accretions within the Analects accrue during the first half of the third 
century, the first of chapters one and sixteen in ca. 294 – 285 BCE and the second 
																																																								
1338 Confucius, Analects, 189; Confucius, The Original Analects, 135. 
1339 Confucius, Analects, 139; Confucius, The Original Analects, 190; John Makeham, Name and 
Actuality in Early Chinese Thought (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 35–50. 
1340 Xunzi, Xunzi: Translation and Study, 160. 
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of chapters seventeen and eighteen in ca. 270 – 262 BCE. Under the leadership of 
Zigao 子髙, the school was suffering under a protracted loss of court influence 
and so made an ideological shift to emphasize a citizen ethic apart from state 
service as evidenced in chapter one.1341 Chapter sixteen sees a return to contact 
with the Lu court with an attendant shift among interlocutors as the Mohists 
have declined in influence and the Daoists ascended.1342 Chapter seventeen 
reflects concerns in the school, now led by Zishen 子慎, about responding to an 
invitation to return to state service in Lu in spite of the fact that the new prince 
was effectively a vassel puppet of the state of Chu 楚, and returns to the topic of 
human nature.1343 Chapter eighteen returns to the dilemma of service to an 
illegitimate ruler, but changes positions such that what is decisive is no longer 
the credentials of the ruler but rather the needs of the state and society.1344 This 
move is representative of the shift in the Warring States period, noted above, 
from insisting that the ruler be a moral paragon to finding ways of limiting the 
																																																								
1341 Confucius, The Original Analects, 145. 
1342 Confucius, 159. 
1343 Confucius, 161, 171. 
1344 Confucius, 173. 
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involvement and influence of the ruler in policymaking while retaining the 
symbolic role of the position. 
The Zhuangzi 莊子,1345 usually lumped together in the Daoist school with 
the Daodejing but actually quite distinct therefrom,1346 was at least in part written 
by Zhuang Zhou 莊周 during the third century BCE, and consists of 33 chapters 
in three sections: the “inner chapters” (1-7), the “outer chapters” (8-22), and the 
“miscellaneous chapters” (23-33).1347 Whereas the Daodejing advocated a method 
for political leadership, the Zhuangzi rejects the very possibility of political 
involvement, instead incorporating the Yangist retreat from public life and 
personal self-cultivation as a spiritual program. “The Way (dao 道) that Zhuangzi 
advocates is one in which we each cultivate our own particular natural Potency 
(de 德) to attain a spontaneity that is so responsive to the way the world is, and to 
the circumstances in which we are surrounded, that we attain the heights of a 
																																																								
1345 There are four notable scholarly translations of the Zhuangzi into English: Zhuangzi, The 
Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, trans. Burton Watson (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1968); Zhuangzi, Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters, trans. Angus Charles Graham (Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett, 1981); Zhuangzi, Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu, 
trans. Victor H. Mair (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1998); Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi. 
1346 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 170. 
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sagely practical wisdom and achieve emotional tranquility.”1348 Brooks and 
Brooks demonstrate evidence of a conversation between the Lu Confucians and 
the community that compiled the Zhuangzi contained in Analects 18.5-7 and 
Zhuangzi 4.1-7.1349 Xunzi also draws on and responds to ideas from the Zhuangzi 
that were lively in the intellectual circles of his day.1350 
The final two chapters of the Analects, from ca. 253 – 249 BCE, find 
themselves in direct engagement with the protagonist of the present project: 
Xunzi, and so their consideration is postponed for his. 
Xunzi 
Biography, Text, and Translation 
In spite of claims to the contrary,1351 there is quite a bit to be known 
biographically about Xunzi 荀子 given he lived well over 2000 years ago. Born in 
approximately 310 BCE in the state of Zhao 趙, Xunzi was named Xun Kuang 荀
況 but known as Xun Qing 荀卿, or “Minister Xun,” for the office he held later in 
																																																								
1348 Liu, 159. 
1349 Confucius, The Original Analects, 258, 174–75. 
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life as Magistrate of Lanling (蘭陵令).1352 At the age of fifteen he traveled to Qi 齊 
to study at the Jixia 稷下 Academy where he mastered the doctrines of many of 
the schools of thought of the time along with their forms of argumentation and 
rhetorical techniques.1353 Having failed to persuade Tian Wen 田文, Lord of 
Mengchang (孟嘗君) and prime minister of Qi, to follow his prescriptions for 
governance, and then watching as Qi collapsed, Xunzi fled to Chu 楚 in 284-283 
BCE where he became acquainted with the doctrines of the Mohists.1354 After a 
period of instability in Chu and the establishment of King Xiang 襄王 in Qi, he 
returned to Qi in 276-274 BCE where he was invited on three separate occasions 
to serve as libationer and make the sacrifice of wine at the Jixia Academy, 
thereby establishing him as the preeminent scholar.1355 Following an episode of 
slander, he left for Qin 秦 in approximately 265 BCE1356 but then returned to his 
home state of Zhao in approximately 260 BCE.1357 In 255 BCE Xunzi received his 
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1355 Xunzi, I: 8-11. Brooks and Brooks date these years as 257-255 BCE: Confucius, The Original 
Analects, 185. 
1356 Xunzi, Xunzi: Translation and Study, I: 16. 
1357 Xunzi, I: 24. 
	 515 
only ministerial appointment, and thus “his first and only opportunity to 
implement his policies,” when he was made Magistrate of Lanling in Lu by 
Huang Xie 黃歇, Lord of Chunshen (Chunshen Jun 春申君) and prime minister of 
Chu.1358 Notably, this would have brought him into the orbit of the Lu 
Confucians, who may have taken him as an “intellectual nemesis.”1359 Alas, 
sometime between 246 BCE and 240 BCE, a retainer convinced Chunshen that 
Xunzi was a threat because his own worthiness positioned him to conquer the 
world, even from a relatively minor fief.1360 When Xunzi departed for Zhao, 
where he was made a senior minister, Chunshen recalled Xunzi in 240 BCE, who 
initially refused, but after relenting, he served again as Magistrate until 
Chunshen was assassinated in 238 BCE and he was again dismissed.1361 Retired 
in Lanling, Xunzi lived out his days as the Qin consolidated all of China into the 
first imperial dynasty (221-207 BCE), dying at the age of ninety to one hundred 
years in 220-210 BCE.1362 
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While the purposes of this chapter do not include a text-critical analysis of 
the text of the Xunzi, it is nevertheless helpful to know something of their 
reception1363 and to consider briefly issues of translation. Liu Xiang 劉向 (77-6 
BCE) collected, edited, and collated Xunzi’s works during the Han dynasty (206 
BCE – 220 CE); Xunzi himself did not write all of the books contained therein as 
singular works.1364 In the late Tang dynasty (618-907 CE), the scholar Yang Liang 
楊諒 wrote the first commentary on the Xunzi and reordered some of the books, 
establishing the standard format.1365 Knoblock takes a strong view of the 
authenticity of the work thus passed down: 
We may conclude that the works transmitted by Liu Xiang and Yang Liang are in general 
the authentic works of Xunzi. Except for interpolations identified in the notes, the text is 
exceptionally reliable and may be used with confidence.1366 
Notably, the purposes of this chapter do not require such a strong view, relying 
instead on the text as it has been received and interpreted in more recent 
scholarship. 
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Issues of translation, however, are significantly more salient to present 
purposes. There are four substantive English translations of Xunzi into English. 
The first is by Homer H. Dubs in 1928,1367 and the second by Burton Watson in 
1963,1368 but both translated only select chapters that they deemed the most 
important. The first complete translation of the Xunzi by John Knoblock was 
published in three volumes from 1988 to 1994, includes extensive introduction 
and commentary, and remains the definitive scholarly translation.1369 All 
quotations of Xunzi in what follows will be taken from this translation and cited 
first with book and section separated by a period and then with volume and 
page numbers separated by a colon in parentheses, while quotations from the 
commentary will simply be cited with volume and page numbers. In 2014, Eric L. 
Hutton published a complete translation in a single volume, although it is 
intended more for teaching than scholarship.1370 Nevertheless, as we will see, all 
of these translations assume a realist interpretation of Xunzi and his project, 
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which means they can be called into question when a constructivist 
interpretation is offered.1371 In this way, the secondary literature returns full circle 
to the interpretive frameworks behind the translations of the primary text. 
Distinctive Doctrines 
Consideration of three doctrines, which Xunzi develops in distinctive 
ways, and their interrelationships, is important for gaining traction on his own 
responses to the problematic of the Warring States period. 
Xunzi is probably best known in the history of Chinese thought for being 
a “heretical” Confucian due to his doctrine of Human Nature (Xing 性) as E 恶, 
which is usually translated “evil,” in contrast to the supposedly orthodox 
Mencius who argued that it is good, as noted above.1372 As has been noted by 
many modern scholars, however, Mencius and Xunzi employed different 
operational definitions of “nature,” which Mencius takes to include human 
agency and artifice (Wei 偽), and thus the basic moral impulse to do good. Xunzi, 
																																																								
1371 Hagen, The Philosophy of Xunzi. 
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by contrast, distinguishes nature and artifice such that any moral formation at all 
falls under the category of artifice,1373 while human nature “embraces what is 
spontaneous from Nature, what cannot be learned, and what requires no 
application to master.”1374 Furthermore, this nature is made up of various 
competing desires, the senses for discriminating their satisfactory fulfillment, 
and the drive to in fact fulfill them.1375 Attempting to fulfill all of these desires to 
their ultimate extent simultaneously leads to chaos and conflict such that none of 
them may in fact be fulfilled, and so education and ritual are needed to limit and 
harmonize the desires for their maximal satisfaction.1376 Following this analysis, 
the translation of Xunzi to say that human nature is “evil” may be rejected in 
favor of a more nuanced translation that human nature is “crude,” in the sense 
that it requires refinement by education and ritual just as a block of stone 
requires refinement by a sculptor to turn it into a piece of art.1377 What the 
conception of crudeness fails to capture, however, is what Xunzi took to be the 
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inevitably disastrous outcomes of failing to refine human nature through 
education and ritual, which is a situation entirely unlike the decision of a 
sculptor to simply leave the stone be. Thus, perhaps the best way of 
understanding human nature for Xunzi is to say that human nature is 
ominous.1378 
Unlike human nature, Heaven (Tian 天) is decidedly not ominous for 
Xunzi, even though it is responsible for imparting the ominous nature to 
humanity, although neither could it be considered propitious.1379 Rather, heaven 
is the sum total of the constant processes that direct the world, and Xunzi 
frequently uses Tian 天 to refer to Tiandi 天地, or heaven and earth, wherein 
earth is the material of the world that heaven directs.1380 While it is true that it is 
impossible to understand how Xunzi conceived heaven apart from the analogy 
to the relationship between a ruler and the people,1381 heaven was nevertheless 
depersonalized and naturalized in his thought such that it should not be 
expected to respond to ritual invocation or seen as responsible for signs and 
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omens.1382 Nevertheless, humanity does interact with both heaven and earth in 
order to order them, as described in the concept of the Trinity of heaven, earth, 
and humanity: “Heaven and Earth give birth to the gentleman, and the 
gentleman provides the organizing principle for Heaven and Earth. The 
gentleman is the triadic partner of Heaven and Earth, the summation of the 
myriad of things, and the father and mother of the people.”1383 Furthermore, 
heaven serves as something of a metaphysical or cosmological principle, 
although a minimally elaborated one,1384 and the trinity of heaven, earth, and 
humanity serves as something of a rejoinder to the Yin-Yang and Five Phases 
cosmology described above.1385 Finally, the conception of heaven promulgated by 
Xunzi is remarkable for its consonance with the Daodejing and Zhuangzi with 
respect to its constancy, such that “the principles, the Way, controlling it are 
invariable, that its patterns are regular, and that, when the Triad of Heaven, 
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Earth, and Man is complete, its order is systematic and hierarchical.”1386 In so 
doing, Xunzi is rejecting the central Mohist doctrine of heaven’s intention 
described above.1387 
Consideration of human nature and heaven enables an initial statement of 
how Xunzi conceived Ritual Propriety (Li 禮/礼) to be elaborated further in the 
course of the remainder of this section. The translation of Li 禮 as “ritual 
propriety” or “ritual” is not uncontested, as the term has been translated “rites,” 
“customs,” “etiquette,” “propriety,” “morals,” “rules of proper behavior,” and 
“worship,” among others.1388 Indeed, the conception of Li 禮 includes at least all 
of these translations, and the concept evolved from referring primarily to 
religious rites, to all social habits and customs, to any right and reasonable 
rule.1389 The translation “ritual” is employed here for the sake of its prevalence in 
the literature and the bridge it provides with Western ritual theory.  
For Xunzi, ritual encompasses “the highest sense of morality, duty, and 
social order as well as the most minor rules of good manners, the minutiae of 
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polite forms, and insignificant, it seems to us, details of costume and dress.”1390 
As noted above, ritual is crucial for forming and shaping human nature from 
crudeness to refinement and to avoid its otherwise ominous tendencies by 
restraining unbounded desire:  
How did ritual principles arise? I say that men are born with desires which, if not 
satisfied, cannot but lead met to seek to satisfy them. If in seeking to satisfy their desires 
men observe no measure and apportion things without limits, then it would be 
impossible for them not to contend over the means to satisfy their desires. Such 
contention leads to disorder. Disorder leads to poverty. The Ancient Kings abhorred such 
disorder; so they established the regulations contained within ritual and moral principles 
in order to apportion things, to nurture the desires of men, and to supply the means for 
their satisfaction. They so fashioned their regulations that desires should not want for the 
things which satisfy them and goods would not be exhausted by the desires. In this way 
the two of them, desires and goods, sustained each other over the course of time. This is 
the origin of ritual principles. 
Thus, the meaning of ritual is to nurture.1391 
The role of ritual in restraining unbounded desire makes it the basis of social 
ethics by providing “the rules that lead to the general welfare of society by 
promoting conservation, attendance to the needs of others, and care for the 
comfort and well-being of others.”1392 Furthermore, ritual is the ideal means of 
governing, such that the ruler will embody ritual principles and thereby 
influence the people through the resulting moral force to follow ritual principles 
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and thus achieve a harmonious society.1393 Indeed, government by ritual is the 
human contribution to the trinity of heaven, earth, and humanity: “Heaven has 
its seasons; Earth its resources; and Man his government.”1394 Notably, however, 
Xunzi is a political realist who recognizes the unlikelihood of rulers so fully 
embodying ritual, so he encourages less able rulers to hand the reins of power to 
more able ministers to manage in accordance with ritual.1395 
Xunzi, the Analects, and “Confucianism” 
Gaining traction on the distinctive contributions of Xunzi both generally 
and regarding ritual particularly requires interrogating the relationship between 
Xunzi and the Analects community, and what this might mean for interpreting 
Xunzi as a “Confucian.” Xunzi was deeply antagonistic toward the Lu 
Confucians who complied the Analects, including calling out three people by 
name affiliated with the Lu school as “base Ru,”1396 and perhaps directly 
insulting Zisi and Mencius for adopting the Five Phases theory.1397 E. Bruce and 
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A. Takeo Brooks describe Xunzi as the “intellectual nemesis of Lu,”1398 and find 
evidence in chapters seventeen, nineteen, and twenty of the Analects that the 
antagonism was reciprocated. Particularly, they argue that Xunzi vilifying the 
three Lu affiliates is a direct response to his views being caricatured in their 
names in Analects nineteen.1399  
This antagonism is present in the conception of ritual in the Analects and 
the Xunzi, although marked agreement on ritual is present as well. As has 
already been noted, the only reference to ritual in the chapter of the Analects 
directly attributable to Confucius is in 4.13, and then only ambivalently. In the 
context of the rest of the chapter, as Brooks and Brooks note, the ambivalence of 
this passage demonstrates that humaneness (Ren 仁) “is central to Confucius,” 
whereas ritual (Li 禮/礼) “is central to Confucianism.”1400 Indeed, by roughly three 
generations after Confucius’ death he is portrayed as deeply concerned with the 
performance details, or mostly the lack of proper attention thereto, of both court 
and family rites and ceremonies, as well as interpersonal relations, beginning in 
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Analects 9.3 and especially in chapters ten and three.1401 Notably, this focus on the 
details of ritual performance does not seem to rely on an underlying ritual theory 
as would be developed in the third century BCE by Xunzi and in the texts that 
would become the Rites classic.1402 The reason for this may be that Confucius 
himself did not need for ritual to fix an utterly broken sociopolitical order, but 
rather only to shore up waning leadership. Furthermore, Confucius did not have 
the sophisticated theories of governance to contend with that would emerge after 
him during the Warring States period, which would stimulate the kind of 
sophisticated ritual theory that later Confucians would develop. Unfortunately, 
the vast majority of the literature on the Analects in English both reads back the 
later ritual theories onto what is said about ritual in the Analects and assumes 
that all of the ideas in the Analects can more or less be associated with Confucius 
himself.1403 The result of these paired conflations is a massive overstatement of 
the coherence and consistency of Confucian thought during the Warring States 
period. 
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One place where the Analects community and Xunzi do agree is the role of 
ritual in restraining human tendencies. For Xunzi, as has been described, ritual is 
a key doctrine for restraining the otherwise ominous human nature. The Analects 
community, at least at this stage, does not have a doctrine of human nature, but 
instead conceives the work of ritual in terms of establishing Limits (Yue約).1404 In 
Analects 6.27, which is still early in the tradition, ritual limits conduct: “Someone 
who is broadly learned with regard to culture, and whose conduct is restrained 
by the rites, can be counted upon to not go astray.”1405 Later, in Analects 9.11, the 
limit shifts from conduct to the self, although without a doctrine of human 
nature, it is hard to draw an overly sharp distinction between the two concepts: 
“The Master is skilled at gradually leading me on, step by step. He broadens me 
with culture and restrains me with the rites, so that even if I wanted to give up I 
could not.”1406 The implication here is that self-transformation cannot be achieved 
alone but requires a skilled teacher.  
By the time of the accretion of chapter twelve ca. 360 BCE, a more complex 
relationship among humaneness (translated “goodness” by Slingerland), ritual, 
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and the self emerges in Analects 12.1: “Restraining yourself and returning to the 
rites constitutes Goodness. If for one day you managed to restrain yourself and 
return to the rites, in this way you could lead the entire world back to Goodness. 
The key to achieving Goodness lies within yourself – how could it come from 
others?”1407 Brooks and Brooks explain the relationship between humaneness and 
ritual in this passage: “It says that (1) [humaneness] is something to which one 
‘goes’ (it is voluntary) after overcoming the self (it is not innate); (2) it is 
conformity to [ritual] ‘propriety’ and has no content apart from [ritual]; and (3) 
as in 3:9, it is a virtue not of the minister but of the ruler, and through him 
afffects the whole populace.” They further note that at this stage in the Lu 
community ritual is the “ideal human and social condition.”1408 Note that the 
need for restraint of the self to achieve humaneness, which means that it is not 
innate, points more toward the ominous human nature of Xunzi than the 
predilection toward humaneness of Mencius, even as the location of the key to 
achieving humaneness within the self leans back toward Mencius. The theory of 
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human nature developed later in Analects 17, particularly 17.2, is decidedly more 
Xunzian.1409  
In spite of their shared conception of an intimate relationship between 
ritual and restraint, however, the Analects community and Xunzi diverge on how 
that restraint actually works. The Analects describes overcoming the self in order 
to return to ritual, which they may have adopted from the thinkers affiliated 
with the Daodejing in Lu,1410 whereas for Xunzi it is by embodying ritual that the 
self (i.e. ominous human nature) is overcome: “the meaning of ritual is to 
nurture.”1411 This divergence has a further implication in their respective 
understandings of sincerity (Cheng 誠). For the Analects community, sincerity 
“denotes a praiseworthy and admirable quality or attribute in a statement or 
person… It characterizes people or things as themselves and differentiates them 
from other beings.”1412 For example, in Analects 13.11 Cheng 誠 is translated 
“true:” “’If excellent people managed the state for a hundred years, then 
certainly they could overcome cruelty and do away with executions’ – how true 
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this saying is!”1413 In this sense, sincerity means realness or reality (Shi 實),1414 
which correlates to the achievement of humaneness through restraint of self. 
For Xunzi, achievement of humaneness results from human nature 
proceeding through a parallel process of transformation by education and 
change by ritual:1415 “It is through ritual that the individual is rectified. It is by 
means of a teacher that ritual is rectified. If there were no ritual, how could the 
individual be rectified? If there were no teachers, how could you know which 
ritual is correct?”1416 As already noted, the purpose of ritual for Xunzi is to 
nurture, and one of the things ritual nurtures is sincerity, which in turn 
empowers humaneness, (note that “truthfulness” is again how Knoblock 
translates Cheng 誠):1417 “For the gentleman to nurture his mind, nothing is more 
excellent than truthfulness. If a man has attained perfection of truthfulness, he 
will have no other concern than to uphold the principle of humanity and to 
behave with justice.”1418 Notably, sincerity is not all that ritual cultivates as a 
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quality of humaneness,1419 but it is the quality at the heart of moral force at the 
heart of his conception of ideal leadership.1420  
Thus, for the Analects community restraint of self constitutes sincerity and 
is a prerequisite for proper participation in ritual such that humaneness is 
achieved. For Xunzi, participation in ritual restrains the self such that it becomes 
sincere, among other things, and thus achieves humaneness. This construal of the 
relationship between ritual and sincerity in Xunzi derives from both his doctrine 
of human nature and his doctrine of heaven. In his treatise on ritual principles, 
Xunzi is emphatic that: 
Inborn nature is the root and beginning, the raw material and original constitution. 
Conscious activity is the form and principle of order, the development and completion. If 
there were no inborn nature, there would be nothing for conscious exertion to improve; if 
there were no conscious exertion, then inborn nature could not refine itself. Only after 
inborn nature and conscious exertion have been conjoined is the concept of the sage 
perfected, and the merit of uniting the world brought to fulfillment.1421 
Ritual for Xunzi falls under the category of conscious activity as distinct from 
inborn nature and the method of formation from being crude and ominous to 
humane and sagely.1422 Ritual “completes” human nature, which is to say that 
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ritual makes human nature sincere and thus humane. Furthermore, ritual is 
related to sincerity in the doctrine of heaven, and more particularly in the 
doctrine of the trinity of heaven, earth, and humanity, as sincerity is given 
cosmological dimension.1423 Yanming An notes that ritual and sincerity are 
analogous for Xunzi in two ways (note that An here translates heaven as 
“Nature”):  
First, they both originate from the human world, and latter (sic) are “read into” Nature. 
Secondly, they are both regarded as general principles after the journey of being read 
into Nature, and thereby acquiring an imperative force to regulate human conducts (sic). 
Obviously, there is a similar circle of reasoning in both cases, which begins and ends at 
the same point – human society.1424 
Thus, both ritual and sincerity for Xunzi are conscious activity and so are human 
artifacts with correlations in the cosmic order. This correlation is given causal 
force through the concept of pattern (Li 理), from which ritual is derived and 
“which are in turn considered the real design of nature.”1425 
This discussion of the contrasting views regarding the relationships 
among ritual, humaneness, sincerity, and restraint leads naturally into the debate 
in the contemporary literature on Xunzi between interpreting him as a realist or a 
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constructivist. Before turning to that debate, however, it is important to consider 
briefly what the distinctiveness of the Analects community with respect to Xunzi 
might mean for conceiving “Confucianism” during the Warring States period. 
Clearly, both the Analects community and Xunzi considered themselves genuine 
heirs of Confucius’ teaching, although they disagreed about exactly what that 
was.1426 This divergence may result in part from the different contexts of their 
development. Xunzi was shaped intellectually in the Jixia Academy where many 
different strains of Warring States period thought were debated, and his stature 
there demonstrates at least some ability to move credibly and civilly among 
them. Xunzi also developed a relatively generous pragmatism in his political 
philosophy after seeing first hand during his travels the terrible suffering 
brought about by the incessant wars instigated by rampant sociopolitical 
disorder. This pragmatism is evidenced in his carving out space for a role for law 
as a secondary but likely necessary compliment to ritual as the basis for 
sociopolitical order.1427 The Analects community, by contrast, sought political 
influence in the Lu court, and so was under constant pressure to distinguish its 
views from other options. Such pressure necessarily results in more ideological, 
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as opposed to pragmatic, prescriptions. It also keeps the focus of the community 
significantly more narrowly on politically relevant doctrines, as opposed to the 
broader systematic, and at times cosmological, treatises of Xunzi. The Confucian 
perspective exhibited marked internal diversity among the diverse perspectives 
of the Warring States period. Therefore, it is critical, with Michael Puett, to resist 
the prevalent cultural-essentialist and evolutionary interpretations of 
Confucianism, the Warring States period, and Chinese thought generally, at least 
in part for the sake of improving comparative approaches to these texts and 
contexts.1428 
Realism vs. Constructivism 
With the publication of The Philosophy of Xunzi: A Reconstruction, Kurtis 
Hagen ignites a debate with the vast majority of prior English-language 
scholarship over the proper interpretation of Xunzi as a realist or a constructivist. 
The strong version of realism that Hagen disputes “maintains not merely that 
there is a reality independent of our thoughts about it, but that there is a 
privileged description of this reality, that concepts can and should mirror it, and 
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that there is a uniquely correct way of being in it.”1429 Instead, Hagen interprets 
Xunzi as advocating what might be called a strong version of constructivism in 
which “there is no privileged description of the world – concepts, categories, and 
norms, as social constructs, help us effectively manage our way through the 
world rather than reveal or express univocal knowledge of it.”1430 Unfortunately, 
in making this case, Hagen relies heavily on a cultural-essentialist approach to 
the Warring States period: “I have endeavored to provide a textually grounded 
interpretation, which strives to be loyal to not only to Xunzi (sic), and to the text 
that bears his name, but to sensibilities that I understand as characteristic of the 
early Confucian tradition generally.”1431 Nevertheless, the dichotomy of realism 
versus constructivism does provide yet further entre into the conception of ritual 
in Xunzi, particularly regarding his understanding of the relationship between 
ritual and language. In the process of unpacking Xunzi from the cultural-
essentialist paradigm, the question of interpreting him as a realist or 
constructivist may be answered: yes. 
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The realist side of Xunzi arises, once again, from his doctrine of the trinity 
of heaven, earth, and humanity. As has already been noted, earth provides the 
material of the world and heaven provides that material form and pattern (Li 理). 
Important here is the concept of constancy, noted above to have derived from the 
Daodejing and Zhuangzi, which has to do with the consistent application of 
general principles, the Way (Dao 道), as opposed to having to do with longevity: 
“when Heaven and Earth conjoin, the myriad things are begot”1432 and “the Way 
itself is constant in its form yet completely changeable.”1433 Heaven is thus 
characterized in terms of the regularity of change according to constant 
principles.1434 This constancy of patterned material in humans is what Xunzi calls 
“inborn nature,” or the crude, ominous nature prior to being refined and 
restrained by ritual and education, which is what is given to humanity by 
heaven.1435 The reality of the world, including human nature among the rest of 
nature, is thus objective and independent; this is the very meaning of constancy 
for Xunzi. 
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The constructivist side of Xunzi, on the other hand, arises from his 
conception of the human role in the trinity as arising from artifice in the form of 
ritual and morality, which are the cornerstones of government and an ordered 
society. In contrast with inborn nature, “what must be learned before a man can 
do it and what he must apply himself to before he can master it yet is found in 
man is properly called ‘acquired nature.’”1436 It is this acquired nature that 
enables human participation in the trinity with heaven and earth:  
Now, if the man in the street were induced to cleave to these methods, engage in study, 
focus his mind on a single aim, unify his intentions, ponder these principles, accomplish 
them each day over a long period of time, and to accumulate what is good without 
slacking off, then he could penetrate as far as spiritual intelligence and could form a 
Triad with Heaven and Earth. Thus the sage is a man who has reached this high state 
through accumulated effort.1437 
The acquired nature arises from the conscious effort of humans, not from their 
inborn nature endowed by heaven: “ritual principles and moral duty, laws and 
standards, are the creation of the acquired nature of the sage and not the product 
of anything inherent in his inborn nature.”1438 This acquired nature, then, is what 
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makes humanity distinctive in the trinity with heaven and earth: “Heaven has its 
seasons; Earth its resources; and Man his government.”1439 
The relationship between realism and constructivism in Xunzi is 
demonstrated first by returning to the concept of sincerity (Cheng 誠) and the 
harmony of its ethical and cosmic dimensions. Xunzi describes both the 
constancy of heaven and the activity of sages in terms of sincerity, (translated by 
Knoblock again as “truthfulness”): “Heaven and Earth are indeed great, but were 
they to lack truthfulness, they could not transmute the myriad things. Sages to be 
sure are wise, but were they to lack truthfulness, they could not transmute the 
people.”1440 While heavenly cosmic sincerity and human ethical sincerity are a 
common principle for Xunzi,1441 heavenly cosmic sincerity is a direct result of its 
constant nature, which is exhibited through and through, whereas human ethical 
sincerity is a result of the acquired nature that refines the inborn nature of 
humanity, that is, of the consciousness and intentionality that heaven lacks.1442 
This intentionality is also what distinguishes humans from animals: “What is it 
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that makes a man human? I say that it lies in his ability to draw boundaries.”1443 
This consciousness and intentionality are crucial for the constructive contribution 
of humanity, which Xunzi describes in terms of transmutation and 
transformation:  
If a man has attained perfection of truthfulness, he will have no other concern than to 
uphold the principle of humanity and to behave with justice. If with truthfulness of mind 
he upholds the principle of humanity, it will be given form. Having been given form, it 
becomes intelligible. Having become intelligible, it can produce transmutation. If with 
truthfulness of mind he behaves with justice, it will accord with natural order. According 
with natural order, it will become clear. Having become clear, it can produce 
transformation. To cause transmutation and transformation to flourish in succession is 
called the "Power of Nature."1444 
(Note that “nature” is one of the translations Knoblock uses for what is otherwise 
translated “heaven”). Nevertheless, this construction is not over and above what 
heaven forms from the material of earth, but rather flourishes as it accords with 
the constancy of heaven: “the gentleman is guided by what is constant.”1445 Yet, 
heaven is lacking without the constructive work of humanity: 
When Heaven and Earth conjoin, the myriad things are begot; when the Yin and Yang 
principles combine, transformations and transmutations are produced; when inborn 
nature and conscious activity are joined, the world is made orderly. Heaven is able to 
beget the myriad things, but it cannot differentiate them. Earth can support man, but it 
cannot govern him. The myriad things under the canopy of heaven and all those who 
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belong among living people depend upon the appearance of the sage, for only then is 
each assigned its proper station.1446 
Xunzi is assiduous in avoiding any subordination in his doctrine of the trinity. 
The intertwining of realism and constructivism is further demonstrated in 
the distinctively Xunzian project of Rectifying Names (Zhengming 正名). In this 
project, Xunzi develops his own conception of language as ritual in dialogue 
with the other strains of thinking about language during the Warring States 
period considered above, particularly the later Mohists.1447 While the conception 
of rectifying names appears in Analects 13.3, the logical chain argument in the 
second half of the passage indicates to Brooks and Brooks that the direction of 
influence was actually from Xunzi into the Analects and not vice versa as is 
usually assumed.1448 The ultimate purpose of rectifying names, like virtually 
everything for Xunzi, is social stability. With respect to a true king, who would 
be a sage, Xunzi says: “Because fixed names keep objects distinguished and 
because when his Way is practiced his goals are universally understood, he takes 
pains to produce uniformity [in regard to names and his Way] among the 
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people.”1449 After considering how the senses are involved in distinguishing 
kinds and qualities, Xunzi proceeds to explain how then to name things 
according to a classification of names.1450 He then goes on to examine the nature 
of names: 
Names have no intrinsic appropriateness. They are bound to something by agreement in 
order to name it. The agreement becomes fixed, the custom is established, and it is called 
“appropriate.” If a name differs from the agreed name, it is then called “inappropriate.” 
Names have no intrinsic object. They are bound to some reality by agreement in order to 
name that object. The object becomes fixed, the custom is established, and it is called the 
name of that object. 
Names do have intrinsic good qualities. When a name is direct, easy, and not at odds 
with the thing, it is called a “good name.”1451 
Names, which is to say language, is thus a subset of ritual for Xunzi, requiring 
sages to construct them in conformity with the Way such that social order is 
established and maintained. The ritual of language includes both pragmatics and 
syntax: 
The “use” of a particular name consists in the object being clearly understood when the 
name is heard. The “linkage” of names [into syntactical units] consists in compositions 
being formed by stringing words together. When both the use and the links between 
names are grasped, we are said to know the name.1452 
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Xunzi also identifies a continuum from words through sentences to rhetoric and 
connects these with mind and reality: 
Names are used to define different realities. Propositions connect the names of different 
realities in order to express a single idea. Dialectics and explanations, by not allowing 
objects to become differentiated from their names, are used to illustrate the Way of action 
and repose. Defining and naming are the function of dialectics and explanation. 
Dialectics and explanation are the mind’s representation of the Way. The mind is the 
artisan and manager of the Way. The Way is the classical standard and rational principle 
of order.1453 
In this way, names as rituals participate in the restraint of the mind such that it 
may accord with the constancy of heaven and thereby generate order: “When the 
mind conforms to the Way, explanations conform to the mind, propositions 
conform to explanations, and when names are used correctly and according to 
definition, the real and true qualities of things are clearly conveyed.”1454 The 
constructive contribution of humanity in naming is fulfilled in its accord with 
objective and independent reality, or heaven. 
Bearing on the question of realism and constructivism in the Xunzi, much 
of the recent literature on Xunzi interprets him as a pragmatist, less concerned 
with the particularities of the ritual forms of his day than with the importance of 
effective rituals. Paul Goldin, for instance, claims that, “Xunzi has specific rituals 
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in mind – as of salutation, of mourning, of eating – but the precise nature of the 
rituals is of only secondary importance to his argument.”1455 For the 
constructivist case, this interpretation allows for a variety of ritual constructions 
that are effective in guiding life. Kurtis Hagen spends significant energy 
contesting the Watson translation of a passage from Xunzi 20.3, as “Music is 
unalterable harmonies. The rites are unexchangeable patterns,” and contests its 
employment by other scholars.1456 Instead he prefers the translation A.C. Graham 
offers: “’Music’ is the unalterable in harmonising, ‘ceremony’ is the irreplaceable 
in patterning.”1457 Notably, Hagen shares the cultural-essentialist orientation with 
Graham, which enables interpreting Xunzi as part of a much more widely 
accepted Chinese cosmology rather than as a contestant over the very principles 
of the cosmology. He neglects the translation offered by Knoblock entirely: 
“music embodies harmonies that can never be altered, just as ritual embodies 
principles of natural order that can never be changed.”1458 This translation 
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indicates that it is not music and ritual in themselves that are unalterable, as this 
would be inconsistent with the principle that ritual is a human creation and 
artifact, but rather the harmonies and natural order that music and ritual 
embody.   
As desirable as abstracting the theory of ritual from the particularities of 
practice in ancient China might be, as the present project in fact does, ascribing 
the acceptability of the procedure to Xunzi is an overinterpretation. For example, 
Xunzi justifies the appropriateness of the ritual of three years of mourning as 
“equal to the emotions involved,” and thus “they admit neither of diminution 
nor of addition. Thus it is said that they are methods that are matchless and 
unchanging.”1459 Even if he is employing hyperbolic rhetoric here, there is 
nevertheless an indication of the objective superiority of the funeral practices 
established by the Ancient Kings: “Thus, the Ancient Kings acted to establish 
proper forms wherein men could express the full measure of their obligation to 
pay honor to those deserving honor and to show affection to those whom they 
cherished.”1460 It is not that the rituals of mourning are in principle unalterable, 
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but rather that the rituals established by the ancient kings most fully embody the 
natural order of human emotions and so altering them would be foolish. 
Furthermore, in Rectifying Theses, the second thesis Xunzi refutes is that 
Tang 湯 (Shang 商) and Wu 武 (Zhou 王) were false kings because they 
overthrew and executed their immoral predecessors, Jie 桀 (Xia 夏) and Zhou Xin 
紂辛 (Shang 商). Instead, Xunzi argues that Tang and Wu were true kings and 
sages because they governed by ritual and moral principles, whereas Jie and 
Zhou Xin were corrupt and “predators of the people.”1461 In the course of making 
this argument, Xunzi defines kingship particularly in relationship to the ritual 
customs of ancient China: “In antiquity, the Son of Heaven had a thousand 
offices in his government and the feudal lords each had a hundred. To use these 
thousand offices to execute orders in all the countries of the Xia Chinese 
traditions is what is meant by being ‘King.’”1462 Knoblock comments: 
The term xia 夏 here transcends its usual meaning of the Xia dynasty. In this context it 
refers to all those countries that followed the common polite forms, rites and rituals, and 
sense of decorum and bearing – li 禮 in all its ramifications – by which the Central States 
distinguished themselves from the surrounding barbarians. In the language of this time, 
it referred to the core of states in the center of the Chinese world that looked back to a 
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past of great renown and power in contrast to the present dominated by upstart, semi-
barbarian states beyond the pale of Xia culture.1463 
For Xunzi, the fit of ritual in culture is clearly connected with the particular social 
formations of ancient China, however ideal and aspirational they may be: “The 
sage clearly understands ritual, the scholar and gentleman find comfort in 
carrying it out, officials of government have as their task preserving it, and the 
Hundred Clans incorporate it into their customs.”1464 In sum, it is unclear that 
Xunzi had access to a philosophical imagination that could entertain a ritual 
order beyond the sociopolitical context of Warring States period China. Again, 
the constructive work of humanity in creating and adjusting ritual is a 
construction toward both an objective, independent, real, natural order, and 
toward an ideal social reality. 
Further nuance is brought to the particular brand of realism Xunzi 
espouses by considering how he conceives ritual with respect to religion. 
Already noted is that religious ceremonies are only one form of ritual that Xunzi 
advocates. Nevertheless, his inclusion of religious ceremonies in the range of 
things that constitute ritual requires a reconceptualization of their function, albeit 
																																																								
1463 Xunzi, 305n18. 
1464 Xunzi, 19.11 (III: 72). 
	 547 
not their form. Xunzi distinguishes between the perspective on ritual upheld by 
commoners and the perspective upheld by noble persons:  
If you pray for rain and there is rain, what of that? Ι say there is no special relationship – 
as when you do not pray for rain and there is rain… We do these things not because we 
believe that such ceremonies will produce the results we seek, but because we want to 
embellish such occasions with ceremony. Thus, the gentleman considers such ceremonies 
as embellishments, but the Hundred Clans consider them supernatural. To consider them 
embellishments is fortunate; to consider them supernatural is unfortunate.1465  
Edward Machle (1919 – 2011) provides an alternative translation: 
When we sacrifice for rain, it rains. Why? I say, there is nothing to ask “why?” about. It 
rains even though we don’t sacrifice.… This isn’t something to be regarded from the 
point of view of obtaining something we seek, but from a cultured standpoint. 
Consequently, although the gentleman looks on it as a matter of humane culture, the 
lower gentry see it as a matter of dealing with spirits. Regard it as a matter of humane 
culture and good fortune follows; regard it as a matter of dealings with spirits and 
misfortune follows.1466 
As Machle further notes, Xunzi is not weighing in here on the existence of spirits, 
but rather denying “the efficacy of rituals to effect some change in events 
independent of their place in the total lives and development of the people 
involved.”1467 Nevertheless, Xunzi allows for distinct understandings of what is 
actually going on in religious rituals depending on social role: “For the 
gentleman, ritual observances are considered to be part of the Way of Man. 
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Among the Hundred Clans, they are thought to be a matter of serving the ghosts 
of the departed.”1468 However, Xunzi also claims that “at the offering of sacrifices 
one reverently serves the spirit” of the deceased.1469 Rather than Machle’s 
interpretive gymnastics, these apparently contradicting statements are best 
harmonized by attending to the final paragraph of the Discourse on Ritual 
Principles: 
One divines with the tortoise shell and milfoil, determines auspicious days, purifies 
oneself and fasts, repairs and sweeps the temple, lays out the low tables and bamboo 
mats, presents the ceremonial offerings, and informs the invocator as though someone 
were really going to enjoy the sacrifice. One takes up the offerings and presents each of 
them as though someone were really going to taste them. The chief waiter does not lift up 
the wine cup, but the chief sacrificer himself has that honor, as though someone were 
really going to drink from it. When the guests leave, the chief sacrificer bows and escorts 
them out, returns and changes his clothing, resumes his place, and weeps as though 
someone had really departed with the guests. How full of grief, how reverent this is! One 
serves the dead as one serves the living, those who have perished as those who survive, 
just as though one were giving visible shape to what is without shape or shadow, and in 
so doing one perfects proper form!1470 
In the context of this passage, the second passage does not conflict as the 
reverence is “as if” the spirit of the person were present. The outcomes of ritual, 
for Xunzi, “are independent of the ontological status of the object of any specific 
ritual and so not dependent on the actual existence of any particular object, such 
																																																								
1468 Xunzi, Xunzi: Translation and Study, 19.11 (III: 72). 
1469 Xunzi, 19.7b (III: 68). 
1470 Xunzi, 19.11 (III: 73). 
	 549 
as a ghost or spirit or a responsive Heaven,”1471 even as the success of ritual does 
depend on its accord with the constancy of heaven. “Ritual exemplifies, 
therefore, ‘locative religiosity,’ the kind of religiosity where crucial features of 
true flourishing consist in properly locating one’s self within a complex social 
[and natural] order thought to have sacred qualities.”1472 It is ritual treating “as 
if” certain objects are real that the  
old religion is secularized and humanized in Xunzi’s doctrine of the “three roots” (san 
ben 三本) of ritual principles. First, Xunzi links Heaven and Earth and considers sacrifices 
to them as homage to the roots of life. In analogous fashion, sacrifies to forebears 
(ancestor worship) are homage to the roots of kinship, and sacrifices to lords and teachers 
are homage to the roots of social order.1473 
This subjunctive quality of ritual anchors the answer to be advanced in this 
project to the problem of religious language. 
Ritual is Pervasive, Conventional, and Transformative  
Three aspects of Xunzian ritual theory are particularly important for 
comparative consideration with Western ritual theory and for the present project 
of conceiving language as ritual, as Xunzi himself does. 
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First, ritual is pervasive. Articulating a conception of ritual as pervasive is 
one of the most original contributions Xunzi made to Warring States period 
thought, demonstrating the capacity of ritual to operate at the cosmological, 
social, and personal levels. John Knoblock is eloquent on this point:  
Xunzi transformed the concepts of ritual from an aristocratic code of conduct, a kind of 
courtoisie that distinguished gentlemen from ordinary men, into universal principles that 
underlay society and just government. Man's nature, which Xunzi believed to produce 
evil results if left undeveloped, made it necessary to have ritual principles… These 
concepts pervaded later generations and were among Xunzi's most important and 
enduring legacies.1474 
Furthermore, each of these levels of ritual operation is interconnected with the 
others. 
At the cosmological level, as Philip Ivanhoe notes, Zhuangzi influenced 
Xunzi to conceive the Way as “the underlying patterns and processes of the 
universe itself,” in contrast with many other thinkers of the time. But Xunzi 
broke with Zhuangzi regarding the value of human culture, understood 
principally as ritual:  
Xunzi’s perspective on the role of the rites was nothing less than universal. The sage 
needed to view things in such a manner in order to attain his grand vision of universal 
harmony. Only such a comprehensive and systematic approach could take account of 
and bring into balance the myriad constituents, various considerations, and diverse 
aspects of the Way. The Way served not only humans but Heaven and Earth as well… 
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For Xunzi, the Way extended far beyond society. It united the human and Natural realms 
into a single seamless web.1475  
Indeed, in the Discourse on Nature, “’Way’ regularly subsumes ‘ritual 
principles.’”1476 For Xunzi, deviation from the Way leads to ruin, while adherence 
leads to order, and this order is accomplished “by minutely examining 
everything in terms of ritual principles. In the past, the Ancient Kings minutely 
observed ritual principles so that wherever they went in making the circuit of the 
world, their acts involved no impropriety.”1477  
At the personal level, it is the pervasiveness of ritual in life that transforms 
inborn nature into acquired nature, thus generating the noble person who is able 
to participate as a member of the trinity with heaven and earth, providing them 
order: “The gentleman is the beginning of ritual and moral principles. Acting 
with them, actualizing them, accumulating them over and over again, and loving 
them more than all else is the beginning of the gentleman.”1478 As Knoblock 
notes, the restraint of human nature by ritual is what makes a person suitable for 
society: “the sacrifices gave ornamented expression to the emotions that 
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otherwise would have no proper outlet and would become socially 
dangerous.”1479 Positively, ritual shows us “how to express reverence in all that 
we do and how to comport ourselves with dignity and gravity so that everything 
seems to be the product of deep thought.”1480 The pervasiveness of ritual in life is 
the fulfillment of humanity and the achievement of the Way of the Sage: “When 
both end and beginning have been fully attended to, then the service proper for a 
filial son is finished and the Way of the Sage is fulfilled.”1481 Without ritual, life is 
not even possible: “A man without ritual will not live.”1482 
At the social level, ritual sets the standards for relationships on analogy to 
physical measures for physical things: “Measures are the standards of things. 
Ritual principles are the standards for obligations.”1483 The standards set over 
society by ritual principles constitute the Way as embodied at the social level: 
“As a general rule, to obtain mankind one must adhere to the Way. What then is 
this Way? I say that it is just ritual and moral principles, polite refusals and 
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deference to others, and loyalty and trustworthiness.”1484 Also, “rites are the 
highest expression of order and discrimination, the root of strength in the state, 
the Way by which the majestic sway of authority is created, and the focus of 
merit and fame.”1485 
The fullest and most eloquent articulation of the pervasiveness of ritual in 
the Xunzi is in the first of the Fu – Rhyme-Prose Poems, quoted here in full: 
Here there is a great thing: 
It is not fine silk thread or cords of silk, 
– Yet its designs and patterns are perfect, elegant compositions. 
It is not the sun, nor is it the moon, 
Yet it makes the world bright. 
The living use it to live to old age; 
The dead to be buried. 
Cities and states use it for their security; 
The three armies use it for strength. 
“Those who possess it in pure form are True Kings; 
“Those who have it in mixed form are lords-protector; 
“And those who lack any at all are annihilated.” 
Your servant stupidly does not recognize it 
And presumes to ask Your Majesty about it. 
The King replied: 
Is it not something that has cultivated form, yet is not brightly colored? 
Is it not suddenly and easily understood, yet especially possesses natural order? 
Is it not what the gentleman reveres and the petty man does not? 
Is it not something that if inborn nature does not acquire it, one is like a wild beast; 
And if inborn nature does acquire it, it produces elegant forms? 
Is it not something that, if one of the masses would exalt it, he would become a sage? 
And if one of the feudal lords exalted it, he would unite all within the four seas? 
It provides the clearest of expressions, yet it is concise; 
It is the extreme of obedience to the natural course of things, yet must be embodied in 
conduct. 
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I suggest where all these qualities come together is ritual principles.1486 
Second, ritual is conventional. This is to say that rituals are human 
constructs, human artifacts. While they participate cosmologically as the human 
function within the trinity with heaven and earth, they are decidedly not 
cosmologically derived.  
The Way of the Ancient Kings lay in exalting the principle of humanity and in following 
the mean in their conduct. What is meant by the “mean”? I say that it is correctly 
identified with ritual and moral principles. The Way of which I speak is not the Way of 
Heaven or the Way of Earth, but rather the Way that guides the actions of mankind and 
is embodied in the conduct of the gentleman.1487 
Indeed, the sage kings are credited with creating the ritual forms in order to curb 
ominous human nature: “In antiquity the sage kings took man’s nature to be evil, 
to be inclined to prejudice and prone to error, to be perverse and rebellious, and 
not to be upright or orderly. For this reason they invented ritual principles and 
precepts of moral duty.”1488 Because ritual is a human creation, “they are things 
that people must study to be able to follow them and to which they must apply 
themselves before they can fulfill their precepts.”1489 Xunzi even describes how it 
is that a sage creates ritual: “The sage accumulates his thoughts and ideas. He 
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masters through practice the skills of his acquired nature and the principles 
involved therein in order to produce ritual principles and moral duty and to 
develop laws and standards.”1490 This creative work is on analogy to an artisan, 
whose artifacts are not part of the nature of the artist: “The artisan carves wood 
to make a vessel, but how could the wooden vessel be regarded as part of the 
artisan’s inborn nature? The sage’s relation to ritual principles is just like that of 
the potter molding his clay.”1491 Unlike the artisan, however, the material that the 
sage crafts is their own inborn desires:  
Shun said: “It is only through following my desires that I have become orderly.” Thus, 
ritual was created on behalf of men from worthies down to the ordinary masses but not 
for perfected sages. Nonetheless, it is also the means by which to perfect sageness. Not to 
study is never to be perfected.1492 
This path toward sagely perfection is claimed for Confucius in Analects 2.4: “At 
fifteen, I set my mind upon learning; at thirty, I took my place in society; at forty, 
I became free of doubts; at fifty, I understood Heaven’s Mandate; at sixty, my ear 
was attuned; and at seventy, I could follow my heart’s desires without 
overstepping the bounds of [ritual] propriety.”1493 
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Though conventional, rituals are not arbitrary. Xunzi identifies behavior 
as indecorous (Gou 苟) if it is “contrary to the mean of behavior prescribed by 
ritual and moral principles.”1494 Knoblock cites Arthur Waley’s (1889 – 1966) 
explication of the range of meanings of indecorous: 
The Chinese have a special word for things done “after a fashion” … but not according to 
the proper ritual. What is done in this way may seem for the moment to “work,” … but 
the gentleman’s code, like that of the old-fashioned artisan, compels him to “make a good 
job” of whatever he undertakes. A temporary success secured by irregular means gives 
him no satisfaction; it is stolen, not honestly come by. Gou … is used when things are 
done “somehow or other,” in a “hit or miss” offhand fashion, when everything is “left to 
chance.” … It applies wherever a result is achieved by mere accident and not as a result 
of inner power (de).1495 
Ritual is the contrast term to this accidental functioning, indicating action with 
consciousness and intent: “Ritual principles use obedience to the true mind of 
man as their foundation. Thus, were there no ritual principles in the Classic of 
Ritual, there would still be need for some kind of ritual in order to accord with 
the mind of man.”1496 Here, the “true mind” seems to correspond with the “mind 
of the Way” in Dispelling Blindness, upon which Knoblock comments:  
Both the “mind of man” and the “mind of the Way” are the mind; the first emphasizes 
the essential qualities of man, which Xunzi regarded as bad, and the second the 
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conversion of these qualities through conscious exertion into what is right and proper 
and accords with the Way.1497 
The accordance between ritual and the mind, in turn, would seem to have to do 
with the role of ritual in enabling the mind to make distinctions and 
discriminations, as was cited above from Contra Physiognomy 5.4 above. Again, 
Knoblock comments: “What distinguishes man from the animals is not his 
external characteristics, but his ability to draw distinctions and to make 
discriminations. This ability enables him to give good and proper form to his 
behavior through ritual principles, which he alone can conceive.”1498 He goes on 
to cite the Liji (“Quli” 曲禮, 1.6b-7a): “Now when men today are lacking ritual 
principles, though they too can speak, do they not also have merely the mind of 
an animal? … For this reason, the sages created ritual principles to instruct man 
and cause him to know that it is only through rites that they are different from 
the beasts.”1499 The drawing of distinctions and discriminations is thought itself: 
“The emotions being so paired, the mind’s choosing between them is called 
‘thinking.’”1500 The drawing of distinctions and discriminations is thus thought 
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operating according to ritual: “Those who keep to the mean provided by ritual 
and are able to ponder and meditate on it are said to be able to think.”1501 Thus 
ritual as the prerequisite to thought results in an alternative definition of Gou 苟 
as “thoughtless.” 
The rituals of language are the primary means of drawing distinctions: 
“fixed names keep objects distinguished.”1502 Thus, the project of rectifying 
names for Xunzi is crucial for having common distinctions that allow society to 
accord with the Way. Without rectified names, the whole rest of the ritual 
apparatus falls apart:  
Alienated minds influence the factors that are relative in the terms we use to illustrate 
our meaning; and in regard to different things, the connection between the name and the 
object is obscure, what is noble and base is unclear, and things that are alike and things 
that are different are not distinguished. Given this situation, intentions are certain to be 
frustrated through a failure to explain fully, and the execution of a person’s duties is 
certain to suffer from being hampered and obstructed.1503 
Here Xunzi talks about the work of sages making distinctions in terms of 
language:  
Wise men made “distinctions” and “separations.” They instituted names to refer to 
objects, making distinctions in order to make clear what is noble and what base and 
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separations in order to discriminate between things that are the same and those that are 
different… This is the purpose of having names.1504 
Elsewhere he likewise speaks of the sages making distinctions through ritual: 
“As a consequence of their perfected form there are the various distinctions 
made by ritual principles, and as a consequence of their perfect discernment 
there are explanations provided for everything.”1505 This leads Xunzi to a further 
consideration of the conventionality of ritual, especially the ritual of language, 
namely, that names, and rituals, do not have an intrinsic appropriateness, an 
intrinsic object, or intrinsic good qualities. Instead, names, and rituals, 
are bound to something by agreement in order to name it. The agreement becomes fixed, 
the custom is established, and it is called “appropriate.” If a name differs from the agreed 
name, it is then called “inappropriate.” … [Names] are bound to some reality by 
agreement in order to name that object. The object becomes fixed, the custom is 
established, and it is called the name of that object… When a name is direct, easy, and not 
at odds with the thing, it is called a “good name.”1506 
Kurtis Hagen celebrates the lack of an intrinsic connection between names and 
realities, which is to say nominalism, in Xunzi, but he also denies the 
independent, objective reality of the objects to which the conventional names are 
correlated, instead claiming that the process of naming constructs the very reality 
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of objects.1507 This neglects the fact that if a good name is to be “not at odds with 
the thing,” then there must be a thing with sufficient determinateness that a 
name could be at odds with it or not. That is, reality must have sufficient 
contours that names fit or do not, which contours are prior to the names 
themselves, not constructed by them. Moreover, as with rituals, the reason that 
agreement is achievable is that the capacity for making distinctions and 
discriminations lies in the sense organs: “What is the basis of deeming something 
the same or different? I say that it is based on the sense organs given us by 
nature.”1508 Since everyone has the same sense organs and lives in the same world 
made up of the same things, the representations of what the organs sense is the 
same: “Whenever things belong to the same category of being or have the same 
essential characteristics, the representation of them presented by the senses is the 
same.”1509 This keeps language grounded in the Way of humanity, which is a 
participant, when rectified by ritual, in the trinity with heaven and earth. 
Third, ritual is transformative. Xunzi testifies to the transformative 
capacity of ritual from the very first chapter: “If you would take the Ancient 
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Kings as your source and the principle of humanity and justice as your 
foundation, then ritual principles will rectify the warp and woof, the 
straightaways and byways of your life.”1510 Moreover, only after being rectified 
by ritual is a person capable of considering the Way:  
Thus, after ritual principles are respected in his actions, you can discuss with him the 
methods of the Way; after his speech is guided by ritual principles, then you can discuss 
the principles of the Way; and after his demeanor is obedient to ritual principles, then 
you can discuss the attainment of the Way.1511  
This rectification is what Xunzi means by self-cultivation, as Knoblock notes: 
“Self-cultivation requires an understanding of ritual principles and cannot easily 
succeed without a teacher to lead one through the Classics.”1512 Even the 
physiological and material conditions of life must be transformed by ritual or 
else suffer physiological and material consequences: “When one’s food and 
drink, clothing and dress, dwelling and home, activity and repose follow the 
dictates of ritual, they are harmonious and measured. But when they do not, they 
become offensive and excessive and so will produce illness.”1513  
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Mark Berkson provides a helpful contrast between the perspective of 
Xunzi and that of some of his contemporaries:  
For the Mohists, ritual was a wasteful, unnecessary activity that took away energy and 
resources from the valuable pursuits of creating wealth, population, and order in the 
state. For the Daoists, ritual was a form of artifice that prevented the spontaneous 
expression of our nature and thus cut us off from the rhythm of the Dao.1514 
As has already been noted, the necessity of transformation by ritual for Xunzi is 
precisely because of the crudeness and ominousness of human nature: 
Now, can one truly take man’s inborn nature to have as its essential characteristics 
correctness, accord with natural principles, peacefulness, and order? Were that the case, 
what use would there be for sage kings, and what need for ritual and moral principles! 
And even supposing that there were sage kings and ritual and moral principles, what 
indeed could they add to correctness, natural principles, peace, and order!1515 
Xunzi in part refutes the claim of “original simplicity and childhood naiveté” of 
humanity Mencius makes by arguing that ritual provides no real transformation 
unless this simplicity and naiveté are “lost or destroyed” in the process.1516 
Having overcome crude and ominous human nature, through rituals “we 
become true friends, devoted servants, filial sons, loving fathers, and proper 
hosts.”1517 
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While ritual seeks to transform conduct, the transformation of conduct is 
for the sake of the tranquility of the emotions: “When what ritual mandates, you 
make so in your conduct, then your emotions will find peace in ritual.”1518 Xunzi 
emphasizes that “ritual may cause us to act in a certain way, but it cannot cause 
us to feel in a way consonant with what we do.”1519 Therefore, emotional 
tranquility can be described in terms of the harmony of ritual and emotion:  
All rites begin with coarseness, are brought to fulfillment with form, and end with 
pleasure and beauty. Rites reach their highest perfection when both emotion and form 
are fully realized. In rites of the next order, emotions and form in turn prevail. In the 
lowest order of rites, all reverts to emotion through returning to the conditions of 
Primordial Unity.1520 
Emotional tranquility or harmony is likely the main content of what Xunzi 
intends by sincerity as a result of ritual: 
When form and principle are emphasized and emotions and offerings are treated 
perfunctori1y, there is the greatest elaboration of ritual. When emotion and offerings are 
emphasized and form and principle are treated perfunctorily, there is greatest 
simplification of ritual. When form and principle, and emotion and offerings, are treated 
as inside tο outside, external manifestation to inner content, so that both are translated 
into action and commingled, there is the mean course of ritual.1521 
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Religious rituals have a particular import with regard to emotional tranquility, as 
Lee Yearly points out: “They modify emotions, especially those powerful 
emotions that certain kinds of situations generate. These modifications ensure 
that such emotions do not disturb the self’s equilibrium and proper 
functioning.”1522 Emotional tranquility is likely an import from Daoist thinkers, 
but for Xunzi the tranquility of the noble person enables the transformation of 
society toward order: “A gentleman creates order in terms of ritual and moral 
principles; he does not create order with what is contrary to them.”1523 Indeed, 
ritual transforms reality: “Rites trim what is too long, stretch out what is too 
short, eliminate excess, remedy deficiency, and extend cultivated forms that 
express love and respect so that they increase and complete the beauty of 
conduct according to one’s duty.”1524 Again, ritual and language are connected in 
their fulfillment of the Way by means of the transformation of persons: “When 
the inner mind finds contentment with ritual principles and when speech is 
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closely connected to categories encompassed in ritual, then the Way of the Ru is 
fully realized.”1525  
Xunzi and Western Ritual Theory – A Comparison 
The aspects of ritual as pervasive, conventional, and transformative 
emphasized in Xunzi now enable a robust comparison with Western ritual 
theory in semiotic terms. 
Pervasive 
Among Western ritual theorists, the ritual theory of Roy Rappaport in 
Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity understands ritual to be relatively 
pervasive. Nevertheless, Rappaport also articulates significant limits on the 
pervasiveness of ritual, which he believes are necessary for the concept of ritual 
to provide any traction on the phenomena it encompasses. For example, he is 
clear that not all religious behaviors qualify as ritual: “There is little point, 
however, in attempting to force alms-giving or the avoidance of adultery, or all 
acts of respect for one’s father and mother into the definition [of ritual]’s 
mold.”1526 In fact, “all acts of respect for one’s father and mother” are at the heart 
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of ritual for Xunzi. Rappaport and Xunzi agree that it is participation in ritual 
that makes people humane, but for Xunzi the ritual forms that accomplish this 
pervade life to a far greater depth and extent than for Rappaport. Moreover, as 
was demonstrated above, the category of ritual for Xunzi extends beyond human 
life to have cosmological dimensions as well. Part of the reason for the difference 
between the two is that Rappaport is still focused on the necessarily religious 
entailments of the ritual form, whereas there is no distinction between sacred 
and secular for Xunzi. More recent developments in ritual studies that build 
upon Rappaport point to modernist ethnography as articulating the ritual 
communication involved in the everyday and to theorists of interaction rituals 
who “emphasize the ritual nature of just about every move people make in social 
interaction” in order to “challenge the contrast between private and public, 
micro- and macrosociological events.”1527 These types of ritual theories are 
moving in the direction of Xunzi and recognizing the pervasiveness of the ritual 
form. 
Alas, for many Western theorists, “the distinction between ritual and non-
ritual is a constituent of the hierarchy of values which shapes our Western 
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society’s social relations.”1528 After all, Meyer Fortes critiqued Leach for 
identifying language as a species of ritual on the basis that “it is a short step from 
this to the position that there is no such thing as ritual per se, no actions, 
utterances, ideas and beliefs that belong specifically to a domain we can identify 
by the term ritual, as opposed to everything else in social life that is non-
ritual.”1529 Xunzi, of course, sides with Leach. The question then arises whether 
this must inevitably lead to the sort of indeterminacy of the category of ritual 
that Fortes prophesies. Notably, the sort of claim that Fortes is making, namely of 
the type “if everything is x then nothing is x,” which would render in this case as 
“if everything is ritual than nothing is ritual,” is a logical fallacy as "x(x) ¹ 
¬$x(x). That said, the functional claim that the distinction between the two 
propositions in a particular instance – in this case of ritual – is without a 
difference should be taken seriously as the claim that if all social behavior is 
ritual then we can stop talking about ritual and just get on with talking about 
social behavior. This is where it becomes important with Rappaport and Xunzi to 
insist on a formal definition of ritual such that any given social behavior cannot 
be reduced to ritual as a domain of activity but rather there is a ritual mode or 
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dimension to any and all social behaviors: ritual is not a domain alongside 
economics, politics, religion, etc.; it is a dimension of all of them. Hence, the 
question is not whether a given behavior is ritual or not but rather whether the 
ritual dimension of a behavior is harmonized with constituent and overlapping 
rituals so as to minimize variance with each and the tension between the 
situation as is and the way the ritual insists it could be is at least addressed. The 
question is not ritual or not ritual. The question is good ritual versus bad ritual. 
Semiotics 
Expecting Xunzi to have anything like a developed semiotics, let alone 
one that would somehow prefigure that of Charles Sanders Peirce, is 
anachronistic. Yet, as Robert Neville notes, the conventionality of ritual in Xunzi 
and the conventionality of symbolic signs and of sign systems in Peirce provide 
an important bridge between the two theoretical paradigms.1530 Whereas Xunzi 
lacks a metaphysics of signs, which Peirce develops in exquisite detail, Peirce is 
less than attentive to the construction and maintenance of sign systems, which 
Xunzi develops in detail principally with respect to the sign systems of politics. 
In arguing that the solution to the social devolution of the Warring States period 
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is for rulers and the ruling class to cultivate themselves with ritual in order to 
attain moral force and thereby restore socio-political order, Xunzi is in effect 
arguing for the rectification of the sign systems that relate individuals to families, 
families to their communities, communities to the state, and rulers to the people. 
These sign systems he calls ritual, and they are means of simultaneously 
understanding the situation as it is and transforming it into something better. In 
addition to these macro rituals, the harmonization of desires within an 
individual that takes place in processes of moral self-cultivation is the integration 
of meso and micro rituals, the integrity of which generates moral force. Similarly, 
John Deely notes that 
The semiotic point of view is the perspective that results from the sustained attempt to 
live reflectively with and follow out the consequences of one simple realization: the 
whole of our experience, from its most primitive origins in sensation to its most refined 
achievements of understanding, is a network or web of sign relations.1531 
The metaphor of the web comes from Jakob von Uexküll (1864 – 1944): “As the 
spider spins its threads, every subject spins his relations to certain characters of 
the things around him, and weaves them into a firm web which carries his 
existence.”1532 The threads with which that web is spun are ritual. 
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Conventional 
By contrast with Xunzi, the majority of the Western ritual theory 
literature, having been overly influenced by Saussurean semiology, takes ritual 
to be conventional and arbitrary: “The bond between the signifier and the 
signified is arbitrary.”1533 Rather than taking convention to be arbitrary, Peirce 
says of a symbolic sign that it is “a conventional sign, or one depending upon 
habit (acquired or inborn),”1534 and “belief of a rule is a habit.”1535 Since rules are 
usually made for a reason and habits are either natural to the interpretant or 
derived from beyond the interpretant, this linking of rule and habit with the 
conventionality of symbolic signs delimits their arbitrariness. Furthermore, 
rituals as symbol systems are further constrained by the encoding of the system 
such that the form of the system establishes the extensionality of any given sign. 
At the representational pole this means that symbolic signs in the symbol system 
																																																								
Thomas Albert Sebeok, Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs, Sources in Semiotics 4 (Lanham, MD: 
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1533 de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 67; David Holdcroft, Saussure: Signs, System, and 
Arbitrariness (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
1534 Peirce, The Essential Peirce 2, 2:9; Bergman and Paavola, “Symbol”; Peirce and Welby, Semiotic 
and Significs, 33. 
1535 Peirce, The Collected Papers, 2.643; M. Bergman and S. Paavola, eds., “Habit,” in The Commens 
Dictionary: Peirce’s Terms in His Own Words, accessed July 5, 2018, 
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must refer to their object such that the resulting interpretant accords with reality 
as it is, while at the constructive pole they must refer to their object such that the 
interpretant accords with reality as the symbol system idealizes it to be. 
Rappaport picks up on this by incorporating the fact that rituals are “not entirely 
encoded by their performers” into his definition of ritual. Performers cannot 
arbitrarily adopt signs to refer to objects; they must adopt signs as encoded in the 
ritual form to refer to their objects in order to generate the desired interpretants. 
Rituals are conventions in that the symbol systems they encode are human 
constructs, but they cannot be constructed arbitrarily: they must be constructed 
so as to accord heaven and earth. 
In his discussion of symbols, Peirce also distinguishes between natural 
dispositions, which he sometimes calls a law, and conventional habits, both of 
which he takes to be symbols, but whereas conventions rely upon common 
agreement among the interpretants, laws are inherent in the natural order.1536 The 
question then arises as to whether the term “ritual” is applicable to both sorts of 
symbol. A definitive answer is not necessary here, given that the major topic of 
inquiry is language, which is decidedly conventional, but given that Peircian 
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semiotics generally demurs from overly strong distinctions between the physical 
and the ideal, an initial hypothesis may be advanced that in fact ritual is 
applicable in both instances as the symbol system that encodes either natural 
laws or conventional orders. 
Rappaport makes his case for distinguishing language and ritual on the 
basis that language, which he says is purely symbolic, allows for the conception 
of alternative orders and thus enables lying, whereas ritual, by virtue of being 
grounded in indexicality, disallows lying by insisting on its own order over 
against any possible alternatives. Peirce provides ample grounding for the claim 
that language is purely symbolic. For example, he says of symbols: 
Any utterance of speech is an example. If the sounds were originally in part iconic, in 
part indexical, those characters have long since lost their importance. The words only 
stand for the objects they do, and signify the qualities they do, because they will 
determine, in the mind of the auditor, corresponding signs.1537 
On the other hand, Peirce consistently refers to at least certain types of pronouns 
as indices: “demonstrative and relative pronouns are nearly pure indices, 
because they denote things without describing them.”1538 The confusion becomes 
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explicit when Peirce says that “A word is the same word every time it occurs and 
if it has any meaning has always the same meaning; but this and that have 
different applications every time they occur.”1539 Apparently Peirce does not 
consider “this” and “that” to be words. Nevertheless, these pronouns are part of 
language, so language en totum is not purely symbolic according to Peirce.  
Furthermore, the claim by Rappaport that the problem of implicating alternative 
orders arises “as much or more from the ordering of symbols through 
grammar”1540 means that the syntactic ordering of symbol systems in ritual 
implicates alternative orders just as language does. Indeed, the interpretant of 
having sins washed clean in baptism implies that the baptizand might just as 
well have been left to wallow in sin among the great unwashed. A better account 
of what Rappaport is attempting to ascribe to ritual, namely the capacity to 
reliably mediate social life without the medium itself having to be constructed 
from scratch in each instance, is better accomplished without having to 
distinguish ritual from language by the notion of effective rituals becoming more 
or less taken for granted. Moreover, at the heart of the ritual theory Xunzi 
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develops is the recognition that when rituals cease to be effective it becomes very 
important to remember their conventionality, i.e. that we were the ones who 
constructed them in the first place, so that we can set about rectifying them. Of 
course, rectifying the conventions of ritual generally begins with rectifying the 
conventions of language. In fact, the ability to implicate alternatives is absolutely 
necessary in order to rectify ritual orders such that they are good rituals instead 
of bad rituals. 
Transformative: Sincerity & Subjunctivity Again 
Xunzi provides an alternative for construing the relationships among 
ritual, sincerity, and subjunctivity from that of Seligman et al as elaborated in the 
previous chapter: Xunzi claims that ritual transforms the crude, ominous human 
nature into a sincere self in harmonious relationship with society and the natural 
world.1541 Rather than contrasting the ritual as if with the sincere as is, Xunzi 
recognizes that the ominous human nature enters the subjunctive ritual space 
and abides there until the subjunctive becomes indicative such that the new 
reality of the human person sincerely accords with the ritual norms. Since ritual 
is a human convention, it is reflexive in that humans make ourselves humane by 
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constructing and participating in rituals to bring about our own transformation. 
In this understanding of ritual reflexivity, the subjunctive space of ritual is a 
reflex of its participants on themselves and their realities to become indicative in 
life. In this, Victor Turner remarkably echoes Xunzi in terms of the role of ritual 
in moving from the subjunctive to the indicative:  
Ritual and its progeny, the performance arts among them, derive from the subjunctive, 
liminal, reflexive, exploratory heart of the social drama, its third, redressive phase, where 
the contents of group experiences (Erlebnisse) are replicated, dismembered, remembered, 
refashioned, and mutely or vocally made meaningful (even when, as so often in declining 
cultures, the meaning is that there is no meaning as in some Existentialist theatre).1542 
However, there is a second aspect of reflexivity in ritual for Xunzi, this one 
connecting up with the reflexive origins of ritual as articulated by Kimberly 
Patton in Religions of the Gods. Patton concludes that “religious action ought to be 
understood as an attribute and reflex of the divine, not simply as the projection of 
human ritual obligation, or as paradigmatic showcase for right action.”1543 As in 
Patton, for Xunzi, Dao 道 as a rough analogue with divinity serves as a guiding 
norm in the human construction of ritual. Notably, Dao is not a supernatural 
agent with focal attention and awareness as the divine is schematized in Patton’s 
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work, but rather a patterned norm inherent in the natural order.1544 In this sense, 
ritual is reflexive from the perspective of Dao in that it is the human realization 
and actualization of natural potential in Dao; it is Dao realizing itself. Then, 
moving beyond Patton’s paradigm, Xunzi articulates a double reflexivity in 
which ritual is the process by which humanity and Dao are harmonized. The 
second moment of reflexivity, from the human side, makes humanity humane by 
realizing the Dao of humanity inherent in the natural order via ritual; human 
beings become fully human by according themselves with Dao through ritual. 
This double reflexivity is an outcome of Xunzi’s distinctive understanding of the 
co-creation of reality by humanity and nature (heaven and earth):  
When Heaven and Earth conjoin, the myriad things are begot; when the Yin and Yang 
principles combine, transformations and transmutations are produced; when inborn 
nature and conscious activity are joined, the world is made orderly. Heaven is able to 
beget the myriad things, but it cannot differentiate them. Earth can support man, but it 
cannot govern him. The myriad things under the canopy of heaven and all those who 
belong among living people depend upon the appearance of the sage, for only then is 
each assigned its proper station.1545  
Furthermore, this double reflexivity reflects the double meaning of Cheng 誠 
sincerity in Warring States discourse: simultaneously human ethical sincerity in 
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the sense of a non-duplicitous self, and heavenly cosmic sincerity in the sense of 
reality as such.1546  
The difference between Xunzi and Seligman et al transcends the 
mechanisms of transformation as it cuts right to the question of the 
transformative nature of ritual. Seligman et al claim that  
The world is inherently fragmented: there is no foundation, there are no overarching sets 
of guidelines, laws, or principles. There are only actions, and it is up to humans to 
ritualize some of those actions and thereby set up an ordered world… the criterion for 
which actions from the past should become part of that ritual canon is simply based on 
whether a continued performance of them helps to refine one's ability to respond to 
others.”1547  
This view of ritual is equivalent to the theory Kurtis Hagen wants to ascribe to 
Xunzi in which humanity constructs the world via ritual, yet there are also 
several problems with it that go beyond the critique of constructivism already 
offered. First, there clearly are at least some laws and principles at work in the 
universe that are not human constructs, e.g. those encoded in the laws of physics. 
Second, this perspective overplays the individual and collective human capacity 
to choose which activities to ritualize, which is the implication of the criterion as 
to which actions “should” become part of the ritual canon. In point of fact, the 
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vast majority of the rituals that pervade our lives have become taken for granted 
and were never really cognitive enough that they could have become matters 
even of inquiry let alone choice. This is to advocate a very strong form of realism 
with regard to ritual: rituals are real completely independent of anyone even 
recognizing that they exist at all. The final problem with the position of Seligman 
et al thus follows: creeping nominalism. The ritually constructed orders they 
prescribe to make living in a fragmented world tolerable are epiphenomenal1548 
with respect to that world and so are incapable of transforming it. Instead, the 
realist account of ritual advocated here, derived from Rappaport and Xunzi, 
claims causality for ritual with respect to the world such that ritual actually 
transforms the fragmented world toward wholeness.  
Summation and Application of the Theory 
It is now possible and profitable to give a summary statement of the ritual 
theory developed over the course of the previous chapter in conversation with 
Western social scientific theories and the present chapter in conversation with 
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the Confucian theory of Xunzi in preparation for its application to a performance 
of the autumnal sacrifice to Confucius. 
Ritual is “the performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal 
acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the performers” (Rappaport, 24). 
This being the case, ritual is a medium in which signs relate to one another and 
form sign systems, and a matrix that orders those systems amid the tension 
between the world as it is and as it could be. This tension generates the 
reflexivity of ritual for its participants as elements of the self-contained sign 
system, driving its transformative capacity toward adaptive advantage when 
maximized. The transformations rituals achieve by performing the ordering of 
their elements in their frame so as to reassign signs to objects then themselves 
become objectively available, which is to say that the interpretants of ritual are 
real. These functions that result from ritual transformations pervade life and the 
world, from the most basic categories all the way up to highly sophisticated 
systems of signs that constitute civilizations and everything in between, yet 
remain conventional. Life is the performance of a thick web of rituals, the vast 
majority of which have dropped from consciousness into the habitus of the 
performer in a relatively doxastic society, such that contingent circumstance may 
be recognized, negotiated, and rectified by reflex into the ritual order. Such 
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performance makes the performer sincere to the subjunctive form of an effective 
ritual by rendering the form indicative. Thus, ritual communicates by 
performing the conventional constitution of community out of and in response to 
the brute reality of the world. This becomes especially complex as nested 
networks of rituals overlap and constitute one another, requiring harmonization 
by yet more rituals. 
The Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius 
In September of 1998, Thomas A. Wilson and Brooks Jessup shot footage 
of the Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius at the Confucius Temple in Tainan, 
Taiwan, and then Stephanie Wong edited the footage, provided historical and 
contextual commentary, and built a website to host the material.1549 This section 
analyzes this material using the novel ritual theory developed over the course of 
these last two chapters. It is important to note that while the ritual is Confucian, 
it was developed and codified long after the Warring States period1550 from a 
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military display-presentation ceremony that predates Confucius1551 but 
nevertheless falls well beyond the ritual imagination of either Confucius or 
Xunzi as applicable to Confucius himself. 
The Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius clearly fits the definition of ritual 
adopted in the theory of ritual elaborated over the past two chapters. The 
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sacrifice includes both acts: dancing,1552 playing music,1553 processions,1554 
bowing,1555 and making offerings,1556 and utterances: the recitation of blessings,1557 
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singing hymns,1558 and announcements of the steps of the ritual;1559 each of these 
elements are themselves rituals that overlap throughout the broader sacrifice 
ritual. The elements have been extensively codified as to their individual 
execution,1560 demonstrating their formality, and as to their sequence.1561 The 
ideal of the invariance of these forms and sequences, and recognition of the 
incompleteness of its fulfillment, is expressed in the codification of its evolution 
and discussion of contextual factors limiting its consummation.1562 The long 
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that present performers have limited involvement in the encoding they enact.1563 
The existence of video and pictorial evidence demonstrates that these forms in 
sequence continue to be performed.1564 
The Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius is a medium in which signs relate to 
one another and form sign systems. The signs themselves include the 
performers,1565 their costume,1566 the elements sacrificed,1567 the text of the 
prayer,1568 the musical instruments,1569 the music itself,1570 the feathers and flutes 
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held by the dancers,1571 and the banners, lanterns, censers, halberds, fan, and 
canopy carried in the procession.1572 The relations of the signs so as to form a sign 
system includes the wearing of the costumes by the performers,1573 the 
coordination of the dances with the music,1574 and the movements surrounding 
the sacrifices of the offerings.1575 That the ritual is the medium of these signs and 
sign systems is demonstrated by the fact that the people performing the ritual 
would be unlikely to wear the costumes, carry the objects, or dance in that 
manner apart from the ritual of the Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius. This is to 
say that the ritual is properly framed both concretely by the space of the 
Confucius temple itself1576 and abstractly by the intentionality of the performers 
in enacting this particular ritual at this time in this place. 
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At the same time, the Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius is a matrix of 
transformation amidst the tension between the world as it is and as it could be. 
This tension and its transformative capacity are made explicit in the text of the 
Ordering Hymn sung during the second offering. The hymn begins by adjuring 
the participants to “Perform the rite without err” and then recounts the 
perfections of the ritual elements: 
Ascend the Hall for the second offering 
Drums and bells sound in accord; 
Genuine, the wine cauldron 
Sincere, the food pots 
Solemn novices, 
Majestic scholars1577 
This declared perfection is in spite of any imperfections that may actually occur 
in the ritual performance, such as misplayed notes in the music or one of the 
dancers fainting.1578 The ritual thus accepts the world as is, broken and imperfect, 
and yet the form of the ritual nevertheless transforms the participants to accord 
with the way the ritual communicates the world could be, as stated in the final 
two lies of the hymn: “The rites correct us, the music refines us; Made virtuous 
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are we who observe this rite.”1579 By reflexively including an explicit statement of 
this transformative process in the hymn, the Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius 
achieves objectification in the sense of the act becoming its own object. This 
objectification also transcends the rite as the participants, having been made 
virtuous by their performance of the ritual, carry forward the virtuous 
orientation inculcated in the ritual into wider rituals that constitute the social 
domain; the subjunctive form of the ritual has been rendered indicative. 
In addition to being transformative, the Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius 
is also one ritual in the thick web of rituals that pervade the lives of its 
performers, setting up a dialectic across the various domains governed by the 
myriad rituals. Not only are there other rituals related to Confucius held at the 
temple that the participants in the Autumnal Sacrifice might also perform, such 
as the Spring Sacrifice1580 and the Joint Puberty Rites,1581 but more recently than 
the filmed performance in 1998, the Autumnal Sacrifice itself has been modified 
by the addition of three procedures so as to incorporate political officials,1582 and 
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women are allowed to serve as ceremonial officials.1583 Moreover, as in the 
Eucharistic ritual in the context of the Great Vigil of Easter analyzed in the 
previous chapter, there are many aspects upon which the performance depends 
that are not governed by the ritual of the Autumnal Sacrifice. For example, as in 
the Great Vigil it was necessary for participants to come forward to receive the 
Eucharistic elements but the ritual itself did not encode the manner of their 
movement, so too in the Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius the ritual does not 
prescribe the manner of walking in the procession into the temple. Participants 
must rely on rituals encoded elsewhere and elsewise in order to accomplish this 
basic act of the sacrificial ritual. Even though the prayer chanted in the middle of 
the sacrifice declares that “We endeavor to follow the regulations and statues, 
solemnly reveal the minute and obscure, and refined in the sacrificial statues and 
hereby offer sacrifice,”1584 the act of walking is not an element of the minutae of 
this particular ritual. The neglect of the basic act of walking is due to the fact that, 
for the majority of people, the act of walking is so deeply inculcated in their 
habitus that the Autumnal Sacrifice may rely on it as doxastic and so need not 
encode it separately. 
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The conventionality of the Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius becomes 
obvious when considering the intentionality of its evolution as recorded in 
Confucius, the Sage Adaptable to Change: Inheritance and Transformation of Taipei 
Confucius Temple. While the historicity of the account cannot be attested, the 
building of temples to Confucius is associated with Duke Ai setting up 
Confucius home in Qufu as a shrine in 478 BCE. Holding ceremonies in honor of 
Confucius is associated with Han Emperor Liu Bang offering sacrifices of ox, 
sheep, and pig when visiting Lu in 195 BCE. The conferral of the noble title of 
Duke on Confucius is attributed to Emperor Ping in 1 CE,1585 the dignity of which 
expanded through a process of canonization until in 1645 CE Confucius was 
known as the “Great Completer, Ultimate Sage, Exalted First Teacher of 
Culture.”1586 The form of the sacrificial ceremony itself evolved from an ancient 
military display-presentation ceremony described in the three Rites texts and the 
Zuo commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals and was then transposed to 
venerate the teachers who founded particular schools.1587 From there, the display-
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presentation ceremony was merged with the sacrificial ritual in the Confucius 
temple during the Han Dynasty.1588 While there were further developments over 
intervening centuries, including additions of sacrifices to disciples of Confucius 
and other worthies, the form remained relatively stable until the latter half of the 
twentieth century when the revival of the performance of the sacrifice to the 
Confucius temple in Tainan, Taiwan was necessitated by the formation of the 
Republic of China in exile.1589 This modern performance resulted from two years 
of research by a working committee resulting in  
significant changes in the ritual system of Display-Presentation Ceremony. For the music, 
it restored to the sacrificial music and movements of the Song and Ming dynasties; added 
more musical instruments, making the scale of Bayin (eight tunes) more complete; 
constructed additional musician platform to distinguish the upper and lower furnishings; 
adopted the Yi dance notation of the Ming dynasty; for the costume of Yi dancers and 
ritualists, kept the long robe and mandarin jacket in the style of the early Republic of 
China, only the long robe is in blue to follow the national etiquette.1590 
More recently, additions were made to the form of the sacrifice in order to create 
roles for national officials, the ceremony has been shortened from ninety to sixty 
minutes, and women have been allowed to serve as ceremonial officials.1591  
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The conventionality of the Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius has to do with 
the intentionality of its human origins and formulation but it is not the case that 
the conventions of the ritual form are either significantly encoded by the 
performers of the ceremony or that they are arbitrary. While certain individual 
participants involved in the performance of the sacrifice in question likely did 
have a role on the working committee that settled its modern form, they 
nevertheless were themselves constrained by the history of its performance as 
revealed in their research such that the sacrifice would be recognizable to the rest 
of the participants. Moreover, changes made to the ritual form had to do with 
contextual factors such as the change of location, involvement and funding from 
political stakeholders, and changing social norms regarding gender. These 
factors themselves were the result of ritual processes that generated new realities 
to which the Autumnal Sacrifice had to be adjusted, or in a sense adjust itself. 
Thus, the conventionality of the changes does not make them arbitrary, as would 
be the case if they were made according to a whim or a preference as opposed to 
being made in response to an objectively real situation. 
Finally, the form of the Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius generating its 
entailments is a ritual dimension in the religious domain of the social lives of its 
participants. The question of the religiosity of the ritual deserves some 
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consideration before turning to the question of the ritual dimension of the 
linguistic domain in the next chapter. Whereas the religiosity of the Great Vigil of 
Easter analyzed in the previous chapter is uncontroversial, the question of the 
religiosity of Confucianism has been a perpetual conundrum among religious 
studies scholars, significantly over the issue of whether the tradition seeks to 
relate to a transcendent reality.1592 In his ritual theory, Roy Rappaport defines 
religion in terms of the generation of the conditions for such transcendence out of 
ritual including cosmological axioms regarding “the establishment of 
convention, the sealing of social contract, the construction of the integrated 
conventional orders we shall call Logoi, … the investment of whatever it encodes 
with morality, [and] the construction of time and eternity,” and ultimate sacred 
postulates that relate these axioms to what is transcendent of them through “the 
representation of a paradigm of creation, the generation of the concept of the 
sacred and the sanctification of conventional order, the generation of theories of 
the occult, the evocation of numinous experience, the awareness of the divine, 
the grasp of the holy, and the construction of orders of meaning transcending the 
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semantic.”1593 The Autumnal Sacrifice to Confucius clearly qualifies according to 
this definition of religion especially by investing what it encodes with morality1594 
and constructing time vis-à-vis its juxtaposition in the autumn with the Spring 
Sacrifice.1595 Aside from the fact that it is not at all clear that all religions or sub-
traditions of religions locate the referent of their ultimate sacred postulates in a 
relationship of transcendence with respect to their cosmological axioms,1596 it is 
also not clear that all rituals generate axioms and postulates in the absolute sense 
of cosmology and ultimacy that Rappaport describes, although it is perfectly 
legitimate to define religion, and so particularly religious rituals, in terms of 
cosmology and ontological ultimacy.1597 For ritual generally, across all domains, 
it is better to understand the cosmological axioms and ultimate sacred postulates 
as relative to the frame of the ritual in question such that, for example, the 
cosmological axioms of the ritual of walking have to do with raising the foot off 
the ground, extending it forward, and lowering it heel first so as to generate a 
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rolling motion, and the ultimate sacred postulate of the ritual is the locomotion 
of the person. While seemingly trivial at the micro level of walking, this relativity 
of axioms and postulates generated by ritual becomes important for 
understanding the degree and extent to which the ritual of language as discussed 
in the next chapter can express religious realities as discussed in the final 
chapter. 
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LANGUAGE AS RITUAL 
Before turning to the particular problem of religious language, this 
chapter interprets the many interlocking elements, structures, and functions of 
language production and reception in terms of the theory of ritual in all its 
aspects in order to show that language is a species of ritual. To accomplish this, 
the interpretation must move in both directions, that is, the ritual theory must be 
shown to be coherent, consistent, adequate, and applicable with respect to 
language, and language must be shown to be comprehensively addressed by the 
ritual theory. Since the goal is to show that the theory of ritual as elaborated over 
the previous two chapters is comprehensive with respect to language as 
articulated in chapter two, no new material regarding language, ritual, or 
semiotics will be introduced in this chapter. A great deal has already been said 
about Peircian semiotics in general and with respect to both language and ritual 
as it serves as the broader theoretical paradigm in which language and ritual are 
brought into relation. Nevertheless, a brief summary of the semiotic landscape 
yet facilitates smoother appropriation of the subsequent bidirectional 
interpretation of ritual and language. The chapter concludes by elaborating the 
implications of the resulting theory of language as ritual vis-à-vis three theories 
of language: Xunzi and the project of rectifying names, Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
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the concept of language games, and Noam Chomsky and the theory of universal 
grammar. 
This chapter relies on hypothetical examples to illustrate its arguments as 
opposed to the empirical examples employed to illustrate and test the emerging 
theory of ritual across the two previous chapters. Such empirical examples are 
the norm in the social scientific literature drawn upon to construct the novel 
theory in chapter four, and so it was appropriate to extend this practice to the 
comparative engagement with Confucian ritual theory in chapter five while 
shifting focus from a Christian to a Confucian ritual. This chapter shifts among 
the multiple disciplinary matrices at play in the project back into a primarily 
philosophical frame to render the semiotic integration of language as ritual, and 
philosophical discourses are more given to hypothetical than empirical 
examples. Given this shift, it is important to note that hypothetical examples 
function differently in philosophical discourse than empirical examples do in 
social scientific discourse: empirical examples in the social sciences function to 
test a theory whereas hypothetical examples in philosophy function to illustrate a 
theory. For the social sciences, the integrity of a theory is determined by its 
ability to explain the phenomena under consideration, which are represented by 
the empirical examples the theory is deployed to analyze. For philosophy, the 
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integrity of a theory is determined by the rigor of the internal logic of the 
argument, which hypothetical examples render in concrete terms so as to 
enhance comprehension of the underlying logic. Thus, whereas an empirical 
example in a social scientific context may be shown to falsify the theory if it 
contradicts the theory when it was predicted to support it, a hypothetical 
example in philosophy contradicting the theory does not necessarily result in the 
theory itself being called into question unless the contradiction illustrates a 
fallacy in the underlying logic of the theory. 
Semiotics: Language, Ritual, and Mind 
Semiotics is the study of the nature and function of signs, rituals are forms 
ordering sign systems so as to produce effects reliably, and the sign system of 
language is a massively complex human ritual. Following the semiotic theory 
elaborated by Charles Sanders Peirce, a sign is an irreducibly triadic relation 
among an object, a sign vehicle, and the effect of the sign vehicle standing for the 
object, called the interpretant. The ontology of the sign is not any of the three 
elements but rather the relation that pertains among them, and so semiotics is a 
form of realism insisting on the reality of relations exercising causal influence on 
the elements. Each of the three elements – the object, the sign vehicle, and the 
interpretant – may be either a physical thing, an action, a relation, or an idea, 
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rendering irrelevant the distinction between the mental and the physical. Sign 
vehicles that generate their interpretants by virtue of similarity or identity with 
their object are called icons. Sign vehicles that generate their interpretants by 
virtue of correspondence with or proximity to their object are called indices 
(singular: index). Sign vehicles that generate their interpretants by virtue of being 
related to their object by convention or law are called symbols. To be a thing, in 
the sense of anything determinate, is to be a sign in which a sign vehicle relates 
to an object in order to generate an interpretant. Signs being inherently relational, 
and the relations being processes generating effects, semiotics is a relational 
process metaphysics. 
In addition to things being signs, things also participate in sign systems in 
which signs are related to one another as objects and sign vehicles generating 
interpretants. Many sign systems emerge spontaneously and then cease, but the 
relational processes of sign systems whose interpretants are valuable to the 
ecology of interlocking relations may be repeated so as to continue to generate 
that value. The form of a sign system repeated in relatively invariant sequence so 
as to reliably generate value is ritual. Rituals are conventional as the ordering of 
sign systems could at least conceivably be otherwise, but they are not arbitrary 
because of the pragmatic necessity of reliably generating their effects. The 
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semiotic processes that the ritual system orders transform the ritual elements in 
dynamic tension between the way things are and the way the ritual form 
envisions they could be. Interlocking ritual systems form thick webs that pervade 
life and constitute experience in a constant process of negotiating among their 
dynamic processes so as to press toward the limit of coherence. Just as the triadic 
relations of individual signs are real independent of their elements, so too the 
nested relations of signs in rituals are real independent of the individual signs 
that make them up as they achieve objectivity. Rituals are thus performed to 
establish and maintain valuable regularities amidst the swirling chaos of 
semiosis, thereby allowing for consistency, continuity, and coherence. 
Language is an exceedingly complex ritual that humans perform as a 
sophisticated way of harmonizing ourselves with one another and the world we 
inhabit, sometimes by transforming ourselves and sometimes by transforming 
the world. The rest of this chapter will delve into the complexities of the 
language ritual in great detail, but it is important not to lose sight of the fact that 
the language ritual is a sign system. Language is one sign system among many 
other types of sign system, although all of them participate in the basic triadic 
process of semiosis, rather than being the sign system on which all other sign 
systems are based. The richness of the linguistic sign system emerges from its 
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depth in the form of the precision of its intension (reference), breadth in the form 
of the expansiveness of its extension (sense), and seemingly infinite 
combinatorial possibilities yet requiring optimization by sharply delimiting a set 
of impossibilities approaching infinity. The cognitive capacity to cope with such 
a rich sign system likely coevolved with the language ritual itself and its 
intricate, multi-level, nested network of signs, as Terrence Deacon describes. The 
complexity of language does not mean, however, that it has somehow become 
independent of or discontinuous with the wider web of ritual sign systems that 
constitute life and experience. 
The issue of the human cognitive capacity to appropriate and utilize the 
language ritual circles back to the question of the role of the mental that was 
central to antique and medieval semiotic accounts of language. The signal 
advance of John Poinsot and then Charles Peirce was to render the distinction 
between the physical and the mental irrelevant for semiotics. The challenge then 
becomes to articulate any role at all for mind other than just a node of signs and 
rituals converging and flowing together. While a systematic theory of mind is far 
beyond the scope of the present endeavor, an initial hypothesis may be advanced 
that the role of mind is to privilege and prefer coherent, consistent, and 
comprehensive orders that provide a sense of unity to life and experience. Mind 
	 601 
thus drives the construction and performance of rituals that harmonize other 
rituals so as to achieve this end. Xunzi persuasively makes the case that this 
desire for a unified and whole life and experience is one of myriad competing 
desires and itself must be cultivated properly by ritual and education in order to 
in turn harmonize all of the desires. Thus, while choice, reason, and freedom are 
not wholly illusory, they are never independent of the webs of signs and rituals 
that delimit their possibilities. 
Language Under the Aspect of Ritual 
If language is ritual, then it must at least be possible to give a 
comprehensive account of language in terms of the theory of ritual developed 
over the course of the previous two chapters in all of its aspects. The next section 
will show how each and every level and function of language, as delineated in 
the variety of modes of linguistic analysis in chapter two, inheres within the 
theory of ritual. This section, by contrast, unpacks the theory of ritual as it 
embraces language in toto. The result is a highly theoretical and abstract account 
of language as a complex sign system enabling humanity to engage the world as 
it is and to envision and enact its transformation in efficient and effective ways 
well beyond the capacity of other natural sign systems and processes. This 
abstraction will be rendered more concrete in the next chapter with respect to 
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religious language, and would benefit from instantiation with respect to a host of 
other social and natural realities that are beyond the scope of the present 
endeavor. 
As was noted above, it is important to keep in view the ways in which the 
language ritual is in constant interaction with other social and natural domains 
via their shared ritual dimension. The many rituals that make up the highly 
complex ritual of language are the topic of the next section, but it would not be 
possible to address language in its totality in this section according to the ritual 
theory without accounting for the non-linguistic rituals that overlap with 
language to generate effects under specific conditions. One of the main problems 
with the various approaches across disciplines that together constitute the broad 
notion of the linguistic turn is that language is abstracted from the broader realm 
of ritual sign systems of which it is one due to the undue influence of Saussure, 
who assumed that the structure of language is the controlling structure of all sign 
systems. Since language is understood here as a species of the ritual genus, at 
least some consideration of the relations between language and the rest of the 
elements of the ritual matrix is entirely appropriate.  
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Definition 
As a species of ritual, language is “the performance of more or less 
invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the 
performers” (Rappaport 24). That language encodes utterances, either verbal or 
written, is analytic, and the robust literature regarding speech acts makes the 
notion of language as act readily available and uncontroversial. Nevertheless, 
both will be discussed in exquisite detail in the next section. The formality of the 
acts and utterances of language has to do with the fact that these elements of the 
language ritual relate to one another according to the ritual form, which will be 
discussed in detail below in this section. While the detail of all of the levels of 
language elements relating to one another according to the linguistic form must 
await the next section, it is important here to emphasize that language elements 
cannot be reduced to words and linguistic form cannot be reduced to grammar 
as this is only one level of linguistic analysis. The relations among phonemes and 
morphemes according to phonological and morphological forms respectively are 
also language elements and linguistic forms respectively, as are the relations 
among sentences according to rhetorical forms. The layering of these many 
layers of sign systems is what makes language such a dynamic and complex 
ritual. 
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The sequences of language elements that define the possibilities of their 
relations must remain relatively invariant lest language lose the ability to encode 
the same meaning over multiple and ongoing iterations: for language to fulfill its 
communicative and constitutive functions, the same linguistic signs must refer to 
the same linguistic objects in order to generate the same linguistic interpretants 
reliably. Language change does happen, but it happens slowly and at the level of 
all language users relatively simultaneously adjusting their usage, which is to 
say that individual language users are unable to encode new linguistic meanings 
alone except as an initiation or participation in a broader process of rectifying the 
language system dependent upon social consensus for its completion. That said, 
linguistic forms do encode multiple ways to express at least some meanings, 
introducing a minimal allowance of variance and providing the performers of 
the language ritual with at least a small degree of freedom to encode a given 
performance within the prevailing constraints.  
Beyond the analytical categories of elements, forms, and sequences and 
their encoding, language is always a performance in which a given meaning is 
enacted in speech or written text according to the forms in which sequences of 
linguistic elements are encoded. Language performances are always 
performances of a particular language according to its forms, many of which are 
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specific to itself, others are common among a family of languages, and a few are 
general or universal. Just as the language ritual interacts with all of the other 
social and natural rituals that make up the web of signification constitutive of life 
and experience, languages interact with one another, borrowing structures and 
vocabulary from one another slowly in the context of ongoing and repeated 
interaction. The complexity of the language artifact must be dynamically realized 
in ongoing successive iterations of performance, each of which reflexively feeds 
back into the process of linguistic evolution, in order for language to achieve its 
effects. 
Consider, for example, the hypothetical case of a mayor of a city bisected 
by a river presiding over the opening of a new bridge across the river. In the 
context of the wider bridge opening ritual, the mayor might say something to the 
effect of, “I now declare this bridge to be open.” The wider ritual of the bridge 
opening might include the mayor cutting a ribbon with a pair of scissors, and 
perhaps someone would drive a town vehicle across the newly opened bridge. 
This wider ritual is not of particular interest to an analysis of the language ritual 
at play, however, which instead focuses on the statement declaring the bridge to 
be open.  
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With respect to the language ritual, the declaration of the bridge as being 
open is notable as containing both verbal utterances and an act. The act in 
question is the act of opening the bridge. The utterances include the words and 
sounds put together in sequence so as to achieve the act. If the sequences of 
words and sounds did not conform to the proper form, for example following 
the German syntax of placing the main verb at the end of the sentence such that 
he said “I now this bridge to be open declare,” the citizens of the city would look 
at their mayor perplexed, wondering what had happened to him, although they 
would likely be able to work out what he meant. Further grammatical changes 
might disrupt the meaning, however, such as “This bridge to be open declare 
now I,” which could mean that the bridge is declaring the mayor to be open, or 
may not mean much in the way of anything at all. Neglecting to adhere to proper 
phonological form, for example by pronouncing all vowels as long vowels, could 
result in similar disruptions or failures of meaning. Moreover, the rhetorical form 
of declaring the bridge to be open is what determines the utterance as an act of 
opening a bridge, so failure to follow this form, perhaps by saying “This bridge is 
open,” shifts the locution from an act of opening the bridge to an act of 
describing the state of the bridge. Without relative conformity to the proper 
forms at all levels of the language, or some reference to which forms are being 
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followed, it is impossible to give an account of what is being said or done in a 
given expression; the speaker or writer is effectively babbling gibberish. 
The linguistic forms themselves are encodings of sequences of language 
elements that have achieved meaning over multiple iterations of invariant 
performance. In the case of the example of the mayor opening the bridge, 
previous mayors, in other places and at previous times have opened bridges 
using the same sequence of elements, and those elements in those sequences 
were understood by the people of the relevant municipality to constitute the act 
of opening a bridge. Had there never been a bridge before, or at least had there 
never been a bridge opening before, then the sequence likely would have been 
adopted from an analogous situation, perhaps the opening of a park, and 
adapted to fit the change to the situation of a bridge. If the mayor varied the 
sequence of elements, perhaps saying “I now suspect this bridge to be open,” the 
citizens would likely at least be perplexed and may even wonder if the bridge 
were really open. The confusion resulting from the mayor varying the sequence 
of elements also demonstrates that individuals, even individuals in positions of 
power, are not able to unilaterally change the meanings of linguistic elements or 
their sequences. The performer of the language ritual must submit to the 
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encoding of the langue form as it was a priori encoded in order to generate the 
desired functions; the performer cannot encode the language form themselves. 
Of course, if the mayor does not actually say “I now declare this bridge to 
be open,” then the act of opening the bridge is not actually achieved. Language 
must be performed in order to generate its effects, even if the effect is merely the 
locution itself: without performance, there are neither acts nor utterances. As a 
result, the meaning of an instance of language cannot be located on either the 
producer or the receiver side of a conversation. Rather, meaning is located in the 
ways in which linguistic elements are ordered according to the form of the 
language ritual under the conditions of the situation in which they are deployed. 
Thus, the mayor saying “I now declare this bridge to be open” has no meaning 
abstracted from the location of the mayor, there being a bridge, the gathering of 
citizens to celebrate the opening of the bridge, the river the bridge traverses, and 
all of the other factors in relation to which the performance of the locution has 
meaning. 
Origins 
The origins of ritual are simultaneously ontological and historical. The 
ontology of ritual has to do with its reflexivity such that the entailments of the 
ritual process include work on the societies and selves that a given ritual 
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constitutes. Thus, rituals are self-contained in that they internalize the rationale 
for the structuring of their elements and adjust that structure through their own 
processes to continually accord with that rationale. Rituals also overlap with one 
another, and so are necessarily in a constant process of adjustment in order to 
maintain the coherence of their rationale in tension with similarly self-adjusting 
ritual processes. As a species of ritual, the ontology of language is likewise 
reflexive as a means for humans and human societies to carry out work on 
themselves. The system of language may represent the world as it is, but since 
the system is self-contained it is also independent of that which it represents such 
that it can also represent the world as it could or should become and enact the 
world to be in the ways the subjunctive articulations of language represent as 
constrained by the other rituals at play in a given situation. Language arises as a 
highly complex and elaborate ritual precisely because of its remarkable capacity 
to carry out this reflexive function efficiently and effectively across a wide range 
of contexts and situations. Thus, this ontology of language origins is a way of 
describing the linguistic side of the coevolution Terrence Deacon elaborates 
between language and the brain. 
The history of ritual origins, according to the theory developed in chapter 
three, has to do with the evolutionarily adaptive advantage of engendering trust 
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in a society. The costs associated with learning to perform a language ritual not 
acquired beginning at birth are quite high in terms of time and intensity of effort, 
to say nothing of the financial burden of taking courses and paying tutors. 
Moreover, those who perform a given language ritual less than fluently are 
usually adjudicated skeptically in a society where that language ritual is 
constitutive and normative; those fluent in the same language have a de facto 
level of common trust upon which to cooperatively build other aspects of a 
relationship. On one hand, this trust is maintained by the ongoing use of the 
common language among the participants in the relationship. On the other hand, 
the basis of agreements in a common language forms the basis for trust that what 
was agreed will be enacted on the basis of assumed common understanding and 
commitment even apart from regular and ongoing communication in the 
common language. This latter case results from the costly signal of language 
fluency itself being a highly reflexive endeavor that constitutes relationships 
articulated under its terms as ongoing concerns enduring beyond the scope of 
the articulation itself. 
Returning to the example of the mayor opening the bridge, the declaration 
of the bridge as open does work on the city bisected by a river by making 
passage throughout the municipality more fluid; the bridge being built but left 
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unused for lack of being communally recognized as ready for use would negate 
the point of constructing it in the first place. The mayor saying “I now declare 
this bridge to be open” enacts the process of moving from the state of affairs as 
they are, which might be represented by the statement “there is a bridge,” to the 
state of affairs as they could be, which might be represented by the statement, “if 
there were an open bridge across the river it would be easier to get to all parts of 
the city,” the latter two being at least implied in the former. The world as it is, 
namely the existence of the bridge, is not enough to achieve the goal of 
improving traffic flow in the city, which requires the declaration to open it. Since 
language is independent of the world by virtue of its reflexive self-containment, 
language may represent any of the situations of the world as it is, the world as it 
could be, and the movement from the former to the latter. Furthermore, 
assuming that the citizens of the city have English as the normative language in 
their society, the declaration that the bridge is open by the mayor in English is a 
trustworthy act that may be taken to be reliable beyond the ceremony of the 
bridge opening, thereby delimiting the need for the mayor to perpetually stand 
next to the bridge explaining to the driver of each vehicle that approaches that 
the bridge is open and they may cross. The language ritual of declaring the 
bridge open is effective, however, only because of its intersection with the 
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political ritual of the mayor leading the city, and so the authority of the 
declaration derives from the political authority of the mayor. 
Consider also the situation of two parties entering into a contract to 
transfer property from one to the other. The contract is written out in language 
that construes one of the parties as the conveyor and the other as the recipient of 
the property in question, thus constituting a relationship of transfer between the 
two. The transfer itself is enacted when the two parties both sign the contract, 
signaling their acceptance of its terms, which include both statements regarding 
the property as it is, owned by the conveyor, the property as it might be, as 
owned by the recipient, and the conditions under which both will understand 
that it has been transferred. Once the contract is mutually signed and those 
conditions are met, then the transfer becomes real and the recipient becomes the 
new owner of the property in question. The reflexive self-containment of 
language enables language to describe all three of these states with respect to the 
property because the structure of language is independent of the structure of the 
world in which the property is in one state or another and so has the capacity for 
reflexive work on the world to enact the movement from one state to another. 
Moreover, the mutual understanding of the language of the contract by the two 
parties enables trust that the terms of the contract endure beyond the moment of 
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its enactment such that the conveyor will not come back at some point in the 
future and lay claim to the property. Should such confusion arise, the language 
of the contract may be interpreted and that interpretation enforced by an 
independent party such as a court or an arbitrator. Thus, the ontological and 
historical origins of language as ritual are quite important for the basic 
constitution, functioning, and perpetuation of human societies. 
Structure 
As a species of ritual, language exhibits the same structure as ritual. This 
structure is not to be confused with the syntax or grammar of a language, 
although it includes them, but rather is the form of the language process 
ordering and transforming its elements. The elements of language include not 
only phonemes, morphemes, words, sentences, and other units of discourse, but 
also the producers and receivers of these linguistic components, as well as the 
objects, ideas, acts, relations, and situations to which the linguistic components 
refer. Each of these elements is a sign of itself to itself and the other elements and 
is a sign of its role in the ritual to itself and the other elements. With regard to the 
linguistic components, their self-reference includes the semiotic processes that 
make them up at each of their levels in the language in question. That all of the 
elements of language are signs of themselves to themselves and each other is an 
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important point often overlooked in linguistic analyses as the meaning of a 
particular instance of language use may depend, at least in part, on the fuller set 
of roles and relationships an element in play inhabits apart from the particular 
role being played in the given language ritual. Going back to the example of the 
mayor opening the bridge, it matters to the meaning of the statement “I now 
declare this bridge to be open” that it is uttered by the mayor, and not someone 
else. Even though someone else could play the role of language producer in this 
particular language ritual, the utterance would not have the same meaning as 
when it is said by the mayor. 
The elements of language must be arranged according to the order 
prescribed by the given language at play including syntax and grammar, but also 
phonological and morphological rules, and rhetorical norms. The network of 
references among the elements constitutes the order of the ritual, but only insofar 
as it adheres to the order as encoded independently by prior iterations of the 
performance of the language ritual. The constitution of the order by the language 
elements is the conventionality of the order, while the independence of the 
encoding of the ritual is its concreteness as opposed to the order being arbitrary. 
The process by which the elements are brought into accord with the various 
orders of language is the means by which they are transformed: the order is the 
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form of a process, and the ordering of the language elements is the performance 
of the language ritual. The mayor saying “I now declare this bridge to be open” 
puts himself as an element in temporal relation with the element of his act of 
declaring with respect to the element of the bridge as object and ascribing the 
status element of openness to it. All of the elements existed prior to the 
declaration, but the performance of the language ritual by the mayor brings all of 
the elements as signs, and thus their referents, into relation in a way they had not 
been previously according to an order none of them can claim credit for, which is 
to say the linguistic performance generates a new interpretant. 
The frame of language rituals is extraordinarily complex because of the 
fact that language rituals are actually networked systems of rituals, which are 
themselves systems of signs. The rituals at multiple levels that make up language 
rituals generally each have their own frames that interact as they are compiled in 
order to constitute the frame of a given linguistic expression. Whereas the 
elements and ordering of elements are relatively straightforwardly abstractable 
from the complexity of layered network systems, this is not the case for the 
frames of language rituals because they are responsible for the layering of the 
networks. As a result, much of the detail of the framing feature of ritual structure 
must await elaboration in the next section, in which the many layers of linguistic 
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ritual are parsed, but the most basic framing elements of the language ritual are 
either patterned vocalization or textuality. Others include lexicon, syntax, and 
rhetoric. Notably, the very fact that there are particular terms in language to 
articulate the framing elements of language indicates the high degree of 
reflexivity of language, which is to be expected as a networked system of rituals. 
The frame of the mayoral statement “I now declare this bridge to be open” 
includes its patterned vocalization by the mayor, its adoption of the English 
language lexicon and adherence to English language syntax, and its fulfillment of 
the rhetorical function of civic enactment. 
The ordered elements of language in their frame effect a transformation of 
at least some of the elements. If nothing else, the ordering of the particularly 
linguistic components in their frame makes that utterance a contribution to the 
ongoing development of the encoded order of the language ritual. In many cases, 
individual linguistic components are given nuance if not outright new meaning 
by the relations they are brought into in a given utterance, and this changes their 
capacity to refer to the realities with respect to which they started as sign 
vehicles. The ordering brought about by the language ritual may also alter the 
very ordering of the elements to which the linguistic components refer, such as 
by changing the status of a bridge from “closed” to “open.” This is a rather 
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practical result of a language ritual on the external world, namely the bridge, 
thereby demonstrating the technical capacity of language rituals and thus ritual 
more generally. Finally, language producers and receivers are at least 
transformed into the producer of a particular utterance or the receiver thereof, 
respectively. The mayor will forever be the person who opened the bridge, and 
the citizens who attended the opening will forever be the ones who received the 
declaration of opening as representatives of all those for whom the bridge is now 
open. 
Last, the transformations of the language elements ordered together in 
their frame achieve objectification. This is to say that a given utterance or text 
becomes available as an element of further ritual process by drawing from the 
storehouse of linguistic ritual constructions and contributing back thereto, either 
in the form of further instantiating a particular ritual process or by contributing 
to the revision of one. A given utterance, once uttered, or a text once written, is 
available to further linguistic process and so language becomes its own object. At 
the same time, the interpretant(s) of the linguistic process become objects of 
further signification independent of the sign process that generated it. Again, this 
independence of language from the reality it engages does not result in 
arbitrariness because it draws from and gives back to the realities constituted by 
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its and other ordering processes and must contribute positively among them in 
order to justify its repetition. Moreover, as ritual, language holds in tension its 
role in representing reality as it is and transforming reality according to a 
subjunctive ideal, the reflex of which generates the ritual order itself. The mayor 
opening the bridge becomes objective first in the sense that the bridge is now 
perpetually open until otherwise closed. It also becomes objective in the sense 
that the language of the declaration by the mayor is now available for reference 
and interpretation by the citizens of the city to further convey what happened, 
remind one another of the new route through town, or question some aspect of 
its meaning. The success of the declaration contributes to the language ritual of 
bridge opening declarations, or detracts from it if it fails, and represents the 
bridge both as existent and as open in conformity with the reflexed ideal of 
improved traffic flow in the city. 
It is important to stress that the structure of language is independent of 
the structure of reality yet the two are inextricably intertwined. Language 
requires independence in order to represent the subjunctive ideal the reflex of 
which is the norm for the encoding of the ritual, yet must also faithfully 
represent reality in order to accurately aim its transformative process. The 
language process, to be elaborated in greater detail below, cannot transform 
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reality to accord with its order if the structure of reality cannot admit the order 
with which the language ritual seeks to accord its elements. At the same time, if 
language and reality had the same structure, i.e. were isomorphic with respect to 
one another, then there would be no possibility of transformation as the two 
would merely reflect one another and so language would only be able to 
represent reality as it is. The independence but inextricable relatedness of the 
structures of language as a species of ritual and reality drive their mutual 
development or coevolution, as Terrence Deacon describes the intertwining of 
language and mind, which is surely a part of reality. 
The example of a property transfer contract is again illustrative of the 
structure of language as ritual. The elements of the contract include the 
conveyor, the recipient, their agents if any, the property being transferred, the 
state of the property at various stages leading up to the transfer, the state of the 
property after the transfer, and any conditions placed on the transfer being 
completed, as well as the words, terms, phrases, sentences, and clauses that 
represent all of these things, states, and their relations in text. The text of the 
contract must be ordered according to the general rules of morphology, syntax, 
grammar, and rhetoric, but must also be ordered to as to accurately represent 
both the relationship between the conveyor and receiver, the property in 
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question and its condition, and the conditions of transfer as they are now, but 
also as they will be as a result of the transfer process effected by the execution of 
the contract. The frame of the transfer contract has to do with its formatting and 
use of terminology in accordance with legal codes and statutes and with past 
precedent, which may be in some tension with colloquial usages. The contract 
effects the transformation of the property from the status of belonging to the 
conveyor to the status of belonging to the receiver. The conveyor and receiver are 
also themselves transformed into the roles of conveyor and receiver by the 
language of the contract. Finally, the transformation of the property from 
belonging to the conveyor to belonging to the receiver becomes objective, as do 
the roles of conveyor and receiver, as they outlast the moment of execution of the 
contract, remaining until further modified by another ritual act. The structure of 
the language of the contract must accurately represent the initial state of the 
property, the conveyor, and the receiver, their final state, and the process of their 
transformation from the former to the latter, but that is not to say that the 
structure of the language mirrors the structure of the relations and their 
transformation. In fact, clauses in the contract representing the final state of the 
property being conveyed often appear earlier than clauses establishing the 
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necessary condition of the property for it to be conveyed, and contracts usually 
begin by declaring their intention of effecting a given transfer. 
Process 
Language is a process of construing the elements of a given utterance in a 
certain way so as to accord with a linguistic order such that at least one of the 
elements is transformed. Even if an expression is intended to be merely 
descriptive, the elements described are transformed for having been so described 
rather than otherwise. The process of a language ritual may assign a general 
linguistic sign vehicle to a particular object, add a new sign vehicle to an object to 
render it more complex, remove a sign vehicle from an object to change its status, 
transfer a sign vehicle from one object to another, or refer a sign vehicle to a 
novel object, among other processes. In the case of the bridge opening 
declaration, the statement “I now declare this bridge to be open” refers the sign 
vehicle “open” to the adjacent bridge so as to change its status from closed to 
open. As the mayor is making the declaration, the sign vehicle “closed” is 
stripped from the bridge, and for a sheer instant the bridge is devoid of status 
signs. This is accomplished largely via the word “now,” which might be 
interpreted as akin to “hereby” signaling that what was true prior to the uttering 
of the word is no longer true, yet the new reality has not yet been fully declared.  
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The experience of liminality is relatively trivial for an inanimate object like 
a bridge, but can be more emotionally and existentially fraught for sentient 
beings. Language rituals prove quite helpful in clarifying the nature of liminality 
in ritual processes more generally. A language producer, in the very act of 
producing a linguistic expression, singles out at least one element of the ritual for 
transformation and thus discriminates or separates that element from the rest, 
which is the first stage of the ritual process as described by Van Gennep. In the 
course of expression, the discriminated elements are ordered with respect to the 
other elements of the ritual in ways that may have been indeterminate or may 
have been otherwise ordered prior, and are utterly alone, including among 
themselves, as the elements being so ordered. This is the liminal stage. From the 
perspective of the elements being transformed, the liminal stage is utterly lonely 
and awful as the order that the language ritual will establish for them with 
respect to the rest of the elements is apocalyptic in the sense of being “already” in 
the form of the expression but “not yet” in the completion of its utterance. From 
the perspective of the language receivers, however, the identification of elements 
as orderable or the discrimination of elements that had become taken for granted 
as inhabiting a new order leaves them temporarily underdetermined but at the 
forefront of attention, which is something like the anti-structure generating 
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comunitas that Victor Turner described. Nevertheless, language is clearly a meta-
structure vis-à-vis the structure of reality that, like other rituals, operates at a 
higher logical level so as to facilitate the transformative process of bringing 
reality perfused by signs into accord with ever-evolving sign systems, which 
accomplishment is the third stage of the ritual process: reincorporation. 
In the case of the bridge opening declaration, the mayor discriminates the 
bridge for transformation. In course of expression, the status of the bridge is 
rendered as open instead of its prior state as closed, but the bridge is utterly 
alone as the element undergoing the transformation, temporarily denuded of the 
signification of either closed or open until the expression is complete. From the 
perspective of the citizens listening to the mayor make the declaration, however, 
the bridge is temporarily in a position of anti-structure, and so having no 
determinate relation to them, and yet the focus of their attention as the potential 
fulfillment of their hopes for improved transit throughout the city. It is the meta-
structure of language that lifts the bridge out of reality as it is, namely in the state 
of being closed, and returns it to the new state of being open as encoded in the 
language of the declaration. 
The example of the property transfer contract is even more analogous to a 
rite of passage, although it is a rite of passage for a piece of property rather than 
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a person. The author and executors of the contract primarily discriminate the 
property in question for transformation, although secondarily also discriminate 
the conveyor and receiver and transform them into those respective roles. The 
process of transfer temporarily denudes the property of being owned by anyone, 
which calls into question its very identity as property. Once the conditions 
outlined in the language of the executed contract are met, the new ownership by 
the receiver attaches and the property has a new identity as being owned by the 
receiver. It is the meta-structure of language that achieves this transformation by 
lifting the property out of its reality as owned by the conveyor and assigning it a 
new set of signs such that it is thereafter in reality the property of the receiver 
upon reincorporation. This reassigning of signs has the effect of transforming the 
property from being a sign vehicle of the conveyor to being a sign vehicle of the 
receiver, to put the process in the idiom of semiosis.  
Function 
Whereas the functions of ritual generally are the whole system of culture 
because ritual is the encoding of all cultural systems, language is one of the 
cultural systems encoded in the form of the ritual process and so is one of the 
functions of ritual along with other cultural systems such as economics, politics, 
religion, etc. That said, cultural systems participating in the ritual form as its 
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species have more particular functions of their own. The principal function of 
language is communication, which will be explored in greater detail below. For 
the moment it is important to note that language generates the function of 
communication both in the sense of transmitting information and in the sense of 
constituting a community, achieving the latter by the former, which is distinctive 
among varieties of ritual. Meanwhile, there are several other aspects of the 
function of language as a species of ritual deserving attention here.  
First, the functions or entailments of language rituals need not be 
cognitive in spite of the fact that the principal function of language is 
communication. For example, in the case of the mayor declaring the bridge to be 
open, the bridge would be open even if there were no citizens there to hear the 
mayor make the declaration. The state of the bridge being open is a function of 
the person with the authority to open bridges in the city, in this case the mayor, 
having declared it so. The declaration is linguistic, but the language need never 
register cognitively in a given citizen for the entailment of the language to 
nevertheless hold. Most citizens do not attend bridge openings, yet they are still 
able to use the bridges that were opened by a declaration by the proper 
authority. Likewise, the property transferred between the conveyor and the 
recipient is the property of the recipient following the transfer regardless of 
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whether a third party is aware of the language of the contract or even that the 
property had previously been owned by the conveyor. The reason that the 
functions of language need not be cognitive is that while the particular function 
of language is principally communication in the sense of the transmission of 
information, that transmission has the effect of generating the function of ritual 
more generally, namely community constitution. Admittedly, there would likely 
be confusion as to whether or not the bridge was really open if no one heard the 
mayor declare it so, and this confusion might result in people checking further 
back up the chain until eventually someone queries the mayor who confirms that 
the bridge is open. Nevertheless, in confirming that the bridge is open, the mayor 
is referring back to the prior linguistic act of declaring the bridge to be open such 
that the bridge was open before the question was even raised, not declaring it 
open anew such that the bridge is only just now open. 
There are also interesting linguistic aspects of the transition from 
foreground to background, i.e. from intentional to taken for granted production, 
facilitated by ritual generally. In the case of the bridge, once the declaration is 
made that it is open, then those who ask whether it is open may be told that it is. 
If they do not believe the first person they ask, they may ask others, or even the 
mayor who opened it, until they feel confident and then they no longer have to 
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intentionally wonder whether it is open and so its openness becomes taken for 
granted. Also, once open the citizens of the town may refer to the bridge as the 
“new bridge,” and say something like, “hey, let’s take the new bridge,” at least 
implying that the bridge is open. Eventually, however, the openness of the 
bridge is not even implied, but rather assumed, such as when an outsider 
consults a map and directs her driver to “take a left and go over the bridge.” The 
bridge opening, however, is effectively a rite of passage for the bridge, so is not 
the best example of the transition from foreground to background. The contract 
transferring property, however, is an ordinary ritual in that such contracts are 
executed many times per day for different sorts of property among many 
different people. The many clauses of contracts, for example, conveying real 
property, i.e. real estate, were generated in response to problems that arose in 
prior transfers, and have become part and parcel of the standard contracts for all 
such transactions going forward so as to avoid the previous pitfalls and thereby 
enhance confidence in the language ritual of the contract. That such linguistic 
rituals within real estate contracts have become taken for granted is 
demonstrated by the fact that in spite of the advent of Global Positioning 
Systems (GPS), which makes possible an absolute rendering of the location of a 
piece of real property and its boundaries, the conveyance of real estate is still 
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ritualized relatively vis-à-vis distances measured from other pieces of property. 
Apparently, such relative means of geolocating have not become problematic, 
and so the ritual of the contract has not needed to be so enhanced. 
Performance 
The form, process, and function of language are abstractions from 
linguistic performances, as the form, process, and function of ritual are 
abstractions from ritual performances. As the enactment of generating its 
functions by its processes according to its form, the performance of language as 
ritual establishes and maintains the very conventions of its form and constitutes 
the acceptance of that form by the performer(s). Production of sentences derived 
from the lexicon and according to proper grammatical construction contributes 
to the normativity of that vocabulary and grammar. By contrast, repeated use of 
neologisms and ungrammatical constructions may lead to alternations in the 
lexicon and grammar, at least among a subgroup of the language community, at 
least potentially leading to a permanent disjunction. For example, “pants” refers 
to trousers in the United States while referring to underwear in England. Thus, 
linguistic performance is fundamentally reflexive as the means by which work is 
done on language itself. At the same time, without the performance of the form, 
linguistic processes are not rendered and so language functions are not 
	 629 
generated. Thus, language performance does real work on and in the world by 
rendering the processes of the language form to generate its functions, as well as 
on itself. The declaration of the bridge being open simultaneously maintains the 
linguistic form and process of bridge opening and opens the bridge. The 
property transfer contract simultaneously contributes to the precedent of 
language forms that constitute contracts and effects the transfer of ownership 
from the conveyor to the receiver. 
Since linguistic performance both establishes and maintains language 
itself and constructs and transforms the world via the functions of its processes, 
it is the proper aspect for addressing the intersection between language form and 
the contingencies of reality. As has already been noted, the elements and 
structures of language are both independent from yet correlated with the 
elements and structures of reality. In order to generate its effects in reality, 
language must be correlated enough therewith to for its processes to be 
applicable. Also, the semiotic systems of language are relatively stable by 
definition as rituals since rituals are encodings of sign systems reliably 
generating certain effects. This stability results from the fact that, once learned, 
language becomes largely taken for granted as part of the habitus of a society 
except when contingent circumstance intervenes or the performance of 
	 630 
overlapping rituals requires language to adjust in order to minimize overall 
cognitive dissonance. Reality, by contrast, includes many interpretants generated 
by sign vehicles standing for objects that are not particularly valuable to the 
wider ecology of the world and so are never encoded into a system such that 
they may be repeatedly generated. Language must nevertheless be able to 
register these contingent realities in order to transform the novel circumstances 
that result. It is at the intersection of the stability of language form and novelty 
generated by contingency that participants in a given language ritual enter into a 
process of negotiating power, roles, relationships, and the elements and forms of 
language itself. 
Consider that a rivet in the bridge over the river may have been 
improperly manufactured resulting in cascading failures such that the bridge 
collapses into the river. In declaring the bridge to be open, the mayor is at least 
implicitly declaring the construction process of the bridge to have been 
successfully completed such that the bridge is now safe to traverse. In so doing, 
the mayor is assuming responsibility for the safety of those who use the bridge. 
When the bridge fails, the mayor is responsible for any injuries and the 
disruption caused to the city by virtue of being the authority that declared the 
bridge open in the first place. The defective rivet is a contingent reality that had 
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no role in the linguistic ritual of declaring the bridge open, yet the mayor is still 
able to hold a press conference and explain, in the same language used to open 
the bridge, that the faulty rivet caused the bridge to collapse. Of course, that 
same language may be used to bring lawsuits against the mayor and the city, or 
to call into question the adequacy of the person serving as mayor to the role. The 
failure of the bridge also does work on the language ritual of declaring bridges to 
be open in that it reduces confidence in them and thus decreases their efficacy. 
Similarly, if the property in question were to be destroyed as the process 
of transfer were being carried out in a way not accounted for in the conditions of 
transfer outlined in the contract, the rights and obligations of the conveyor and 
receiver with respect to the property in question would become rather 
indeterminate, at least potentially resulting in negotiation via legal action by one 
or both parties. In fact, the conditions that had been accounted in the contract 
were likely themselves included as a result of contingency striking in a previous 
transaction. Nevertheless, the relative stability of the rhetorical form of a contract 
accounting for precedent cannot anticipate every possible contingency, and the 
contingency that destroyed the property in this case will likely feed back into 
that rhetorical form as a contingency clause in future contracts. Language is thus 
more dynamic than reality in having the potential to account for any possible 
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configuration of the world that might erupt, but also less dynamic than the world 
that admits such contingencies necessarily banished from the systematization of 
ritual. 
Sincerity, Subjunctivity, Efficacy, and Play 
To be sure, not all language producers are sincere in what they say or 
write, so language clearly does not function on the Augustinian model that 
would demand producers become sincere about what they articulate prior to 
linguistic production. In fact, the mayor may declare the bridge open even while 
thinking that taking the low bid meant the contractor used cheaper materials 
more prone to failure, the conveyor may be transferring the property due to 
financial distress, and the receiver may wonder if what they got was really worth 
what they paid, i.e. “buyer’s remorse.” Equally certain is that language provides 
no escape from the realities of the self or the world and so provides no contrast to 
sincerity. Neither would the mayor declaring a nonexistent bridge to be open 
somehow improve the ability of the citizens of the city to cross the river, nor can 
one of the construction workers successfully open the bridge by declaring it so 
no matter how sincere they are in making the declaration. Instead, whether or 
not they start off sincere, language users become sincere in the course of the 
language process effected by linguistic performance. A mayor harboring doubts 
	 633 
about the construction quality of a recently opened bridge nevertheless becomes 
the authority who opened the bridge by virtue of having performed the process 
of declaring the bridge open. Likewise, a conveyor under duress nevertheless no 
longer owns the property even as a receiver experiencing remorse is now stuck 
with it because the language of the contract transferring the property was 
performed in its execution and so conveyor and receiver are made sincere to its 
terms regardless. Sincerity is an outcome of the language ritual for its users, 
neither a precondition nor a contrast to its performance. 
Much more will be said about the subjunctivity of language in the next 
chapter, but for the moment it is enough to say that subjunctivity has to do with 
the ways in which language articulates reality as it could, should, or would be. 
Certainly, language is capable of describing reality as it is, but in so doing at least 
implies that reality in its current state and configuration is as it could, should, or 
would be. The capacity of language to articulate alternatives to the way things 
are results from its correlated independence vis-à-vis the world as a conventional 
sign system, i.e. a ritual. In linguistic performance, language constructs a 
subjunctive space in which the world is construed and schematized as if it 
accords with the structure the expression attributes to it. Rather than an escape 
from the world as it is, language rituals are effective precisely by rendering their 
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subjunctive constructions indicative by illocutionary force. Linguistic expression 
generates or adjusts the actions and pattern of relations among the elements of 
the language ritual by casting the subjunctive form it articulates as normative. 
The language ritual fails if and when the world is not capable of adhering to that 
norm or if other rituals at play interfere with the elements according with the 
norm. Elements that do adhere to the normative subjunctive construction of the 
language ritual thus become sincere and the language rituals that construct the 
norms with respect to which the elements become sincere are effective. 
Consider the situation of the property transfer contract. The language of 
the contract sets up a series of subjunctive spaces, first regarding the status of the 
parties, the property, and the payment prior to the transfer, then the conditions 
under which the transfer is effected, and finally the status of the parties, 
property, and payment once the transfer is complete. The correlated 
independence of the language in which the contract is written is what enables the 
contract to pick up on the parties, property, and payment, construe them as such, 
and then articulate their relations among one another at each stage of the 
transfer. The execution of the contract brings its illocutionary force to bear such 
that the status of the parties, property, and payment are adjusted to accord with 
the terms laid out in the contract and rendered sincere with regard to the norms 
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it articulates; the subjunctive is rendered indicative. If it turns out that the 
property was not actually in the state outlined in the contract that it must be in 
prior to transfer, such as in fact being owned by someone other than the 
conveyor, or if other rituals, such as economic rituals, preclude the payment 
being made, then the illocutionary force of the contract would be disrupted and 
the language ritual of the contract would fail. 
In addition to linguistically casting subjunctive spaces as normative for 
the world, language also ritually establishes subjunctive norms and makes its 
users sincere with respect to itself, i.e. reflexively. In fact, in order for the forms 
of language to successfully construct subjunctive norms for the world, they must 
first adhere to the conventions of the language ritual in which that norm is 
expressed. Each individual linguistic expression is uttered or written as if it is 
meaningful, meaning being constituted by conformity to the norms of prior 
instances of language use. In saying “I now declare this bridge to be open,” the 
mayor is operating as if the sounds, words, grammar, and rhetoric of the 
declaration conform to the norms of English. Since they do, they are meaningful 
and the mayor is sincere as a competent user of English as are the citizens of the 
city who understand the declaration and adjust their behavior to accord with the 
new status of the bridge. If the mayor instead said “I now declare this bridge to 
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be klarg,” neither would the sentence be meaningful, adopting a word not to be 
found in the lexicon, nor would the bridge be opened. Thus, the sincerity of 
language users, the subjunctive spaces language creates, and the efficacy of 
linguistic expression are always intimately interrelated at two levels 
simultaneously: the reflexive level and the level of world construction. 
The contrast between ritual and play is particularly clear and acute with 
regard to language. Language users at play must be sincere with respect to the 
subjunctive norms language casts for itself in order to understand one another 
but need not be sincere with respect to the subjunctive norms cast in language 
constituting the arena of play. Thus, play is to be distinguished from ritual 
primarily on the basis that the norms constituted in play do not endure beyond 
the framework of the arena of play whereas the norms constituted by ritual do 
endure beyond the ritual frame. Hence, while language may be used in play, it 
may never be itself a form of play because adherence to its own subjunctive 
norms requires its users to be sincere with respect to them and the performance 
of those norms does reflexively contribute back to their ongoing maintenance. If 
two children who attended the bridge opening were to get home, place a plank 
of wood over two cinderblocks, decide among themselves who would play the 
mayor, and then that one were to declare their “bridge” to be open, then neither 
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would traffic flow in the city thereby be improved nor would it be safe for a 
motor vehicle to traverse the plank of wood. Nevertheless, for their play to be 
play at bridge opening, the child playing the mayor must be sincere with regard 
to linguistic norms in saying “I now declare this bridge to be open,” even while 
not being sincere about actually opening the plank of wood across the cinder 
blocks to public access. Language itself is always ritual as it generates sincerity 
with regard to language even when being used to generate playful worldly 
norms constrained to their respective arenas of play. Whereas language as ritual 
is always in correlated independence from the world, play is independent but 
not correlated.  
Communication 
That language is a medium of communication is analytic, yet the 
prevalent approach to theorizing linguistic communication focusing on the 
propositional content of expressions obscures the fullness of the communication 
paradigm of language as ritual. The two levels of subjunctive casting rendering 
linguistic subjects sincere when efficacious correspond to the self-referential and 
canonical messages encoded in ritual as elaborated by Rappaport, but their 
interdependence is more readily articulated in the present scheme: self-
referential, i.e. reflexive, messages locate their elements and construe their 
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relationships according to the canonical messages of language encoding, which 
are then themselves either further instantiated or adjusted by the conformity or 
variations on the encoding, respectively, they reflexively perform. Self-referential 
messages thus contribute to the construction and maintenance of linguistic 
convention, i.e. the canon, and linguistic convention encodes the elements and 
their relations represented in self-referential messages. The simultaneity of the 
two levels and their interdependence bridges the gaps between the language 
producer, the correlated but independent linguistic medium, and the 
appropriation by the language receiver(s). Alas, this bridge cannot be said to 
entirely eliminate the possibility of miscommunication, especially given the 
multiple, interlocking webs of ritual at play in any given situation at any 
particular moment, i.e. the ubiquity of ritual. Thus, language is only secondarily 
communication in the sense of signal transmission; language is primarily 
communication in the sense of community constitution: distinctions among 
elements and construal of their relations in language depends upon the prior 
acceptance of the linguistic conventions that render the elements distinct and 
thus relatable. Just as performing a ritual order depends upon acceptance of 
what is encoded in the canon of the order, performing a language ritual depends 
upon acceptance of what is encoded in the canon of the language, namely its 
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lexicon, grammar, syntax, and rhetoric. Generally speaking, the canon is quite 
mystified to the performers of a given language ritual as it has become 
thoroughly taken for granted as part and parcel of the doxa of the linguistic 
community in question and the sincere habitus of the individual members 
thereof. The basic purpose of this chapter is to demystify the conventions of the 
language ritual as such in order to then be able to grapple with the capacity of 
linguistic convention to address or express that which is indistinguishable. 
Not only does the mayor saying “I now declare this bridge to be open” 
express the proposition that the bridge is open, it also has the effects of opening 
the bridge, of identifying the mayor as mayor to the citizens in attendance, and of 
making the mayor the official who opened the bridge. Not only does the 
property transfer contract express various propositions about the state of the 
property in question, it constructs the conveyor and receiver in those roles and 
governs the process of the transition of the property from one set of states to 
another set with respect to each. The capacity of language to carry out these 
effects derives from the accretion of conventional norms of structures, forms, and 
patterns organizing linguistic elements against which the performance in 
question is measured as meaningful with regard to the realities it seeks to 
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construe. Communication happens when these norms are relied upon to 
adequately construe the elements and their relations in the case at hand. 
The bridge opening declaration, by according with the canonical linguistic 
form for bridge opening, first constructs the roles of the various elements. The 
declaration construes the mayor as the authority capable of opening the bridge, 
and by in fact making the declaration and exercising that authority, the 
performance of the bridge opening ritual by the mayor also feeds back 
reflexively into the ritual of being the mayor as a further instantiation. The 
declaration also construes the constructed edifice of steel and concrete spanning 
the river as a bridge, which may seem obvious and thus trivial, but is important 
if the citizens are going to have confidence in the edifice as adequate to their 
needs in traversing the river. The syntax of the declaration construes the 
relationship between the mayor and the bridge as the relationship between the 
one with the authority to open municipal structures and the bridge in need of 
being opened. The word “now” locates the illocutionary force of the declaration 
temporally as contemporaneous with the making of the declaration. The word 
“declare” indicates what sort of rhetorical form the expression is taking and the 
type of illocutionary force it imputes. Restriction of the class of bridges to “this” 
bridge is extremely important for clarifying the precise edifice being opened and 
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further confirms the status of the edifice indicated as a bridge. In the case that the 
edifice in question is less than obviously a bridge, the mayor might need to 
accompany the declaration by a gesture for want of the citizenry casting about 
for what precisely the mayor is going on about. Use of the verb “to be” renders 
the declaration as conferring a quality, state, or status on the object, in this case 
the bridge. In this instance, the conferral is of a status, namely that of being 
“open.” All of that together reflexively serves to further instantiate the 
conventions of the linguistic ritual of bridge opening declarations within the 
even more general canon of declarations. 
The aspect of communication provides opportunity to clarify the activity 
of subjunctive casting that linguistic rituals necessarily undertake. Turning to the 
property transfer contract, the language of the contract addresses the conveyor 
and the receiver as if those roles wholly determine them and fully express their 
determinateness. Of course, the actual people involved in the transfer are not 
nearly as determinate nor determined by the language of the contract as it would 
purport. The conveyor and receiver may each also be a mother, daughter, sister, 
wife, friend, supervisor, employee, student, entrepreneur, contemplative, runner, 
etc., but these determinations of them are stripped away in the language ritual of 
the contract: within the frame of the contract, they are merely the conveyor and 
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receiver. So too, the property in question may have a rich history, may have 
interacted with many others over the course of its existence, and so may in fact 
be a kaleidoscope of determinations, yet it is necessarily reduced to the role of 
property within the linguistic ritual of the property transfer contract. Also, 
within the ritual frame, the relations among the conveyor, receiver, and property 
are also reduced to the ways in which they are construed by the contract, even 
though the conveyor may also be the mother of the receiver and the property in 
question may be the home built by the parents of the conveyor, now being 
passed on to the next generation. All language necessarily reduces elements and 
their relations, i.e. its referents, to the roles they play in the linguistic ritual at 
hand in order to maintain traction on them and to facilitate the particular process 
the form of which it is. Without this reduction, the myriad determinacies of the 
elements and intricate interrelations among them would be entirely unwieldy 
given the seemingly infinite flexibility of the linguistic medium, so the reduction 
is a function of efficacy. Also, the restriction of meaning to the frame of the ritual 
intensifies its reflexivity, further heightening its efficacy. Thus, within the frame 
of the language ritual it is extremely important for participants to accept the 
elements and their relations as if they are fully determined by the conventional 
terms of the canon in order for the linguistic process to come to fulfillment, even 
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though the full reality of the elements and their relations, metaphysically, are 
much more complex. The acceptance of the as if is necessary for the efficacy of 
the linguistic ritual at play, even as the complexity and indeterminateness with 
respect to the given ritual frame of the as is remains in the wider matrix of ritual 
webs in which a given subject participates.  
Pervasive 
Ritual is pervasive, as established in the previous two chapters, but 
language as a species of ritual is not pervasive in the same sense because other 
species of ritual, such as religious, political, economic, family, and all of the other 
myriad ritual types, participate in the pervasion of ritual generally. However, 
there is a sense in which language is pervasive on analogy to the pervasiveness 
of ritual generally on the basis that language rituals are frequently party to most 
of the rest of the species of ritual that are humanly socially significant. For 
example, a great deal of the analysis of the Great Vigil of Easter in chapter three 
addressed linguistic expressions therein. Conceptually, then, ritual in general 
functions architectonically as sign systems formally arranging sign processes 
taken as metaphysically simple, and language falls at a meso-level between the 
architectonic of ritual and humanly significant social rituals. Three clarifications 
are important with regard to this conceptualization. First, as an architectonic of 
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metaphysically simple sign processes, there are many species of ritual that are 
not necessarily socially significant for humans, and analysis of which exceeds the 
scope of this project. Second, language rituals pervade human social experience 
on two sides: on the side of ritual generally, which is to say on the canonical side 
of their own conventionality, and on the side of the broader social rituals in 
which the language rituals are employed, which is to say on the self-referential 
side reflexing on themselves and on language more broadly. This two-sided 
mediation is to be expected for a ritual functioning at the meso-level within the 
ritual web of life and experience, and is the engine driving the process of 
subjunctive casting rendering elements sincere to the ritual form at the social 
level. Finally, there is a great deal more to socially significant human rituals than 
language, and such rituals should be understood to rely on rather than depend 
on language for their functioning. 
The bridge opening declaration is a linguistic ritual constitutive of a 
political ritual. If the mayor just stood next to the bridge and gestured at it, the 
citizens of the city would not have any reason to understand that the bridge is 
open and that they may now use it to traverse the river bisecting their 
municipality. The elocution “I now declare this bridge to be open” may be 
interpreted on the side of ritual generally, which underlies the canon of sounds 
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forming words forming sentences deployed rhetorically. It may also be 
interpreted on the side of the political ritual of bridge opening, which employs 
language to construe the mayor as the authority capable of opening the bridge 
and of changing the status of the bridge from closed to open. While it is in 
principle possible for some other ritual system to fulfill this function, language is 
an extremely efficient means of doing so. 
Similarly, the property transfer contract is a linguistic ritual constitutive of 
an economic ritual. Notably, the language itself has effectively nothing to do 
with the actual exchange involved in the transfer but rather sets the terms by 
which the transfer takes place. The letters, words, phrases, sentences, 
paragraphs, clauses, and rhetoric of the contract must conform to the canon of 
the language in which the contract is written in order to be interpreted as 
language at all, let alone as an employment of language to encode the terms of 
transfer of a piece of property between a conveyor and a receiver. Again, 
language is an efficient means of encoding a mutually understood set of 
conditions of transfer that may be referred to by an objective party in case of a 
dispute regarding the terms or their effect. This efficiency coupled with and in 
spite of the almost infinite flexibility of language to express seemingly any 
situation is what makes language valuable as an adaptive advantage. 
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Conventional 
Language is conventional because language, as a species of ritual, is a 
human artifact socially constructed by common consent in correlated 
independence with the world. With very few exceptions, such as onomatopoeia, 
and aside from minimal limitation arising from physiological capacities for 
sound and graphic production, there is nothing inherent in particular sounds, 
markings, words, or their sequences, syntactic or grammatical rules, or norms of 
rhetoric that necessitate their serving as sign vehicles for their objects and not 
some other. Hence the sheer quantity and diversity of languages around the 
world, and the ability of humans to invent languages wholesale, such as 
computer languages. Also, because language is correlated but independent of the 
world, that independence means that there is nothing about the world that could 
delimit the capacity of a linguistic element to refer to it. Instead, meaning in 
language is established by accretion, that is, the repetition by multiple members 
of a community of the use of a linguistic element as a sign vehicle for an object in 
order to generate a particular interpretant. Eventually the community will forget 
that it invented that usage in the first place, thereby mystifying its 
conventionality, and the linguistic element will simply become a part of the doxa 
of the community and the habitus of its members. 
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At the same time, language is not arbitrary. New linguistic elements must 
map into the language system, its norms, and the extensionalities of prevailing 
elements in order to effectively generate their interpretants. This is to say that, 
contrary to much of the Western ritual theory literature, the establishment of 
new linguistic conventions is on the very basis of their technical capacity to 
reliably generate their interpretants within the given linguistic system. The 
necessity of this capacity to reliably generate the interpretant may be contrasted 
with the constraint denials in the previous paragraph, which are constraints 
imposed by the nature of either the sign vehicle or the object rather than the 
interpretant. This is how ritual in general and language in particular can be 
conventional but not arbitrary, namely that their construction is teleological and 
so cannot be arbitrary, or in the idiom of Xunzi, ritual and language are results of 
artifice crafted to govern the world by according heaven and earth. 
When the mayor speaks to open the bridge by declaring it so, the sounds 
vocalized so as to form words in sentential sequence draw upon previously 
established encodings with reference to which the citizens of the city may 
determine the speech as meaningful or not. There is nothing about the sound or 
word “I” (“aɪ”) that necessarily refers reflexively to the speaking subject of the 
sentence, nor is there anything about the mayor that requires the sound or word 
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“I” to serve as sign vehicle. Instead, the history of speaking subjects using the 
sound or word “I” to reflexively refer to themselves enables the citizens to 
recognize that they mayor is so self-indicating, which recognition is the proper 
interpretant of the mayor so speaking. While conventional, this use of the sound 
“aɪ” is not arbitrary because attempting to substitute the sound “ju” would not 
only fail to generate the proper interpretant because it does not accord with the 
norms of prior use in the language, it would also generate confusion because of 
the association of the sound “ju” according to the norms of past use in English 
with the word “you.”  
This articulation of the conventionality of language allows for a more 
precise rendering of the notion of correlative independence. The social 
construction of convention establishes and maintains a whole system of linguistic 
sign vehicles interrelated according to normative patterns established by the 
ritual form. That system of linguistic sign vehicles is independent of the system 
of relations among objects in the world to which those vehicles refer in order to 
reliably generate their interpretants. This independence is characterized by the 
ability to provide a description and explanation of the language system as a 
whole without necessarily referencing the system of worldly objects to which the 
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sign vehicles refer. On the other hand, it is not possible to give an account of the 
generation of the interpretants of taking the linguistic sign vehicles to stand for 
their worldly objects without reference to said objects and their relations in the 
world. Thus, while the linguistic sign system is independent, it must be 
correlated to the objects in the world and their relations in order to reliably 
generate its interpretants, which is why language is conventional but not 
arbitrary. The structure and contents of language need not mimic the structure 
and contents of the world, but the greater the disparity between them, the fewer 
interpretants will reliably be generated, so it behooves language to more or less 
closely mimic the world so as to maximize its efficacy. At the same time, the 
differences between language and the world are what allow language to 
construct its subjunctive spaces and render the world sincere with respect to 
them, so a purely descriptive language, which would precisely mimic the objects 
in the world and their relations, would inevitably renounce the transformative 
capacity of language. 
Returning to the example of the property transfer contract, the words 
“conveyor,” “receiver,” “property,” and all of the rest of the vocabulary in the 
contract must be properly formed words according to the phonetics and 
morphology of the language in which the contract is written. Furthermore, they 
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must be sequences according to the syntax and grammar of the language, and 
those sequences must be deployed so as to construct a valid rhetorical argument. 
All of these formal norms belong to the linguistic system of sign vehicles, which 
is also to say the canon of the language ritual, and are independent of the objects 
in the world and their relations that the language system might be used to 
describe and transform. In order to actually describe and transform the world, 
however, the vocabulary, grammar, and rhetoric of the contract must pick up on 
an actual person who is the conveyor, an actual person who is the receiver, and 
some object that is the property of the conveyor in order to effectively transform 
the situation such that the property in question thenceforth belongs to the 
receiver. Were the language of the contract to, for example, refer to a whole 
neighborhood instead of a single lot within the neighborhood, the contract 
would likely be invalid. The vocabulary of the contract, in this case the definition 
of the property in question, must correlate with the world or risk failing to 
generate its proper interpretant. 
Transformative 
As a species of ritual, language transforms its elements to accord with its 
construal of them according to its form in its frame. This happens in several 
ways. First, language renders its elements determinate within its frame by 
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distinguishing them from one another as being as its terms refer to them. For 
example, the declaration of the bridge as being open distinguishes the person 
making the declaration as the mayor, i.e. the person with the authority in the city 
to open bridges, from the bridge, i.e. the structure being opened. The declaration 
also renders its own illocution temporally determinate as taking place in the 
present, and renders the issue at play a question of status through its use of the 
verb “to be.” Language also transforms at least some of its elements by removing 
the sign vehicle that element began with and assigning a new sign vehicle. In the 
case of the bridge opening declaration, the implied sign vehicle of “closed” is 
removed and replaced with the explicit sign vehicle of “open.” Finally, linguistic 
expressions construe their elements as relating to one another according to their 
ideal form as linguistically encoded, and then render these ideal relations 
indicative through illocutionary force. The declaration of the bridge as open 
takes the elements of the sentence as determined by the terms of the sentence and 
renders or re-renders their relations such that the bridge is hereafter open by 
subjunctively casting them as open, in turn becoming indicative by the 
illocutionary force imposed by the status of the declaration within the wider 
frame of the political ritual.  
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This motion between the subjunctive casting and indicative rendering of 
language that transforms its elements to accord with the form of the linguistic 
ritual within its frame is crucial for understanding how language functions in 
achieving communal and social harmony. When a language user generates a 
linguistic expression, the elements of the expression enter the social arena as if 
they are fully determinate according to the terms of the expression and their 
relations. For example, in the case of the property transfer contract, the conveyor 
and the recipient are required to operate as if the construal of the property in 
question by the language of the contract expresses its full reality. This is part of 
what it means that rituals, and thus language, are framed activities. If the 
property in question were expressed in the contract as “a crystal vase,” the 
material of the vase as crystal is taken as if it were fully expressive of the 
property even though the vase is also nine inches tall, cylindrical, and chipped at 
the rim. One of the implications of this is that if the status of the property were to 
be called into question after the contract has been executed, an objective party 
called in to arbitrate would have no way of determining whether the cubic 
crystal vase the recipient actually ended up with is the crystal vase that was to 
have been conveyed through the instrument of the contract or not. The necessary 
reduction of the objects addressed in language to the interpretants generated 
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when referred to by the sign vehicles employed inevitably admits a certain 
vagueness that only an infinity of linguistic expression that is practically 
impossible could overcome. The reduction entailed in subjunctive casting results 
in an inherent fragility in the interpretant generated by illocutionary force 
rendering it indicative. The mystification of the conventional order of the ritual 
such that it becomes taken for granted serves an important function of 
reinforcing the fullness of the reality of the interpretant by making it part and 
parcel of the doxa of the community and thus of the habitus of each of its 
members. 
A counterargument to the case for the transformative capacity of language 
as elaborated here is that simply declaring “this rock is cheese” does not 
somehow make the rock cheese. Transposed into the domain of religious ritual, 
the counterargument may analogously be stated that declaring “this bread is 
flesh” and “this wine is blood” does not make them so. Several replies may be 
offered to this counterargument, starting with the fact that it neglects several 
aspects of the theory of language as ritual as it has already been stated. The 
counterargument mistakes the communicative nature of language as 
transmission of information rather than constituting a community for which the 
rock is cheese, the bread is flesh, or the wine is blood. Moreover, the 
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counterargument also fails to recognize that the theory under development here 
acknowledges that linguistic expressions that fail to be properly correlated with 
the reality of the world do result in ritual failure. It may be that the person 
declaring the rock to be cheese somehow intended the illocution to magically 
effect a transformation of the rock into a dairy product. Yet, that does not mean 
that the socially constructed linguistic medium is actually capable of carrying 
this out when there is a profound mismatch between the language system and 
the system of the world. The subjunctive casting of the declaration that “this rock 
is cheese” lacks illocutionary force and runs counter to the doxa of most 
communities and societies. The lack of such communities at least in part results 
from an evolutionary constraint: any community or society that did take rocks 
declared to be cheese as cheese would likely end up constituted by dentally 
challenged members who would be less likely to survive. 
Rituals of Language 
Just as the previous section started from the theory of ritual elaborated 
over the previous two chapters and showed how it addresses the phenomenon of 
language in general, this section returns to the second chapter to interpret the 
various modalities and levels of linguistic analysis in terms of the ritual theory. 
In so doing, this section provides an alternative interpretation of the linguistic 
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turn in its various manifestations as rooted in the semiology of Saussure, instead 
oriented toward the semiotics of Peirce as developed in the present project to 
include symbol systems encoded as rituals. The narrow goal in each subsection is 
to elaborate how a particular level of or angle on language as developed in 
linguistics, philosophy of language, logic, and hermeneutics, relies on, functions 
in, or otherwise engages the theory of ritual elaborated over the previous two 
chapters. In doing so, the section as a whole envisions language as itself made up 
of many layers of intersecting rituals that in turn bring language users, both 
producers and receivers, into interaction and relation with one another and the 
world around them. Achieving this wider goal will constitute success in making 
the various vantage points on the phenomenon of language coherent and 
systematic with respect to one another according to the terms of the ritual theory 
so as to constitute a singular theory of language.  
Phonology and Morphology 
An atomistic approach to linguistic theorizing starts from the most basic 
units of language, speech sounds, or phonemes, and builds upwards into 
morphemes, at which level meaning begins to emerge, and up the hierarchy into 
syntax, semantics, and eventually pragmatics. This is the approach associated 
with the Sound Pattern of English phonology of Noam Chomsky and the 
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inheritors of his lineage. By contrast, Optimality Theory (OT) begins at the level 
of meaning with basic morphological units called lexemes and then derives the 
most optimal inflections as measured against a range of phonological constraints. 
In both cases, phonological and morphological analyses proceed on the 
assumption that linguistic processing happens independent of the realities 
language engages. The theory of language as ritual (LR) emerging here instead 
takes the correlation of sound and meaning to be the basic unit of language, the 
most basic element of the language ritual. The range of sounds available for 
correlation with elements of reality are limited only by the human physiological 
capacity to produce them and the auditory capacity to readily distinguish them 
from other sounds. Phonology in this sense is restricted to the analysis of which 
sounds are so producible and distinguishable and is an abstraction from, rather 
than a fundamental unit of, morphology. Moreover, while OT is taken as an 
advance on atomistic theories, LR takes the lexemes it relies upon to be 
abstractions and prefers a genealogical, developmental, and systems theoretic 
analysis of language development rather than the computational paradigm of 
OT. 
The language as ritual paradigm derives the initial stage of its linguistic 
analysis from the assumptions of ritual as conventional and transformative. At 
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baseline is the range of sounds, myriad yet finite, that the human vocal apparatus 
is capable of producing and that the human auditory apparatus is capable of 
distinguishing, recognizing that individual languages may rely upon the fullness 
of this range to greater or lesser extents. The conventional character of language 
means that humans socially and collaboratively construct language, patterning 
sounds together in mutually meaningful ways so as to correlate with the world 
as it is and as it could be. The transformative character of language means that 
the purpose of patterning sounds together so as to be mutually meaningful in 
correlation with the world as it is and could be is to transform language users 
and other fragmented elements of the world toward wholeness. These three 
principles – sonic range, convention, and transformation – provide the theoretical 
basis for analyzing the basic units of language, namely, meaningful sounds. 
Linguistic analysis under the rubric of language as ritual starts with the 
full yet finite range of sounds and their auditory discrimination. In order to 
construct a language such that its conventions might be effective in achieving 
transformation, a language community must begin by identifying a particular 
sound with a particular element or aspect of reality, thereby establishing its 
intension. The community must also, in time, collaboratively agree upon the 
limits of its extension. For example, the sound ‘tree’ may initially be adopted to 
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refer to a particular oak tree planted in front of a particular house, but in time 
may be employed to refer to other oaks, and then to maples, birches, and pines as 
well. The move from specific to general necessitates drawing upon further 
sounds to pick up on the particularities of specific instances of the generalized 
term. The distinction between ‘tree’ as a collection of sounds linked together 
phonologically or functioning morphologically as a word are both abstractions 
from the sound ‘tree’ referring to a particular oak and its analogues within the 
extensional range.  
As the extension of a sound becomes increasingly fixed within a language 
community, the availability of that sound for use in other linguistic constructions 
is restricted. For example, if the sound ‘s’ becomes designated to indicate 
plurality when appended to the end of nouns, then it is no longer available to 
designate other qualities of nouns, such as color or size, although it might be put 
to use otherwise when applied to other parts of speech, such as verbs. Instead, 
other sounds must be employed to distinguish color and size, such as ‘blue,’ 
‘green,’ ‘big,’ and ‘small,’ and in designating them, they also accrue certain 
extensionality delimiting their employment for alternate uses. The delineation of 
a language system thus begins with an ongoing set of correlations among 
producible and distinguishable sounds, the relations of their intension and 
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extensional ranges to one other, and the realities in the world those sounds are 
taken to represent. 
There are several constraints that impact the development of these basic 
elements of language systems. First, once a sound has a fixed extension, it is no 
longer available to mean something outside the scope of that extension, except 
by analogy, in which case it is drawing that thing into its extensionality as 
related. This is what it means for a sound to have become correlated with 
particular elements or aspects of elements in the world such that while the 
sounds are independent from reality in principle, they are no longer arbitrary 
once fixed. Second, language communities will resist using sounds that could 
easily be confused for sounds employed to discriminate elements of reality or 
aspects of those elements they take to be most important, and will often use 
sounds most easily produced for the most frequent elements or aspects engaged. 
This introduces an element of economic selection into the development of 
language systems such that ease and efficiency are privileged. Finally, the ways 
in which sounds are conjoined such that their meanings are conjoined must 
follow the pattern of relations among elements in the world and the relations of 
aspects to their elements. This patterning across instances, admitting limited 
variation for the sake of easing the process of sound production, is a result of 
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correlation with the systems and processes of the world, not a rule set inherent to 
language itself. Without such an integral connection to reality, language would 
be incapable of transforming the world. Moreover, the tendency toward common 
patterns across instances reflects the ritual privileging of harmonization as a goal 
of the transformative process and is a means of its achievement. Patterning of 
combinations of consonants and vowels, and then the further patterning of 
syllables into words, is better explained by these constraints excluding certain 
possibilities than by necessary rules built into an innate grammatical function. 
This first level analysis of language in a ritual paradigm is necessarily 
somewhat genealogical as the initial assignment of a sound to an element or 
aspect of an element in reality is at first arbitrary. Over time, other sounds 
become assigned to other objects, and the process of interrelating sounds to 
reflect the interrelation of elements and aspects in reality gets going. 
Increasingly, it becomes difficult to change the meaning of a particular sound, or 
to substitute a new sound for a given element or aspect of reality, without 
destabilizing the whole system. The system of language may also become 
resistant to accepting changes in the world, or at least changes in the 
understanding of the world that it was initially developed to represent and 
transform. Furthermore, it is quite possible to overstate the degree of direct 
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mapping between the system of language and the system of the world. To resist 
this temptation, it is necessary to remember that as ritual, language seeks to 
transform the fragmented world it engages by a process of harmonization 
toward wholeness. As a result, the system of language tends to overrepresent 
wholeness by trending toward greater degrees of consistency, regularity, and 
patterning than the world actually exhibits apart from its having been ritualized. 
Language at this level thus adheres to the definition of ritual as “the 
performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances 
not entirely encoded by the performers” (Rappaport 24). Most of the time 
language performers do not wholesale encode which sounds refer to which 
elements or aspects of reality, but they do further instantiate inherited 
correlations. That said, they do sometimes have to incorporate new sounds or 
conjunctions of sounds to pick up on elements or aspects of reality that their 
language had previously either overlooked or otherwise been unaware of, or had 
misclassified under the extension of another sound. The ongoing correlation 
between sounds and elements and aspects of reality result in formal patterns of 
correlation and relation among correlates. The level of variance in their sequence 
is an issue properly belonging to syntax, but the optimization of correlation and 
harmonization even at the phono-morphological level would predict a relatively 
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high degree of invariance in sequencing phonemes and morphemes. Finally, 
these correlations and patterns must be performed in speech if they are to be 
sustained as useful means of transforming selves, societies, and thereby the 
wider world. 
Syntax 
While the preceding analysis of language sounds addresses a degree of 
relation among sounds so as to generate complexes of meaning, syntax is the 
arena in which relations among meaningful sounds comes to the fore. The 
purpose of syntax is to package meaningful sounds together against a backdrop 
of structural precedent in order to generate novel meanings among the 
participants in the language ritual. This novelty generated by syntactic relations 
constitutes one aspect of the shift in language from representing the world as it 
is, toward which the basic units of speech sounds tend, to construing the world 
as it could be. This syntactic subjunctivity is one of two subjunctive points that 
together form an elipse of meaning circumscribing the limits of meaningful and 
communicative language use. The syntactic pole pulls toward the structural 
construal of the sound elements such that they conform to the precedent of 
syntactic ritual norms at play in the language. For example, if a language has the 
ritual norm of subject-object-verb and a language user instead orders a sentence 
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verb-object-subject, the structural anomaly of the sentence will impede and 
occlude the communication of its meaning, if not disrupt that meaning entirely. 
It is important to contrast the structural subjunctivity of syntax, which has driven 
the locus of interpretation of language and all other sign systems on its model, 
with the other pole defining the elipse, pragmatics, which includes language user 
intent against the backdrop of a sociocultural knowledge base. Syntactic 
subjunctivity is the structural norm encoded ritually to which language users 
must conform in order for their intentional meanings to communicate, but that 
does not mean that intentional meaning can be reduced to the structure imposed 
by the ritual form of syntax. 
Syntax has to do with the patterned system of relations among the sounds 
of language that correlate with reality, but this is not to say that the syntactic 
patterns themselves necessarily mirror the patterns of relations among things in 
the world that the sounds of language discriminate. Instead, the patterns among 
sounds follow the formal patterns of the norms ritually encoded in the syntax of 
the language. The difference between the patterned relations in the world and 
the patterned relations in language is what constitutes the subjunctivity of 
syntax, creating space in which to construe the world as it could or should be. As 
a result of this emphasis on pattern and relation, syntax leans most heavily into 
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the structural aspect of ritual. The elements of the syntax ritual are the sounds 
that it inherits from phonology/morphology, which it then orders according to its 
form within its frame. In so doing, the language ritual transforms at least the 
perception of the patterned relations among the meanings of its elements, if not 
the meanings themselves, and these perceptions and meanings achieve 
objectification as they become taken for granted as so. Thus, language as ritual 
(LR) harmonizes formalist and functionalist approaches to syntax. On the 
formalist side it acknowledges the aspiration toward a minimal, common set of 
norms that guide well-formedness, which is the very structure of the syntactic 
patterns of relations. On the functionalist side, it recognizes the need to sacrifice 
rigor in order to adequately pick up on the relations among elements of reality 
that do not directly mirror the relations encoded in the grammar of the language.  
Syntax being the primary mechanism for defining the ritual sequence of 
language, this harmony of form and function is enabled by that sequence being 
more or less invariant. If it were entirely invariant, it would be a strict formalism, 
risking ossification, whereas too much variance leads to incoherence and so risks 
failure of the communicative function. Instead of admitting a higher degree of 
structural variance, language introduces numerous mechanisms to allow 
increasing complexity to account for the discrepancies between the patterned 
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relations encoded in the syntax of the language and the patterned relations 
among things in the world that linguistic elements discriminate among.   
As the primary structure of the language ritual, syntax is not entirely 
encoded by the performers. The majority of the encoding emerges from prior 
performances of the language in question, and a present performance contributes 
to that encoding process for future iterations, either reaffirming past syntactic 
forms, or experimenting with alternatives that may be embraced or rejected. One 
of the problems with generative theories of grammar is that they assume that 
there is some static thing that is syntax arising from human mental structures. 
Instead, LR takes the stability of syntax to be a result of fulfilling the 
communicative function of language rather than an innate mental faculty. 
Likewise, this obviates the need to explain structural differences among 
languages, as there is no reason to posit anything like a universal linguistic 
structure from which individual languages deviate in various ways and to 
varying degrees. 
Pragmatics 
The second point defining the elipse of meaning in language is 
pragmatics, having to do with the context of language use. The elements 
discriminated by language sounds are ordered one way according to the artificial 
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patterned norms of syntax, but that artifice must then be realized, which 
accomplishment often requires yet another schematization of the relations 
among the elements. In syntax, language establishes a subjunctive space that is 
artificial in its construal of reality according to its pattern of relations, but in 
pragmatics that subjunctivity turns back to reality as a potential pattern of 
relations that could or should apply to the discriminated elements. In some cases, 
the final meaning of a linguistic utterance adheres quite closely to the syntactic 
pattern, such as when a speaker says of a red house, “That house is red,” 
although even then the meaning of “that” depends on which house is present in 
the situation, which is a pragmatic concern.  In other cases, the meaning of an 
utterance has almost nothing to do with the pattern set by the syntax, such as 
when a speaker expresses anger by saying, “I’m seeing red,” which depends 
instead on assumed common background knowledge, and so the meaning is 
almost entirely pragmatic. Whereas the elipse of meaning is structural at the 
syntactic pole, it is functional at the pragmatic pole, and the tension between the 
two is a main source of the creative capacity of language in human life. 
Given its functional role, the pragmatics of language leans heavily into the 
functional aspect of ritual. On one hand, as was noted in chapter three, language 
as a cultural system is itself one of the entailments of the pervasive ritual 
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paradigm in human life as the form of all socio-cultural systems. At the same 
time, language is a ritual process of meaning-making and so generates its own 
particular sorts of products, outcomes, and entailments. These functions range 
from clarifying syntax by picking out the actual reference of deictic terms, to 
meaning that arises out of implicature constraints, to the social realities 
communally constituted by communication through the language medium. 
Whereas syntax relies on the structure of language to derive meaning from 
speech sounds, pragmatics renders that meaning through the contextual matrices 
of other ritual forms and processes at play in a given situation, such as social, 
political, economic, religious, or other language rituals.  
Linguistic pragmatics plays the role of aiding the transition from cognitive 
to taken for granted in several ways. Language is the primary means by which 
humans grapple with problems that arise in the other ritual forms and processes 
at play in life, and so language is a means of transforming reality to address 
aspects of social, political, economic, religious, etc. life that become cognitive 
because they have become problematic. Once resolved, linguistic repetition of 
the solution to the problem often plays a role in its becoming taken for granted 
within the domain for which it is relevant. Also, the successful generation of 
pragmatic interpretants as solutions to problems makes the linguistic structures, 
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processes, and meanings that gave rise to a given solution normative for the 
language in question, and their ongoing success in so generating solutions may 
result in their also becoming taken for granted. While the solution to a problem 
in another ritual domain is usually cognitive at least in the first instance, the 
process of linguistic norms for addressing the problem either becoming 
normative or reinforcing prior norms is frequently noncognitive for language 
users. Notably, their being meaningful as linguistically normative is independent 
of whether they are recognized, i.e. known, as such. 
Semantics 
Semantics supervenes on phonology and morphology as the meaning of a 
sound simply is that element or aspect of reality the sound discriminates through 
use and systematization with respect to other sounds. Semantics supervenes on 
syntax in that randomly conjoined sounds and words cannot have meaning at all 
apart from their conforming to syntactic norms according to which their meaning 
is construed in relation to one another. Semantics supervenes on pragmatics as 
the meaning of language must always be linguistically, situationally, and 
contextually realized in reality. Thus, semantics encapsulates phonology/ 
morphology, syntax, and pragmatics in the conceptual scheme of language as 
ritual (LR) as the dimension of meaning that each of these elements of the 
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linguistic system generates independently and together. Semantics literally 
means “meaning,” but the meaning of a linguistic expression is only ever 
partially determined by the intensional and extensional ranges of particular 
sounds, the linguistic structure encoded in syntax, and the functions produced 
through language use. The surplus of meaning generated by the three elements 
of the system together as the ritual system of language is the domain of 
semantics.  
Semantics leans most heavily into the process aspect of the theory of ritual 
as it is the meaning of language that allows it to be a transformative force in the 
world. The movement among phonology/morphology, syntax, and pragmatics 
follows the three stages of the ritual process first outlined by Van Gennep. The 
sounds of language discriminate various objects and relations in reality, which 
are their meaning, separating them from one another and drawing them into the 
language ritual. Syntactic meaning is the marginal or liminal stage in which the 
objects and relations in reality represented in language sounds are reordered 
according to the norms of the patterned relations of the grammar of the 
language. Syntactic encoding, being a correlated yet independent pattern of 
relations from those inherent in reality, is a meta-structure rather than an anti-
structure, and so generates ambiguity and disorientation with respect to the 
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meaning of language against the horizons of real relations and syntactic 
relations. Pragmatics is the meaning that language offers back to reality both as a 
reconfiguration of what was and as a novel contribution to its ongoing processes 
of signification. Semantics is the domain of transformation in which the structure 
of relations among objects in the world and the syntactically encoded artificial 
structure of the language tool are rendered together so as to achieve the 
pragmatic intents of the language user in the understanding of the receivers. 
Syntax detaches the phonological and morphological signs from their objects and 
relations in reality and reorders them according to its own pattern of relations in 
order to pragmatically generate new and renewed semantic realities. 
The surplus of meaning in language that semantics encompasses may be 
analyzed on a spectrum moving from phonology/morphology, or the sound of 
language, through syntax, or the structure of language, to pragmatics, or the 
entailments of language. Linguistic meanings having to do with construal of 
situations tend to fall at the phonological/morphological end of the semantic 
spectrum, relying more or less heavily on sound features to nuance linguistic 
elements and relations according to tense, aspect, modality, evidentiality, or 
situation type. Linguistic meaning having to do with the roles being played in a 
given situation, and their relative status in the situation, tend to rely more or less 
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heavily on syntactic structures to locate objects and relations in a particular role 
and then to foreground or background that role through varieties of voice. 
Linguistic meanings having to do with cooperative inferences and contextual 
knowledge fall at the pragmatic end of the spectrum as they account for the 
relevance of the linguistic entailments. Structurally, semantics supervenes on all 
three linguistic levels, but genealogically, it is semantics that gives rise to each 
and to all three together as the ritual of language. 
The meaning of language arises from elements of reality encoded as 
sounds that are then brought into artificial syntactic relation in order to be 
offered back to reality as an alternative to, or a reinforcement of, what was. Roy 
Rappaport claimed that language gives rise to the notion of alternative, of the 
cognitive possibility of things being other than as they are, but alternative is 
introduced in the liminality stage of all ritual processes, not just language rituals.  
The general trajectory of modern linguistics and that of language as ritual (LR) 
are very different in this regard. Modern linguistics interprets all levels and 
dimensions of language in terms of structure, i.e. phonological structure, 
morphological structure, syntactic structure, pragmatic structure, semantic 
structure. This is true whether or not a given linguistic paradigm consciously 
identifies with structuralism. LR, by contrast, sees a variety of aspects of the 
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ritual phenomenon at play in linguistic meaning making, including structure, but 
also process, generation of functions, establishment of convention, and 
preparation for and realization of transformation. What is interesting about 
language is not that it has or is an isomorphic set of interlocking structures to be 
decoded, but rather that it is a dynamic and multifaceted tool for making and 
remaking reality.  
Language as a species of ritual is “the performance of more or less 
invariant sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the 
performers” (Rappaport, 24). Language does not have meaning except as 
performed either in speech and listening or in writing and reading. Performers 
neither encode which sounds refer to which elements or aspects of reality, nor 
the syntactic patterns that govern their ordering, but rather inherit them from 
prior performances. The sequences of sounds performed must adhere to the 
more or less invariant encoded patterns of syntax in order to be intelligible. That 
said, the syntactic form alone does not constitute meaning as the acts and 
utterances of language are always in a particular context of the intentions of the 
performers against the backdrop of a communal knowledge base. Language is 
the performance of conventional and transformative speech sounds governed by 
the syntactic form to achieve pragmatic functions via the semantic process 
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relating phonology/morphology, syntax, and pragmatics together. The systems 
of relations among sounds and between sounds and reality are different at each 
level, but they work together something like gears in an engine in the semantic 
process in order to render linguistic meaning.  
Written Language 
Like most of modern linguistics, language as ritual (LR) takes spoken 
language to be paradigmatic and written language to be secondary. However, 
whereas most of modern linguistics takes written language to be parasitic on 
spoken language, LR finds a symbiotic relationship between the two. Written 
language is yet another ritual system of codifying language, and as such is 
correlated but independent of both the world language engages and the other 
linguistic systems. As a result, writing both constrains and adds complexity to 
language in a variety of ways at each level of linguistic analysis. The codification 
of speech sounds in an alphabet-based graphemics that seeks to represent all 
sounds employed in a language as economically as possible may also constrain 
future deployment of sounds not included in its scheme and standardize 
pronunciations of sounds that might otherwise have taken on distinctive 
features. A character-based system, by contrast, may admit multiple 
pronunciations of a single character, as is the case for Mandarin and Cantonese 
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within the wider family of Chinese languages. Writing systems rely heavily on a 
process of abstracting morphemes and phonemes from the sounds of language as 
part of their codification process, and feed these artificial abstractions back into 
the understanding of the language by its users as inherent. As a result, syntax is 
more rigid in writing systems, and speakers of languages that have associated 
graphemics and orthographies may enforce the written syntax of the language 
more rigorously in both written and spoken contexts. Writing thus becomes a 
means of stabilizing language pronunciation and organizational pattern against 
erosion, thereby slowing the process of language change. Issues of pragmatics 
are also quite different in the written context, requiring more language in order 
to elaborate the contextual elements at play that might be able to be assumed in a 
spoken context, especially with an audience that is reasonably well known. Since 
written language provides an objectification of spoken language, it also enables a 
reflexive engagement leading to intentional manipulation of the linguistic artifact 
that would be more likely to remain taken for granted otherwise. 
All of these impacts of writing systems on language may be interpreted in 
terms of aspects of the theory of ritual as well, especially sincerity, reflexivity, 
and communication. Writing systems force language users to become more 
sincere with respect to the formality of the language ritual because the longevity 
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of the text and the anonymity of the audience require packing more of the 
meaning of language into the abstractions of phonology and morphology and the 
artificial structure of syntax since neither pragmatic contexts nor effects may be 
presumed. Even as writing is a costly signal of human civilization, it also allows 
language users to adopt a reflexive stance with respect to spoken language, 
writing being a context in which work is done on language by objectifying it so 
that it may be addressed. This has the effect of heightening levels of trust among 
language users not only in one another but also in what their language 
communicates, thereby enabling an expansion of the circle of trust to encompass 
those who lie beyond the immediate context. By making language users more 
sincere with respect to the form rather than the entailments of language, and by 
making the artifice of language explicit and reflexively available, writing 
enlarges the site of the tent of a given linguistic community such that it might 
encompass a much larger public. This is the main reason that writing is the sine 
qua non of human civilization and that written language is crucial for funding the 
complex civilizational forms of societal domains such as politics, religion, 
economics, etc. 
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Typology and Relativity 
Language as ritual (LR) provides a systematic treatment of the 
relationships among language, mind, culture, and reality. It starts with the 
metaphysical understanding of reality as semiotic, that is, of reality as a 
proliferation of sign processes. The sign processes of reality form sign systems as 
rituals in which complexes of processes are performed in relatively invariant 
sequences. Human minds have evolved to not only pick up on the sign processes 
and systems at play in reality, but to actively participate in the processes and 
systems by adjusting existing rituals and constructing new ones. Ideally, signs 
and rituals are constructed so as to maximize harmony among all of the many 
elements, at each of their levels of ritualization, in reality, although harmonies 
often conflict. Humanity is maximally, as opposed to uniquely, capable of 
evaluating and addressing these conflicts of all known living beings due to the 
remarkable capacity for ritualization exhibited by our minds.  
Language is one of the primary tools that humans use to construct, adjust, 
and harmonize rituals at play in reality, especially humanly significant ritual 
systems such as religion, politics, society, economics, etc. Itself a ritual, language 
maximally leverages the human capacity to pick up on signs and sign systems in 
the world to socially mediate the process of ritual construction, adjustment, and 
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harmonization. The ritual of language is therefore schematically located, in one 
sense, between the ritual capacity of mind and the ritual process of reality, in 
another sense between the minds in reality and the humanly significant social 
systems, and yet also a peer of those systems as an entailment of the mental 
ritual process. Thus, language is simultaneously a product of culture, the 
fundament of culture, and a cultural artifact and tool. Ritual is the common 
dimension and feature of mind, culture, and reality, and language is the medium 
that renders them mutually intelligible and relevant to one another. 
LR demurs from the typical views regarding the relationship between 
language and mind: language being the structure of thought, i.e. mind, in 
linguistic relativity and linguistic determinism, and a faculty in mind 
determining language in universal grammar. While more amenable to the 
proposals of Daniel Everett and Terrence Deacon, who disrupt arguments over 
direct causation between language and mind, LR insists on ritual as the common 
element among language, mind, culture, and reality. Human minds are 
themselves rituals, i.e. semiotic systems, because they are part and parcel of the 
semiotic web that constitutes reality. The ritual of language is a further 
ritualization of the mind ritual, which as Deacon describes co-evolves with 
minds in order to increase their reflexive capacity to transform reality by 
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adjusting, constructing, and harmonizing the rich array of social rituals that 
constitute culture. This co-evolution is constrained by the need to cultivate the 
particular purpose of language to accurately and transformatively engage reality 
in ways that lead to improved harmonization of its rituals. Language does not 
structure thought. There is no universal language faculty. Instead, language and 
thought mutually participate in the domain of ritual, and so influence one 
another through dialectical, rather than direct, causality.  
Meaning 
The section on philosophy of language in chapter two framed the whole 
project of philosophy of language as a series of debates about how language is 
meaningful. Hilary Putnam showed that a theory of language must be able to 
show how language is a medium of interaction among individual thought, social 
convention, and the real world in order to be adequate and thus meaningful. The 
theory of language as ritual (LR) locates itself precisely at this intersection as a 
sign system capable of transforming the world by imposing its structure in order 
to enact is process and thereby achieve its entailments.  
The abstraction of elements and aspects of reality and their relations into 
speech sounds renders the discriminations of the world in thought into linguistic 
elements, but the systematic relations among the elements so abstracted is purely 
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sonic rather than semantic. The meaning of speech sounds is the realities in the 
world to which they refer intensionally and extensionally according to the 
network of relations socially encoded in the sound system of the language in 
question. Like the truth condition theories of Quine and Davidson, LR adopts 
semantic holism such that the meaning of an individual speech sound is 
dependent on all other speech sounds. However, LR does not adopt Davidsonian 
compositionality, rather allowing for different sorts of meaning to emerge in 
syntax and pragmatics. Within discussion of the system of speech sounds, LR is 
compatible with the Kripkean causal-historical theory of reference, wherein the 
reference of a name depends upon the social convention of its employment for 
that purpose, but extends this manner of reference to all words due to having 
adopted semantic holism. Thus, in LR, the issue of reference is one aspect of the 
larger question of meaning, and particularly the aspect having to do with the 
meaning of speech sounds. 
At the level of syntax, the question of meaning shifts from the reference of 
speech sounds to the pattern of relations among words to accord with the 
structure of the language. Whereas the system of speech sounds relies on 
distinctions among sounds mapping to distinctions in mind among things and 
relations in and aspects of reality, the syntactic system shifts to socially 
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constructed conventions of relations among speech sounds. The issue of meaning 
at the level of syntax has to do with whether or not a particular utterance 
conforms to these conventions, and so is an issue of the well-formedness of 
particular linguistic expressions. Some of these conventions arise as ways of 
privileging the economy and efficiency of communication to varying degrees. It 
is also important that syntactic patterns allow sounds to be rendered together in 
a way that reflects reality as it is and as it could or should be, and so must 
correlate with the pattern of relations in the world without necessarily 
corresponding to them. That said, many syntactic conventions are relatively 
arbitrary individually but become necessary as a system of structural norms, 
adjustment to any one of which may result in at least changes in, if not outright 
breakdown of, meaning. LR thus subscribes not only to semantic holism with 
regard to speech sounds, but also with regard to syntax, even though the two 
systems are whole in themselves and so not coterminous. 
The meaning of syntax is the validity of a linguistic utterance according to 
its expression in logic. This is because syntactic meaning has only to do with the 
meaning that arises from ordering the sonic elements of speech sounds according 
to the conventions of patterned relations encoded in the syntax. Thus, the 
meaning of syntax is at the furthest remove from linguistic engagement with 
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reality, and so the metalanguage of logic is particularly apt for evaluating 
syntactic meaning given its goal of formalization, i.e. codifying linguistic 
structure. While logic includes the usual understanding of syntax as the ordering 
of words in sentences, logic also expands the notion of syntax as including 
criteria of validity among sentences and maintenance of meaning through 
stretches of discourse. At the same time, the notion of logic at play in syntax 
demurs from issues of truth and truth conditions, and so LR may be read as a 
type of logical instrumentalism. Indeed, the relative invariance of the syntactic 
sequence is what makes language an effective tool for communication. 
Nevertheless, reality does place constraints on syntax as its structure must be 
capable of both adequately construing speech sounds such that they maintain 
their reference to elements of reality, and facilitating the pragmatic processes of 
transforming reality by generating linguistic entailments. Thus, LR may best be 
interpreted as a form of logical pluralism that embraces a variety of logics as 
identifying differing loci of stability within reality and as toolkits for facilitating 
processes that either address different problems or address the same problems 
differently. Based in critical realism, LR expects that the diversity among loci of 
stability, problems, and thus possible solutions, should be relatively minimal.  
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Whereas at the level of speech sounds, meaning is the elements of reality 
referred to, and at the level of syntax, meaning is the artificial structure to which 
language must conform, at the level of language use, or pragmatics, meaning is 
what it is that language does, that is, its entailments or products. In addressing 
the meaning generated in language use, the theory of language games developed 
from Wittgenstein and the theory of performative language derived from Austin 
both suffer from overemphasizing the social context in which language is used 
such that meaning is reduced to the wider ritual frames in which it is employed. 
The Gricean advance is to acknowledge speaker intent and syntactic norms 
deployed according to the efficiencies of conversational implicature, but this 
program stops short of showing how actual outcomes are achieved. Donald 
Davidson points toward a resolution of this deficiency by giving an account of 
what would need to be the case in order for language to produce its entailments 
in a given case, but this largely has to do with the reference of speech sounds. LR 
identifies the pragmatic meaning of language as the actual products that 
language use entails when it instantiates syntactically patterned speech sounds 
in reality amongst the conventional patterns at play. The pragmatic meaning of 
the statement “I am seeing red” changes depending on whether the speaker and 
receiver are standing side by side facing a red barn or are facing one another 
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commenting on election outcomes precisely because the statement produces 
different entailments in each case. In the first case the speaker is describing the 
color of the barn, which may result in either concurrence or dissent. In the second 
case the speaker is expressing anger, which may either be shared or not. Of 
course, whether any entailments at all are produced may be called into question 
if the two people are facing a red barn while discussing election outcomes. 
Pragmatic meaning thus has to do with the situation of reality as it receives the 
artificially patterned speech sounds referring to other elements, relations, and 
aspects of reality. The wider ritual frames elaborated as games or performances 
are extremely important here, and focal, as they are for Wittgenstein and Austin, 
but as one dimension of meaning, namely pragmatic meaning, rather than as 
meaning per se.  
Phonological, syntactic, and pragmatic meaning thus having been 
distinguished, semantics as a whole was described above as the process by which 
speech sounds are structured so as to generate entailments and the surplus of 
meaning arising from that process. This means that meaning overall, not just 
meaning as expressed in either the phonological, syntactic, or pragmatic mode, is 
the result of taking the whole process of language to stand for the process of 
reality moving from what is to what it could or should become. Thus, meaning is 
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semiotic in two senses. First, the syntactic sign vehicle standing for the speech 
sound elements that refer to reality generates the pragmatic entailments as 
interpretants. Second, the whole semantic process is itself a sign vehicle of the 
process of reality undergoing transformation, and taking the semantic vehicle as 
a sign of reality becoming, itself generates interpretants in reality. Written 
language intensifies these semiotic processes by making them more rigorous and 
reflexing them on themselves. At the semantic level, then, LR fulfills the 
demands set by Hilary Putnam that linguistic meaning arise from and account 
for the ideas and intentions of the language user amidst social conventions of 
language structure to address the reality of the world.  
A final question regarding meaning as a philosophical category is whether 
any room has been left in LR for a concept of truth. Clearly, truth cannot be 
conceived in LR as anything like a simple correspondence between an utterance 
and reality because neither language nor reality is a single system that could 
correspond to another. Instead, both are ongoing, complex, interlocking system 
processes made up of system processes that interact with one another at multiple 
levels. Truth must therefore be equally complex, consisting in the success of the 
whole process of abstracting distinguished elements from reality and ordering 
them according to the syntactic pattern of the language in play so as to generate 
	 685 
the intended functions within the frame of the ritual as constrained by other 
social rituals. An utterance could thus be phonologically true by successfully 
referring to distinguished elements of reality but syntactically false by violating 
norms of word order. Likewise, an utterance could be syntactically true by 
following the right patterns but phonologically false by not referring to anything 
real. An expression could be pragmatically true by generating its function, such 
as turning the public on an opposing official, but phonologically false by 
employing speech sounds that do not refer to anything in reality. The same is 
true for all of the combinations of modes of meaning. Furthermore, it is also 
possible to conceive of truth in a more holistic sense as the success of the whole 
expression in all of its modes, in which case it makes a more significant and 
substantial contribution to the ongoing ritual process of the language in total. 
This sense of truth thus turns to the reality of language as ritual as a 
performance, reflexively rendering its own patterns and processes as normative, 
and constituting its elements and entailments as individuals and collectives 
participating in the ongoing processes of reality and society. 
Hermeneutics 
The individual capacity to produce meaningful language is insufficient in 
establishing language as ritual (LR) as a comprehensive theory of language 
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because it does not yet address how meaning produced is then received, 
interpreted, and understood. This requires a turn to the set of domains 
categorized in chapter two under the heading of hermeneutics and their 
reinterpretation as themselves participating in aspects of ritual. The tradition of 
hermeneutics broadly construed as described in chapter two shifted from 
aspiring to universality to privileging the particular. LR, by contrast, demurs 
from making linguistic interpretation determinative for interpretation across all 
domains of human ritualization, while acknowledging that linguistic 
interpretation participates in many, if not all, of these domains. Likewise, LR 
resists the tendency to relativize linguistic interpretation to individual social 
events and their reigning ideologies, instead recognizing common interpretive 
processes that are generalizable as they are rooted in cognition.  
The interpretation of linguistic utterances involves three simultaneous, 
interlocking movements between the language producer and the receiver(s). The 
first movement pertains to the ascertainment as to the reference of speech 
sounds. A language receiver must connect the speech sounds heard with 
particular discriminations of reality. Both the producer and the receiver assume 
that they are connecting the speech sounds in question with the same 
discrimination of reality, but in a given act of interpretation this connection may 
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vary between the two to greater or lesser degrees. For example, a producer may 
use the word “fork” to refer to a fork with four tines, but if the receiver expects 
that forks only have three tines, the language ritual may either fail or require 
further linguistic process to establish the connection. This is a different 
distinction that that put forward by Kripke between speaker reference and 
semantic reference because LR does not assume, as Kripke does, that syntax is 
capable of bearing referential meaning. Instead, the difference between user 
reference and receiver reference results from subtle differences between the 
mappings of speech sounds onto discriminations of reality between the two and 
from differences in discriminations among elements, aspects, and relations in 
reality. While discrepancies in the discriminatory matrix between user and 
receiver may disrupt communication via the language medium, the language 
ritual is also a means of harmonizing discriminatory matrices by negotiating the 
proper conception of their contours. To use Gadamerian terminology, the 
communicative practice of the language ritual aims toward fusion of the 
horizons of speech sounds that map the discriminatory matrix of elements, 
aspects, and relations in the world that language users and receivers employ. 
Understanding in this phonological movement is the result of speech sounds 
referring to discriminations of reality that are shared between the language 
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producer and any and all receivers. Interpretation is the work of negotiation to 
make such sharing possible. 
The second movement between language producer and receiver has to do 
with the degree of variance between the set of formal norms presumed as 
governing the syntax of the language in use and the form of the utterance in 
question. If the language producer violates norms that the receiver takes to be 
determinative of the meaning of the utterance in question, then the receiver may 
deem the expression uninterpretable or just wrong. It is important to remember 
that the syntactic norms that pattern linguistic expressions are not mirrors of 
either the structure of reality or the structure of the human mind, although they 
must correlate to each to some extent, but rather are artificial structures built up 
ritually over time by accretion and repetition. This is to say that, for LR, the 
meaning that syntax encodes on its own is simply adherence to conventionally 
established norms in the language. As a result, interpretation is less hindered by 
relatively minor variations in syntax than by minor variations in phonological 
reference because corrections based on reference to norms and anticipated 
purpose may be interpolated on the fly. On the other hand, more significant 
variations often result in a complete breakdown of interpretation as meaning is 
only communicable between language producers and receivers insofar as it 
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adheres to those conventional norms; the language ritual is without form apart 
from syntax. Understanding in this syntactic movement merely consists in 
knowledge of, conformity to, and adherence to the forms that constitute the 
syntax of the language, from which interpretation emerges and toward which it 
contributes. 
The third movement connecting the language producer and the receiver(s) 
in the interpretive work of arriving at understanding has to do with their 
sharing, or not, in a common context out of which the utterance in question 
emerges and toward which it makes pragmatic offerings of certain entailments. 
The issue of the common context is not whether they inhabit the same world or 
are located in relatively the same place and time within that world. Rather, the 
issue of the common context has to do with whether their discriminations of the 
elements, aspects, and relations in the world are aligned such that the expected 
and perceived entailments generated by the linguistic process may also be 
aligned. Included in this contextual discernment is a whole set of assumptions 
that the producer and receiver(s) make about one another and about themselves 
with regard to motivations, aspirations, and goals. Not only must 
discriminations of reality be aligned in order for a receiver to pick up on that in 
the world to which language refers, but they must also be aligned in the 
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pragmatic movement in order for a receiver to anticipate what a producer is 
doing in the world via language. Variations between the discriminations made 
by producers and receivers are thus more disruptive of shared meaning between 
them than relatively minor divergences in adoption, adherence, and application 
of syntactic norms. At the same time, it is the variations among discriminations 
that make ritualization, and especially the ritual of language, necessary as a 
means of bridging, negotiating, and harmonizing purposive behavior. This 
analysis of the pragmatic dimension of interpretation leads to a critique of the 
critique critical theory levels against hermeneutics for aspiring to universality at 
the expense of social change and liberative practice. LR acknowledges that the 
universal aspirations of hermeneutics can be problematic, but resists the 
overcorrection in critical theory that ends up reducing interpretation to the 
pragmatic movement, thus obscuring the fullness of interpretation encompassing 
the whole ritual of language. The pragmatic focus of Critical Discourse Analysis, 
while revelatory in its interpretations of pragmatics, is particularly concerning as 
it risks turning reduction to pragmatic intent into a form of linguistic 
determinism. 
Ritual is pervasive in human life and in the world as the systematization 
of semiosis. Language, as a species of ritual, is not pervasive because there are 
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other species of ritual at play systematizing semiosis in life and the world as 
well. Nevertheless, interpretation is pervasive, as all rituals require 
interpretation, albeit not necessarily interpretation by a knowing mind, because 
they are means of communicating and so must mediate between a producer and 
at least one receiver. This is to say that rituals systematize reality among their 
participants so as to constitute that reality and so require that participants in the 
receiver role interpret the ritual process enacted by those in the producer role. 
The pervasiveness of interpretation, but not language, leads to an important 
consideration vis-à-vis semantic holism, which LR adopts. In the hermeneutic 
tradition as influenced by Ast and Schleiermacher, semantic holism refers to the 
mutual interdependence of parts and wholes as determinative of meaning. While 
agreeing with this central insight into whole-part interdependence for meaning, 
LR agrees with Ray L. Hart that semantic holism applies to language but not to 
the world to which language refers. This is to say that the meaning of speech 
sounds depends on the whole system of speech sounds, the meaning of syntax 
on the whole system of grammar, and the pragmatic meaning on the full set of 
understandings, intentions, and dispositions of the whole set of ritual elements, 
but not on the whole system of the world. As Hart insists, there is always more to 
be revealed from the wellspring of being than can be encoded in a finite system 
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such as language, although language can register newly revealed elements, 
aspects, and relations in being due to its nearly infinite capacity for configuration 
and expansion. Thus, the shared meaning interpreted from language contributes 
to an ongoing process of accretion and growth in understanding and knowledge. 
Returning to the producer perspective within the language ritual, rhetoric 
relies on the reflexive capacities of the human mind to imagine and anticipate 
how a receiver will interpret a particular utterance. Selection of speech sounds to 
incorporate in an utterance may be based on presumed shared discriminations of 
reality or instead may lean into ambiguity created by presumed divergences in 
discriminations and reference to those discriminations by particular sounds. 
Similarly, while effective rhetoric relies on adherence to syntactic norms, the 
complexity that grammar is capable of generating in language also allows for 
rendering of norms so as to make the vague clear or vice versa. Perhaps nowhere 
is the capacity for nuance greater than when a producer accounts for the context 
and intention of speech to structure sounds to particular effect. While admission 
of ambiguity, vagueness, and nuance permits language to be deployed for 
nefarious ends, they are also requisite for language to be an effective medium of 
communication at the intersection of the world, language producers and their 
intentions, and language recipients and their interpretations. Harmonizing and 
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attuning all three requires room for negotiation of how each user discriminates 
reality, infelicities due to divergences in appropriating syntactic norms, and 
diversities of participant goals and intentions. Rhetorical space is also necessary 
for maintaining and sustaining the realities ritually constructed in language and 
other ritual domains in life amidst the flux and flow of semiosis. Rhetoric relies 
on the interpretation of the language ritual and its participants and then feeds 
back into further interpretations, ideally toward common ground for the 
common good, but always admitting the possibility of malevolent or subversive 
intent. 
As was mentioned in chapter two, stylistics frequently suffers from 
disciplinary dislocation as a result of its incorporation of concepts and 
orientations from the hermeneutic stream of thought into linguistics proper. LR 
locates stylistics as an empirical approach to dimensions of language that are 
important for guiding rhetoric and facilitating interpretation, particularly in the 
realm of pragmatics. Stylistics also picks up on features of language that 
contribute to at least part of the semantic surplus of meaning that exceeds the 
semantic process linking phonological reference, syntactic structure, and 
pragmatic entailments. Stylistic analysis is particularly important for exploring 
the junctures between linguistic rituals and other ritual domains. In fact, stylistics 
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seeks to render a rigorous analytic framework for understanding many of the 
aspects of life, such as courtesy and etiquette, that Confucians took to be 
important for restoring socio-political stability to Warring States China. 
Confucian interest in minute details that establish genre, tone, and style, 
characteristic of several stages of development in the Analects, is reflected in 
stylistic interest in such details that stretch beyond the linguistic in modern 
stylistics. Xunzi was notable to expanding this more limited notion of ritual to 
encompass all conventional human behavior, and LR reflects this expansion by 
locating stylistics as one aspect of a more extensive range of ritualizing processes. 
Moreover, LR honors the interdisciplinary urge in stylistics by locating it at the 
intersection of linguistic and non-linguistic rituals, but in so doing seeks to 
ground it in the wider theory so as to avoid untethering. 
Translation 
As should be expected, LR advances a novel theory of translation as the 
interpretive work of transposing meaning from a source language into a target 
language. Just as religious philosophy adopts critical realism as a minimum 
assumption underlying interdisciplinary work, as explained in chapter one, LR 
adopts critical realism as a minimum assumption undergirding translation. 
Critical realism posits that there is a real world independent of what any given 
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person may think about it, or in the linguistic frame, independent of how any 
given language may refer to it. On one hand, because there is one common 
world, any and all languages should be able to refer, at least in principle, to 
anything in that world. On the other hand, because any two language users may 
discriminate the elements, aspects, and relations in the world differently, one 
language may develop ritually on the basis of discriminations that another 
language may not readily make. So too, two users operating in the same 
language may discriminate the world differently, which is the way of articulating 
in LR the underdetermination of meaning Quine identifies as the indeterminacy 
or inscrutability of reference. Translation at the level of speech sounds, then, 
given that they refer to elements, aspects, and relations in reality, involves not 
only finding equivalent speech sounds but also nuancing and complexifying the 
expression in the target language to specify that to which the source language 
seeks to refer.  
At the level of syntax, translation shifts from privileging the reference to 
discriminations of reality in the source language to privileging the patterning of 
sounds according to structural norms in the target language. This is because 
syntactic meaning inheres in the normative patterns of the language in which 
meaning is sought, unlike phonological and pragmatic meaning, which inhere in 
	 696 
the reality language discriminates and transforms, respectively. Then at the 
pragmatic level, translation involves harmonizing what can be known of the 
purposes of the source text, some of which must inevitably be assumed, with the 
purposes of the translator in undertaking the translation. Thus, interpreters must 
account for deviations in purpose between source text and translator when 
interpreting translations. The pragmatic orientation toward rendering the 
entailments of the language ritual process also provides a common point of focus 
for either text and translator or producer and receiver to share in the dialectic, 
eventually generating concurrence in the radical interpretation of Davidson. 
Translation theorists are often at pains to recognize that there is an 
inevitable loss of meaning in the translation process that must be grieved by 
those who engage the text in the target language. This is because the surplus of 
meaning generated in the whole semantic process of phonological reference, 
patterning according to syntactic norms, and the generation of pragmatic 
entailments taken together is disrupted. Such disruption is necessitated by the 
fact that in the LR translation procedure, it is the syntactic norms of the target 
language and not the source language to which the translator must adhere, and 
so the semantic process is accordingly different from that in the source language. 
While a surplus of meaning will, of course, emerge from the process of the 
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language ritual in the target language, it is a fundamentally different surplus of 
meaning. Thus, LR affirms the holophrastic indeterminacy identified by Quine. 
Toward a Philosophy of Language as Ritual 
With the theory of language as ritual in hand, developed in both 
directions, it is now possible to step back and begin to suggest ways that the 
theory has implications for other domains of philosophical discourse. Indeed, it 
is anticipated that language as ritual (LR), as a theory of language that aspires to 
be systematic, should have implications across the domains addressed by 
philosophical inquiry. The next two subsections begin to address some of these 
implications with respect to logic formalisms and to the framework of critical 
realism. There are two other areas that would benefit from consideration, and 
which are touched on in these subsections, but which must await systematic 
treatment in the future. First, LR denies many notions of mentality that have 
been dominant in other theories of language, such as universal grammar and 
linguistic relativitiy, some of which will be discussed in the last section of this 
chapter, but a comprehensive philosophy of mind exceeds the project at present. 
Second, reference has been made throughout to a semiotic metaphysics along the 
lines of that developed by Peirce, and the theory of ritual has been understood as 
making further metaphysical contributions, but the development of a systematic 
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metaphysics of semiosis and ritual also exceeds the scope of the project. With 
regard to logic and critical realism, LR will benefit from articulating a logical 
formalism in comparative engagement with a variety of global logics, and from 
more systematically elaborating its notion of critical realism in contrast to both 
Bhaskar, its theological forms, and other realist alternatives. 
Logic 
Logic has thus far been engaged as a useful means of rendering syntactic 
norms, but requires further consideration as to its relationship and function with 
regard to the full language ritual. It is likely that language as ritual (LR) will need 
to develop its own logical formalism, but doing so far exceeds the scope of the 
present project. For the moment it is possible only to sketch some of what that 
formalism will need to attend to and some of the positions LR takes in 
philosophy of logic. 
The purpose of logical formalisms is to be able to describe the soundness 
of arguments, that is, the truth of their premises plus their validity. The 
application of logic to natural language, then, presumes that language formulates 
such arguments, albeit in ways that do not necessarily privilege explicit and 
concise explication of the soundness thereof, hence the development of logical 
formalisms in the first place. Indeed, most of the ways in which logic proceeds 
	 699 
presume that truth arises from reference, and validity from syntax, but this 
formulation will clearly not do in LR, taking meaning, as it does, as a function of 
the whole ritual process and not merely true reference plus valid syntax. Neither 
is the reduction of language to expression of arguments acceptable because 
language is a transformative system, and so the conceptualization of logic must 
be expanded such that soundness encapsulates achievement across the range of 
the ritual process.  
Truth has to do with where language and reality meet. Logical discussion 
of truth has largely either had to do with whether or not phonological reference 
is achieved, or with whether or not the sound elements of language as 
syntactically patterned correlates with reality. This is the approach of truth-
conditional semantics as elaborated by Donald Davidson. There are several 
problems with this approach in LR. First, LR does not understand syntactic 
patterns as truth-bearing because syntax is the codification of formal norms 
inherent in language largely independent of reality. The correlations between the 
syntactic patterns in language and the patterns of process in reality are therefore 
inevitably indirect at most. Second, Davidsonian truth-conditional semantics 
ignores the pragmatic entailments that language offers back to reality out of its 
subjunctive semantic process. This negligence arises from the framing of 
	 700 
language as argument in Western logical systems, rather than as process in LR. A 
logical formalism adequate to LR must be able to codify both the reference of 
speech sounds to elements, aspects, and relations in reality, and the pragmatic 
entailments language offers to reality. This is to say that the truth conditions a 
logical formalism for LR must articulate include not only the descriptive 
conditions under which language refers to reality as it is, but also the subjunctive 
conditions toward which language seeks to change or make reality into. These 
conditions include not only reality as it was found and referred to 
phonologically, but also all of the elements, including participant elements, in the 
language ritual that is accomplishing the semantic process. Thus, it is at this 
point that the Gricean program of accounting for cooperative principles among 
participants links into Davidsonian truth-conditional semantics as some of the 
conditions in reality under which the pragmatic entailments of language may be 
generated by the language ritual process. As such, the cooperative principles are 
some of the truth conditions that a logical formalism for LR must articulate. 
Logical validity is syntactic in that it has to do with adherence to the 
axioms or rules of the logical system, which are the syntactic norms that pattern 
it, giving rise to the question as to the measure by which the axioms or rules are 
to be taken as axiomatic. They may be taken as axiomatic on the basis of their 
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reflecting patterns and relations in reality, in which case the logic is realistic, or 
they may be taken as axiomatic on the basis of their reflecting patterns and 
relations in the mind, in which case the logic is idealistic, or some combination of 
the two. Assuming that the axioms or rules of the logical system properly adhere 
to the structures and patterns of reality or the mind, then the conclusions derived 
by adhering to the rules and axioms are necessarily valid. In spite of its adoption 
of critical realism, and thus affirmation of the independent reality of the world 
from knowing minds, LR demurs from connecting the syntactic norms that order 
the elements of language and are represented in logical axioms and rules with 
the world. Instead, syntax is inherent to the language in question, the innate form 
of a given language ritual, not derivative from elsewhere. This does not mean, 
however, that there is no way to conceive validity in LR. As in any ritual, the 
structure of language is the form of the ritual process that generates its 
entailments. Thus, it is not that the syntax of language reflects the structure of 
reality, but instead that the structure of language is the form of the language 
process that generates its entailments in and for reality. Validity, then, has to do 
with adhering to norms that order the elements of language such that the 
produce their entailments when so patterned. Given that this is the case, valid 
syntax is inextricably interconnected with true reference at the point of the 
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language ritual generating its entailments. Moreover, this point of intersection 
between truth and validity is also the point of intersection between logic and 
thought: rather than logic merely expressing thoughts, logic describes the 
process by which thoughts have desired effects on and in reality. 
A logical formalism adequate to LR must therefore be able to articulate 
validity as the syntactic norms that successfully generate entailments for reality. 
In order to accomplish this, the formalism will need to account for not only the 
syntactic axioms of the structure of the language, but also the pragmatic axioms 
of the context in which the syntactic norms patterning linguistic elements 
successfully generate their entailments. The development of such a formalism is 
of benefit for improving linguistic clarity and explaining why linguistic 
expressions succeed or fail in certain cases. That said, the inherent necessity of 
accounting for the pragmatic context of language use calls into question the 
capacity of logic to achieve the level of generality, simplification, precision, and 
rigor to which Western logic, at least, aspires. Nevertheless, the assumption of 
critical realism in LR means that there is one and only one world, however 
opaque, on which all of the different language rituals, and other rituals, are 
operating, rendering logic possible, at least in principle, across the various ritual 
systems. 
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Since LR articulates language as a ritual process in which elements of 
reality are rendered syntactically so as to achieve certain entailments, LR might 
be assumed to approach logic as instrumental. Since LR adopts critical realism, 
however, it is better to think of logic for LR as an important component of the 
critical feedback mechanism that allows for traction on reality. In principle, logic 
should be able to encode both linguistic and non-linguistic ritual systems that 
transform reality from what it is into what it could or should be, including both 
modification of existing elements and dimensions of reality and creation of new 
ones. Logic is ultimately thoroughly fallibilistic, not only allowing but requiring 
modification upon encounter with realities or ritual systems that successfully 
and reliably generate entailments in reality. At the same time, the singularity of 
the reality being operated on by all ritual processes means that while the logics of 
various subsystems may develop independently, they are all, at least in principle, 
able to be systematized together. 
In fact, the theory of ritual developed across chapters three and four is 
itself the logic of LR, albeit decidedly not a logical formalism. The fundamental 
insight of the theory of language as ritual is that ritual is the logic of sign 
systems, sequencing signs together according to patterns in order to create and 
transform reality. Thus, logic is descriptive of the ritual systems that are 
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themselves processes creating and transforming reality into novel, complex, and 
beautiful configurations. As these processes are themselves processes in and of 
reality, logic itself is an element of reality, and so is subject to its own ritual 
processes and transformations, which constitutes the necessity of its fallibilism. 
Since ritual is the logic of semiotic systems, and language is one such semiotic 
system, the logic of language is necessarily consistent, and therefore able to be 
systematized with, ritual systems generally. At the same time, the logic of 
language may include specifications that must be included in the more general 
logic of ritual but are only applicable in the instance of language. This is what it 
means, from the perspective of logic, that language is a species of the ritual 
genus. 
Universals and Critical Realism 
Reality is real, singular, and opaque. To say that reality is real is to say 
that individual things in reality are real, as are properties of things, relations 
among things, and so patterned collections of things; this is what has been meant 
in preceding sections by elements, aspects, and relations in reality. Reality is 
singular because there is one, shared reality in which everything participates 
together, albeit any given thing only ever participates partially. This partial 
participation is the reason that reality is opaque, because any one thing is only 
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ever capable of encountering some small range of elements, aspects, and 
relations in reality. This is so even if that thing, such as a human person, can at 
least in principle conceive of the totality of reality, its singularity, and the opaque 
sharing with all other things therein.  
The assertion of the reality of things both general and particular is what 
commits language as ritual (LR) to a form of realism. Not just any realism will 
do, though. A naïve or simple realism would allow language and thought to 
refer directly to reality, but in so doing would deny the opacity of reality that LR 
takes to be the case. Moreover, LR takes language to be a human tool for 
transforming reality in spite of its opacity, which is to say that the semantic 
holism with respect to language in LR does not require an epistemic holism with 
respect to reality. The Peircian metaphysical semiotics advanced in chapter two 
and developed over the course of the intervening chapters takes ritual to be the 
process by which signs form systems and thus create general realities. 
Individuals participate in the process of transformation by likewise developing 
and deploying ritual sign systems, such as language. Rituals like language are 
thus tools of critique, not only representing but transforming reality. The notion 
of critique in critical realism as deployed here signals the transformative work of 
language, which echoes the Marxist notion of critique embedded in the 
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Bhaskarian conception of critical realism. It is very different than the conception 
of critical realism deployed in certain theological circles, which instead makes 
linguistic negotiation the only means of common access to a fixed and stable 
reality without contributing to its change or development.  
Important to the conception of critical realism under development here is 
the notion of discrimination. Speech sounds refer via correlation to elements in, 
aspects of, and relations among reality that have been discriminated by human 
minds from the opaque reality in which we participate. The codification of a 
discrimination by virtue of its correlation with a particular speech sound makes 
the element, aspect, or relation so discriminated available for ongoing 
transformative linguistic processes. That said, it not necessarily the case that two 
people who use a particular speech sound to refer to a particular element, aspect, 
or relation are discriminating that element, aspect, or relation in precisely the 
same way, although their employment of the speech sound in discourse 
necessarily presumes that they are. Instead, their ongoing transformative work 
on reality in dialogue will reveal the fissures and fractures between their 
discriminations as the failure of common correlations result in failure to generate 
the entailments of the language ritual at play. As a result, the reference of a given 
speech sound is neither wholly determined by what it refers to in itself, as 
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conceived by the language producer, or as conceived by the language receiver(s). 
Instead, as will be explored in greater detail in chapter six, speech sounds refer 
subjunctively, that is, as if the discriminated element, aspect, or relation in 
reality, the conception of the language producer, and the conception(s) of the 
language receiver(s), were one and the same. Speech sounds are therefore sites of 
negotiation and contestation, some degree of resolution of which results from the 
entailments being successfully generated through the language ritual process. So 
too, the understanding of an element, aspect, or relation in reality by a given 
language user, either producer or receiver, is subjunctive as it lies somewhere 
between the thing as the mind discriminates it and the thing as it is encoded in 
the speech sound correlated with it. The subjunctive space that holds the real 
thing itself, the thing as referred to by a corresponding speech sound, and the 
thing as understood by a language user, is part of what obscures reality from its 
participants, resulting in the necessary opacity of reality to its participants. 
Notably, the opacity of the world does not arise inherently from the world but 
rather emerges epistemologically from the fallibility of humanity, and part of the 
role of linguistic communication is a sort of triangulation of reality among the 
fallible discriminations of the language producer, the receiver(s), and the speech 
sound correlated to it. 
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The types of universals that discrimination engages include properties 
and relations that inhere across individual instances of things discriminated. 
While LR takes all universals to be real, it is useful to distinguish between this 
sort of universal, which is real prior to any sort of linguistic transformation 
process, being abstracted phonologically from preexistent reality, from 
universals that are real entailments of the language ritual. This is to say that 
universals are not only something to which language refers, but also something 
that language makes, both explicitly and implicitly. The explicitly created 
universals are the entailments of the language ritual themselves, which are 
general across the elements of the ritual by virtue of resulting from their 
patterned organization according to the ritual form, that is, the syntax. Implicitly 
created universals have to do with lingering proclivities toward the syntax of the 
language that impact the framing of future and other ritual processes. These 
proclivities have been overdetermined in the linguistic turn derived from 
Saussure, and stand corrected in LR in the sense of registering among the wider 
range of linguistic processes and entailments. Some of the universals that are 
generated in language rituals are relatively close to the same level as the 
elements that the ritual harmonizes. For example, the universal of friendship 
may be generated by one person saying to another, “I really enjoy spending time 
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with you.” Some of the universals that language creates, however, are much 
higher-level social phenomena, such as whole social, political, economic, 
cultural, and religious systems. Consider the new political realities created by the 
language rituals of declaring independence from colonial rulers. These, too, are 
real as they achieve independence from their individual elements and the 
particular expression that births them. 
Merely taking universals, both of the a priori and of the constructed 
variety, to be real, does not yet escape the limitations of a naïve or simple 
realism. The nature of critique in the critical realism underlying LR remains to be 
explicated. The notion of critique that emerges in the critical theory literature, as 
developed from the initial insight of Marx, contrasts the interpretive approach of 
hermeneutics with the transformative approach of criticism. LR instead construes 
an arc from interpretation of reality as given, into the subjunctive space among 
language, minds, reality, and society, through the transformative ritual process, 
resulting in a new and novel stage in the ongoing semiosis of the world. The 
result is that critique is continuous with interpretation at a further point on the 
arc of linguistic ritual transformation.  
With critical theory, LR acknowledges the pervasiveness of politics, i.e. 
power dynamics, in human interaction, and so necessarily in language rituals as 
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well. In contrast with critical theory, LR is more hopeful about the prospects of 
communities of inquiry functioning to meliorate their common situation through 
collaboration and negotiation rather than presuming intractable agonism. In fact, 
rituals are crucial to constraining the unbridled exercise of power, serving to 
channel power toward mutually positive ends by transforming our common 
reality. Critique in LR therefore has to do with cultivating better rituals rather 
than reducing all rituals to illegitimate exercises of power.  
Likewise, LR concurs with critical theory that truth is provisional, but 
gives an alternative, positive account of that provisionality from the tendency in 
critical theory to derive it negatively from anti-essentialism. Truth is provisional 
in LR in at least two senses. First, reality is a constant process of semiosis, not a 
set of static substances, and so truth is only ever with respect to the state of 
reality at a given point in its ongoing process. Also, truth inhabits the subjunctive 
space among the minds of language users, reality, language, and society, and so 
varies along with changes in each of those variables. In sum, the provisionality of 
truth is a result of the provisionality of reality. Whereas critical theory would 
distinguish contingent from unconditioned truth, LR acknowledges a spectrum 
between areas of greater and lesser stability amidst the ongoing flow and process 
of signification that constitutes reality and in which language operates. LR is 
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anti-essentialist in the sense of rejecting fixed essences of things, but recognizes 
higher degrees of continuity among dimensions of reality than critical theory 
tends to admit. Critique in LR thus has to do with the ongoing process of 
updating truth to keep pace with the ongoing process of semiosis that is reality. 
Just as truth must remain in motion in order to keep pace with reality, so 
too must meaning bob and weave amidst the constantly shifting contours of the 
semiosis of reality and its ongoing transformation, in part by rituals, including 
language. Thus, LR also concurs with critical theory regarding the fluidity of 
meaning contingent upon the ebb and flow of the processes of reality. At the 
same time, LR presses back against the tendency in critical theory to overread the 
fluidity of meaning such that it becomes arbitrary and capricious. For critical 
theory, the meanings of a particular expression are at least potentially infinite, 
including contradictory meanings, and are impossible to adjudicate among. LR, 
by contrast, provides a means of identifying the locus of meaning in the 
subjunctive space among minds, language, reality, and society. While meaning is 
not fixed, neither is it infinite in any given situation. There is some meaning, or at 
least range of meanings, intended by a language producer, which may differ 
from but must be related to the range of meanings appropriated by a language 
receiver. That set of meanings may also vary from, even as it must also be related 
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to, the range of meanings bearable by the linguistic encoding employed. The 
space for meaningful play with respect to reality is more interesting as it arises 
both from the difference between the contours of reality as they are in reality and 
as they are discerned by discriminating minds, and from the probabilistic nature 
of all semiotic processes in generating entailments. In the end, meaning is fluid, 
but not infinitely so for LR, as it is for critical theory, and so it is possible to 
uncover historical meaning in the sense of what meanings emerged in a given 
particular situation, and those meanings may be predictive, albeit not 
determinative, of future semantic configurations. 
One of the reasons that critical theory takes meaning to be infinite is that 
meaning arises from language use, and language is understood to be 
determinative of reality. This is to say that, for critical theory, language is not 
merely descriptive but also constitutive. Clearly, LR goes a long way with this 
view of language, as it also presses back against descriptive conceptions of 
language by emphasizing the transformative capacity of linguistic processes. 
Where LR demurs, however, is in the strong sense in critical theory of language 
being constitutive of reality, rather than being creative and transformative within 
reality. The constructionism of critical theory derives from the Saussurean 
overreading of language structures as determinative of the structures of all sign 
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processes, whereas LR takes ritual to be the basic mode of sign systematization 
and language a speciation thereof. This contrast is important for understanding 
the difference between critical and constructive realism. Constructive realism 
views reality as constructed, or constituted, by social processes that operate on 
the model of language. Critical realism understands language as a transformative 
tool for engaging reality that also provides critical feedback for improving future 
engagements and their outcomes. This notion of critique positions LR as 
participatory in the ongoing transformative processes of reality, rather than 
constitutive of all of reality, which sounds awfully essentialist by contrast. LR 
seeks to reclaim the notion of critique from those who would convert it to 
constructionism. 
Ironically, the conditional provisionality of critique in LR contrasts with 
the pervasive determination of constructionism in critical theory so as to reveal 
the viability of universals that had been deemed illegitimate for being totalizing, 
absolutizing, and essentializing. Consider the concept of human nature. Critical 
theory detests notions such as human nature for including within them 
normative assumptions that in fact fail to pick up on whole ranges of instances 
that should be included in their respective domains. Unfortunately, because 
critical theory takes the assumptions of such concepts to be fixed, having been 
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linguistically constituted, the only option is to wholly write them off and 
theorists must decamp to narrower ranges of achieving understanding. LR has 
no trouble acknowledging the shortcomings of the concept of human nature, 
along with other likewise universal concepts, right alongside the critical 
theorists. But rather than being left to either persist in the deficiencies of these 
concepts or abandon them, LR recognizes the critical capacity of language to 
transform them. If the conception of human nature has left out demonstrably 
human persons, such as women, people of color, etc., then the concept requires 
reform so as to properly register the full range to which the concept aspires, not 
abandonment.  
The willingness to write off concepts taken to be totalizing, absolutizing, 
or essentializing in critical theory reveals a creeping nominalism. LR takes 
universals to be real, and so of course we need language to refer to universal 
realities. Moreover, LR acknowledges that the discriminations of reality to which 
language is correlated may not be accurately discerning the contours of reality. 
In these cases, it is important to employ all of the tools at our disposal to improve 
the operative understanding of reality so that the terms refer to reality as it is 
rather than as it is mistaken to be. Of course, all of this is transpiring amidst the 
ongoing semiosis of reality, and it is important to distinguish the corrective 
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function of critique in overcoming linguistic failures from the ongoing 
adjustment of truth and meaning to account for the flow of reality. Because 
critical theory takes language to be constitutive, use of the term imposes its 
concept across all instances to which it is applied. Rather than the term referring 
to an independent reality, the use of the term instantiates the reality as 
constructed in and by the term. Thus, when language is taken to be improperly 
imposing itself, the solution is to simply get rid of the concept and its attendant 
language, and this is not problematic because there is no reality to which the 
language refers anyway. LR views this approach as giving too much credit to 
language, and instead locates language among the rituals that systematize sign 
processes and transform reality. 
Language as ritual, rooted in critical realism, has the capacity to address 
universals holistically among the four poles demarcated by Putnam of mind, 
language, reality, and society. This holistic encompassing is demonstrable by 
considering the contrasting parochialism and resulting reductive myopia of 
simple realism, nominalism, idealism, and constructionism. Simple realism takes 
reality and its contours, including universals, to be relatively available to match 
up to language in more or less one to one correspondence, and conceives 
universals to be there in reality prior to linguistic representation. LR takes this 
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form of realism to be woefully naïve, first because of the opacity of reality, 
requiring the triangulation among minds, society, and language to penetrate, and 
second because many abstract universals result from, rather than existing prior 
to, various ritual processes.  
Nominalism takes the extensional meaning of language to be an extrinsic 
identification of commonalities among things that lack an inherent causal 
connection and have no reality apart from the imposition of the commonality 
through use of the term. LR rejects nominalism as giving too much credit to the 
capacity of language to impose generality across instances apart from any real 
commonality, and for reducing the criteria of commonality to causal relation. 
Nominalism also inevitably falls into a dichotomy between brute and 
constructed reality in order to account for the reality, in a secondary sense, of 
abstract universals that emerge from collective relations. LR instead sees 
continuity between the brute reality to which ritual processes respond and the 
constructed realities the ritual produces via itself as medium.  
Whereas nominalism puts too much faith in language and simple realism 
in reality to understand universals, idealism takes universals to be mental 
schemas that sufficiently discriminate the contours of reality and provide a 
rational basis for organizing experience. LR again insists upon the opacity of 
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reality and recognizes that imperfections of the ritual tools for discriminating its 
contours on their own, which nonetheless are capable of helpfully penetrating 
the veil when reality is triangulated among them. Also, LR rejects the 
universality of universals to the extent that it admits variations among the 
discriminations of universals each in language and the minds of producers and 
receivers, such that their schemas neither match between the two nor serve as a 
firm foundation, on their own, for discriminating reality. 
Constructionism moves in the direction of recognizing social and cultural 
universals such as language, cognition, myth, ritual, aesthetics, technology, and 
society as part and parcel of reality, as does LR. However, it is not clear that the 
reality constructionists acknowledge has any metaphysical status, because reality 
as constructed is not independent of the minds that construct and perpetuate it, 
which means that reality is not really real in the sense realism intends it to be 
real. Nevertheless, constructionism reduces explanation of events in reality to the 
variously overlapping magisteria of these socially constructed universals, and so 
is nominalistic by recourse to society just as idealism is to minds, and 
nominalism is to language. Language as ritual, by contrast, is realist precisely 
because it identifies ritual as a common process that generates new realities from 
extant ones, whether material, mental, linguistic, social, or otherwise, and the 
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realities thus generated are independent of the process that gave rise to them or 
its elements. The upshot is that deconstruction and reconstruction is not nearly 
as straightforward as postmodern constructionists would have it, which is why 
LR prefers the realist accounts of constructionism developed by the social 
scientists who initiated the program, especially Berger and Luckmann.  
The holistic character of LR comes not from the fact that it accounts for all 
four of the poles Putnam identifies of reality, minds, language, and society, but 
from the fact that it non-reductively locates both particulars and universals in a 
matrix constituted by the four poles. First, LR recognizes that both particular and 
universal realities are real, independent of their being known, engaged, or 
represented by minds, language, or society. LR also recognizes that minds play a 
particular role, to be elaborated in the next subsection, in discriminating 
elements, aspects, and relations in reality and in embodying the norms that guide 
ritual performances that transform reality. This is not to say, however, that two 
minds will necessarily, or even possibly, discriminate reality or embody ritual 
norms in precisely the same way. Language is therefore an important tool for 
triangulating reality among collections of minds, and yet LR understands that 
language picks up on reality in its own way that does not directly correspond to 
how it is in itself or how minds that engage reality with language take it to be. 
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Instead, language engages reality with its own intensional and extensional 
networks of reference between speech sounds and reality, its own system of 
syntactic norms for ordering those sounds, and its own process for generating 
entailments. Moreover, the linguistic systems for engaging reality are social and 
ritual in character, but nevertheless are distinct from other sorts of social rituals 
that engage reality, generating their own entailments through their own 
processes. The result of the process of triangulation among reality, minds, 
language, and society is therefore not a singular point locating reality at a fixed 
point, but rather the establishment of a space, of varying size and scope, in which 
reality registers and is transformatively engaged. This space is what will be 
elaborated in the next chapter in terms of subjunctivity, although in that case it 
will be discussed in a way that focuses on language. The space among reality, 
language, minds, and society is subjunctive because it treats reality as if the four 
poles agree with respect to it, when in fact they do not, and so the subjunctive 
space is constituted by the differences among them.  
The subjunctive space is also the locus of critique in critical realism. 
Minds, language, and other social rituals all bring their perspectives on reality, 
and allow individuals and groups to triangulate reality among them, together 
constituting a network of critical feedback loops that hopefully improve 
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knowledge. Reality itself generates its own feedback loop on knowledge, 
resisting mental discriminations, embodied norms, phonologic reference, 
syntactic construal, pragmatic processes, and employment in and for other social 
rituals that are inadequate in their modes of engagement, thereby falling outside 
the subjunctive space of critique. Thus, the notion of critique in critical realism 
really is crucial because it distinguishes reality as it is in itself, which naïve 
realism takes to be obvious, from the subjunctive space in which reality registers 
for us as individuals and as members of societies.  
This conception of the critical subjunctive space among the four poles 
Putnam identified has an important implication for understanding the reality of 
universals. Properties of discriminated elements of reality may register as more 
or less universal than they actually are in the subjunctive matrix that emerges 
from their engagement by minds, language, and other social rituals. While reality 
critically presses back against such incorrect interpretations to some degree, it is 
nevertheless possible for language and other ritual processes to generate 
entailments from what they take to be universal even if those universals do not 
inhere in reality. For example, it is entirely possible to build an entire political 
system based on social class distinctions that are based on inadequate 
discriminations among the people in the society. Such universals may remain 
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real even when minds shift regarding the proper discrimination of reality as they 
have become independent of the processes from which they initially arose, which 
is what it means to say that they are real in the first place.   
Summation: Return to Ritual and to the Linguistic Turn 
The linguistic turn, articulated by Rorty in analytic philosophy and 
registering largely via Saussure in continental philosophy and the social sciences, 
sought to make everything, or at least the answers to all philosophical questions, 
turn on language. This was taken as an advance on either everything turning on 
metaphysical principles, i.e. essentialism, or everything turning on 
epistemological foundations, i.e. foundationalism. While the results of the 
linguistic turn have in fact resulted in powerful anti-essentialist and anti-
foundationalist discourses, they have struggled to provide a positive alternative 
that is coherent, consistent, adequate, and applicable. Indeed, these projects may 
rightly be critiqued, and have been from various quarters, for either taking for 
granted metaphysical essences or epistemological foundations even amidst their 
own denials, or for making language and what are taken to be its progeny as 
analogous to an essence or a foundation. Language as ritual (LR) joins in this 
criticism, while acknowledging that the perspectives that have emerged from the 
linguistic turn have made important contributions and provided necessary 
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correctives in various ways. What LR enjoins, that other critics of the inheritors 
of the linguistic turn have yet to elaborate, is an alternative positive vision for 
metaphysics, epistemology, and language. The category that LR offers for 
uniting all three is ritual. 
Ritual, or “the performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal 
acts and utterances not entirely encoded by their performers” (Rappaport, 24), is 
taken metaphysically as the means of systematizing together various semiotic 
processes in which sign vehicles refer to objects, and in so doing generate 
interpretants. In epistemology, rituals are the normative patterns against which 
semiotic processes register as meaningful. Language is itself a ritual, a species of 
the ritual genus, but also operates at a meso-level between ritual and other social 
processes, such as politics, economics, culture, etc., by virtue of being 
substantially constitutive thereof. Language and other rituals receive from and 
help the minds of participants in ritual processes gain traction on what is 
otherwise opaque reality, but in a sense also serve as their own epistemologies 
apart from mental engagement with reality. In fact, it will be important for LR to 
be able to give an account of the ritual capacities of minds, which is to say an 
account of mentality vis-à-vis ritual, as its distinctive philosophy of mind 
emerges. Central to the theory of LR is that the ritual form and process is 
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continuous among reality, mentality, language, and society, not as an essence or 
a foundation, but as a matrix from which each draws, toward which each 
contributes, and that mediates each to and from the others. Rather than taking 
one or another of reality, mind, language, or society as most basic, ritual is a 
medium among them that harmonizes the four poles around a common 
subjunctive space.  
The notion of ritual as a locus of harmony and process of harmonization 
derives from the Confucian ritual theory of Xunzi and others during and after 
the Warring States Period in China. The notion of ritual in the theory of language 
as ritual exceeds that of the Confucian conception of ritual, however, in that for 
Confucians ritual is a locus of harmony and process of harmonization for 
humans, whereas for LR ritual transcends human interests to encompass all of 
reality and the world. For the Confucian lineage, ritual is any and all 
conventional human behavior guided by socially constructed norms that 
harmonize humans with one another and humanity with the rest of the natural 
world. That said, ritual is distinctively human, and in fact the human 
contribution to the trinity with heaven and earth, which is government. In LR, 
ritual is also understood in terms of government, but the governmental function 
of ritual is not scaled to human interests alone. Rituals are crucial for maintaining 
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stability amidst the otherwise chaotic maelstrom of perpetual semiosis. They 
achieve this because their formal sequences are more or less invariant, the 
invariance promoting stability, but the admission of some variance enabling 
ritual to cope with a world of constant change. With the Confucians, LR 
recognizes that stability is the result of convention established by invariance of 
ritual form and process, but finds all of reality to be governed by convention, not 
just human societies. 
As a species of ritual, language is made up of a set of conventions 
regarding speech sounds correlated, albeit not necessarily corresponding, to the 
world as discriminated by language users and adhering to its own historically 
developing system of intensional and extensional references. Language is also 
made up of conventional syntactic norms for patterning the sounds so referred in 
order to enact a process that generates certain desired functions. According to 
LR, the variance in the patterns of reference and of syntactic norms is inversely 
proportional to the capacity of language to facilitate the sharing of meaning 
among participants in the language ritual. The greater the variance in its 
sequences, the less language is capable of communicating, and the less likely that 
the desired entailments will result. Language is one ritual among other social 
rituals by which humans triangulate their mental discriminations with reality so 
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as to improve them toward being able to improve their situation more generally. 
Language is a tool for transformation, not merely a means of describing reality as 
encountered, and it provides a particular perspective, proper to its own ritual 
forms and processes, on the reality it is in process of transforming even as reality 
itself undergoes perpetual semiosis. 
Some Implications of Language as Ritual 
Eventually, the theory of language as ritual (LR) will need to be elaborated 
in two ways in order to supplant the dominant theories of language that pervade 
the study of language at present. First, it will need to be developed dialectically 
as a detailed, systematic account that addresses intractable problems in each of 
the domains and subdomains of linguistics, philosophy of language, and 
hermeneutics, as well as metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and philosophy of 
mind. Second, it will need to be transposed into an analytic framework for 
studying languages, drawing on, revising, and replacing current analytic 
approaches, that is then made available for evaluation and assessment as to its 
comprehensiveness and rigor, as well as baseline qualifications of adequacy and 
applicability. Such elaboration vastly exceeds the scope of the present project, 
which main goal is to apply the theory of language as ritual to the problem of 
religious language, which is the focus of the next chapter. However, some brief 
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remarks are possible here regarding three ways of interpreting language that 
arose from Confucian ritual theory, philosophy of language, linguistics, and 
Western ritual theory, respectively, in the preceding chapters. 
Xunzi and Rectifying Names 
In one sense, the Confucian project of rectifying names, likely as not 
carried over into Confucianism from Moist and Legalist disputes picked up on 
by Xunzi at the Jixia Academy, is the closest interpretation to the theory of 
language as ritual (LR) given that Xunzi too theorizes language as ritual. In this 
sense, LR merely develops a more rigorous framework on the basis of Western 
social scientific ritual theories, linguistics, and Western philosophy of language 
to explicate this core insight from Xunzi that language is a species of ritual. With 
Xunzi, LR takes reality to be real and so independent of what anyone thinks of it, 
how language encodes it, or how societies engage it, and so language, thought, 
and society must pick up on reality as it is lest they meet resistance in the form of 
failure to engage or generate their functions. Therefore, again with Xunzi, LR 
understands speech sounds, which Xunzi calls “names,” to be conventional but 
not arbitrary, which is to say they correlate but do not necessarily correspond 
with the elements, aspects, and relations of reality to which they refer. 
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In addition to these important and central commonalities, however, there 
are equally important differences between Xunzi and LR. One of these is that 
Xunzi views the project of rectifying names as fundamentally aimed at social 
stability, resulting in several problems in his construal of language vis-à-vis 
minds, reality, and society. First, Xunzi recognizes that for the vast majority of 
people, reality remains mostly opaque, but he allows that for a small subset of 
people, namely sages, it is possible to pierce the haze masking reality in order to 
see reality as it really is. The project of rectifying names, then, is to be undertaken 
by these sages who are thus able to fix language such that it correlates with 
reality as it is. This class distinction seems to espouse a naïve realism for sages, 
who then socially transmit their purchase on reality to the masses by rectifying 
names. On one hand, LR acknowledges that those who employ a wider range of 
rituals have a greater number of angles from which to triangulate reality, which 
mirrors the meritocratic approach Xunzi is advocating without the implication of 
a social class distinction that he carries over into his conception. On the other 
hand, LR rejects the idea that any degree of triangulation will ever fully 
overcome the opacity of reality, and so some subjunctive space must always exist 
as a remainder among reality, minds, language, and society.  
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Also, Xunzi indicates that when a society has agreement about what 
elements of reality names refer to respectively, then the society at least has the 
potential for social stability and harmony. LR finds this expectation to be 
inadequate in two ways. First, since the opacity of reality is irreducible, language 
never directly and decisively refers to reality, which is to say it never 
corresponds to reality, anyway. Instead, language correlates indirectly by 
referencing reality as mentally discriminated and as it registers in the extensional 
network of speech sounds, which are then ordered together according to the 
syntactic patterns inherent to the language in use in order to generate its 
entailments. Similarly, Xunzi finds that names can be inherently better or worse 
for referring to a given element of reality, which inadequately acknowledges the 
opacity of reality. LR better explains the facility of names in referring to objects as 
resulting from their extensional location in the phonological system of the 
language.  
Second, Xunzi presumes that minds are capable of discriminating reality 
in precisely the same ways by rooting mental discriminations in sense organs 
that are in common among humans. Notably, the notion of discrimination as a 
basic mental function comes from Xunzi. Nevertheless, LR recognizes that in 
spite of the commonality of sense organs, which do enable relatively similar 
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discriminations of reality, the interpretation of those perceptions is inevitably 
colored by the unique set of experiences and the particular matrix of ritual 
participations each individual brings to a given situation. Thus, LR takes the 
disjuncture among mental discriminations involved in a given ritual engagement 
with reality as constitutive of the irreducibility of the subjunctive space among 
the four poles. As a result, there is a persistent disjuncture between minds, 
language, reality, and society such that the achievement of social stability and 
harmony is only ever fragmentary and temporary. That said, LR is in full 
agreement with Xunzi regarding the role of ritual, including language, in 
restraining mental discriminatory excesses. This is what LR means by many 
rituals allowing minds to better triangulate reality and thus improve their 
discriminations, which is the critical function in critical realism. The difference is 
that Xunzi believes that sufficient triangulation leads to perfect clarity, whereas 
LR insists upon the irreducible opacity of reality. 
One reason that Xunzi and LR diverge is that LR identifies ritual as the 
common matrix of language, mind, society, and reality, whereas Xunzi identifies 
their common matrix as the Way (Dao 道). Since the Way functions as a 
cosmological, if not ontological, concept for Xunzi, his program ends up 
privileging the forms and patterns inherent in reality, and then rituals function to 
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harmonize humans with those forms and patterns so as to be able to effectively 
govern. LR similarly insists upon the independence of reality from its being 
known and engaged, but advances his program by recognizing the role of ritual 
in patterning and harmonizing reality prior to human involvement. Ritual does 
this by serving as the form of the process that systematizes semiosis into pockets 
of stability, coherence, and consistency. In LR, then, the Way is the Way by virtue 
of having achieved ritual harmonies and stabilities amidst the maelstrom of 
semiosis, rather than an a priori set of patterns and orders independent of the 
ritualization humans undertake to accord themselves with reality. 
Wittgenstein and Language Games 
From the perspective of analytic philosophy of language, an immediate 
question for the theory of language as ritual (LR) has to do with justifying the 
shift to ritual from the highly developed notion of language games developed 
from Wittgenstein. It should be obvious by now that LR would take this line of 
inquiry to be drastically naïve, but it is worthwhile nonetheless to play out the 
contrasts for the sake of clarifying the theory even further and distinguishing it 
from the Wittgensteinian program. Adding encouragement to address the 
commonalities and differences between the two theories is the fact that Seligman, 
Weller, et al, in their reading of Roy Rappaport, theorize ritual quite closely to 
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play, and thus to games, whereas LR does not read Rappaport this way. They are 
not the only ritual theorists who link ritual and play, of course, and since LR 
depends heavily on a systematic theory of ritual, the issue of the relationship 
between ritual and play, and thus games, demands consideration. The contrasts 
drawn with play in the third chapter center around the fact that the norms of 
ritual and its entailments endure beyond its frame into future iterations and into 
other ritual domains. The norms of play, however, are only normative within the 
frame of the game being played, and their entailments do not become objective, 
and so real. As a result, it is not at all clear that Wittgenstein intends his language 
games to be forms of play in this sense, especially given his understanding that 
games are played against the broader background of forms of life. In this sense, 
then, language games are closer to rituals in the sense LR understands ritual than 
they are to play among theorists of play and ritual theorists who take ritual and 
play to be closely linked. 
Wittgenstein elaborates his notion of language games in terms of games, 
and thus language, being rule governed behaviors. The rules determine what 
counts as proper or improper uses of language in a given game, and so are 
crucial to his conception of meaning as language use. Rules therefore function 
primarily pragmatically, setting the conditions under which a given utterance 
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will generate certain entailments. The closest analogy to game rules in LR is the 
patterned norms of syntax that are the forms of the processes by which language 
generates its products, functions, or entailments. The difference between the two 
is that rules in the Wittgensteinian sense operate on the pragmatic end of 
semantics, rather than the syntactic end where LR locates formal patterns. Sellers 
adjusts the notion of rules in language games to locate meaningful language use 
in appropriating the inferences implied in the course of the game being played in 
order to reject appeals to universal truth conditions. This is to say that for Sellars, 
rules govern the inferences expected to be drawn in a particular game scenario 
rather than just individual instances of language use as proper or improper. As a 
result, he is able to pick up on the syntactic rules that Wittgenstein appears to 
either ignore or at least downplay. A common problem that the two nevertheless 
still share, from the perspective of LR, however, is that use is operating entirely 
at the social level without any recourse to reality. LR is therefore an advance on 
the notion of language games because it grounds the process of generating 
pragmatic entailments as a process rendering speech sounds that correlate with, 
even if they do not quite correspond to, reality. 
The rules of the language games Wittgenstein posits are to be played 
against the backdrop of a form of life, which has to do with wider pragmatic 
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context, and which is intended to ground the consistency of language across 
different games being played by different rules. The advantage of the notion of 
forms of life as deployed by Wittgenstein, and which LR affirms, is that the 
consistency of language is guaranteed by real relations among people, either at 
the level of society or of culture in some sense, without having to appeal to 
abstract and absolute logic. Rather than distinguishing between games and forms 
of life, however, LR locates both the immediate context of language use and the 
broader context of objectivated meanings as expressions, at different levels, of 
the ritual form and process. With Wittgenstein, LR is skeptical of the capacity of 
logic to successfully evaluate, let alone guarantee, the truth and validity of 
expressions apart from the pragmatic contexts in which language operates. 
However, LR addresses this neglect by seeking to include context within a logical 
formalism rather than rejecting logic outright. Whereas the later Wittgenstein 
sought to redress the neglect of context by rejecting logic as the basis for meaning 
and shifting meaning entirely to use, the lineage of use theories inaugurated by 
Austin is more amenable to logical formalisms. As a result, LR derives its own 
pragmatics in more sustained conversation with speech act theorists than with 
Wittgenstein. 
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Wittgenstein was attempting to overcome the limitations of entity theories 
of meaning, where a word refers directly to an entity. As a result, he, like Austin 
and the speech act theorists, shifted the locus of meaning from entities in reality 
to contexts of use. Language as ritual shares some of the suspicions of entity 
theories of truth, betraying, as they do, a predilection toward a naïve realism 
about the entities to which language refers. The problem is that a shift to a theory 
that locates meaning exclusively in terms of the pragmatic context results in a 
form of nominalism with regard to social universals as described above with 
regard to constructionism. Rather than swinging the pendulum so decisively 
away from entity theories of meaning, as do the use theories of Wittgenstein, 
Austin, and their successors, LR deploys the theory of ritual to explain language 
as a continuum that picks up on reality and transforms it through use. This 
allows LR to acknowledge the elements, aspects, and relations in reality to which 
language refers, but to avoid locating the meaning of language exclusively in that 
initial act of reference, withholding the ascription of meaning until the 
completion of the language ritual process. Also, LR distinguishes the correlation 
of speech sounds to reality from full correspondence. The nomenclature of 
correspondence is taken to indicate that each discrimination of reality would 
have a one to one relation with a particular speech sound. Correlation, by 
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contrast, allows that speech sounds pick up on the contours of reality in various 
ways so as to be able to express discriminations in reality at times in a one to one 
relation but frequently through varieties of combinations of sounds giving voice 
to a single discrimination. This is to say that the whole system of speech sounds 
is capable of expressing relevant discriminations of reality without the system 
having to represent each and every element of the system of the world. Meaning 
begins to emerge at the level of the system of speech sounds correlating to 
reality, but comes to fruition only once those sounds are rendered according to 
the patterned norms of syntax, which is the form of the language process 
generating its transformative entailments. 
Chomsky and Universal Grammar 
That language is innate in human cognition, biologically encoded and 
genetically transmitted, such that language faculties are universal across all 
human beings, is the most influential linguistic theory in the second half of the 
twentieth century. This theory of universal grammar, discussed in greater detail 
in chapter two, is singularly creditable to Noam Chomsky, and its advent ignited 
a revolution in linguistics and analytic philosophy of language. Increasingly, 
however, this view is coming under attack, and language as ritual (LR) joins a 
rising chorus of linguists and biological anthropologists who are dismantling 
	 736 
what evidentiary basis existed to justify its conclusions and offering alternative 
explanations. Daniel Everett instead locates the commonalities across languages, 
some of which may prove universal, in the sharing of cultural norms and values. 
Terrence Deacon, by contrast, identifies language as a tool that correlates and 
then coevolves with the human capacity for symbolic thinking. LR is skeptical of 
Everett for failing to account for any role at all for mind, resulting in a sort of 
cultural determinism mediated through language, which is ipso facto linguistic 
determinism. LR also finds Deacon unsatisfactory for inadequately 
distinguishing symbolic thinking from what Chomsky would call an innate 
faculty, and for failing to address the relationships of minds, languages, and 
societies with reality. Indeed, none of these paradigms adequately theorizes all 
four of the poles identified by Putnam of mind, language, society, and reality and 
their interrelations. Chomsky overemphasizes cognitive, i.e. mental, faculties. 
Everett overemphasizes cultural, i.e. social, determination. Deacon attempts to 
correlate mind and society, but leaves out reality and renders language overly 
determined by mental capacities. LR aspires to theorize all four poles together as 
interrelated but not interdetermined by identifying their sharing in the ritual 
form and process and their location around a common subjunctive space. 
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Since universal grammar starts with a strong theory of mind, and it is the 
most influential theory on offer to which language as ritual must respond, it is 
important at this stage to clarify further the way LR construes mind and its role 
among reality, language, and society. Central to the role of mind is the capacity 
for discrimination, which has to do with perceiving reality and ascertaining the 
respects in which elements, aspects, and relations in reality are relevantly 
determinate with respect to one another. Mind itself is a result of ritual processes 
generating a set of stable capacities for interpreting and engaging the world that 
proved evolutionarily advantageous. So too, some of those capacities are 
especially attuned to the ritual processes at play in reality, and are able to 
contribute to rituals, which is to say mental rituals generate entailments that 
perform yet further rituals. Many of the rituals that minds perform are 
themselves social rituals, which norms are shared among societies and cultures. 
Society itself is constituted by minds together performing a common set of norms 
and cognitively revising their shared norms through further processes of 
ritualization such that new entailments are generated as appropriate in the 
ongoing process of semiosis in reality. 
This is a very different way of thinking about what mind is and does than 
that propounded in the theory of universal grammar. For Chomsky and his ilk, 
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mind is made up of faculties corresponding to brain states that enable interaction 
with an external environment by coordinating the various faculties in different 
ways, much like a computer employs a relatively discrete set of functions in 
combination to enact a wide variety of processes. LR demurs from the notion of 
faculties and instead finds mind to be in continuity with reality, language, and 
society as sharing in the common matrix of ritual. Ritual is not a faculty. It is a 
form and process at play across domains of reality that minds participate in with 
a particularly high degree of acuity. Deacon identifies the capacity for symbolic 
thought as the mental function that enables humans to engage the cultural 
artifact of language. While this approach has the advantage of acknowledging 
that language itself is cultural artifice, instead of innate in human brains, it is not 
at all clear that the capacity for symbolic reference alone, properly understood, is 
either unique to humans or sufficient for explaining the incredibly intricate, 
nested, and multi-level network of signs that constitute language as a sign 
system. LR identifies ritual as both the matrix in which semiotic processes 
achieve stability together as sign systems, and the matrix to which mind is 
acutely attuned so as to enable engagement with and contribution to the world 
made up of greater and lesser degrees of ritualized stability. Language is a 
particular mode of such engagement and contribution to the world by enabling 
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communication among minds such that they can coordinate their engagements 
and contributions.   
The discriminations that minds make have to do with ascertaining how 
the contours of reality are relevantly determinate with respect to one another. 
This is not to say that reality in itself is so determinate. The determinateness that 
minds discriminate are the determinations relevant to those minds, or at least the 
determinations discerned as relevant in a given situation. The elements, aspects, 
and relations in reality are almost never as determinate as either they are 
discriminated to be by minds perceiving them or as encoded in the speech 
sounds of a language. That said, minds discriminating reality in relationship 
with one another, principally through language but also through many other 
social rituals, are better able to gain common traction on reality by virtue of 
being able to triangulate their discriminations with their representations in other 
ritual modes. This too is very different from a universal grammar that guarantees 
a common discrimination of reality in language due to language itself being an 
inborn faculty. Instead, LR preserves the opacity of reality to knowing minds and 
allows the ubiquity of language to emerge organically as an outworking of the 
evolutionarily advantageous capacity for discrimination and ritualization in 
human minds. 
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One of the struggles of the universal grammar program is to be able to 
articulate necessary and sufficient mental functions to account for the structures 
found universally across all languages. An alternative program to universal 
grammar that instead attempts to locate language structures in culture, such as 
that advanced by Daniel Everett, runs into an analogous problem of explaining 
how culture is structured such that it may in turn structure language. This 
strategy inverts Saussurean semiology, in which the structure of language is 
taken to be the structure common across all sign systems, such that instead the 
structure of the sign systems that constitute culture determine the structure of 
language. In the case of semiology, the commonality of linguistic structure with 
non-linguistic sign systems is merely empirically false, whereas its inversion 
leaves open the question of what constitutes the structure supposedly common 
between language and culture. LR answers this question with ritual as the 
common form and process embodied in the sign systems of language and the 
other social rituals that together constitute culture. That said, LR denies the direct 
causality from culture to language as in Everett, instead recognizing that 
commonalities among linguistic and other rituals arise from their ongoing 
common response to a singular, albeit opaque, reality. Thus, LR has the added 
advantage over the cultural determinism theory of being able to ground the high 
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degree of commonality between, and translatability among, languages in the fact 
that languages, cultures, and the minds that create and employ them are working 
together to increasingly adequately discriminate reality. The common 
denominator is reality, constituted itself by ritual, and discriminated and 
transformed by ongoing ritual processes of language, culture, and the human 
minds that together constitute them. What LR shares with Everett is the notion of 
language as a tool, enabling people to accomplish things cooperatively in the 
world, which is why LR emphasizes the ritual, and thus linguistic, process 
transforming reality. 
Returning to Rappaport on Language 
As discussed in chapter three, Roy Rappaport diagnoses two maladies in 
human life that are symptoms of the underlying condition of language, and he 
prescribes ritual as the medicine to cure the disease. Clearly, language as ritual 
(LR) rejects this strange medicine due to the fact that it takes language to be a 
species of the ritual genus rather than an alternative system to it. That said, LR 
does have alternative ways of considering both the illnesses Rappaport 
diagnoses and the ways in which they might be resolved.  
The first illness introduced by language, according to Rappaport, is that of 
the lie, because language may be employed to represent reality as other than it 
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really is. Importantly, Rappaport prescribes ritual as the cure for the linguistic lie 
because ritual generates religion, in his theory, and religion is what actually gets 
the job done to ameliorate the ill effects of falsehoods. LR has an alternative 
conception of the lie, and thus also an alternative prescription for addressing it. 
Of course, people do lie, and they do so in the medium of language, but people 
also lie using other rituals, including religious rituals. Sometimes that lie is told 
in language, but other times the lie is told through other means, including 
sartorial means, such as when the priest wears vestments to signal that they are 
functioning as Christ in the Eucharistic liturgy, but of course they are not in fact 
Christ. Lies are not, therefore, unique to language rituals but rather to rituals 
generally, and the reason that they are possible arises from the subjunctive space 
among reality, minds, language, and other social rituals that are always at play in 
any given situation. The subjunctive space holds reality as it is discriminated by 
the minds participating in the ritual, as it is represented in language and in other 
rituals, and as it is in itself, all at the same time, even though these things are not 
actually one and the same. This is why the subjunctive space is a space and not a 
point: it must be able to hold the same thing in different ways simultaneously, 
that is, the reality being discriminated mentally, represented linguistically, and 
addressed ritually, even as it is present really. This discrepancy means that as the 
	 743 
ritual processes of mind, language, and society get going, it is quite possible that 
they are not in fact picking up on reality as it is, and yet the process moves 
forward and may even generate the desired entailments if what they do pick up 
and ritualize is close enough for that purpose.  
Lies are capable of generating new realities. In LR, however, the solution 
to this problem is not some other form or process that corrects it, but rather just 
more and better ritual. This gets back to criticism being critical, i.e. crucial, for 
critical realism as rituals provide feedback for their participants, and the many 
rituals that make them up, to improve their discriminations of reality. 
Eventually, a reality ritually generated that inadequately engages reality will be 
revealed and displaced when it is unable to function in other rituals due to its 
inadequate discrimination of reality, which may initiate a process of ritual 
reconstruction. While this may sound like a radically progressive vision, holding 
out hope for the eventual ritual reconciliation of all things, it is important to keep 
in mind that reality is irreducibly opaque, and the threshold for instigating 
inquiry in stably funded experience is quite high. This means both that false 
rituals are stubbornly persistent, and that holding out hope for perfect 
knowledge is false hope. Nevertheless, lies are at least in principal always 
correctible, even if there will never be an expression of the fullness of truth. 
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The second illness Rappaport diagnoses as arising from language is that it 
enables the conception of alternative realities to the present order, excluding the 
possibility of an ultimately stable absolute that finally grounds individuals in 
societies over against the constant threat of things being otherwise. These 
alternatives are not themselves lies, because the alternative is actually possible, 
not false as in a lie. The threat of the alternative, then, is that it threatens to 
undermine the medium itself, which Rappaport takes to be language, the further 
medium of which LR takes to be ritual. Rappaport ends up theorizing religion as 
the ultimate backstop that legitimates a particular conception of reality over 
against any and all alternatives as that to which language can, should, and must 
refer. It is important to keep in mind that religion, for Rappaport, is an 
entailment of the ritual form and process, and so the backstop grounding ritual 
ends up being something that the ritual itself generates, which is at least circular.  
LR abandons the search for an ultimately stable absolute that can ground 
the many and various sorts of ritualization, settling instead for the singularity 
and reality, albeit with its concomitant opacity, of reality. Language, and all sorts 
of other rituals, do by their existence imply that reality could be other than as 
they pick up on it. In fact, as processes that transform and generate new realities, 
rituals more than imply that reality could be different, they actually make reality 
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different. That said, reality also constrains how far rituals can go in their 
transformations. The ritual process is not so powerful as to be able to generate 
absolutely any alternative. Rituals that attempt to do so will fail, or their 
entailments will sputter out and die. Since the goal of ritual is to establish stable 
patterns out of the maelstrom of semiosis, the ritual process must accord itself 
with reality, and so too the participant minds that perform it. It is the tension 
between reality and the ritual process of its transformation that generates the 
subjunctive space in which reality becomes other than as it is in itself, rather 
taken as it is for minds that discriminate it, and rituals, such as language, that 
make with it. The subjunctive is the space in which reality is treated as if it 
accords with the discriminations of mind and the forms and processes of rituals. 
It is therefore this tension, and the space it opens among reality, language, 
minds, and society, that enables language to say what cannot be said. How this is 
so is what is left to be explained in the next chapter. 
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SUBJUNCTIVE RITUAL AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE 
At long last, with the theory of language as ritual in hand, the problem 
this dissertation set out to solve returns to the center of focus. Having meandered 
so long and so far since the initial statement of the problem, it is important to be 
reminded of what the problem of religious language is understood to be that the 
remainder of the chapter will address: The problem of religious language 
inquires about the adequacy, capacity, correlation, and propriety of language, 
speech, texts, and their enactments, on one hand, and ultimate realities and the 
human, cosmic, and environmental dimensions contingent thereon, on the other. 
Thus, the problem of religious language had two sides. One side has to do with 
the nature of language, and the other with the nature of that which language 
seeks to engage. The theory of language as ritual has held these two sides 
together throughout its elaboration, emphasizing in its critical realist frame that 
language is always engaging and transforming reality. This chapter will show 
how the subjunctive space that arises from the tension between rituals, including 
language, and reality, makes it possible for the ritual process of language to 
engage even infinite realities, such as God. The central thesis of the chapter is 
that, contrary to the common assumption that language functions primarily 
indicatively and propositionally, language is in fact always functioning in the 
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subjunctive mood. This thesis in turn grounds the continuity between the 
operation of language with respect to infinite realities with its operation vis-à-vis 
finite realities. 
The first section of this chapter carefully considers the subjunctive mood 
as it registers in linguistics, social theory, and logic, and how the subjunctive is 
resisted in several strains of modern philosophy and theology. The second 
section returns to semiotics in order to give an account of the subjunctive in 
terms of the critical realist theory of language as ritual. Section three considers 
linguistic situations often assumed to be indicative and propositional, namely 
description, conversation, community, and things that are taken to be 
unaddressable by language, and reinterprets them in the subjunctive frame. 
Section four develops a typology of religious language, distinguishing three 
ways in which the subjunctive space may be construed among minds, language, 
society, and reality, and then concluding by showing how each type of linguistic 
expression is a form of poetic creativity. A fifth section undertakes some 
housekeeping by first distinguishing the solution to the problem of religious 
language derived via the theory of language as ritual in this dissertation from 
two interrelated and prevalent alternatives: language as metaphor and language 
as model. This section also points to three areas for future development of the 
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project with respect to metaphysics, ritual, and mind and religious experience. 
The conclusion of the chapter is a meditation on theopoetics, situating the 
solution of the problem of religious language advanced here as an attempt to 
broaden the site of the theopoetic tent as it has been erected in recent literature. 
The Subjunctive Mood 
The first step in demonstrating that infinite objects are able to register in 
the subjunctive space among minds, language, society, and reality is to gain 
further traction on what is meant by subjunctive space. This in turn requires 
interrogating the very notion of subjunctivity, arising as it does in the fields of 
linguistics, social theory, and logic, which while related are not entirely coherent 
with respect to one another. As an initial foray into the notion, subjunctive is 
defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “Designating or relating to a verbal 
mood that refers to an action or state as conceived (rather than as a fact) and is 
therefore used chiefly to express a wish, command, exhortation, or a contingent, 
hypothetical, or prospective event.”1598 It is also helpful to contrast the 
subjunctive as it arises in these disciplinary matrices with the predilection 
																																																								
1598 “Subjunctive, Adj. and n.,” in Oxford English Dictionary Online, A.1.a, accessed December 21, 
2018, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/192731. 
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toward indicative and propositional speech in modern philosophy and theology, 
highlighting the respective allergies to subjunctivity diagnosable in the thinking 
of Rene Descartes, Immanuel Kant, and Karl Barth (1886 – 1968). These 
considerations of subjunctivity and its alternatives are the terms of debate into 
which language as ritual will enter the lists and compete in the next section. 
Subjunctive Mood and Modality in Linguistics 
The concept of the subjunctive, as it is employed in linguistics, is a 
particular species of the genus of mood, which “refers to a formally 
grammaticalized category of the verb which has a modal function.”1599 Such a 
definition merely shifts the locus of inquiry to the topic of modality, which 
linguistics generally takes to be “the semantic domain pertaining to elements of 
meaning that languages express.” Languages accomplish this by “the addition of 
a supplement or overlay of meaning to the most neutral semantic value of the 
proposition of an utterance, namely factual and declarative.”1600 This is to say that 
																																																								
1599 Joan L. Bybee and Suzanne Fleischman, Modality in Grammar and Discourse (Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins, 1995), 2. 
1600 Bybee and Fleischman, 2; F. R. Palmer, Mood and Modality (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), chap. 1.2.1; Paul Portner, Mood (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2018); Paul Portner, Modality, Oxford Surveys in Semantics and Pragmatics (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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meaning is taken to be expressible in terms of propositions, and the basic 
semantic value of any given proposition is whatever it is declaring as fact. 
Modality, in this sense, adds a bit of ornamentation to convey something of the 
attitude of the language user to whatever the proposition of the sentence might 
be.1601 This is what it means to say that modality is “consideration of alternative 
realities mediated by an authority,”1602 where the authority mediates those 
alternatives via linguistic ornamentation. These authored alternatives, or 
attitudes, are generated syntactically via verb modification, through lexical 
additions, or by phonological or morphological changes.1603 Mood is thus 
distinguishable from tense and aspect, which frame linguistic events temporally 
and show how those events move through time, respectively, as emphasizing not 
the events but the perspective of the language user on those events with respect 
to how they are or could be otherwise.1604 Of course, this notion of modality 
																																																								
1601 Joan Bybee, Revere Perkins, and William Pagliuca, The Evolution of Grammar: Tense, Aspect, and 
Modality in the Languages of the World (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 176. 
1602 Shopen, Language Typology and Syntactic Description: Grammatical Categories and the Lexicon, 
III:315. 
1603 Bybee and Fleischman, Modality in Grammar and Discourse, 2. 
1604 Palmer, Mood and Modality, 1; Shopen, Language Typology and Syntactic Description: Grammatical 
Categories and the Lexicon, vol. III, chap. 5. 
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assumes that there is enough traction on how things are to differentiate them 
from how they could be otherwise. 
The distinction between how things are and alternatives to that situation 
gives rise to the most basic distinction in analysis of linguistic modality between 
the realis and irrealis: “The realis portrays situations as actualized, as having 
occurred or actually occurring, knowable through direct perception. The irrealis 
portrays situations as purely within the realm of thought, knowable only 
through imagination.”1605 Not all linguists are sanguine with regard to employing 
this distinction, however, for the very reason that Roy Rappaport identified as 
the inherent linguistic capacity to suggest the alternative. As Alan Timberlake 
notes, even a statement so seemingly obviously in the realis mood as a 
description necessarily implies that the language receiver might have thought 
the situation to be otherwise, and so the language producer is responding to at 
least the potential of that alternative.1606 One way of resolving this tension is by 
noting that the distinction between the realis and irrealis applies with respect to 
developing a syntactic typology of modality, but collapses into the irrealis when 
																																																								
1605 Marianne Mithun, The Languages of Native North America (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 173. 
1606 Shopen, Language Typology and Syntactic Description: Grammatical Categories and the Lexicon, 
III:316. 
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shifting to the work of rhetorical analysis. The former has to do with what a 
given linguistic expression purports to be doing according to its syntax, and so is 
applicable in an analysis of mood, whereas the latter has to do with the 
pragmatic context of its emergence and interpretation as a function of semantic 
modality.1607 It is little wonder, then, given that “there is no common semantic or 
pragmatic basis for the terminology”1608 because the distinction only applies at 
the level of syntax, that there is little cross-linguistic commonality with regard to 
the grammaticalization of the categories.1609 Nevertheless, the distinction remains 
important precisely because the syntax construes situations to be real, when in 
fact the meaning of the expression has to do with the attitudes and perspectives 
of the language user. 
The loosening of linguistic traction with reality enabled by irrealis 
modalities in language emerges from three dimensions of relations among 
language users and elements, aspects, and relations in reality.1610 The first 
																																																								
1607 Petar Kehayov, The Fate of Mood and Modality in Language Death: Evidence from Minor Finnic 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), 18. 
1608 Marianne Mithun, “On the Relativity of Irreality,” in Modality in Grammar and Discourse, ed. 
Joan L. Bybee and Suzanne Fleischman (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1995), 368. 
1609 Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca, The Evolution of Grammar, chap. 6.12. 
1610 Shopen, Language Typology and Syntactic Description: Grammatical Categories and the Lexicon, 
III:329–30. 
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dimension has to do with the degree of confidence a language user has that their 
mental discriminations of reality are true and relevant, and so may be termed the 
epistemic dimension,1611 denoting “necessity, probability, or possibility in 
reasoning.”1612 The second dimension has to do with language producers locating 
and transferring responsibility for enacting changes in reality either on 
themselves, on language receivers, or on reality itself,1613 and so may be termed 
the ethical dimension, denoting “real-world obligation, permission, or ability.”1614 
The third dimension, not always classed with the other two, has to do with 
identifying states of affairs in reality that, should they pertain, necessitate further 
states of affairs, and so may be termed the ontological dimension, denoting 
causality, contingency, and dependency in conditional cases.1615 One of the 
challenges for linguists in grappling with the irrealis modality is that there are 
few, if any, commonalities across languages in terms of how the various 
																																																								
1611 Shopen, III:316–18. 
1612 Eve E. Sweetser, “Root and Epistemic Modals: Causality in Two Worlds,” Annual Meeting of 
the Berkeley Linguistics Society 8 (June 25, 1982): 484, https://doi.org/10.3765/bls.v8i0.2049. 
1613 Shopen, Language Typology and Syntactic Description: Grammatical Categories and the Lexicon, 
III:318–21; Palmer, Mood and Modality, chap. 1.2.2. This dimension is called here “deontic.” 
1614 Sweetser, “Root and Epistemic Modals,” 484. The ethical dimension is here referred to as 
“root.” 
1615 Shopen, Language Typology and Syntactic Description: Grammatical Categories and the Lexicon, 
III:321–26. 
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dimensions and their subsets are marked, and yet meanings associated with 
these three dimensions are present in virtually all languages.1616 Moreover,  
There is no single accepted name; traditions differ, and usage differs in different 
languages. The term subjunctive points to the fact this mood will commonly appear in 
embedded structures. Conditional points to one major function of marked modality, that 
of indicating contingency in explicit conditional structures. Potential covers a broad range 
of especially future possibilities. When there is no established term in some tradition, 
irrealis is useful.1617 
The result of this multifarious terminology and diversity of linguistic marking 
across languages1618 is that, while the presence of irrealis modalities across 
languages is acknowledged, the space the irrealis demarcates among language, 
minds, reality, and society is undertheorized in the literature. 
With this conception of modality, and the distinction between realis and 
irrealis, in hand, it is now possible to locate the subjunctive mood within the 
irrealis modality as a particular verb form. On one hand, “the term ‘subjunctive’ 
is a translation of the Classical Greek hypotaktiké which literally means 
																																																								
1616 Mithun, “On the Relativity of Irreality”; Palmer, Mood and Modality, chap. 1.6. 
1617 Shopen, Language Typology and Syntactic Description: Grammatical Categories and the Lexicon, 
III:326. 
1618 Caterina Mauri and Andrea Sansò, “What Do Languages Encode When They Encode Reality 
Status?,” Language Sciences, Papers selected from the “What do languages encode when they 
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subordinate,” and so “one of the functions of the subjunctive is simply that of 
being subordinate, in that it is typically the mood used in subordinate 
clauses.”1619 On the other hand, the subjunctive grammatical construction has 
come to be used to express the irrealis modality far beyond the limited scope of 
subordinate clauses.1620 For languages that do not have a subjunctive 
grammatical mood, the irrealis modality may be marked by other features, but 
“it is, perhaps, a little unfortunate that the terms ‘realis’ and ‘irrealis’ have been 
adopted as grammatical terms in place of the traditional terms ‘indicative’ and 
‘subjunctive’.”1621 The subjunctive is thus the linguistic markings, whether 
“individual suffixes, clitics, and particles,” “inflection,” or “modal verb,”1622 that 
distinguish expressions in the irrealis from expressions in the realis, in which 
case they are unmarked or indicative.1623 The concept of the subjunctive in the 
disciplinary matrix of linguistics is thus a typological category for expressing the 
notion of irreality as it is expressed in language. The concept of subjunctive as 
																																																								
1619 Palmer, Mood and Modality, chap. 5.1. 
1620 Palmer, chap. 5. 
1621 Palmer, chap. 6.2. 
1622 Palmer, chap. 1.6. 
1623 Palmer, chap. 7.1. 
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the space among language, minds, reality, and society therefore inverts the 
type/notion relation by using subjunctive to refer to the notion of irreality. The 
justification for doing so emerges from consideration of the subjunctive in ritual 
and social theories, which will proceed following consideration of semantic 
theories of modality in linguistics. 
Understanding of how the irrealis is formed, often through the use of 
subjunctive verbal constructions, does not yet reveal very much about what 
linguistic constructs that invoke the irrealis might mean. The most prevalent 
formal approach to the semantic question is that developed by Angelika Kratzer, 
hewing closely to the framework of modal logic and its attendant possible world 
semantics, to be discussed in greater detail below.1624 Kratzer adjusts the 
semantics of modal logic by acknowledging the necessity of accounting for 
context in delimiting the possible meanings of modal expressions in her notion of 
a “conversational background,” “a function from worlds to sets of propositions 
which serves as a parameter of interpretation.”1625 An alternative formalization 
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derives instead from dynamic logic,1626 an extension of modal logic, in which “the 
meaning of a sentence is a function which modifies the context in which it's 
used,” either “the knowledge of some participant in the conversation” or “the 
pragmatic presuppositions of the conversation.”1627 While potentially facilitating 
a wider interpretation of a wider range of modalities, the shift to dynamic logic, 
in which meaning is an action rather than an object,1628 requires abandoning 
modal contributions to truth conditions,1629 in addition to suffering from 
underdevelopment among semantically oriented linguists.1630 Another approach 
to semantics that aspires to formality, albeit perhaps not in the same way as do 
the approaches rooted in modal logic, is that of cognitive semantics, in which 
meaning is identified as a metaphorical transposition of basic concepts from 
embodied experience in the world into abstract domains.1631 Paul Portner raises 
an important point about the cognitive approach pressing semantics too hard 
toward the mental dimension of meaning, and negating pragmatics entirely as a 
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result.1632 Returning pragmatics to the fold does not make things any clearer, 
however, as Barbara Dancygier and Eve Sweetser note regarding a particular 
subset of the irrealis modality: “In the last twenty-five years, speech-act theorists 
and pragmatics scholars have uncovered the uses of conditional forms in 
presenting speech acts, thus setting up a tradition which parallels the logical one 
and presents problems for it.”1633 Their aspiration to bridge the gap between form 
and function is thus laudable, even if their particular approach, rooted in the 
theory of universal grammar, is questionable for reasons that will be discussed 
below. 
The Subjunctive in Ritual and Social Theories 
The notion of the subjunctive emerges in social theory with the ritual 
theory of French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858 – 1917) in The Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life1634 in which social realities are treated “as if” they are 
elements of brute reality. Reflecting general trends in French social thought at the 
time, Durkheim agrees with Saussure regarding the arbitrariness of signs with 
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respect to their objects,1635 noting that a soldier might be willing to die to 
recapture a flag when “he forgets that the flag is only a symbol that has no value 
in itself but only brings to mind the reality it represents. The flag itself is treated 
as if it was that reality.”1636 Likewise regarding the symbolic elements of rituals, 
then, after encountering which “everything happens as if they really were 
working. People are more confident because they feel stronger, and they are 
stronger in reality because the strength that was flagging has been reawakened in 
their consciousnesses.”1637 For Durkheim, then, ritual inhabits a fundamentally 
unreal “as if” space between society and reality that nevertheless has real effects 
when it is taken as real, in effect realizing a determinate trajectory through reality 
that could have been otherwise should another trajectory have been taken. The 
problem is that because the symbolic elements of the ritual are taken to be 
arbitrary, there is no way to evaluate whether one trajectory is or could be better 
than another. Notably, the grammatical construction of treating a subordinate 
reality “as if” if were a superior one is only one linguistic function of the 
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subjunctive mood, but the whole of the meaning of the subjunctive in social and 
ritual theories that employ the concept. 
A second locus of consideration of the subjunctive within social theory 
emerges from the social philosophy of Alfed Schutz (1899 – 1959), operating at 
the intersection of sociology and phenomenology.1638 Like Durkheim, Schutz 
does not use the nomenclature of the subjunctive but has a related notion of a 
space of irreality in his conception of multiple realities. Of course, 
“phenomenology is concerned with that cognitive reality which is embodied in 
the processes of subjective human experiences,”1639 and so Schutz conceives 
reality within mental experience rather than as it is independent of thought, as 
critical realism would have it. Concurring with William James (1842 – 1910), 
Schutz says that “reality means simply relation to our emotional and active life; 
whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real.”1640 The totality of this reality 
Schutz refers to, with Edmund Husserl (1859 – 1938), as the “life-world,” which 
“is the whole sphere of everyday experiences, orientations, and actions through 
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which individuals pursue their interests and affairs by manipulating objects, 
dealing with people, conceiving plans, and carrying them out.”1641 Within the 
life-world is a “paramount reality” that James identified with sense perception, 
but Schutz expands the domain somewhat by including a modicum of semantic 
relation such that things sensed might function as “socio-cultural objects.”1642 
This indicative paramount reality may be contrasted with two subjunctive 
dimensions. The first subjunctive dimension is that of “nonparamount realities,” 
e.g. “the world of dreams, of imageries and phantasms, especially the world of 
art, the world of religious experience, the world of scientific contemplation, the 
play world of the child, and the world of the insane.”1643 The second is that of 
“transcendence,” which consists in “my knowledge that nature transcends the 
reality of my everyday life both in time and in space,” as does “in a similar way 
the social world.”1644 Moreover, for Schutz, unlike James, the nonparamount 
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realities depend on, as “modifications” of, paramount reality,1645 and so are 
properly subordinate as subjunctive realities. 
The nomenclature of the subjunctive enters into the social and ritual 
theory literature with the work of Victor Turner, who links the subjunctive with 
liminality in his theory of the ritual process. Eric W. Rothenbuhler links the 
notion of liminality and its subjunctive character in Turner back to Durkheim, 
although he locates them in the Dukheimian distinction between the sacred and 
the profane.1646 Turner self-consciously draws the analogy between cultural 
performances such as “ritual, carnival, festival, theater, film, and similar 
performative genres,” and the subjunctive mood, by contrast with “the indicative 
mood of culture,” which “controls the daily arenas of economic activity, much of 
law and politics, and a good deal of domestic life.”1647 He further connects the 
subjunctivity of cultural performances with the liminal stage of the ritual 
process, discussed in detail in chapter three, in which participants experience 
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communitas free from structure and hierarchy: “The antistructural liminality 
provided in the cores of ritual and aesthetic forms represents … its subjunctive 
mood, where suppositions, desires, hypotheses, possibilities, and so forth, all 
become legitimate.”1648 This notion of the subjunctive is thus of a “time and place 
in which quotidian roles and statuses do not apply:”1649  
The new rules correspond to the domains of the “potential,” or the “desirable.” Norms 
are no longer ideal constructions, inaccessible models, lofty guidelines, both revered and 
neglected because of their unattainability. When it accedes to the subjunctive mode, a 
society becomes, at least temporarily, what it ought to be. It enacts its professed 
objectives, reiterates its own principles.1650 
Unlike Durkheim and Schutz, who admit of the ambivalence of the subjunctive 
dimensions of life, Turner renders the subjunctive as “ontologically privileged” 
as it enables envisioning and articulating the world as it could be by contrast 
with the indicative mood describing the world as it is.1651 This binary contrast 
between in the indicative and the subjunctive moods in cultural performances 
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may be rightly critiqued for neglecting the interaction between them, including 
both the exercise of control over the subjunctive by the indicative and the drive 
of the subjunctive toward the imperative, or the world as it should be.1652 
The most extensive engagement of the subjunctive mood as the sine qua 
non of ritual and social theory is that undertaken by Seligman et al in Ritual and 
Its Consequences1653 and addressed extensively in chapter three. There is much to 
commend about their theorizing the subjunctive space in which ritual operates, 
especially their insistence that “ritual activity – and, with it, the construction of a 
subjunctive universe – occurs throughout many different modes of human 
interaction, not just religion.”1654 However, whereas Turner contrasts the “as if” 
of the subjunctive with the “as is” of the indicative, these theorists associate the 
“as is” with the notion of sincerity, which they identify with Protestantism and 
as seeking “to replace the ‘mere convention’ of ritual with a genuine and 
thoughtful state of internal conviction. Rather than becoming what we do in 
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action through ritual, we do according to what we have become through self-
examination.”1655 Unfortunately, their positing of an oppositional binary between 
sincerity and subjunctivity results in the same challenges Turner faces in positing 
an oppositional binary between the subjunctivity of liminality that characterizes 
the antistructure of communitas and the ritual reintegration into the indicative 
mood of everyday life. Moreover, the oppositional binary results in a creeping 
nominalism in which the conventions of ritual leave reality fundamentally 
unchanged as fragmented and disordered, as was discussed in chapter four. This 
results in Seligman et al misinterpreting Xunzi as similarly a nominalist 
constructivist when he in fact envisions ritual as the human contribution to 
harmonizing humanity with heaven and earth in an ongoing process of mutual 
transformation toward wholeness. The purpose of ritual is not an alternative to 
sincerity but rather the very means to become sincere to the form of the ritual 
process. Ritual does establish “an order as if it were truly the case,”1656 and then 
goes on to make it so.  
The notion of virtuality as developed by Bruce Kapferer serves as a 
corrective to the theory that ritual creates subjunctive space as an alternative 
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either to the indicative of everyday life or an internal disposition of sincerity.1657 
In spite of their proclivity toward totalizing the relations among their elements, 
“some rites may come to influence experience and affect the structuring of 
relations outside the domain of ritual performance through processes that are not 
directed to the representation of such realities.”1658 Returning to theorists such as 
James G. Frazer (1854 – 1941), Bronisław  Malinowski, and Claude Lévi-Strauss 
(1908 – 2009), Kapferer views ritual “as a technological dynamic for the 
(re)creation, (re)generation, (re)production, redirection, or intervention within 
the circumstances and continuity of personal realities and social and political 
forms of human life.”1659 This is to say that his conception of reality, like that of 
Schutz, is phenomenological, and so pertains to reality as perceived in minds and 
society. The independent reality of critical realism Kapferer calls “actuality” and 
identifies with a process metaphysics: “It is not something fixed or stable, but is 
always in process, subject to forces that are always extending beyond any human 
knowledge of them.”1660 The transformative capacity of virtuality is possible 
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because, in line with Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Susan Langer,1661 it is 
conceived as part and parcel with reality. A virtual space is “a construction, but a 
construction that enables participants to break free from the constraints or 
determinations of everyday life, and even from the determinations of the 
constructed ritual virtual space itself.”1662 Kapferer identifies virtuality, and 
especially ritual virtuality, as a space in which emergence emerges, which is to 
say a space that opens up within reality but is irreducible thereto, and in which 
its representations are techniques for transforming reality.1663 “The virtualizing 
machine of ritual holds certain dimensions of actuality in abeyance while 
exposing the formational processes of other aspects of actuality, while in the midst 
of it, to exploration, manipulation and, perhaps, to reconfiguration.”1664 In 
recognizing the affinity of his theory with the analysis of liminality undertaken 
by Turner, Kapferer locates his notion of virtuality within what is understood 
here as the subjunctive, although the “as if” space opens within and then 
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transforms reality rather than transcending from and contrasting with the 
quotidian.1665 
Terrence W. Deacon, at the outset of The Symbolic Species: On the Co-
Evolution of Language and the Brain, identifies subjunctivity as the demarcating 
boundary between humans and nonhuman animals. He is worth quoting 
extensively on this point as he notes that humans 
live in a world that no other species has access to. We inhabit a world full of abstractions, 
impossibilities, and paradoxes. We alone brood about what didn't happen, and spend a 
large part of each day musing about the way things could have been if events had 
transpired differently. And we alone ponder what it will be like not to be. In what other 
species could individuals ever be troubled by the fact that they do not recall the way 
things were before they were born and will not know what will occur after they die? We 
tell stories about our real experiences and invent stories about imagined ones, and we 
even make use of these stories to organize our lives. In a real sense, we live our lives in 
this shared virtual world. And slowly, over the millennia, we have come to realize that 
no other species on earth seems able to follow us into this miraculous place.1666 
Deacon goes on to elaborate language as the human cultural artifact and tool for 
engaging this subjunctivity, employing the language of virtuality to articulate the 
common space among language, reality, minds, and society that humans, to 
varying extents, mutually inhabit. The power of his notion of co-evolution 
between language and brains is precisely that the richness of these subjunctive 
mental spaces would likely be impossible without the transformative work 
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undertaken with the language tool to render them so. The limitation of the 
framework, as elaborated above in chapter two, is that it overemphasizes the 
work of representation of reality in language, and so ultimately inadequately 
recognizes that the transformative work of language as ritual proceeds 
irrespective of representational adequacy. Nevertheless, Deacon provides the 
most robust account of how language deploys and employs subjunctivity to 
accomplish its transformative work in the social science literature to date. The 
main advance of the present project on this accomplishment is to press the notion 
of subjunctivity back from the species of language to the genus of ritual and to 
enrich the notion of subjunctivity in language by recourse to a systematic 
treatment of linguistics and logic as dimensions of the ritual process. 
The Subjunctive Mood and Modal Logic 
The notion of the subjunctive has taken center stage in the study of logic 
since the advent of modern modal logic with the work of Clarence Irving Lewis 
(1883 – 1964) in the early twentieth century.1667 Also important for logical 
consideration of the subjunctive, emerging at the intersection of logic, linguistics, 
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and cognitive science, is the rich contemporary literature regarding conditional 
constructions, including the conditional mood. However, before turning to these 
developments, it is helpful to return to an earlier logical discussion of the 
subjunctive in medieval supposition theory. 
In the medieval period in Western philosophy, especially in the 
development of logic in the latter decades of that epoch, supposition and 
signification together constituted a semantic theory. Signification has to do with 
reference in the sense of the relations among words in natural language, concepts 
as codified in mental language, and things in the world,1668 and so is a theory of 
meaning prior to either syntax or pragmatics. Supposition, by contrast, only 
pertains in the context of a proposition, and so is the meaning of language when 
it is actually used to talk about things, whether or not that meaning has anything 
to do with what any given term or their composition together in the proposition 
signifies.1669 Supposition, then, accounts for syntax but only insofar as it 
contributes to the meaning of language as used, which is to say it lies at the 
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pragmatic pole of the semantic ellipse of meaning.1670 Catarina Dutilh Novaes 
argues that the complex taxonomies developed in supposition theories are ways 
of analyzing all of the different meanings a given expression could have: 
“supposition can be seen as a piece of machinery which, when given 
propositions as input, outputs their possible readings.”1671 This is to say that 
medieval theories of supposition are means of mapping the subjunctive space 
among language, minds, reality, and society and charting the process of 
transformation that plays out therein. 
In modern logic, modal logic stands in for the supposition theories of 
medieval logic in providing a mechanism for analyzing subjunctivity in the form 
of what John L. Pollock (1940 – 2009) calls “subjunctive reasoning.”1672 Pollock 
notes that subjunctivity suffers from philosophical neglect “because it seems to 
presuppose a strange metaphysically suspicious sort of logically contingent 
necessity,” but since “subjunctive concepts do make sense… the problem cannot 
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be whether they make sense, but what sense they make.”1673 The apparatus of 
modal logic, with its additional operators, was detailed in chapter two, and some 
consideration was given to the various metaphysical and epistemological 
possibilities undergirding the possible worlds framework in which that 
apparatus operates. Of interest here are two issues in philosophy of logic with 
respect to modal logics and how they construe subjunctivity, and then the main 
way in which logicians have addressed subjunctivity, namely in terms of 
conditionals. 
The first issue in the philosophy of modal logic is epistemological, having 
to do with underlying assumptions regarding the relationships in analytic 
philosophy, where modal logic emerged and developed, among the four poles of 
mind, language, reality, and society that Putnam identified as grounding 
linguistic meaning. As Richard Rorty (1931 – 2007) argues in Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature, modern epistemology relies upon the assumption that mental 
organization of sense data mirrors reality, although his conversationalist 
alternative to this overemphasis on mental representation may similarly be 
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critiqued for overemphasizing the social pole.1674 Modal logic reflects this 
assumption of mental representations mirroring reality precisely because, as 
logic, it gives expression to principles of sound reasoning such that reasoning 
reflects relationships in the world, or at least in a possible world.1675 At the same 
time, under the influence of the theory of universal grammar developed by 
Noam Chomsky and inculcated in analytic philosophy, language is understood 
to mirror mind as the structures of language are determined by certain mental 
faculties.1676 This purported connection between mind and language justifies 
modal logic as not merely a codification and systematization of subjunctive 
linguistic expression but rather of a deeper “subjunctive reasoning.”1677 The result 
is a double mirroring between mind and reality and between language and mind 
that closely resembles the Saussurean assumption in continental philosophy that 
the structure of language is the same structure as in all sign systems. Of import 
for considering the construal of subjunctivity is that the reduction of the space 
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among mind, language, and reality to the process of mirroring effectively 
collapses the three together, which in turn enables the collapse of the subjunctive 
into conditional propositions, thereby translating them into the indicative. A 
central goal of the present project is to provide an account of mind, language, 
reality, and society as more independent from one another by envisioning a 
larger space among them, in which they nevertheless mutually condition and 
transform one another. 
The second issue in philosophy of modal logic is metaphysical, having to 
do with the ways in which different interpretations of possible worlds construe 
subjunctivity. Possible worlds semantics are necessary for modal logic to 
function as the modal operators make claims about elements, aspects, and 
relations in reality that do not inhere in the actual world and so must be 
predicated of a possible world.1678 These possible worlds thus inhabit the 
subjunctive space of interest in the present project, and so their metaphysical 
status is of interest. However, an immediate problem arises with the concrete 
physical realist approach, as epitomized by David Lewis (1941 – 2001), in that the 
possible worlds modal logic refers to are entirely cut off from one another:  
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They are isolated: there are no spatiotemporal relations at all between things that belong 
to different worlds. Nor does anything that happens at one world cause anything to 
happen at another. Nor do they overlap; they have no parts in common, with the 
exception, perhaps, of immanent universals exercising their characteristic privilege of 
repeated occurrence.1679 
The problem is that the modal operators, and the subjunctive linguistic 
expressions they logically encode, while functional, are thus rendered irrelevant, 
as describing some other world that has nothing to do with the actual one.1680 
Subjunctivity is thus real, but relegated to a mere opportunity for imaginative 
wonderment entirely cut off from any relevance to the ongoing processes of life 
in the actual world; subjunctivity is reduced to serving as a marking of 
discussion of a possible rather than the actual world. 
The reigning alternative to concrete physical realism in interpreting 
possible worlds is abstractionism,1681 in which possible worlds are maximal 
(total) states of affairs which elements, aspects, and relations are determined to 
the extent that every subset thereof is fully determined, i.e. included or 
precluded.1682 Only one possible world actually obtains, although its constituent 
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states of affairs also exist across worlds that, as totalities of states of affairs, do 
not obtain.1683 At the same time, since it is states of affairs as abstract entities, 
rather than the things from which states of affairs abstract, that are ontologically 
primitive, abstractionism is generally committed to actualism such that only 
things in the world that obtains exist in any possible world.1684 The language of 
ontology and abstract entities signals that abstractionism need not be merely a 
mental process of construing possibilities, and thus commits abstractionism to an 
irreducibly modal metaphysics that precludes the semantic extensionality 
possible worlds were developed to recover in the first place.1685 This irreducibility 
of possibility among states of affairs means that subjunctivity is thus pervasive 
on the abstractionist account, reality being perfused by possible states of affairs, 
some of which actually obtain. The pervasiveness of subjunctivity is further 
inculcated by the commitment to transworld identity, wherein the same 
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individual has different properties and relations in different possible worlds,1686 
among abstractionists. That said, given this pervasiveness, their commitment to 
actualism, and their willingness to sacrifice extension to irreducible modality, it 
is unclear why abstractionists need to posit possible worlds at all instead of 
simply positing subjunctivity as a metaphysical principle of the one actual world. 
Combinatorialism is a close cousin to abstractionism that takes facts 
understood as the conjuncts of particulars and properties/relations to be 
ontologically basic:1687 
The simple individuals, properties and relations may be combined in all ways to yield 
possible atomic states of affairs, provided only that the form of atomic facts is respected. 
That is the combinatorial idea. Such possible atomic states of affairs may then be 
combined in all ways to yield possible molecular states of affairs. If such a possible 
molecular state of affairs is thought of as the totality of being, then it is a possible world.1688 
By pressing its ontology back from states of affairs into a type of atomism and 
then making supervening facts derivative therefrom, combinatorialism is able to 
constrain its notion of states of affairs such that it may remain reductive to first-
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order propositional and predicate logic and thereby retain extensionality.1689 
Moreover, given the proclivity toward scientific reductionism in the account 
given by David Malet Armstrong (1926 – 2014), it is unsurprising that his 
combinatorialism adopts modal fictionalism1690 with regard to possible worlds 
such that non-actual worlds do not exist but may be spoken of as if they do. 
Subjunctivity on the combinatorialist account has to do with the different ways 
that atomic facts may be combined into atomic and then molecular states of 
affairs, quite apart from the indicative, and so adherent to predicate and 
propositional logic, of those atomic facts and their individuals, properties, and 
relations. Furthermore, on the fictionalist account embraced by Armstrong, 
subjunctivity is the means by which the modality of states of affairs is reduced to 
the indicative of first-order propositional and predicate logic by treating fictional 
possibilities as if they are real. 
Logicians frequently address the topic of modality, and thus subjunctivity, 
in natural languages by recourse and reduction to conditional constructions. 
Interest in conditionals was sparked primarily by a paper by F.P. Ramsey (1903 - 
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1930) that puts to the question the rationale for disagreement regarding 
conditional statements when the facts at hand are agreed upon.1691 An early 
response locates the source of disagreement not in the facts at hand but in the 
contextual factors, such as physical laws and circumstances, in which those facts 
are to play out so as to result in the consequent.1692 More recently, three 
approaches to explaining conditionals in natural language have emerged most 
prominently. The first makes recourse to the possible world semantics developed 
to provide truth conditions in modal logic to provide truth conditions to 
conditional statements by evaluating for truth in a possible world where the 
antecedent is true.1693 The interpretations of subjunctivity just discussed for the 
three main interpretive traditions of possible world semantics thus hold for this 
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interpretation of conditional constructions as well. The other approaches demur 
from attempting to provide truth conditions for conditional constructions, 
instead providing reasons for accepting or rejecting conditional claims.1694 Ernest 
W. Adams (1926 – 2009) determines the acceptability of conditionals on the basis 
of the probability of the consequent given the antecedent,1695 introducing a 
probabilistic mapping of the topology of subjunctivity. Peter Gärdenfors brings a 
cognitive semantics approach to conditional constructions, arguing that the 
consequent is acceptable as an element of knowledge only if the antecedent has 
already been included in the set of beliefs that constitute knowledge.1696 This last 
move returns mentality to the domain of subjunctivity, recognizing the cognitive 
suspense the underdetermination of conditional constructions invokes.  
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Resisting the Subjunctive in Modern Philosophy and Theology 
In Ritual and Its Consequences, Adam Seligman et al contrast a notion of 
sincerity they link genealogically with Protestantism with their notion of the 
ritual subjunctive.1697 Without necessarily buying into either their historical 
analysis or their general conception of the notion of sincerity, it is nevertheless 
quite clear that the inheritors of Protestantism in Enlightenment thought and 
then modernity more generally have been exceedingly suspicious of 
subjunctivity. While tracing the full development of this skepticism toward the 
subjunctive through modern philosophical and theological thought vastly 
exceeds the scope of the present project, consideration of a few highlights 
illustrates the contrast between the indicative aspirations of modernity and the 
subjunctivity advocated here.  
René Descartes (1596 – 1650), a French Catholic who set the stage for much 
of the modern program in philosophy and theology, to say nothing of his work 
in the sciences, is perhaps best known for his dictum, “Cogito, ergo sum,” “I 
think, therefore I am.”1698 This conclusion, providing as it does the basis for a 
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rationalist turn toward a purely intellectual, extrasensory engagement with 
reality, is of far less interest than the process by which Descartes arrives at it: “I 
came to think that I should … reject as completely false everything in which I 
could detect the least doubt, in order to see if anything thereafter remained in my 
belief that was completely indubitable.”1699 What Descartes seeks to do is to 
doubt absolutely everything until he arrives at something he cannot doubt, 
which may then serve as a sure foundation for knowledge. In short, Descartes 
seeks certainty, and certainty, even more than sincerity, is the hallmark of the 
indicative. Indeed, the subjunctive, with all of its possibility, desire, opinion, 
obligation, conjecture, hypothesis, and above all, irreality, is precisely that which 
makes sensory experience dubitable and thus provokes the anxiety at the bottom 
of which Descartes seeks certainty. Once found, the project of modernity is then 
to build a bulwark on its foundation, although the subjunctive seems always to 
be whispering at the gate. 
One of the whisperers of subjunctivity is David Hume (1711 – 1776), 
whose skepticism arose from his denial of the human rational capacity for 
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inductive reasoning, and thus knowledge of causation, from the bare 
impressions and ideas of experience, and thereby banishing them from the 
domain of knowledge to mere belief.1700 Reinforcement of the indicative bulwark 
arrives in the person of Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), whose Critique of Pure 
Reason attempts to synthesize rationalism with empiricism.1701 Kant argues that 
the a priori, analytic categories of time and space ground causality as the a priori, 
synthetic category of the two, and together they provide the basis for all a 
posteriori synthetic empirical knowledge of phenomena.1702 He thus inaugurated 
the subjective captivity in modern philosophy, in which things cannot be known 
as they are in themselves, that is as noumena, which is the goal of metaphysics, 
but only as they are in sense experience, that is empirically, as phenomena.1703 
Liberation is only possible once the lingering anxiety of the Cartesian demand for 
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certainty is assuaged such that the rejection of the subjunctive by Kant in his 
explicit denial of hypothetical reasoning1704 may be concomitantly abandoned. 
After all, the Kantian project relies upon the same underlying assumption that 
knowledge is representational, carrying things as they are out there over into the 
cognitive apparatus, which in turn presumes that things are determinate enough, 
apart from being known, to be so represented. 
While the Cartesian and Kantian projects, and their relata, set the agenda 
for large swaths of the development of modern theological thinking,1705 the 
skepticism they engendered to classical conceptions of divinity led to a 
theological backlash against the influence of philosophical thinking on 
theological development. The epitome of this revolt is the “Nein!,” “No!,” of Karl 
Barth (1886 – 1968) to the call by Emil Brunner (1889 – 1966) for a return to 
natural theology.1706 Instead, Barth reaffirms the utter transcendence of God with 
respect to human reason, and thus reconfigures theology as a science of the 
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church in which the task of the theologian is to measure what the church says 
about God against the revelation of God to the church in Jesus Christ. In making 
this shift, Barth acknowledges that theology “presupposes that the true content 
of Christian talk about God can be known by man”1707 and “attests itself in Holy 
Scripture in the word of the prophets and apostles to whom it was originally and 
once and for all spoken by God's revelation.”1708 Whereas the appeal to scriptural 
authority made by Martin Luther (1483 – 1546) at the outset of the Protestant 
Reformation sought to supplant ecclesial authority, the appeal to scriptural 
authority by Barth seeks to supplant both the Cartesian authority of reason and 
the Kantian authority of experience. The foundation of certainty for Barth is thus 
a narrative, not only of the person of Jesus of Nazareth as attested in the Gospels, 
but also of the church constantly measuring itself against that gospel down 
through history to the present. That narrative is very much in the indicative 
mood: Jesus was born, lived, taught, died, rose from the dead, ascended to 
heaven, and lives on in the discipleship of the church. While Barth has certainly 
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supplanted any and all anthropological grounds for certainty, he persists in the 
anxiety for certainty that he inherits from the likes of Descartes and Kant. 
If modernity is characterized by the search for certainty in the indicative 
mood, then postmodernism, understood as “incredulity toward 
metanarratives,”1709 i.e. such indicative assertions of universal grounds for 
certainty, might be expected to emerge in the subjunctive mood. It does not. 
Instead, postmodernism launches a panoply of indicative rejoinders to modern 
attempts to ground epistemological certainty on sure foundations. There is 
something of a contribution to emerge from this skeptical stance toward 
modernity in that postmodernism finally rejects the central aim of the Cartesian 
project: “What postmodernity discovers (or, rather, rediscovers), is that 
rationality cannot ground itself, and that therefore modernity cannot be 
grounded. As a result, the idea of modern knowledge turns out to be a self-
defeating proposition.”1710 Clearly, modernity substitutes here for the anxious 
pursuit of certainty. Unfortunately, the postmodern indicative rejoinders to 
modernity have less than responsibly appropriated ammunition for their 
agonistic enterprise from unwitting and unwilling communities of inquiry along 
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the way.1711 Moreover, the vehemence with which postmodernism has launched 
and sustained its attack on modernity results in something of a fog of war from 
which no alternative is offered, or may even be possible. “That postmodernism is 
indefinable is a truism. However, it can be described as a set of critical, strategic 
and rhetorical practices employing concepts such as difference, repetition, the 
trace, the simulacrum, and hyperreality to destabilize other concepts such as 
presence, identity, historical progress, epistemic certainty, and the univocity of 
meaning.”1712 Postmodernism is thus wholly defined by what it is against, and 
being so must respond to the indicative mood of modernity with equally 
indicative retorts and rebuttals. By contrast, the present project aspires to offer an 
alternative to the anxious pursuit of certainty that characterizes modernity by 
making the shift from the indicative to the subjunctive mood. 
Subjunctive Realism – Language as Ritual 
Having surveyed the idea of the subjunctive as it registers in linguistics, 
social theory, and logic, and resistance to it in modern philosophy and theology, 
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it is now possible to elaborate the conception of subjunctivity as it emerges in the 
theory of language as ritual developed in chapter five. The elaboration begins 
with consideration of subjunctivity as it emerges from the metaphysical semiotics 
underlying the theory of language as ritual. It continues with a systematic 
treatment of the subjunctive from the various aspects and dimensions of the 
theory of language as ritual. It concludes with an account of the subjunctive as 
grounding a particular form of critical realism. Subsequent sections will deploy 
the conception of subjunctivity derived here to show how language engages a 
range of realities, including infinite or indeterminate realities, and to develop a 
typology of religious language.  
Subjunctive and Semiotics 
In the conclusion to his consideration of the virtuality of ritual, Bruce 
Kapferer provides a rich justification for discussion of the subjunctivity of the 
metaphysical semiotics that underlies the theory of language as ritual prior to its 
consideration proper: 
The stress I place on ritual as a virtuality is directed to the dynamic technology of ritual. 
It is intended as a corrective to mimetic and performance perspectives towards ritual. 
While such perspectives are extremely important… there is an over-use of dramatic and 
theatrical metaphors in the discussion of much ritual and there is often a reduction to the 
terms of a semiotic of textual analysis and interpretation… Ritual seen from such 
perspectives continues the importance of the phenomenon for those anthropologists who 
engage the events they call “ritual” as a means for gaining access to realities that are not 
usually their own. But these orientations may reduce an understanding of how rituals 
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operate on those who routinely have recourse to them. Thus an approach to ritual as a 
virtuality which concentrates not merely on the surface as a play of representations but 
on the dynamics of ritual, on the rules and procedures… whereby rituals penetrate 
beneath the surface to intervene in the very process of personal and reality 
construction.1713 
This is all to say that ritual cuts much deeper to the bone, to borrow a metaphor 
from Ronald Grimes,1714 than much of the anthropological literature on ritual 
allows. Since what is being discussed here as subjunctivity, which Kapferer calls 
virtuality, is the scalpel ritual employs to cut to the bone and then graft elements, 
aspects, and relations of reality together, its metaphysical semiotics provides the 
interpretive frame for its surgical practice. 
The metaphysical semiotics developed in conversation with Charles 
Sanders Peirce (1839 – 1914) in the second chapter understands reality itself, and 
not just human experience of reality as in phenomenological semiotics, to be 
pervasively perfused by semiosis, or sign processes. To be a thing is to be a sign, 
which is to say a sign process. A sign involves an object related either iconically, 
indexically, or symbolically to a sign vehicle, which relation, or reference, results 
in the generation of an interpretant. The interpretant is then itself a sign vehicle 
at least for the sign process that generated it, which additional function drives 
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the ongoing process of semiosis. There is nothing about a sign process as such, 
however, that necessitates that a sign vehicle referring to an object will 
necessarily generate an interpretant, or if it does that it will be the same 
interpretant as the last time. There is also nothing about sign processes that 
allows sign processes to interact with one another so as to achieve greater 
degrees of complexity. These codifying, systematizing, and networking functions 
are fulfilled by ritual understood as “the performance of more or less invariant 
sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the performers” 
(Rappaport, 24). Of course, this definition also describes the sign process itself, 
but ritual exceeds the spontaneous generation of interpretants by sign vehicles 
referring to objects by adding pattern, harmony, and order to the proceedings. 
Given this metaphysical account, what role does subjunctivity play in 
semiosis? Metaphysical semiotics must be very clear that none of the three 
components of the sign process – the vehicle, the object, or the interpretant – is 
reducible to either or both of the others, nor is the sign as a whole reducible to 
any one or two of the components. One implication of this doctrine is that there 
is necessarily space between the vehicle, the object, and the interpretant within 
the sign. This space is what Victor Turner called liminal with respect to ritual 
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process, a betwixt and between1715 of as yet indeterminate possibility, which is to 
say of subjunctivity. The space between the vehicle and the object is subjunctive 
because the sign treats the vehicle as if it were the object; it is this very relation of 
vehicle as if object that generates the interpretant. The space between the object 
and the interpretant is subjunctive because the interpretant is generated as if by 
the object through the mediation of the vehicle, which relation to the object was 
just similarly classed subjunctive. The space between the vehicle and the 
interpretant is subjunctive because the interpretant is generated as if by the 
vehicle, which is a medium by relation for the object. Indeed, the very notion of 
reference requires subjunctivity as that which refers is treated as if it were that to 
which it refers. 
One implication of the role of subjunctivity in semiosis is that reality is 
rendered far less determinate than usually assumed, and that the modern anxiety 
for certainty would require it be in order to be assuaged. To be a thing is to be a 
sign, and yet the subjunctive space within and among the sign relations opens up 
the process of signification to ecological and other contextual influence and 
admits the probabilistic character of the sign function. Contextual factors may 
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interrupt reference from vehicle to object, or may interrupt the generation of the 
interpretant once reference is achieved. Even apart from external conditions, 
many signs only signify in a certain proportion of cases, with vehicles referring 
to one object a certain percentage of the time and possibly to another the rest of 
the time or not at all, and with interpretants likewise being generated from 
successful reference probabilistically. The codifying, systematizing, and 
networking functions of ritual serve to stabilize these inherent and contextual 
indeterminacies somewhat, and thereby increase the determinateness of the signs 
they encode, systematize, and network. “’To be determinate is, minimally, to 
have some identity over against or in difference from what is other than that 
identity,’1716 to be ‘this’ rather than ‘that.’ To be indeterminate, then, is not to be 
different from something, not to be ‘this’ rather than ‘that.’”1717 Rather than a 
simple binary, determinateness is better conceived as a spectrum in which the 
degree of determinateness is determined by a calculus coupling the probability 
of a vehicle referring to an object, the probability of reference successfully 
generating an interpretant, and the extent of the encoded networks and systems 
in which the resulting sign registers. Signs are thus interpretable as more or less 
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determinate, both in general and with respect to other particular sign processes 
and ritual encodings. To be fully determinate would require that a sign always 
refer to one and the same object resulting in the generation of one and the same 
interpretant and that the resulting sign be encoded in networks and systems with 
every other sign in the universe. To be fully indeterminate would require that a 
vehicle never refer to its object, never generate its interpretant, and be 
relationally encoded with absolutely no other signs in the universe. Needless to 
say, there are very few things, if any, that are either fully determinate or fully 
indeterminate. Of course, in the case of indeterminacy, since the vehicle does not 
refer to the object and so the reference does not generate the interpretant, a 
completely indeterminate sign is not a sign, and therefore is not a thing, anyway.  
These metaphysical considerations regarding subjunctivity in the semiosis 
of reality lead to concomitant cosmological considerations regarding the 
subjunctivity among reality, minds, language, and society. First it should be 
stated that minds, language, and society are themselves encodings of networks 
and systems of signs, which is to say rituals, in reality. Minds, language, and 
society are thus part and parcel of reality, themselves real elements, aspects, and 
relations. Cosmological consideration of subjunctivity is thus consideration of the 
subjunctivity of ritual. The role of ritual thus far has been described in terms of 
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encoding networks and systems of signs, which is analogous to the metaphysical 
description of the sign process in which a vehicle refers to an object and thereby 
generates an interpretant. This is to say that subjunctivity describes the space 
among the signs in the ritually constructed network or system, just as it describes 
the space among the vehicle, the object, and the interpretant at the metaphysical 
level. The subjunctive space is thus similarly a space of possibility, of becoming, 
in which signs are related together as if they inherently accord with the ritual 
form and process. Just as successful semiosis results in an interpretant that is at 
least determinate enough to be available for ritualization, successful ritualization 
results in a network or system of signs that is determinate enough for further 
ritualization. It is important to remember that ritual, like semiosis, is a process. 
The process operates within the subjunctive space of possibility, of becoming, of 
as if to render indeterminate things more determinate. This is to say that semiosis 
and ritual serve to make signs more determinate, and thus indicative with 
respect to all of the other signs with respect to which they are determinate. That 
said, the moment a sign becomes determinate, it also becomes available for 
ritualization, or when a ritual becomes determinate it becomes available for 
further ritualization, and so enters a new subjunctive space of indeterminacy. 
The specific rituals of mind, language, and society instantiate these more general 
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cosmological considerations of the subjunctivity of ritual. The subjunctive space 
among them and reality is the topic of the next section, and the notion of the 
subjunctive in language and society was discussed above and will be taken up 
again in the next section, but mental subjunctivity remains to be addressed. 
In Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter, Terrence W. Deacon 
provides an incredibly detailed account of the processes of emergence that 
organize and constrain chemical and biological elements into the “ententional” 
phenomena of mind, consciousness, and life.1718 Crucial in his account of 
emergence is the concept of constraint, “the property of being restricted or being 
less variable than possible, all other things being equal, and irrespective of why it 
is restricted.”1719 Emergence posits orders or patterns that structure the system 
organizing component elements such that they exhibit an emergent property, 
which is to say that emergence is ritual, rendering a determinate property from 
things related in a previously subjunctive space of indeterminacy. Rather than 
locating these patterns in some sort of ideal realm, Deacon identifies them as 
arising from constraint, and as was noted in conversation with Xunzi in chapter 
three, one of the key functions of ritual is to restrain otherwise ominous, i.e. 
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subjunctive and indeterminate, human nature. Deacon notes that “what exists 
are processes of change, constraints exhibited by those processes, and the 
statistical smoothing and the attractors (dynamical regularities that form due to 
self-organizing processes) that embody the options left by these constraints.”1720 
Moreover, he links constraint to the notion of habit elaborated by Charles 
Sanders Peirce and which he summarizes as “regularities of behavior arising in 
both physical and organic contexts.”1721 All of these descriptions of emergence, 
particularly with respect to the emergence of mind from matter, fit the 
cosmological description of ritual as a process by which signs are brought into 
increasingly determinate relation to one another. Moreover, the initial stage 
Deacon identifies as “processes of change” seems to indicate the subjunctivity, 
the possibility and becoming, that characterizes the space among the elements, 
aspects, and relations to be ritualized together. For Xunzi, Xing 性 as “the root 
and beginning, the raw material and original constitution,” and as what is 
“spontaneous from nature,” may have more to do with what we now understand 
to be the underlying neuro-physiology and anatomy of the human body, and 
especially the brain. He further describes this raw material as being made up of 
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competing desires, which might better be schematized in the contemporary 
context as a chaotic amalgam of neurological elements. It is this brain matter that 
he then identifies as crude and ominous apart from its going through the process 
of emergence by constraint or restraint, which is the function he ascribes to ritual. 
This restraint by ritual is what he calls “conscious activity” and “is the form and 
principle of order,” which is precisely what Deacon elaborates arising from 
intrinsic constraint of brain matter such that mind emerges. If mentality and 
consciousness are taken to be hallmarks of what might be called human nature, 
then it is likely better to associate the Cheng 誠 sincerity/reality that results from 
restraining Xing 性 with Li禮 ritual as human nature for Xunzi. 
Subjunctive and Language as Ritual 
With the metaphysics of subjunctivity now in hand, an account of the 
notion of subjunctive language may be given in systematic relation to the theory 
of language as ritual developed in chapter five. The first order of business is to 
explore the subjunctivity among reality, minds, language, and society as the 
space among them serves as the context for the subjunctivity of the language 
ritual, and thereby more carefully construe the relationships among these four 
poles. Then it will be possible to give an account of the role of subjunctivity in 
facilitating the ritual process of language itself, keeping in mind that language is 
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a species of the ritual genus according to the theory of language as ritual. This 
will enable an explanation as to the subjunctivity of otherwise apparently 
indicative, propositional statements. 
Within the subjunctive space among reality, minds, language, and society 
are multiple subdomains of subjunctivity. The first is the space between mind 
and reality. The act of discriminating reality was identified in chapter five as a 
central mental function. Mental discrimination has to do with picking up on the 
determinateness of signs in reality that are then available as objects to be 
referenced by sign vehicles, including linguistic sign vehicles, such that they 
generate various interpretants. The subjunctivity between minds and reality does 
not have to do with this further semiotic process but rather with the mind 
treating the determinateness it discriminates with respect to itself as if it were the 
sign itself. Mental discriminations are interpretants of sign vehicles referring to 
the signified object, which means that they are not representations of the sign 
because they are themselves elements of the sign process. It is therefore not 
incorrect to say that discriminations in the mind are a result of the activity of the 
sign process and not, at least primarily, of the discriminating mind. That said, the 
interpretant is not the whole of the sign and yet is carried over into the 
ritualizing processes of mind as if it were. It is important to keep in mind that the 
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interpretant in mind is necessarily a determinate product of the process of 
signification with respect to the discriminating mind even as the sign itself may 
be less determinate with respect to the whole of reality. In spite of this fact, the 
ritualized interpretant may nevertheless carry the whole sign, including its less 
determinate elements, over into the ritualizing process, and the parts of the sign 
that were not party to the discrimination of the sign in mind may nevertheless 
contribute constitutively to the ritual entailments. All of this is to say that mental 
discrimination treats the determinateness it discriminates as if it were the whole 
of the sign, which is to say subjunctively, and in so doing includes the whole of 
the sign in the process of generating its indicative functions. The subjunctivity of 
mental discrimination may be stated conditionally as “If the interpretant were 
the whole sign, then the whole sign would participate in the further processes of 
mental ritualization.” It is the subjunctivity of mental engagement with reality 
that enables the mereological inclusion of whole signs in ritualization rather than 
excising the determinate interpretant discriminated. 
In addition to the discrimination of reality, mentality itself is a process of 
ritualizing the discriminated determinations together into a networked harmony, 
a process frequently referred to as thought. A full ritual account of mentality 
exceeds the scope of the present project, but understood as a ritual process, 
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thinking too exhibits subjunctivity. This is because the mental ritual of thinking 
renders the discriminated elements of reality together into a harmony according 
to a form that relates them according to a pattern. That pattern, prior to the 
accomplishment of the harmony, is a subjunctive pattern, which is to say that the 
pattern expresses relations that could, should, or would harmonize the elements 
prior to their being so harmonized. Moreover, the pattern of relations is 
subjunctive because it is a space in which the elements are brought into relation 
as if the relation were inherent to each element so related. Insofar as logic aspires 
to formalize mental processes, i.e. thought, which would ideally conform with 
the processes of reality, logic is a means of encoding this ritual pattern that 
harmonizes discriminated elements of reality.  
Yet another sense in which mentality is subjunctive has to do with the 
location, so to speak, of the ritual patterns thought employs to produce these 
harmonies. On one hand, it is entirely correct to say that these patterns are 
inherent in mind, and insofar as they are themselves the entailments of ritual 
processes accreting in mind over time. On the other hand, the elements 
themselves must be so relatable as to be conformable to the pattern, and so the 
pattern must at least partially inhere in the discriminated elements of reality. 
This bilocation of the ritual form of mentality would seem to provoke once again 
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the debate between nominalism and realism, on which the theory of language as 
ritual has already taken a definitive stand on the realist side. Instead, however, 
the debate may be subverted by a turn to the subjunctive, invoking the capacity 
for negotiation inherent in ritual. Prior ritual forms encoded in a given mind 
must be adjusted to the given circumstances of a particular process harmonizing 
the elements at hand. Even more important is keeping in mind that the mind in 
which discriminated elements are harmonized is itself one of the elements of the 
ritual harmonizing the elements, and so is one of the ritual performers. This is 
necessarily so because the discriminated elements are determinate precisely with 
respect to the mind that discriminates them. The definition of ritual requires that 
the form not be entirely encoded by the performers, and so the process of 
negotiation is inherent in mentality, although constrained by the further 
principle that the form be made up of more or less invariant sequences. Thinking 
is thus subjunctive because of the gap between the form offered by the thinking 
mind at the start of the process and the form that is in fact enacted by the 
completed performance of thought at the end in which negotiation inevitably 
results in some degree of alteration. 
Another subjunctive domain constituting the subjunctivity among reality, 
minds, language, and society is that of society, which has to do with the fact that 
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society itself is no more and no less than a massive ritual complex made up of 
ritual processes, ritualizing their entailments. One of the reasons that the very 
notion of society can feel so diffuse and ephemeral is that the scale of its ritual 
processes admits of a staggering degree of subujunctivity. The political, 
economic, religious, familial, educational, cultural, institutional, and all the rest 
of the ritual processes that are harmonized together in the ritual of a society are 
themselves subjunctive because they pattern their elements according to what 
they could, should or would become. The experience of the subjunctivity of 
society also feels very different, and in many respects more obvious, because of 
the human location within it. Instead of having a solid sense of self and then 
discovering that it relies on something as soft and malleable as ritual 
subjunctivity, as in the case of mind, humans view society up through the haze 
of rituals that constitute it as relatively minor elements thereof. From within, the 
social rituals feel as though they address minds as if they were parts of the ritual 
in question because the indicative entailments of mental rituals are often quite 
divergent from the further entailments generated from them in social processes. 
This is to say that self-understanding frequently conflicts with the self as it is 
expressed as an element of increasingly higher and higher-level social rituals. 
The entailments of those higher-level rituals do nevertheless impinge on the self, 
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regardless of whether or not they are individually authorized, and necessitate 
response through further ritualization. 
It is now possible to provide a concise cartography of the subjunctive 
terrain among reality, minds, language, and society. Language is itself one of the 
social rituals that harmonize human minds together in and with reality, but it 
resides at the lowest level of the social hierarchy of rituals, interacting intimately 
with the other three poles. Language does not refer to reality directly but rather 
indirectly via the mental discriminations of the determinateness of reality with 
respect to the mind discriminating it. This statement of the relationship is still 
somewhat misleading, however, because there is no distinction between the 
mental discrimination and the interpretant of the sign discriminated. Mental 
discriminations are not representations, they are the interpretants themselves. 
Thus, linguistic reference to mental discriminations is reference to reality, and 
the distinction between direct and indirect reference is lacking in a difference in 
this instance. Language does not merely refer to discriminations of reality, but 
patterns them according to its own ritual form, which is largely encoded in its 
syntax. The syntactic patterns do not necessarily reflect the extant relationships 
among the linguistic elements patterned but are instead inherent patters to the 
particular ritual form of the language in question. That said, misconstruing the 
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extant relationships among the elements discriminated risks ritual failure, so the 
matrix of reality does constrain the syntactic pattern book indirectly. This is what 
it means to say that syntactic patterns correlate but do not correspond to patterns 
in reality. Neither do syntactic patterns directly arise from nor determine the 
patterns of mental rituals, although again, there is mutual influence across the 
mental and linguistic domains via the processes of ritualization. Other social 
rituals likewise pick up on the entailments of mental and linguistic rituals as 
elements of their own ritual processes, and offer their own entailments back to 
minds and language in reality both as elements to be further ritualized and as 
constraints on ritual forms. The subjunctivity of language, treating reality as if it 
conformed to its forms and patterns, thereby provides a nexus of interpretive 
interaction among minds and society in reality that enables their mutual 
transformation through relatively stable and reliable processes and their 
encodings. 
Each stage of the ritual process of language involves subjunctivity as well. 
The theory of language as ritual takes speech sounds, i.e. phonology, to be the 
linguistic locus of reference to reality via discriminations thereof in mind. The 
subjunctivity between speech sounds and discriminations of reality is the same 
as the subjunctivity between sign vehicles and objects in semiosis. The speech 
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sound is treated, by the rest of the language ritual process, as if it were the object 
to which it refers, in spite of the fact that the object to which it refers, as a thing 
and thus a sign, is itself the interpretant of another sign vehicle referring to an 
object. There is also subjunctivity in the way in which reference is phonologically 
encoded extensionally in the sound system of the language in that the same 
sound may be used to represent a given characteristic as applied to different 
things. For example, the “s” sound in English added to the ends of nouns 
indicates the characteristic of plurality. This has the effect of imposing deontic 
and logical equivalence, respectively, between pluralities across both 
metaphysical hierarchies and numerical inequalities. With respect to 
metaphysical hierarchies, the “twoness” of hydrogens in a water molecule is 
rendered linguistically and mathematically equivalent to the “twoness” of eyes 
in my head. With respect to numerical inequalities, the “twoness” of hydrogens 
in a water molecule is linguistically but not mathematically equivalent to the 
“myriadness” of atoms in the universe. In both cases, phonological reference 
implies more similarity between things than they exhibit apart from the 
intensional reference of the “s” sound in English applied extensionally across 
speech sounds classed as nouns. Phonological extensionality thus has the 
capacity to treat elements, aspects, and relations in reality as if they were 
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equivalent, that is, as subjunctively equivalent, when that equivalence is in fact 
equivocal. 
The subjunctivity of language is at its peak in syntax, the encoded form 
that language applies to speech sounds referring to mentally discriminated 
elements of reality. The patterns of syntax are neither inherent in reality nor in 
mind but are instead proper to the language in question, and so are artificial with 
respect to reality, accreting over time as the codification of patterns that 
successfully generate desired entailments. In ordering its elements according to 
the syntax, language patterns them not as they are, in varying degrees of 
determination with respect to one another, but as they could be, determinate to 
each other via the language ritual. In linguistics, the subjunctive is contrasted in a 
binary way with the indicative, as the realis is with the irrealis, but in the theory 
of language as ritual, the subjunctive is a space that receives from and gives back 
to the indicative. This means that syntax, the linguistic pinnacle of subjunctivity, 
is constrained and thus constituted by the limits of its difference from the 
indicative, which is to say it is limited by what is possible. What is unreal in the 
subjunctive space of syntax must nevertheless remain possible. To construe and 
pattern the speech sounds of phonology in such a way that the elements, aspects, 
and relations in reality to which they refer could not possibly pertain would 
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result in ritual failure to generate the entailments of the language process. Reality 
is never very far from subjunctive spaces ritually carved out within it, and the 
constraint it induces reflexes the subjunctivity of syntax back toward it. After all, 
syntax is the form of the language process, and as the form of a process it is 
constrained in its evolution by that process to be its form such that it generates its 
entailments. Syntax treats the phonological speech sounds as if they could be 
patterned according to its form such that when they are so patterned by the 
linguistic performance they may become indicative. Of course, having become 
indicative, the resulting linguistic entailments are then immediately handed off 
for further ritualization and thus thrust right back into subjunctivity, but they 
nevertheless are so now as an indicative element in a subjunctive space having 
been rendered so by their own ritual process. 
The subjunctivity of pragmatics has to do with the space in which the 
syntactic form construing the phonological elements according to the inherent 
pattern of the language is rendered together with the intent of the language 
producer and the conditions of language use. The subjunctive space of 
pragmatics is constituted by the tension between the structural pole of the 
syntactic patterns construing the linguistic elements and the necessity to generate 
the desired functions of the language producer in the context of its use. It is in 
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pragmatics that the meaning of language as encoded in the syntactic structure is 
rendered against the background of other linguistic, mental, and social rituals 
and their forms, processes, and entailments, in some cases resulting in a reversal 
of meaning. The subjunctivity of pragmatics has to do with treating the syntactic 
form as if it has meaning, i.e. is coherent, amidst the contextual conditions of 
language use. Since pragmatics is at the functional extremity of the subjunctive 
space of language, it is the locus in which the as if of the language ritual becomes 
the as is of its entailment. Could, should, and would must either put up or shut 
up as in pragmatics they make their offering back to the minds discriminating 
real determinations as interpretants of semiosis amidst the kaleidoscope of social 
ritual processes in the midst of being performed. 
The semantic subjunctive, then, is the space in which phonological 
reference, syntactic structure, and pragmatic use are all rendered together as if 
they have a singular, determinate meaning in common. In fact, the mentally 
discriminated determinate realities to which speech sounds refer are not 
inherently ordered in anything like the pattern by which syntax orders them, 
which is what gives rise to the subjunctivity of syntax. They are also unable, on 
their own, to produce the pragmatic entailments the syntactic form makes 
possible under the contextual conditions of their use, because if they could there 
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would be no need for the language ritual at all. The syntactic pattern plays no 
role in phonological reference, serving only to order the sounds already referred, 
and may propositionally diverge entirely from what ends up being pragmatically 
entailed. Furthermore, the pragmatic conditions may construe speech sounds in 
ways that have little if anything to do with the discriminated determinations 
they refer to, and may put well-formed syntactic constructions to uses at odds 
with their structured pattern. Nevertheless, the full performance of a linguistic 
expression does end up with a singular, determinate meaning that shares in and 
exceeds the meanings of each level of the language ritual process as the whole 
meaning together is more than the sum of the parts. It is this subjunctive 
semantic process that gives rise to the whole of the language ritual and its 
phonological, syntactic, and pragmatic parts. The semantic subjunctive is the 
creative context of construction in which reality is taken up, processed, and fed 
back into in an iterative cycle of transformation. The semantic subjunctive, in 
which the mechanisms of the linguistic process participate, is like a bubble of 
possibility in reality, taking the indicative that is, re-rendering it according to 
what it could, should, or would be, and then paying its wonderment forward in 
a newly indicative actuality for further ritualization.  
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One of the features of the theory of language as ritual that may come as a 
surprise is its rejection of morphology as a proper dimension of linguistic 
analysis. Instead, some aspects of morphology are subsumed under phonology 
as pertaining to the reference of speech sounds to reality, and the rest are 
understood as deriving from graphemics. On one hand, writing systems are 
parasitic on language proper, as no writing systems could or would exist apart 
from the languages they codify. On the other hand, writing systems are to be 
understood as independent rituals in their own right, and thus establish and 
maintain their own subjunctive spaces with respect to the languages they encode. 
Generally speaking, graphemics maintains a much stricter structure than 
language proper, and it serves the function of placing a further constraint on 
language use in languages that have writing systems by pressing linguistic 
functions to conform to its strictures. This further restraint has the benefit of 
making a language understandable among a larger public as it heightens its 
communicative capacity. Furthermore, graphemics adds a new pragmatic 
dimension of language use by enabling the separation in time and space of the 
language producer from the recipient(s). This too contributes to the subjunctivity 
of graphemics as writing allows producers to speak as if their recipients were 
present and vice versa. The morphological content of graphemics also 
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contributes to its subjunctivity by dividing speech sounds into words, as if words 
are individual as opposed to nested amongst a range of sounds, which both 
functions to improve the legibility of written language and adds a dimension to 
linguistic analysis. 
Linguistic meaning is subjunctive precisely because it emerges in surplus 
from the space constituted by the mutually constraining tension among 
phonological reference, syntactic structure, and pragmatic entailments. To say 
that meaning emerges is to say that the phenomenon of linguistic expression 
cannot be reduced to any of the three aspects of its semantic process or even to 
the cumulative meanings across them. Instead, the meaning of language is 
carried through the language process and as the object to which its entailments 
refer as sign vehicles of a subsequent semiosis. It is necessary for a given 
producer to employ the language ritual in order to achieve the desired intents, 
and yet the meaning generated along the way by that process far exceeds the 
intents accomplished. Thus, not only are phonology, syntax, pragmatics, and 
semantics subjunctive in and amongst themselves, their subjunctivity together 
provides the context from which meaning emerges as if it were reducible to each 
and all of their functions in the language ritual. In spite of language being a 
distinctively human social ritual, its meaning emerges when its process and the 
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entailments thereof are regarded as if they were a process in and of reality, which 
they are, and so meaning is the result of the subjunctive as if of the language 
ritual meeting up with the indicative as is of reality. This leads to an important 
conclusion regarding truth, which destabilizes standard accounts of truth in 
predicate and propositional logic. Truth cannot be determined by mapping a 
linguistic expression to reality as is, but is rather the condition of an indicative 
result returning in reality from the subjunctive ritual process of linguistic 
transformation. Measured against reality as it was prior to the linguistic ritual, 
truth would always appear modal, as reality could, should, or would become, as 
if its construal of things obtained, that is, truth would be subjunctive. Measured 
against the results of the linguistic process, however, it is possible to envision 
something like a truth table for evaluating the potential stability of the 
entailments amidst the ebb and flow of ongoing ritualization. Of course, that 
ongoing process means that even this sense of truth is provisional and so 
subjunctive. 
 Once meaning is accomplished, there is a first order interpretation in 
which that meaning is appropriated as an element in other new and ongoing 
ritualizations, but this level of interpretation is prior to the reflexive, second 
order interpretation intended in hermeneutics. Indeed, the understanding 
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achieved through such reflection likewise emerges from the subjunctive space 
among the producer, the interpreting receiver, and the linguistic expression in 
question. The understanding of the interpreter does not necessarily include the 
full meaning of the expression as it emerges from the linguistic process but 
instead proceeds as if it corresponds with the intent of the producer. The 
interpreter must treat the speech sounds received as if they refer to the same 
discriminations in the mind of the producer as they do in their own mind, and 
that those discriminations are of the same determinations of reality. The 
correspondence between determinations of reality is particularly unstable as 
determinateness is always with respect to a relatum, and since the producer and 
receiver are necessarily different relata, the starting assumption should in fact be 
that their determinateness with respect to reality is likewise different. The 
interpreter must also analyze the syntax of the expression to determine its degree 
of well-formedness as if their standard therefore coincides with that of the 
producer. Moreover, the interpreter must decide whether variance in well-
formedness is accidental, due to a divergence in structural standards, or 
intentional and thus meaningful. Finally, the interpreter must register the 
linguistic entailments of the expression as if they register against a shared 
background of contextual factors and rules of implicature with the producer so 
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as to discern their intent. In the end, the understanding of the interpreter is 
subjunctive as it necessarily proceeds as if it coincides with the intent of the 
producer amidst the surplus of meaning carried through the expression. 
It should be of no surprise, given the reliance of linguistic expression on 
subjunctivity, that translation is likewise a process by which meaning is rendered 
in subjunctive circumstances. The subjunctivity of translation carries over the 
subjunctivity of meaning and interpretation in language already considered, but 
also operates in a subjunctive space between the source and target languages. 
The target language must be crafted as if it could express one and the same 
meaning as that expressed in the source language, except that the 
multifariousness of meaning, itself an emergent property of subjunctive 
circumstances, restrains the target language from achieving this indicatively. 
Translators must inevitably pick and choose which aspects of meaning they take 
as elements in their performance of the translation ritual. Given that the system 
of speech sounds is ordered differently across languages, as is the structure of 
syntax, and the pragmatic context of translation is inevitably at variance from 
that in which the expression was produced, it is impossible that the fullness of 
meaning in its surplus should be so adopted. This too contributes to the 
subjunctivity of translation. As a further ritualization of a prior linguistic 
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expression, translation necessarily reconstrues its source as it could, should, or 
would become in the target idiom, thereby generating not the same meaning but 
a new meaning, even should the source and target languages coincide. 
If language as ritual is fundamentally subjunctive, as has been elaborated 
here, then some degree of wonderment is entirely understandable regarding how 
to interpret the linguistic phenomenon of the indicative mood. Much of the 
analysis of conditionals and the subjunctive mood generally has attempted to 
restate subjunctives in ways that enable their interpretation on the terms of 
indicatives. The indicative itself, and the realis mood it expresses, as the norm 
against which the subjunctive deviates and is thus interesting, receives passing 
little attention in the literature except to note that it “portrays situations as 
actualized, as having occurred or actually occurring, knowable through direct 
perception.”1722 Language as ritual reverses the direction of this analysis and 
instead posits that indicatives are best understood as themselves expressing 
subjunctivity. Rather than understanding indicatives as describing states of 
affairs as they are, indicatives should be understood to render states of affairs 
more determinate with respect to the recipients of the linguistic expression in 
																																																								
1722 Mithun, The Languages of Native North America, 173. 
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which they occur, even if the recipient is only the producer her/himself. This is 
not to say that the statement, “That barn is red,” somehow paints the barn red by 
addressing the barn as if it were red. Rather, the indicative expression changes 
the relation between the recipient of the expression and the barn by making the 
redness of the barn more determinate with respect to the recipient. The mind of 
the language producer discriminates the redness of the barn and correlates this 
discrimination with the speech sound “red.” “Red” and “Barn” are then 
syntactically related in a well-formed sentence, “The barn is red,” which 
generates the entailment of making the redness of the barn determinate to the 
recipient. In the indicative mood, the color of the barn is treated as if it were 
significantly relevant to the recipient, and in expressing its color, the producer 
makes it so. It is not that the indicative, i.e. that there are states of affairs at any 
given point in time, does not exist in the theory of language as ritual, but rather 
that the indicative mood achieves its state of affairs precisely by moving through 
the same subjunctive space of language as expressions in the subjunctive mood. 
This interpretation of the indicative mood as in fact operating in and 
through the subjunctive space enacted by language rituals impacts the 
understanding of propositions in propositional and predicate logics as either 
affirming or denying a predicate of a subject. Under the classical understanding, 
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propositions are claims about states of affairs that may be adjudicated as either 
true or false, thus enabling truth-conditional semantics as emerged from the 
work of Tarski. In language as ritual, however, the function of a proposition is 
not to make a claim about the relation between the subject and the predicate but 
rather to establish, maintain, or adjust the relationship between the producer and 
receiver with respect to the situation addressed in the statement. This is what it 
means for language as ritual to communicate in the sense not of transmitting 
information but in the sense of community constitution and the negotiation of 
the state of affairs of the community rather than the state of affairs of the world. 
If it turns out that the barn is green and not red, then the entailment of the 
expression will presumably be a state of disagreement, which is to say increased 
indeterminacy, in the community, rather than a state of greater determinacy 
resulting from agreement. Further ritualization may ensue in order to increase 
the determinateness of the community with respect to the barn, although other 
members of the community may be willing to let the producer persist in their 
delusion of redness if the bard is in fact adjudicated unimportant. The important 
point is that the truth of the proposition in the sense of predicate and 
propositional logic is secondary to the effect that the proposition has within the 
community among which it is communicated. 
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Subjunctive Realism 
Language, as a species of the ritual genus, is fundamentally subjunctive as 
it treats reality as if it could, should, or would be otherwise, and then realizes 
that possibility by its transformative process. As should be clear from the above 
discussion, this is a very different way of understanding language than has 
classically been the case, at least in Western social scientific and philosophical 
accounts of language. None the least, logical accounts of propositions and the 
assumption of the indicative as the norm from which the subjunctive must be 
explained as deviating have been turned on their heads. What remains to be 
explained in terms of the subjunctivity of language is how all of this 
conceptualization of possibility, of as if spaces, and of how the world could, 
should, or would be, may be rendered coherent in a philosophical framework of 
realism. 
The critical realism to which the theory of language as ritual adheres takes 
reality to be real, singular, and opaque. Reality, inclusive of elements, aspects, 
and relations, is real because it is what it is independent of what minds know 
about or what language says about it. That said, the rituals of mind, language, 
and society are means of harmonizing reality by transforming the elements, 
aspects, and relations in reality into stable systems and networks that produce 
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significant and meaningful entailments to be taken up by further processes of 
ritualization. The subjunctive character of these rituals is crucial, because it is the 
context of their transformation from what they are in an initial state to what they 
could, should, or would become in a final state relative to the ritual process in 
question. Subjunctivity is like a bubble in reality in which things as they are may 
be rearranged and related so as to become something else; the something elses 
that are improvements over the initial state are then eligible for codification as 
rituals that guide ongoing transformation. Thus, ritual serves an evolutionary 
function. Without subjunctivity, reality would be static, which is impossible in a 
world perfused by semiosis, as the theory of language of ritual takes the world to 
be according to its metaphysics. Moreover, the singularity of reality in 
combination with this process metaphysics means that the subjunctive bubbles 
that transform reality are not other possible worlds but rather the most 
fundamental dimension of reality from which indicative haecceity is an 
abstraction. Such a fundamentally subjunctive world, that takes possibility rather 
than actuality, as if rather than as is, could, should, and would rather than is, 
was, and will be as its basic premises, is of course opaque because it is 
fundamentally underdetermined. Nevertheless, subjunctive ritual processes 
render it more determinate, and thus more habitable in an evolutionary sense. 
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In The Construction of Social Reality,1723 John Searle presses back against the 
social constructivism that takes all of reality to be a social construct, which is 
itself very much at odds with the initial vision of The Social Construction of Reality 
as developed by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann.1724 Searle distinguishes 
between brute reality codified in scientific facts that are independent of the 
minds and societies that know them, and institutional reality codified in social 
facts that are constructed by minds in society. Central to his argument is that 
brute facts are logically prior to constructed institutional facts, and that 
“institutional facts exist, so to speak, on top of brute physical facts” in a 
hierarchy.1725 In spite of a common commitment to realism, the theory of 
language as ritual rejects this distinction in reality between brute and constructed 
realities for three reasons. First, the semiotic theory that metaphysically grounds 
the theory of language as ritual denies as meaningful the distinction between 
mental and physical interpretants, and so obviates the need for a further 
distinction on its basis. Second, the theory of language as ritual locates ritual as 
the common denominator among the systematization of harmonies in the world, 
																																																								
1723 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality. 
1724 Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. 
1725 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, 34–35. 
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mentality, and social processes such as language, and its commonality obviates 
the need for a distinction between the physical and the social. Finally, and 
positively, rather than a cosmological distinction between the physical and the 
social, language as ritual makes a logical distinction between elements, aspects, 
and relations in reality prior to ritualization and as entailments of ritual 
processes. That said, language as ritual, following the original insights of Berger 
and Luckmann, recognizes something like the distinction made by Searle in that 
the entailments of ritual processes become taken for granted as they are treated 
subjunctively as if they had not been constructed in and through that process. 
Nevertheless, subjunctivity underlies the notion of critique in the critical realism 
of the theory of language as ritual, whereas Searle abides in domain of indicative 
normativity. 
The subjunctive spaces that effect transformations of reality likewise 
underlie the analysis of determinateness as a key aspect of reality defining 
relations therein in the theory of language as ritual. To be a thing is to be a sign 
and to be a determinate thing is to be what it is instead of some other thing. In 
order to be systematized together in rituals, signs must be determinate enough 
with respect to the other elements of the ritual that they are relatable within the 
system. Sometimes the elements are so prior to ritualization, and other times it is 
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the act of being ritualized that renders elements determinate to one another. 
Nevertheless, given the spectral conception of determinateness, being 
determinate with respect to other elements of the ritual does not necessarily 
mean either being fully determinate in that network of relations or determinate 
with respect to things in the world beyond the ritual frame. All that is necessary 
is determinateness sufficient for the ritual process to have traction for its 
patterning to be transformative. In so doing, rituals treat the determinateness of 
their elements with respect to one another as fully determinative. This is to say 
that elements are treated within the ritual frame subjunctively, as if they were 
fully determinate, because determinateness is the characteristic of elements 
necessary to their ritualization. When that frame is expanded in the process of 
objectification of the ritual entailments into the taken for granted habitus of each 
performer, discussed in chapter three, the subjunctively framed determinateness 
carries over through that process. Thus, the determinateness of ritualized 
elements is actually overdetermined in the ritual entailments generated, and so 
the realities rituals produce are rooted in subjunctivity, presenting as if they are 
determinate when in fact they admit of a relatively high degree of 
indeterminateness.  
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This analysis of the subjunctivity of determinateness is crucial for 
understanding how rituals, including language rituals, cope with 
indeterminateness, and thus with elements that are wholly or almost wholly 
indeterminate, such as God. The coping mechanism the ritual process has 
developed for incorporating indeterminate elements is the same subjunctivity 
that has already been demonstrated to pervade the rest of its functions. Rituals 
treat indeterminate elements as if they were determinate. In so doing, they 
render those elements determinate with respect to the rest of the elements of the 
ritual. As noted in the above discussion of determinateness, however, rituals 
overdetermine their elements in generating their entailments, and this is never 
more the case than with regard to indeterminate elements. The “this” that a ritual 
takes an element to be, in contrast to the “that” that is some other element, is not 
so contrastable in the case of an element that is indeterminate in that respect but 
is being treated as if it were in the ritualization process. This is an exceedingly 
abstract way of putting the issue, so it is helpful to ground the discussion of 
ritual subjunctivity and determinateness in a couple of examples and then to 
contrast the ritual approach with another similar strategy. 
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Paul Tillich (1886 – 1965) advocates understanding God as “being itself,” 
“the ground of being,” or “the power of being.”1726 In this conception God is 
indeterminate because “God cannot be understood as the existence of a being 
beside others or above others:”1727 “As being-itself God is beyond the contrast of 
essential and existential being.”1728 The intersection between this indeterminate 
God and its ritualization in language resides for Tillich in the notion of the 
symbolic, which he distinguishes from the Saussurean notion of signification as 
participating “in the reality of that for which it stands.”1729 The symbol is thus a 
finite or determinate thing that participates as part of the less finite and less 
determinate reality and so correlates that reality with the existential situation of a 
person for whom the symbol refers as revelation.1730 All language that 
successfully refers to God, according to Tillich, is necessarily symbolic, except for 
one: “The statement that God is being-itself is a nonsymbolic statement. It does 
not point beyond itself. It means what it says directly and properly; if we speak 
																																																								
1726 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1951, I:235–36. 
1727 Tillich, I:235. 
1728 Tillich, I:236. 
1729 Tillich, I:239. 
1730 Tillich, vol. I, pt. II.IIB.3.b; Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. II (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1957), 8–10. 
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of the actuality of God, we first assert that he is not God if he is not being-
itself.”1731 Tillich doubles down on the exception by asking and answering, “Can 
a segment of finite reality become the basis for an assertion about that which is 
infinite? The answer is that it can, because that which is infinite is being-itself 
and because everything participates in being-itself.”1732 Translated into the idiom 
of the present project, Tillich is identifying all religious language as subjunctive 
except that the identification of God with being-itself is alone granted indicative 
status. This exception would cause Tillich no end of grief, and so in the second 
volume he shifts his position to say that the only non-symbolic statement about 
God is “the statement that everything we say about God is symbolic,” and must 
be so or fall into the fallacy of circularity.1733 The assertion of God as being-itself 
is then further reinterpreted as a formulation of that which humanity seeks in its 
quest for God and so as “a combination of symbolic with non-symbolic 
elements”1734 because such formulas “precisely designate the boundary line at 
																																																								
1731 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1951, I:238–39. 
1732 Tillich, I:239. 
1733 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1957, II:9. 
1734 Tillich, II:9. 
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which both the symbolic and the non-symbolic coincide.”1735 This change allows 
Tillich to decamp from a universal commitment to the ontology of being-itself, 
opening the door to metaphysical idioms that frame ontology otherwise, while 
maintaining the capacity of his ontology to function as the stable center of his 
theological system. The corollary of the claim that the statement “everything we 
say about God is symbolic” is itself non-symbolic, for the theory of language as 
ritual, is that the statement that all language is subjunctive is itself indicative. 
Whereas the claim requires Tillich to justify granting the exception by recourse to 
its mirroring the human existential situation, language as ritual has already 
incorporated the indicative as the momentary achievements of stability that 
result from and then feed back into the otherwise subjunctive ritual process. 
Meanwhile, the shift of the idiom of being-itself from being non-symbolic to 
being at the boundary between the symbolic and non-symbolic further insulates 
Tillich from charges of foundationalism, but still fails to account for the 
interactions between the two domains, or the possibility of their being mutually 
dependent. The main problem with respect to the issues at hand is that Tillich 
wants to preserve the capacity for language and its human employment to at 
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least approach God rather than acknowledging that linguistic usage is inevitably 
an act of drawing God into mundane and human affairs.  
The way in which Tillich elaborates the identification of God as being-
itself or ground of being specifies that God is determinate with respect to 
everything that exists in precisely one way, namely as ground or power of its 
being. Robert C. Neville likewise1736 identifies the determinateness of God as a 
singular point with respect to reality by deploying the category of 
determinateness, arguing that God is entirely indeterminate except for the self-
determining singular act of creation of the eternal entirety of reality.1737 Like 
Tillich, Neville deploys the classical Western ontology of being such that God is 
being-itself, and in his earliest work he weds himself to this ontological 
framework as both logically and literally true to the exclusion of all other 
frameworks.1738 Also like Tillich, Neville later divorces himself from this 
commitment, reorienting his perspective on an ontology of being as an index 
pointing toward a reality toward which alternative ontologies might also point: 
																																																								
1736 For his own account if his inheritance from Tillich, see Robert C. Neville, “Tillich’s Lovechild,” 
Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society 44, no. 2 (Spring 2018): 3–11. 
1737 Neville, God the Creator, pt. I. 
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Our argument here develops a dialectical account of ultimate reality through the 
metaphoric system of being, mainly in order to take advantage of positions and standard 
moves likely to be familiar with readers of English. In principle, the same dialectic could 
be developed through the metaphors of non-being and Brahman.1739 
The metaphor of God as being-itself, which is to say the being that all beings 
have and are, is pointing to the indeterminate creative act that makes all 
determinate things and thereby makes itself determinate with respect to those 
things as their creator.1740 Given that he says earlier in the volume that 
“metaphysics is so abstract because it aims to be true across all contexts, not just 
those in which by metaphor a true indexical engagement is achieved,”1741 this 
would seem to imply that the analysis of being is not itself properly 
metaphysical. “To engage ultimate matters with literal iconicity is the goal within 
theology that serves to explain the limitations of the metaphors,”1742 and so it is 
the creative act by an otherwise indeterminate creator that Neville takes as 
metaphysically basic. Strangely, he continues to insist on calling this an 
“ontological creative act,”1743 even though it is possible to speak of the context of 
																																																								
1739 Neville, Ultimates, I:174. 
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mutual relevance provided by the creative act as the indeterminate and 
univocally one for the many without reference to the metaphor of being. In fact, 
the linking of act with ontology seems contradictory, inhabiting mutually 
exclusive metaphors, because an act is a doing whereas ontology is all about 
being. Furthermore, “Apart from creating the world, the ontological creative act 
is indeterminate, that is, nothing, not something rather than nothing nor 
something rather than something else. Without creating, the act is not an act.”1744 
From the perspective of the wholly indeterminate God, then, the act of creation is 
a subjunctive act, rendering the determinate world out of sheer indeterminate 
possibility, which from the standpoint of determinate beings is indistinguishable 
from nothing. The ultimate reality that is God thus likewise employs a ritual 
process of treating its indeterminate self as if it were determinate and as if the 
world created were its determinations in order to create them so. From the 
perspective of indeterminate divinity, the world subjunctively created is less real 
than the pleroma and plenitude of possibility precisely because it could be 
otherwise, even if it could not be otherwise once the conditions of determinacy 
obtain. The irreality of reality from the divine point of view is nevertheless the 
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reality the theory of language as ritual approaches realistically precisely by 
taking its subjunctivity as basic and moments of indicative stability as 
abstractions therefrom. 
The characteristic of subjunctivity enables rituals, including linguistic 
rituals, to engage and transform absolutely any element of reality, including 
elements that are indeterminate either at all or with respect to the other elements 
of the ritual and its process. Indeterminate elements may be rendered 
determinate in part through the process of phonological reference, where an 
assigned speech sound renders the reality to which it refers determinately with 
respect to all of the other speech sounds in the language. They may also be 
rendered determinate syntactically with respect to the other elements being 
ritualized in the structure of the language in question. The pragmatic entailments 
of the ritual process are inevitably determinate with respect to the context in 
which they are generated and to which they are offered. Finally, the semantic 
surplus of meaning is significantly due to the indeterminacy of the elements 
ritualized that exceeds their subjunctive determination for the sake of the ritual 
process. In each case, the aspect of the linguistic ritual that contributes to the 
determination of elements has the capacity of so determining them because it is 
	 831 
able to treat them as if they are as that aspect takes them to be, regardless of 
whether they really are so. 
This analysis of subjunctive linguistic engagements with variously 
determinate elements of reality leads to a novel analysis of the issue of effability, 
and thus also ineffability. Effability, at baseline, is the capacity of language 
rituals to engage elements, aspects, and relations in reality. Elements of reality 
that are determinate with respect to all of the other elements of the ritual and to 
the ritual process itself may be said to be fully effable, and so the semantic 
surplus of meaning is relatively minimal. Elements of reality that are determinate 
with respect to some elements of the ritual and some aspects of the ritual process 
are more or less effable proportionate to the proportion of elements and aspects 
with respect to which they are determinate, with a proportionally larger surplus 
of semantic meaning. Elements of reality that are indeterminate with respect to 
any of the other elements of the ritual or aspects of its process, and so are 
rendered determinate by the process itself for the sake of their ritualization, are 
minimally effable, and thus mostly ineffable. The small degree of effability arises 
from whatever determinateness an element might have with respect to elements 
of reality beyond the ritual frame but that nevertheless contribute to the 
pragmatic meaning in which the entailments are generated and to which they are 
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offered. An element of reality that is indeterminate with respect to any other 
element of reality is ineffable prior to the process of ritualization, but may 
nevertheless register in a linguistic ritual as it is rendered determinate by the 
ritual process itself. Even this minimal degree of effability, however, is at risk 
due to the ongoing possibility that the indeterminate element may resist being so 
determined. Likewise, the indeterminacy that contributes to the semantic surplus 
of meaning also contributes a proportional risk of ritual failure due to its 
resistance to being so determined by the linguistic ritual process. Effability is 
thus shot through with subjunctivity as well, as very few language rituals deal 
entirely in elements that are fully determinate with respect to one another and to 
the ritual process. Moreover, the only way for any element of reality to remain 
fully ineffable is never to be engaged in a linguistic ritual process. Thus, the 
various elements, aspects, and relations in reality register along a spectrum from 
full effability to utter ineffability, with the latter extreme requiring a prior 
commitment not to speak of it, or to otherwise ritualize it, in order to ever 
actually obtain.  
Subjunctive Engagements 
The preceding theoretical discussion of subjunctivity per se provides the 
apparatus for discussing some actual examples of subjunctive engagements by 
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language rituals with reality. The discussion begins with the relatively simple 
case of linguistic description of an object in reality, showing how an act usually 
as taken for granted as linguistic description is in fact deeply subjunctive in its 
engagement with reality. Another level of complexity arises by adding a second 
discussant to the conversation and showing how the relationship between the 
two speakers is constituted by the object of discussion as they simultaneously 
triangulate reality between their discriminations thereof. Yet further complexity 
emerges when the object is removed from the presence of the discussants such 
that community emerges from a shared confidence and trust that discourse is 
referring to absent objects as if they were present and in spite of their absence. 
Finally, these discussions enable a return to consideration of what it means for 
something to be unsayable and strategies for saying what cannot be said. 
Description 
As was noted above, theories of modality have classically considered the 
indicative and its attendant function of description as the primary and 
fundamental mode of discourse from which all other modalities differ and with 
which they must be reconciled. The theory of language as ritual, by contrast, 
takes the subjunctive to be normative and requires explanation for the indicative, 
and so also its descriptive function. Doing so will require showing how 
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descriptions of states of affairs are actually transformations of the situation in 
play that rely on subjunctivity to accomplish their changes. Doing so reveals that 
language is never benign, as it is always bringing about changes from what had 
been the case, rather than simply representing states of affairs as classical 
theories of description would have it. Language, it turns out, is serious business, 
and deserves all of the attention that has been heaped upon it, albeit perhaps not 
under the interpretations that have thus far prevailed. 
Let us consider the description, “That mug is red.” The theory of language 
as ritual begins to analyze this statement by noting that the phoneme “mug” is 
being used to refer to a discrimination of reality that is an element of reality 
frequently used to contain hot liquids and enable their being drunk. The 
phoneme “red” is being used to refer to a discrimination of reality that is an 
aspect of reality, namely, the color red. The phoneme “is” refers to a 
discrimination of reality that is a relation in reality between the element “mug” 
and the aspect “red” that identifies the two as coterminous. The phoneme “that” 
refers to an aspect of reality in that it serves to modify “mug” to clarify that it is a 
particular discrimination of reality, likely present at least to the language 
producer, rather than mugs or mug-ness in general. Syntactically, “mug” and its 
modifier “that” serve as the subject of the sentence, “is” the verb, and “red” the 
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predicate, and so this is a well-formed syntactic sentence in the English language. 
So far, there is a great deal of agreement between the analysis under language as 
ritual (LR) and contemporary linguistic theories, except for the fact that LR 
denies the relevance of morphology as a distinct dimension of linguistic analysis.  
A major difference emerges between contemporary linguistics and 
language as ritual (LR) in terms of what uttering the statement “That mug is red” 
does. Contemporary linguistics would say that the statement predicates redness 
of the mug, and it might be willing to say that so predicating the quality of 
redness to the mug object could have further effects depending on the pragmatic 
circumstances. Alternatively, LR takes the transformation of the situation 
entailed by the statement “That mug is red” to be part and parcel of the meaning 
of the statement, encompassing yet exceeding the syntactic meaning that results 
from predication. Undertaking the rest of the analysis of the statement under LR 
demonstrates how this is so.  
For LR, the utterance and the object described are not the only elements of 
the language ritual in play, which also includes the language producer and any 
language receivers. In expressing the statement “That mug is red,” the producer 
is discriminating the mug object and the aspect of redness as a determinate entity 
and a determinate quality of that entity, respectively. The object described exists 
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independently of anything discriminated, (i.e. known or thought), or anything 
said about it, but it exists less determinately before being described than it does 
after. Prior to being described, the object is a mug, but it is also at least a vessel, a 
cup, and a container, and without being ritualized as one or the other, which it is 
remains indeterminate. The identification of “that mug” in the language ritual 
determines the object as a vessel intended to contain hot liquids, even though it 
could certainly be used for other liquids, or someone could fill it with marbles or 
pencils. Saying “that mug” cuts off those other determinations and makes the 
capacity for containing hot liquids the determinate entailment of the expression. 
It is so subjunctively, however, because the expression is treating the object as if 
it were a mug and thus not a vessel, container, or cup, even though it could still 
function as one. Likewise, identifying the quality of redness as coterminous with 
the mug object both makes the color of the object determinately red, as opposed 
to cherry, or crimson, or scarlet, and identifies this quality as relevant to the 
situation of the ritual participants. Again, this treats the color subjunctively as if 
it were red and thus not cherry, crimson, or scarlet, and as if the color were in 
fact important to the participant elements of the language ritual.  
Language always overdetermines its objects as if they were more 
determinate than they in fact are. That said, the determinations language 
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produces as entailments are the reality of the object as handed on to further 
processes of ritualization, and so they are very real. This is not to say if the 
person who came in and said “That mug is red” were to leave and another 
person came in and said “That mug is tall” that the color and height of the mug 
would be different for each of them. After all, reality is real independent of what 
is known or said about it, and it is anything someone could be wrong about. If 
someone came in and said “That mug is green” when it is in fact red, then the 
higher order quality of color would be what is identified and the incorrect 
identification would be handed on as such for ritual correction in a subsequent 
iteration. Descriptions are thus hardly benign. In describing an object we make it 
something for us that it may not be necessarily apart from our having described 
it so. We cannot make any given thing into anything, as reality pushes back on 
descriptions that exceed the scope of determination. Calling a plate a mug and 
then pouring hot tea on it is not suddenly going to make the plate a suitable 
vessel for the hot liquid. That said, if someone were to come in having identified 
the red mug and asked if you had seen their cup, you might respond that you 
had seen no cup and then be surprised when they identify the red mug as their 
cup. Our descriptions treat reality as if it conforms to the determinate pattern of 
the language ritual, but the pattern of reality inevitably exceeds the pattern of 
	 838 
any given ritual process and so the process must treat reality subjunctively in 
order to engage it at all, thereby transforming reality along the way.  
Conversation 
Shifting from a singular description of an object to a conversation between 
two interlocutors about an object adds complexity to the subjunctive space, 
broadening it from the space between the language producer, the language, and 
the object, to also include the language receiver. Of course, in a conversation each 
interlocutor alternates between the roles of producer and receiver. In so doing, 
the discussants ritually elaborate a shared reality by constituting themselves, 
their relationship, the objects in their environs, and their relationships with each 
out of the subjunctive possibility that results from the indeterminacy of the 
situation prior to any ritualization. Moreover, objects referred to in conversation 
may be rendered increasingly determinate through the nested rituals of 
expressions responding to one another in the ongoing flow of exchange. 
Throughout, the interlocutors must proceed under the assumption that they have 
discriminated the objects to which they refer as being determinate in more or less 
the same respects, and so are operating subjunctively as if the referents and their 
relations are the same for each of them. 
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Let us consider a conversation developing from the already analyzed 
description, “That mug is red.” An interlocutor, attending to the vessel in 
question, might discriminate its nature and color and then advance the 
conversation by adding, “Yes, and it is tall.” Several things have already 
happened. First, the two discussants have agreed that the object in question is a 
mug, and so the reference relationship between the object and the word “mug” is 
now an entailment of the language ritual that may be taken for granted, 
becoming part of the conventional matrix of the conversation and its 
participants, at least until it comes into question. For example, if the conversation 
proceeds for a while and then someone else enters and asks about their “cup,” 
each of the two participants in the conversation will have to perform a further 
mental ritual of discrimination in order to determine that the cup the interloper 
is asking about is the mug they had been discussing. Second, the discussants 
have agreed that the aspect of redness applies to the mug in question, and so this 
too becomes part of the taken for granted conventions of the conversation and its 
participants. Furthermore, the mug is further determined, in much the same way 
as was analyzed above with respect to the aspect of redness, by the addition of 
the aspect of tallness. Finally, the reality of the relationship between the two 
interlocutors is now in part constituted, albeit mostly trivially in this case, by 
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their sharing in relationship with the mug as if the discriminations that go into 
each of their relationships with it were the same.  
The first speaker might then continue the discussion by saying, “Not tall 
enough. I did not sleep well last night and I need more coffee than that.” Now it 
would appear that the aspect of tallness is not yet a shared discrimination as 
applicable to the mug, and so cannot yet become part of the taken for granted 
habitus of the participants and the conversation. The second speaker in the 
conversation clearly discriminated the mug as tall vis-à-vis other mugs either 
present or in memory, other objects in the room, and perhaps what might be 
understood as an average serving size. The speaker who initiated the 
conversation need not disagree with any of these standards of measure, and yet 
rejects the appellation of tallness as sufficient for their own needs, much as F.P. 
Ramsey showed that disputes over conditional statements need not be about the 
facts of the matter. Furthermore, the additional expression introduces yet another 
object for discussion into the conversation, namely the state of the first speaker, 
which may be logically albeit not metaphysically be distinguished from the first 
speaker qua speaker. Here too an element of subjunctivity comes to the fore as 
the aspect of tallness is being adjudicated by reference to an aspect of the state of 
the first speaker that does not in any way pertain to height, as if that standard of 
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measure were relevant to such an adjudication. The conversation is now 
negotiating the shared discrimination of the mug with regard to height, 
determining it as either tall or not, and the negotiation too is subjunctive as it 
treats the aspect of height as if it were determinative of volume when in fact a 
fatter mug would also hold more liquid. 
At the level of conversation, there is a great deal more going on ritually 
than merely the individual language rituals of each utterance or their collocation 
as the conversation as such. In addition to the language rituals, the rituals of 
conversational implicature also apply as constraints on the entailments that the 
language rituals might produce, and also as means of facilitating the pivot, for 
example, that results in height serving as a proxy for volume. Yet deeper layers 
of ritual govern the process of exchange such that one speaker is allowed to 
finish before another begins, set the tone and volume of speech as appropriate or 
not, and accompany speech with hand gestures, facial expressions, and other 
communicative acts. The language rituals both contribute to and receive from 
these other rituals, and all of these rituals are elements of the larger ritual of the 
conversation itself. Both interlocutors are participants in that widest ritual, and 
probably most of the intervening levels of ritual as well, but there are some 
rituals at play in the larger ritual of the conversation in which one or the other 
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may not or cannot participate, such as the mental rituals of each other. 
Nevertheless, the ritual processes at play in the conversation serve to further 
determine each of the interlocutors, the objects and situations they discuss, and 
all of their relationships with one another individually and all together 
collectively. Of course, the extent to which the conversation ritual results in 
entailments that themselves become elements of future ritual processes beyond 
the conversation depends on their relevance thereto. Moreover, their becoming 
taken for granted in the habitus of each interlocutor and their relationship 
depends on their being so taken up in future ritualization. The color and height 
of the mug may not be relevant beyond the immediate conversation, and indeed 
the same interlocutors might enter the same room and conclude that the mug is 
precisely the right height, or even too tall, under other circumstances, without 
necessarily altering their reality and the mug therein. If the mug and its color and 
height do become part of their taken for granted habitus, however, then future 
engagements will require its further transformation. This illustrates once again 
that realities becoming taken for granted is not the point at which their reality is 
reduced but rather the point at which they are most real.  
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Community 
Descriptions overdetermine reality because they treat reality as if it were 
the way the language construes it rather than as transforming reality into what 
the description says it is. Likewise, conversations constitute the shared reality of 
participants and discriminated elements by treating them as if they are 
determinate with respect to one another in precisely the same ways. At yet a 
more abstract level of analysis, communities are constituted by their shared 
orientation around a common subset of reality and the ongoing process of 
ritually negotiating their common store of discriminations determining that 
subset of reality. Language participates in this negotiation in two directions. 
First, communities are constituted by a shared conventional storehouse that 
enables further employment of language on the basis of the taken for granted 
entailments of prior rituals with confidence that the discriminated 
determinations of the ritual elements are shared enough to proceed reliably and 
successfully. Second, communities have the capacity to linguistically address 
realities that are not present to them, which is to say that communities can 
linguistically do reflexive work on their conventional storehouse, and in doing so 
may further determine elements of reality in ways that those elements resist 
precisely by in fact being indeterminate in those respects. Each and its 
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subjunctivity should be addressed in turn, but a reprise of the discussion of 
conventionality provides important framing for both. 
One of the important contributions of Confucian ritual theory, especially 
that of Xunzi as elaborated in chapter four, is the notion of rituals as 
conventional rather than arising from some sort of physical or natural necessity. 
The conventionality of ritual has primarily to do with the fact that the 
establishment of ritual forms is itself a function of higher order ritual processes, 
and so are active makings rather than the results of innate causality in reality. 
The conventionality of ritual in the Confucian sense is to be contrasted with the 
linkage of conventionality with arbitrariness as under the influence of Saussure. 
While not innately necessary, ritual forms provide benefits to the elements they 
harmonize together such as evolutionary advantage, adaptive achievement, or 
aesthetic enhancement. If they did not, the form would not be encoded as a 
convention to be followed in future iterations of the ritual performance, let alone 
fall into the taken for granted conventional storehouse of a community. 
Furthermore, ritual forms are constrained by the reality of their elements, which 
resist interpretations that determine them inappropriately, and by both lower 
level and prior ritual performances of similar or the same elements under similar 
or the same circumstances. Thus, they can hardly be arbitrary given the 
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constraints placed upon them by the ecology in which they emerge and operate. 
As a species of ritual, language too is conventional but not arbitrary as it employs 
its phonological system and syntactic structure to transform its elements so as to 
generate its entailments. If it were arbitrary, its phonological system and 
syntactic structure, which together make up its form, would not be able to 
reliably or stably effect transformation or generate entailments, either at all or at 
least consistently enough so as to justify their encoding and becoming taken for 
granted in repetition. 
To be a community is to share in a set of conventionally encoded 
transformative ritual processes engaging a shared subset of reality. Communities 
engage in ritual processes of negotiation arising from description and 
conversation to determine common interpretations of their shared reality. Reality 
is thus rendered more determinate for the community and its members by the 
negotiation ritual. This negotiation process begins with incongruent 
discriminations of reality among the ritual participants, who are members of the 
community, but the result of the negotiation is a determination of a common 
understanding of the element of reality in question. This common 
understanding, the entailment of the negotiation ritual, becomes part of the taken 
for granted conventional storehouse of the community as a determinate element 
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available for further ritualization. Communities thus operate subjunctively as if 
their interpretations of the determinateness of reality are appropriate, stable, and 
reliable. Of course, when reality proves to be less determinate or otherwise 
determinate than the rituals transforming it take it to be, ritual renovation must 
ensue. It is therefore the common orientation around a shared reality and the 
shared work of harmonizing with each other and the rest of that reality that 
constitutes a community. One of the characteristics of the modern situation is 
that individuals participate in multiple communities simultaneously such that 
communities overlap and the realities around which they are oriented overlap to 
varying extents. As a result, two different communities that share at least some 
of the same elements in the subset of reality around which they are oriented may 
engage in ritual negotiations that result in very different determinations of some 
of those elements. There are a variety of ways that an individual participant who 
is a member of both communities might respond, elaboration of which exceed 
the scope of the present project. For now, it is important to note that it is a 
hallmark of the modern condition that individuals must find ways to harmonize 
themselves as members of multiple communities oriented around increasingly 
shared subsets of reality. 
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In the more specific ritual realm of language, communities likewise build 
up a taken for granted conventional storehouse, to be appropriated in the habitus 
of each member, of phonological references and syntactic relations that 
determine their shared reality. Returning to the example of the conversation 
about the red mug, the two people discussing the mug may disagree in their 
discriminations regarding the height of the mug, but they concur on its color and 
the appropriateness of the phoneme “mug” for the object in question. However, 
when another person enters the ritual frame and refers to the same object as a 
“cup,” they must each engage in a further mental ritual of consulting their 
acquired phonological system of prior references of the phoneme “cup” to other 
objects to determine whether “cup” and “mug” are relatively equivalent. Since 
the appropriateness of the phoneme “mug” was never contested between the 
two initial interlocutors, it may be said to reside in their communal conventional 
storehouse. This means that the determinate features of mugs need not be 
deliberated in order to mutually consent to the applicability of the phoneme in 
this instance. The problem is that both participants are bringing different sets of 
prior discriminations of mugs to the table in consenting to the appropriateness of 
the phoneme in this particular case. As a result, the common consent regarding 
the phoneme between them is in spite of the fact that they are employing the 
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sound to refer to discriminations of the determinateness of this particular mug 
that may not in fact entirely coincide. Thus, the communal engagement of reality 
is just as subjunctive as the individual descriptive and interpersonal 
conversational engagements, except in this case community is constituted as if all 
of its members were oriented around its shared reality in precisely the same way. 
From there, community also proceeds subjunctively as if reality is as determinate 
as their shared references to it take it to be such that further ritualization will be 
relatively stable and reliable. Communities thus compound subjunctivity on 
subjunctivity until their ritual transformations result in a new reality frequently 
far removed from what they started with, and on occasion actually 
incommensurate therewith.  
One of the functions of the linguistic conventional storehouse cultivated 
by communities is the ability to employ language rituals to address realities that 
are not present to the ritual participants, which is to say that language allows for 
virtual elements to participate in its process. For example, if the two interlocutors 
were to go on about their business and then reconnoiter elsewhere the next day 
to set up for a meeting at which they plan to serve tea, one might say to the other, 
“Go get the red mug.” The habitus communally cultivated is portable, enduring 
beyond and outside the presence of the elements ritualized in the process of its 
	 849 
formation such that its taken for granted elements may be employed to refer to 
objects in their absence. In and of itself, this is an incredibly useful feature of 
language, enabling linguistic elements to stand in for physical elements, aspects, 
and relations in reality. The problem is that this feature also enables further 
transformations of objects, rendering them more or otherwise determinate, even 
when they are not available to verify that these transformations adequately 
discriminate them, i.e. are not available to resist being so determined. For 
example, assuming that the red mug was one of a set of four mugs the 
interlocutors discussed the day before, one discussant might say to the other, 
“Go get the mugs,” having mistakenly discriminated their number as five, as 
would be necessary for their five-person meeting. The other discussant might 
comply, assuming the first had some plan to provide for a fifth mug. Presumably 
the first would discern their error upon the return of the second with only four 
mugs, or might wonder why the other had left one behind or whether one had 
been taken, resulting in a correction to the determinateness of the set of mugs. 
That said, in some cases ongoing processes of ritualization may go on for quite a 
long time apart from the presence of the object to verify its determinateness in 
the relevant respects. Consider Jesus or Confucius, who continue to be 
determined in many ways in popular piety and scholarly literature quite apart 
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from their historically determinate selves. In fact, many of the ways in which 
these figures have been determined are ways in which neither could have been 
determinate in their lifetimes, such as Jesus being determined artistically as 
white, blonde-haired, and blue-eyed. Moreover, some realities simply are not 
determinate with respect to at least certain other elements of the ritual process or 
the process itself, and so are ritualized as if they were, leading to the ritual 
entailments generated being unreliable and unstable. The donuts being eaten in 
the pew by small children during a celebration of the Eucharist are simply not 
determinate with respect to the Eucharistic ritual form, and interpretation of 
them as the body of Christ like the consecrated bread would be quite improper. 
On one hand, language transforms elements of reality that are not present 
subjunctively as if they were present. On the other hand, language receives into 
its communally held conventional storehouse entailments generated by its 
process subjunctively as if the realities to which they refer were in fact 
determinate in the respects in which the ritual makes them so. Communities 
engage reality by ritually rendering it increasingly determinate, as if an element 
of reality were as determinate as the language ritual treats it, but possibly more 
determinate or otherwise determinate than a given element is apart from being 
so ritualized.  
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One final consideration is necessary regarding the discrepancy between 
the fullness of the reality of objects and the determinateness of elements as they 
are ritualized together. The communal storehouse of conventional references of 
sounds and syntactic patterns of relation engages reality as if it were determinate 
in precisely the respects in which the language ritual construes it. This is to say 
that the determinateness of a thing having been ritualized is overdetermined 
with respect to all of the other ways a thing might have been and even might yet 
be otherwise. For example, the ongoing communal discussion of the set of mugs 
and their employment for serving tea determines the mugs as tea mugs and sets 
aside the possibility of their being used to scoop water out of a leaky boat. The 
fact that language becomes taken for granted means that reality becomes 
determinate in the ways the language ritual construes it even though under other 
circumstances reality could in fact be construed otherwise. To use the mugs to 
scoop water requires at least a further mental, if not linguistic, ritualization of the 
mug as a scooping device. This further process is necessitated precisely by the 
fact that the determination of the object as a mug has become taken for granted 
as such in the communal conventional storehouse. The full reality of the object is 
that it is only a mug or a scoop by virtue of having been ritualized as one or the 
other, and is actually relatively indeterminate as to its usage apart from being so 
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transformed ritually. The communal conventional storehouse encodes 
communally negotiated determinations of reality and proceeds to transform 
reality further as though it were so determinate, thereby making reality more 
determinate than it is apart from being so ritualized, and apart from the ways 
other communities might ritually determine it. This point leads naturally to the 
further consideration of realities that are fully indeterminate. 
On What Cannot Be Said 
In principle, things that cannot be said are ineffable precisely because they 
are indeterminate with respect to other elements of the language ritual or the 
language ritual itself. In the case of indeterminate elements, the language ritual 
loses traction and its process is incapable of transforming the element according 
to its process such that it generates its entailments. Or at least this incapacity 
would pertain if the ritual process, its reference, form, process, and functions, 
were in the indicative mood, transforming elements of reality from being one 
thing into being another. If anything at all should be clear at this point, however, 
it is that language as a species of ritual operates not in the indicative mood but 
rather subjunctively engages the elements of reality under its auspices. One 
result of this subjunctive modality is that language rituals may always speak an 
indeterminate element as if it were determinate in the relevant respects. In so 
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doing, the language ritual renders the indeterminate element more determinate 
than it is apart from being so ritualized. In this case, the entailments generated 
from ritualizing an indeterminate element are in fact less stable and reliable than 
in the case of ritualized elements in which the prior determination of the element 
and its determination as ritualized are relatively equivalent or verging on 
identical. Thus, there is in principle nothing that cannot be said in the paradigm 
of language as ritual, although performing language rituals on indeterminate 
elements of reality still deserves deeper consideration. 
To reiterate, to be indeterminate is not to be one thing rather than another, 
not to be in a relationship of distinction with respect to some other thing. To be 
indeterminate is to be indistinguishable, and so phonologic reference fails 
because a phoneme must refer to something that is distinguishable from another 
thing that another phoneme refers to, which in turn violates the established 
relations within the phonological system. Similarly, syntax orders things 
according to its pattern, but it cannot order two things that are not in some sense 
distinct from one another such that a relation might pertain; there is no gap 
between the things that a relation could bridge. Thus, rituals, including language 
rituals, must treat their indeterminate elements as if they were in fact 
determinate in order for their process to function. The question then arises as to 
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what it means to treat something indeterminate as if it were determinate? One 
way to interpret this is to simply say that when rituals determine their 
indeterminate elements they get them wrong and fail, but the ritual capacity for 
building on insecure foundations of less than perfect stability and reliability has 
already been demonstrated. Moreover, the fact that an indeterminate thing is not 
at present distinguished from another thing does not necessarily mean that it 
lacks the potential for being so distinguished, such as through a process of 
ritualization. Neither does an indeterminate thing necessarily admit of such 
possibility, in which case the instability and unreliability of resulting entailments 
comes to the fore, although even then the threat of abject failure is often staved 
off by the contributions of properly determinate elements. Regardless of the 
degree to which a given thing admits of the possibility of determination in a 
particular respect, so determining the thing inevitably artificially circumscribes 
the fullness of the thing as it is in itself, reducing possibility to actuality, and so 
only picks up on the thing partially in generating its effects. When such 
determinations are resisted as impossible by the indeterminate thing, the stability 
and reliability of entailments generated from them is reduced, but when the 
determination corresponds to the possibility of the indeterminate thing, the 
reliability and stability of entailments is maintained. Nevertheless, it would be 
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possible to determine the indeterminate thing otherwise in some other ritual 
process and thereby generate incommensurate entailments therefrom. 
Indeterminate things are thus fecund resources for ritualization as their 
subjunctivity correlated with the subjunctivity of the ritual process results in an 
infinity of meaning. 
Language has the capacity to subjunctively engage absolutely anything, 
including indeterminate things that otherwise could not be said, i.e. are ineffable, 
except for being ritualized as if they were determinate and so effable. 
Nevertheless, a gap, if not a chasm, remains between the language producer and 
the indeterminate thing ritualized in their language use resulting from the 
subjunctive distance between the indeterminate thing in itself and the thing as 
determined by the language ritual process. The problem of religious language 
arises from the desire for the indeterminate thing in itself that inevitably remains 
unrequited by the process of determination, which does not bridge the chasm it 
establishes by the very saying of what cannot be said. Indeterminate things are 
utterly transcendent with respect to the determinate things with respect to which 
they are indeterminate by virtue of the very fact that they are in themselves not 
determinate and so are beyond the grasp of determinateness. At the same time, 
by virtue of not being something other than that with respect to which they are 
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indeterminate, they are also utterly immanent to them as part and parcel of their 
very determinate selves. This immanence grounds the desire for the 
transcendence that is immanent to that which it transcends, and rituals, 
including language rituals, are attempts to fulfill that desire by making the 
indeterminate determinate and thus more concretely immanent. Alas, the price 
of concrete immanence is the sacrifice of transcendence by transforming the 
indeterminate into yet another determinate element, which must inevitably 
disappoint in contrast to the awfulness, i.e. awe-fulness, of the immanently 
transcendent indeterminate. 
It is simultaneously the case that language has the capacity to say 
absolutely anything and that indeterminates are utterly unsayable, the resolution 
of which paradox emerges from the transformative work language as ritual 
carries out on indeterminate things to render them determinate and thus effable. 
“Any statement of ineffability, ‘X is beyond names,’ generates the aporia that the 
subject of the statement must be named (as X) in order for us to affirm that it is 
beyond names.”1745 The classic nod to the ineffability of the undetermined 
indeterminate is the rhetorical strategy of apophasis, i.e. negation or unsaying, 
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whereby the infinite linguistic regress resulting from the aporia “is harnessed 
and becomes the guiding semantic force, the dynamis, of a new kind of 
language.”1746 These are “languages that cancel, interrupt, or undo discourse, 
languages that operate, paradoxically, by annulling or unsaying themselves. 
They manage to intimate or enact, by stumbling, stuttering, and becoming dumb 
– sometimes with uncanny eloquence – what they cannot as such say.”1747 
Apophasis is thus a way of humbly acknowledging the subjunctive gap, itself 
indeterminate, between the indeterminate thing in itself and that thing as it is 
rendered determinate by the language ritual. Apophatic discourse is a 
recognition that the desire on the part of the determinate language user for the 
indeterminate thing in itself is not only unrequited in the language ritual but is 
inherently unrequitable. This is because the determinate language user, qua its 
determination, has the capacity for relationship with other things, but the 
indeterminate thing, qua its indeterminacy, lacks the capacity for relationship 
because relation requires a determinate difference between the relata to relate. 
Desire, as a relation, can never apply from indeterminate to determinate, even 
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though it can vice versa but is inherently unrequitable. At the same time that it 
humbly acknowledges the subjunctive gap, apophasis is an anger-filled, 
wrenching cry of grief at the loss of the immanently transcendent indeterminate 
that is the object of desire. Of course, as utterly immanent, the indeterminate 
thing is hardly lost, which discrepancy with the apophatic performance of grief 
demonstrates the pervasive inculcation of the ritual form and process in the 
constitution of the self amidst the ongoing semiosis of the world. 
A Typology of Religious Language 
As was discussed above in relation to Neville and Tillich, God is one of 
the indeterminate things that language users render determinate in and for the 
sake of the language ritual process of engagement therewith. In fact, according to 
Tillich and Neville, in distinct but related ways, God is determinate at a singular 
point with respect to each and every other determinate thing, aside and apart 
from which God is utterly indeterminate. This singular point of determinacy is 
important for understanding the metaphysical type of religious language as 
hewing closely to as literal and precise a rendering of reality as it is prior to 
ritualization as possible. Metaphysical language seeks to render reality and each 
of its elements intelligible and systematic in relation to one another, including 
indeterminate elements, and thus including God. Liturgical language, by 
	 859 
contrast, is the commonly accepted idiom that a community or a tradition 
employs to express indeterminate things, such as God, and their relation to 
determinate elements of reality, such as their members. That idiom is encoded in 
the storehouse of taken for granted ritual forms that make up the conventions of 
the community, appropriated in the habitus of each member, and is arrived at by 
a substantial degree of common acceptance among the members of the 
community or society. Mystical language, in yet another contrast, renders the 
indeterminate determinate in such a way as to expresses something important 
about it that has either been neglected or ignored by metaphysical and liturgical 
languages so as to make those aspects central or accessible. Mystical language 
arises from fresh discriminations of the indeterminate that failed to register prior 
due to being incoherent with the systematic constraints of metaphysical 
language, or out of step, or even in conflict, with the communal idiom. Together, 
metaphysical, mystical, and liturgical language form a typology of religious 
language that gains traction on its indeterminate object(s) by virtue of 
comparative engagement with one another rather than attempting individual 
derivations of each therefrom. Notably, the three types correlate with the poles of 
reality, society, and mind outlined by Putnam and defining the elipse of an 
adequate theory of language. Mercifully, the rich literature in theology and 
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literature provide ample examples for analysis, thus enabling a shift from the 
hypothetical examples that have been employed thus far in this chapter as 
objects of analysis. Finally, each of the types of religious language may best be 
characterized as poetic, as opposed to many analyses of religious language that 
attempt to understand expressions as propositional. The poetic character of 
religious language, and indeed all language, properly acknowledges the 
linguistic transformation of God as relevant to human and otherwise mundane 
affairs. 
Metaphysical Language 
Metaphysics attempts to put reality into words. This is to say that 
metaphysical language seeks to reduce the degree and extent of transformation it 
effects on reality, instead undertaking to correlate the systems, structures, 
processes, and functions of language to accord with those of reality. In the 
context of the theory of language as ritual elaborated in chapter five, 
metaphysical language demurs from the critical dimension and highlights the 
realist commitment to the independence of reality from knowing minds, 
speaking tongues, and social constructions. Metaphysics thus aims to be 
representational, mirroring the reality that is independent of it as closely as 
possible so as to achieve as literal and precise an icon of reality as possible. 
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Metaphysical language hews to the pole of reality among the points demarcating 
the ellipse of an adequate theory of language elaborated by Putnam. The goal of 
metaphysics is to close the subjunctive gap between the world as it is and its 
transformation into a new possibility as the result of the language ritual process. 
The argument made throughout chapter five is that language is one of the rituals, 
among many others in human life and naturally pervading the world, that 
harmonize sign processes, i.e. semiosis, so as to generate stable and reliable 
systems in what would otherwise be a chaotic and entirely spontaneous reality. 
Metaphysics in this sense, then, seeks to align human language rituals with the 
ongoing natural and social rituals generating harmonies in reality without itself 
generating its own distinct patterns of harmonization. The goal is to cultivate a 
correlation between language and reality. 
The problem with the whole metaphysical project, of course, is that in 
spite of being a ritual, the particularly linguistic species of ritual does not 
inherently align with any, let alone all, other ritual processes in reality. The 
subjunctive gap persists. Consider phonological reference. Phonemes do refer to 
discriminated elements of reality, but they do so according to the phonological 
system governing the sound pattern of the language, and the mentally 
discriminated elements to which they refer are inevitably more determinate than 
	 862 
reality itself. Syntax generates even more resistance to achieving the goal. 
Syntactic patterns, like the phonological system, are inherent in the language in 
question, and while they may be adjusted over time to better correspond to 
reality, their goal is not such correspondence, let alone correlation, but rather 
harmonization of patterning such that communication is adequately facilitated. 
Regardless of how hard the metaphysical impulse strains to force the subjunctive 
gap closed, it is held immovably ajar at least by the phonological system, 
syntactic pattern, and the mental pole discriminating the elements to which 
sounds refer. Moreover, as a species of ritual, language has its own ritual process 
distinct from the processes of other species of ritual, although related as they all 
conform to the basic definition of ritual, which is what it means for ritual to be 
their genus. In order to correlate to the forms of all of the other natural and social 
ritual processes, language would have to transform itself to become as general as 
its ritual genus itself, in which case it would still not correlate to each and every 
other species of ritual specifically. Thus, metaphysics is in fact impossible, at 
least to achieve, although this need not obviate the value of trying. After all, 
reality is worth holding onto if it is worth going to all of the trouble of 
transforming. The metaphysical project is thus best construed as pushing 
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language to accord with the ritual processes in reality to the greatest extent 
possible while recognizing that absolute success is impossible. 
There is another important reason that metaphysics is impossible, having 
to do with the ritualization of indeterminate elements. Reality is not fully 
determinate, and individual elements in reality are not fully determinate. Reality 
admits of varying degrees of indeterminacy, of elements lacking the capacity to 
relate to one another for lack of being distinguishable such that a relation might 
pertain. The language ritual correlates speech sounds with mentally 
discriminated elements of reality, but mental discriminations of indeterminate 
things necessarily determine them by the very act of discrimination. It is not 
possible for language to transform reality without first rendering it determinate, 
and since reality is not fully determinate in itself, it is impossible to engage it 
linguistically without some degree of transformation. Since the goal of 
metaphysics is to close the gap between language and reality by eliminating the 
transformative effects of the language ritual such that language merely expresses 
reality as it is, metaphysics is once again impossible to achieve finally. 
Subjunctivity persists irreducibly. Notably, God is one of the indeterminate 
things that language must determine in order to engage in its process. It is not 
quite proper to say that God is “in” reality, because God’s relationship with 
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reality, and thus sole source of determination apart from subjunctive ritual 
determination, is as its creator (Neville) or ground (Tillich); to be “in” reality 
would suggest further spatial determination. Nevertheless, the reality of God is 
largely indeterminate with respect to the rest of the elements of reality, and so 
language must render God more determinate in order to engage, just like any 
other element of reality that is indeterminate in the relevant respects. This is to 
say that for language to engage God metaphysically is no different than how 
language engages any other indeterminate thing. Religious language is no 
different than ordinary language because ordinary things are often indeterminate 
too. 
The inability to ultimately close the subjunctive gap, and the resulting 
tension between the goal of metaphysical language and its possibility, motivates 
the deployment of apophatic discourses in metaphysics. Metaphysicians press 
language as close to reality as they possibly can, but must ultimately yield and 
confess the inadequacy of their results. Reality is only ever partially effable, yet 
the metaphysical impulse is toward a perfectly adequate idiom, and so what is 
said must be unsaid as an inadequate realization of that drive. Tillich made the 
apophatic turn in decamping from the claim that the only nonsymbolic statement 
about God is that “God is being itself” to claim that the only nonsymbolic 
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statement about God is that all statements about God are symbolic. Neville 
makes the apophatic turn in recognizing ontological discourse, i.e. “being,” 
as a metaphoric rather than literal system. Studies of religious language have 
often focused primarily on the ways in which God is unique in needing to be 
unsaid. The understanding of metaphysical language advanced here, however, 
recognizes the need to unsay the entire metaphysical system, which is far closer 
to what Neville does in identifying the ontological project as a metaphoric 
system than to what Tillich does in limiting his discussion to statements about 
God. Again, God is not different vis-à-vis language than any other indeterminate 
thing, requiring further determination within the ritual form in order to be 
engaged by its process. Both God as a mostly, if not entirely, indeterminate 
element of reality, and the fullness of reality itself as less than fully determined, 
must be unsaid because language cannot be made to fully accord with 
indeterminacy. 
One way of reading the argument here that metaphysics is impossible is 
as a submission to the Kantian anti-metaphysical project. Such a reading is 
entirely misguided. As was outlined above with respect to modern resistance to 
subjunctivity, Kant delimited knowledge to the domain of phenomena, or things 
as they are present to the senses and patternable according to the categories of 
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time, space, and causality, and excluded noumena, or things as they are in 
themselves.1748 The first thing to note is that Kant was concerned with knowledge 
whereas the present project is concerned with language, although with 
significant implications derived throughout with respect to mind, so the 
concerns are not entirely distinct. That said, the impossibility of metaphysics for 
Kant has to do with the mental transformation of sense perception to accord with 
its categories resulting in a hard distinction between things as they are in 
themselves and things as they are for us according to the categories of 
knowledge. Kant is concerned with mental transformation of sense perception, 
not of reality, whereas the perspective taken here views both mental and 
linguistic rituals as transforming reality itself. The distinction between things as 
they are in themselves and things as they are for us is denied on the basis of the 
semiotic denial of the distinction between mental and physical determinants as 
meaningful, as was discussed in chapter two. Moreover, mental rituals, language 
rituals, social rituals, and rituals at play in reality apart from human involvement 
are all species of one and the same ritual genus that serves to harmonize semiosis 
so as to render reality relatively stable and reliable, which is advantageous over 
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what would otherwise be chaotic and spontaneous. All of these rituals transform 
reality, which includes but cannot be reduced to sense perceptions of other 
elements of reality. 
The Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena results from 
an overly developed concern with sincerity in the Augustinian form discussed in 
chapter three and pressed to extremity by Seligman et al in Ritual and Its 
Consequences.1749 To reiterate, this form of sincerity requires that elements, 
including participant elements, become sincere prior to the performance of the 
ritual. In the Kantian imagination, the a priori categories of time, space, and 
causality set the terms of sincerity for knowledge, and since things in themselves 
cannot be proven, according to Kant, to conform in themselves to these 
categories, they may not be known in themselves. Any further mental 
manipulations performed on knowledge are thus performed on the things as 
they are schematized according to the categories, which is to say performed on 
the representations of the things in the mind. There is no mental manipulation 
possible of things in themselves, only of things as they are for a knowing mind. 
The result is the subjective captivity in which metaphysics is impossible because 
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it claims to know things in themselves when it really is representing things as 
they are for us.1750 Furthermore, reality is reconstrued as the world of things as 
they are for knowing minds rather as things as they are in themselves, which is 
why Kant is a transcendental idealist and decidedly not a realist. The realist 
alternative presented here is that rituals certainly pick up on things by 
construing them according to their form and process, but in so doing they pick 
up on the thing itself, not only the thing as it accords to that form and process. 
Instead of making sincerity a prerequisite to ritualization, rituals engage reality 
subjunctively and transform it to become sincere according to its form and 
process. Knowledge is not representational, even though metaphysical language 
aspires to be. Rituals transform reality, not represent reality; knowledge is the 
act1751 of transformation that the ritual process carries out.  
The subjective captivity has dominated modern philosophy and theology, 
all the way down through the present predilection toward postmodernism. For 
many postmodern thinkers, reality as the world as it is for us is socially 
constructed and the world as it is in itself does not even bear discussion because 
it is unknowable anyway. To be sure, postmodern thinkers have abandoned the 
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quest for certainty that instigated the critical approach Kant developed, let alone 
physical categories such as time, space, and causality. In spite of having thrown 
these aspects of the Kantian apparatus overboard, however, they have replaced 
them with equally categorical “concepts such as difference, repetition, the trace, 
the simulacrum, and hyperreality,” notably retaining the notion of critique, i.e. 
“critical,” at the heart of their enterprise.1752 The turn to ritual as conceptualized 
throughout this project is a more complete break with the modernist impulse, as 
represented by Kant, than what postmodern thinking has been able to 
accomplish. Indeed, it is a “highroad” around both.1753 The domain of reality is 
unbridled from things as they are for us in our knowing minds to include 
anything at all undergoing the pervasive process of ritually harmonizing 
semiosis. Human ritual masters are liberated from the subjective captivity, able 
to engage reality and its ongoing transformative processes by performing ritual 
forms of our own. The Augustinian demand for a priori sincerity in the indicative 
mode is replaced by a Confucian invitation to become sincere to the form and 
process and of the ritual by its subjunctive performance. While recognizing the 
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impossibility of metaphysics to achieve its goals ultimately, the pursuit of 
metaphysics is encouraged as a form of faithfulness to reality so as to improve 
the rituals by which we transform it. 
How, then, should metaphysics proceed? The hypothetical approach, as 
advocated in chapter one and developed systematically by Neville elsewhere,1754 
develops complex hypotheses rendered in language that attempt to represent 
reality as closely as possible. Moreover, hypotheses are fallible and so subject to 
correction by further ritualization in an attempt to press them closer to the reality 
they seek to represent. Hypothetical metaphysics at least implies a properly 
apophatic approach to reality, recognizing the limits of its capacity to attain its 
goals, even under the condition of an infinite process of revision. This 
implication benefits from being rendered explicit, as it has been here. Not only 
are hypotheses unsaid ultimately, however, they are also constantly being unsaid 
proximately and iteratively as they fail to properly account for the fullness of 
reality and so are revised. It is precisely this process of ongoing revision, 
correlating to the process of ongoing transformation characteristic of reality, that 
makes hypothetical metaphysics properly faithful to reality whereas both 
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classical metaphysics, seeking certainty and finality, and anti-metaphysics, 
constraining reality within the subjective realm, fail to be so. Moreover, rather 
than being grounded in a categorical scheme, hypothetical metaphysics may 
proceed creatively out of the tension of its purpose with respect to the purposes 
of the other types of language. The creativity of this tension will be addressed in 
the final subsection. 
Liturgical Language 
Instead of faithfulness to reality, liturgical language is characterized by 
loyalty to a community as it hews to the social pole of the ellipse Putnam 
identified demarcating an adequate theory of language. While liturgy is 
frequently understood as having to do with particularly ordered religious 
rituals,1755 the notion of liturgical language employed here harkens back to an 
etymological understanding of liturgy as “the work of the people.”1756 All 
language is always work as an act of transformation of reality, liturgical 
language is particularly of the people given its loyalty to community, and in fact 
																																																								
1755 “Liturgy, n.,” in Oxford English Dictionary Online, Def. 1 & 2, accessed February 14, 2019, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/109293. 
1756 Naphtali Lewis, “‘Leitourgia’ and Related Terms,” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 3, no. 4 
(Fall 1960): 175–84, https://grbs.library.duke.edu/article/view/12341. 
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liturgical language is a form of community service as it serves to constitute the 
community by managing its conventions. Liturgical language is the way that a 
community talks about things so as to privilege the communicative function of 
language, even though doing so may sacrifice literal and precise reference to and 
construal of reality. Indeed, because of its loyalty to community, liturgical 
language is willing to transform reality such that it is more amenable to the 
needs, desires, and advantages of the community and its members. As was noted 
above, community is constituted by being oriented around a common subset of 
reality, but being so oriented, communities then also transform that reality to 
their benefit through a variety of social rituals, including liturgical language 
rituals. As a type of religious language, then, liturgical language is how a 
community talks about God. Such liturgical language is not necessarily terribly 
beholden to either the reality of God or what any individual member of the 
community thinks about God. Instead, liturgical language generates entailments 
from prior ritualizations of divinity and continues to render them through its 
process amongst other elements that primarily have to do with the community 
itself, its members, and its interests. It is not hard to see, then, how such a process 
may construe God further and further away from anything to do with the reality 
of divinity.  
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A point made back in chapter three regarding the conformity of the ritual 
elements to its form is quite important for understanding the liturgical language 
type. The point is derived from Roy Rappaport in Ritual and Religion in the 
Making of Humanity, and deserves recapitulation here for the sake of further 
consideration: 
To perform a liturgical order… is necessarily to conform to it… By performing a liturgical 
order the participants accept, and indicate to themselves and to others that they accept 
whatever is encoded in the canon of that order. This act of acceptance is the first of 
ritual’s fundamental offices. The self-referential and the canonical are united in the 
acceptance of the canon. Acceptance is the self-referential message intrinsic to all 
liturgical performances, the indexical message without which liturgical orders and the 
canonical messages they encode would be without consequence, non-existent, or 
vacuous.1757 
There is some equivocation between the uses of the terms “liturgy” and “ritual” 
in Rappapport and the present project, but the point he is making in his own 
framework holds in this context as well: Language users necessarily accept 
everything encoded in the language ritual whenever they perform it, from its 
references to its pattern to its process to its entailments. At the level of the 
community of all users of the language, this acceptance is somewhat trivial as the 
cost of communicating via the medium of that language. At the level of subsets 
of the full linguistic community, however, nuances of vocabulary, grammatical 
																																																								
1757 Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity, 118–19. 
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formation, rhetoric, style, and discourse may simultaneously impact the 
transformations that a given usage of the nuanced language effects even as 
acceptance of and conformity to these norms constitutes the language user as a 
member of that more circumscribed community. The reality that becomes as a 
result of the liturgical language ritual process is thus transformed toward the 
communal pole for the sake of constituting the language users as members of the 
community of those who accept its canon. At the same time, the canon thereby 
reaffirms and reinstantiates itself as the meaning of the community oriented 
around a common reality that is in process of being transformed toward the 
canonical pattern. Language users must sacrifice their own discriminations of 
reality and reality itself apart from its ritual transformation by adopting the 
norms encoded in the canon of the liturgical language of the community in order 
to gain membership therein.  
In and through the process of constituting the community of people who 
employ a given liturgical language, liturgical language simultaneously 
establishes, develops, inculcates, and transforms the communal conventional 
storehouse, i.e. the canon, that reflexively govern its own norms and patterns. 
Likewise, other social rituals contribute to the overall ritual canon of the 
community, governing its ritual engagements with all elements, aspects, and 
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relations in and of reality, including themselves. This ritual storehouse of 
conventions, including linguistic conventions both generally and particular to 
the liturgical language of the community, is what individuals appropriate in 
their habitus and so are that to which they become sincere in and through the 
ritual performance. Without liturgical language, and other social rituals that 
function liturgically, the conventional storehouses would wither and become 
diffuse to the point that the canon would no longer obtain and the community 
would cease to exist. Communities require their canons to determine them, i.e. 
render them determinate, as distinct from other communities, and thus relatable 
thereto. Employment of liturgical language is thus crucial for the maintenance of 
a community and its transformation in order to preserve the canonical order as 
much as possible in response to the determining transformations of other 
communities that might encounter and attempt to ritualize it.  
As was mentioned above, one of the characteristics of the modern 
condition is that most people inhabit more than one community simultaneously, 
and so must learn to speak more than one liturgical language. This can become 
quite challenging as many of the communities a given person might inhabit will 
likely have significant overlap among the subsets of reality around which they 
are oriented. Moreover, many of those communities may speak the same base 
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language such that the distinctiveness of each of their canons derives from 
nuances of vocabulary, grammar, rhetoric, style, and discourse rather than a 
completely alternative language system. This linguistic pluralism may result in 
liturgical languages with significantly overlapping memberships shifting to 
accept the nuances distinctive to each, or it may result in cognitive dissonance 
within an individual member who must navigate using alternative canons in 
respectively alternative contexts. In most cases, some combination of the two 
results likely pertains. Regardless, the canon of each community in a pluralistic 
context requires heightened frequency, amplitude, and intensity of liturgical 
rituals, including liturgical language in order to maintain the community qua 
community. Not only does this increase the likelihood of conflict among the 
communities that take the redoubled canons to be normative, it also renders 
them less plausible with respect to metaphysical and mystical language types as 
it pulls liturgical language ever closer to the social pole of the language theory 
ellipsis. With respect to individual language users, this means that their habitus 
will decrease in determinateness as the quantity of valences applicable to each of 
its elements increases due to the overlapping magisteria of the various canons 
governing each community in which they are a member. 
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Unlike metaphysical and mystical language types, liturgical language 
exhibits a potent allergy to apophasis because is refuses to acknowledge its own 
subjunctivity. Liturgical language is still subjunctive, to be sure, which is 
precisely how it is able to proceed as if it were indicative. Insistence on the 
indicative is a way for liturgical language to reflexively reinforce itself in the 
habitus of each of the members of the community which conventional storehouse 
governs it and to which it contributes. The difference between the liturgical 
language type and either the metaphysical or mystical types is that the canon 
that governs liturgical language is constitutive of the community to which the 
type maintains loyalty. Apophasis would thus at least potentially weaken the 
normativity of the canon and thus the bonds that unite the community. The 
particularity of a metaphysical system or expression of a mystical vision does not 
likewise constitute either reality nor the mind of the mystic, respectively, and so 
apophasis is not threatening but rather preserves the integrity of each.  
One excellent example of the liturgical language type is liturgical 
language in that other sense of language employed in religious services such as 
the Great Vigil of Easter that served as the empirical example interpreted by the 
ritual theory as it developed in chapter three. That service is a particularly good 
example because of its employment of the Book of Common Prayer and 
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supplemental liturgical texts as the canonical language of the community, which 
is in fact a defining characteristic of Anglican liturgy.1758 In any worship service, 
the worshipping community accepts the language of the scripture, prayers, 
songs, and sermon, which they have limited influence over. As Rappaport notes, 
“acceptance is not belief,” that is, it “is not a private state, but a public act, visible 
both to witnesses and to performers themselves” that “can be more profound 
than conviction or sense of certainty, for it makes it possible for the performer to 
transcend his or her own doubt by accepting in defiance of it.”1759 Thus, the 
liturgical language about God in a given liturgy need not correlate with the 
discriminations of divinity carried out by any or each of the minds that make up 
the gathered community at worship. Neither need it feel beholden to express the 
reality of God, even though the indicative character of liturgical language at least 
implies that what it says about God aspires to be literally true. Instead, liturgical 
language holds itself to the standard of expressing God as encoded in the canon 
of the community, however that may be, which is how the community as a 
whole has accepted God to be for them collectively.  
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Karl Barth clearly locates the work of theology in the domain of liturgical 
language as he argues that the person of Jesus, the texts of the bible, and the 
proclamation of the church are held together in the concept of the “Word of 
God,”1760 which is what is revealed in revelation.1761 He acknowledges the pull of 
liturgical language toward the communal and social pole as he locates 
knowledge of the Word of God in the church: “Knowledge of the Word of God in 
this sense is the presupposition of the Church. We may and must also reverse the 
statement and say that the Church is the presupposition of knowledge of the 
Word of God.”1762 Yet, Barth still aspires to the universality of the liturgical 
community, at least potentially, in a way that fails to recognize the integrity of 
the canonical orders and idioms of other communities, risking charges of 
colonialism and imperialism in the context of pluralism. A more amenable 
approach to liturgical language emerges largely in continuity with Barth in the 
form of postliberal theology, which adopts the Wittgensteinian notion of 
language games to articulate the integrity of the liturgical language of each 
																																																								
1760 Barth, The Church Dogmatics, I, 1 (§§ 1-12):88–124. 
1761 Barth, I, 1 (§§ 1-12):295. 
1762 Barth, I, 1 (§§ 1-12):188. 
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community.1763 Barth may also rightly be critiqued for rejecting any recourse to 
reasoning about the natural world as in any way relevant to interpreting the 
revelation of the Word of God, which is corrected in the radical orthodoxy 
movement that is significantly in continuity with Barth: “[Radical Orthodoxy] 
considers that the world can only be fully understood as a participation in divine 
being, truth, goodness and unity. Inversely it believes that the world as partially 
restored through grace gradually discloses to us the nature of the Godhead, 
without ever allowing us to comprehend it.”1764 Notably, radical orthodoxy falls 
afoul of the same aspiration to universality as Barth and rejects the postliberal 
turn. The substantive trajectory in analytic theology may be classified in this 
broadly Barthian project of locating theology in the domain of liturgical language 
as well.1765 The influence of Barth and his ilk is such that confessional theology 
																																																								
1763 George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 
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operating in the domain of liturgical language is often presumed normative for 
the discipline, especially from an etic perspective, but frequently emicly as well. 
This has made for great institutional difficulty both for philosophers of religion 
and natural theologians who would locate theology closer to the pole of 
reality,1766 and for theopoets and liberation theologians who would locate 
theology closer to the pole of fresh mental discriminations. 
Mystical Language 
If metaphysical language is faithful to reality and liturgical language is 
loyal to community, then mystical language may be said to prophetically 
advocate for the fresh discriminations of reality that are functions of mental 
rituals. Thus, mystical language pulls toward the mental pole of the ellipsis 
demarcating an adequate theory of language. A full analysis of mental rituals 
exceeds the scope of the present project, as will be discussed below, but for the 
moment it is enough to note that since mental discriminations are themselves the 
results of a ritual process, they are far less stable than either the communal canon 
of linguistic norms or even the pleroma of semiosis constituting reality. With 
																																																								
1766 Lawrence A. Whitney, “Institutional Dimensions of the Future of Philosophy of Religion,” 
Palgrave Communications 4, no. 1 (June 12, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0131-7. 
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regard to determinate things, mental rituals may discriminate them either as they 
are in their determinateness or transform them to some extent such that their 
determinateness is other than it was prior to being discriminated. With regard to 
indeterminate things, including God, discrimination rituals must necessarily 
transform them to be determinate in the appropriate respect, but whether the 
determinateness discriminated falls within the realm of possible determinations 
is hardly guaranteed. It is important to remember that mental discriminations of 
reality are simultaneously mental activities interpreting reality and the 
interpretants of semiotic process in reality, which is how they avoid falling into 
their own subjective captivity. It is also important to recall that language is 
incapable of referring to reality directly, even metaphysical language, but only to 
reality as discriminated, which discrimination may be encoded and thus shared 
in the canon of a community guiding its liturgical language. The mystical type of 
language is thus implicated across all of the types, as in fact each type is in each 
of the others, but as an ideal type it pulls toward the discriminations of an 
individual apart from any testing as to its adequacy against a system 
representing reality. 
The subjunctive equivocation inherent in the ritual process, and thus in 
mental discrimination, results in a language user adopting a high degree of 
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vulnerability when encoding a discrimination in mystical language. Apophasis 
of the mystical expression itself is thus an incredibly important discursive 
strategy for mystical language users to incorporate in order to inoculate 
themselves against incurring harm invited by the vulnerability they adopt in 
uttering a mystical expression. Unsaying allows mystical language to say what it 
has discriminated and then acknowledge the possibility that it might be wrong 
or otherwise objectionable, and so inappropriate for incorporation in the 
communal canon. Apophasis becomes a form of apology, inviting forgiveness for 
any offense even prior to the offense itself being expressed and thus the 
entailment of disruption entering the communicative arena. This vulnerability 
inherent in employment of the mystical language type is highlighted by the fact 
that many mystical expressions transgress ethical norms of the communities in 
which they are uttered. Mystical language is often also itself an unsaying of at 
least implicit norms encoded in the communal canon that governs liturgical 
language or at least one aspect of a metaphysical system striving to represent 
reality, and sometimes it is both. The examples of mystical language considered 
below participate in just such transgressions and unsaying. 
A comprehensive theory of experience generally or religious experience 
particularly is far beyond the scope of the present endeavor, but since mystical 
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language is often presumed to correlate to ecstatic experiences, the category of 
experience requires some consideration. Experience is best interpreted itself as a 
ritual form and process harmonizing discriminations together such that the self 
that experiences the harmony is oriented to all of the things discriminated in 
reality, their aspects as likewise discriminated, and their relations to one another 
and the self. Mystical language emerges from the reference of speech sounds and 
their patterning in syntax with respect to elements, aspects, and relations in 
reality that differ from how reality is encoded in the communal canon or a given 
metaphysical system as appropriated in the habitus of the language user. This 
means that mystical language may or may not contradict the norms of the 
communal canon or a given metaphysical system. Moreover, experiences 
referred to in mystical language may be ecstatic if they significantly differ from 
the harmony of determinations that constituted experience prior to the 
discrimination of an elements, aspect or relation in reality to be other than that 
had been understood. Alternatively, mystical language may refer to a novel 
discrimination of reality that allows for retention of a high degree of continuity 
with the prior harmonization of discriminations, which is to say that the mystical 
language refers to lived experience rather than ecstatic experience. Ecstasy and 
lived experience are thus on a continuum, and mystical language is appropriate 
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for communicating experiences anywhere on the spectrum as differing from 
reality as represented in a metaphysical system or encoded in a communal 
canon.  
Like metaphysical language and liturgical language, mystical language 
may be employed to talk about absolutely anything, not just God, but also not 
excluding God. When mystical language does seek to express God, it expresses 
God, who is otherwise almost or entirely indeterminate, as determined for the 
language user by the mental discrimination ritual. If nothing else, God will 
inevitably be overdetermined by this process because the movement from 
indeterminate to determinate is necessarily one of reduction. The question of 
interest in interpreting mystical language is whether the mental discrimination of 
God expressed is significant for improving the representation of reality in a 
metaphysical system or adjusting the canonical code so as to enhance its capacity 
to constitute its community. The implication if the expression in question is 
determined to be so significant is that the metaphysical system or communal 
canon in question has missed something important and should be reformed to 
accommodate this new datum. The problem is that, since God is either 
completely or almost completely indeterminate, God is never or almost never 
either what any expression determines God to be nor not what any expression 
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determines God to be, and so incorporating new discriminations of divinity is 
necessarily destabilizing to metaphysical systems and communal canons. 
Metaphysical systems at least have recourse to apophasis in order to reestablish 
equilibrium, but as was discussed above, apophasis equally threatens to 
destabilize communal canons, leaving liturgical language between a rock and 
hard place vis-à-vis revelations of novel discriminations of God. Thus, the 
apophatic turn in mystical language is far more important for defanging assaults 
by liturgical defense mechanisms as metaphysical systems have their own 
internal coping mechanisms for ameliorating the risks introduced by mystical 
language. 
The stakes are quite high in giving voice to mystical language, including a 
quite literal stake and the burning of the speaker thereon, such as was the case 
for Marguerite Porete (also Porette, c. 1260 – June 1, 1310).1767 Porete was 
condemned for fifteen articles of heresy, of which three survive: 
The annihilated soul sets the virtues free and is no longer in their service, having no 
further use for them. Rather the virtues obey her will. 
The annihilated soul in love of its founder can and should give to nature whatever it 
wishes and desires, without blame or remorse of conscience. 
																																																								
1767 Sean L. Field, The Beguine, the Angel, and the Inquisitor: The Trials of Marguerite Porete and Guiard 
of Cressonessart (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012). 
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Such a soul has no concern for the consolations of God nor for his gifts, nor should she 
have such a concern, because she is completely intent on God and her concentrations 
would be distracted by such concerns.1768 
Transposed into the terms of determinacy and indeterminacy employed here, 
Porete is describing a loss of determinacy on the part of the human soul upon 
sustained encounter with the indeterminacy of divinity. As a result, reason and 
morality fall away as inapplicable relations for a soul lacking sufficient 
determinacy therefor in a world otherwise exhibiting far greater 
determinateness. This indeterminacy would likewise exempt such a soul from 
the traction of liturgical language such that it could be ritualized together with 
other elements of the world according to the pattern encoded in the communal 
canon. In sum, Porete was understood to be threatening the authority of the 
communal canon on the basis of her discrimination of the indeterminacy of God 
resulting in a concomitant loss of determinacy on the part of human souls that 
encounter the divine indeterminacy. Porete was executed to cauterize the 
resulting wound to the community, i.e. the church, and the transformative 
capacity of its liturgical language and other rituals. Ironically, her book, the basis 
of the articles of heresy brought against her and so banned and burned, was 
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identified in 19461769 as The Mirror of Simple Souls,1770 which was a “famous and 
until then anonymous mystical treatise… known for centuries in Latin, Italian, 
and Middle English translations.”1771 It “had even been published in 1911 by the 
Downside Benedictines in a modern English translation with the formal Church 
approvals of nihil obstat and imprimatur.”1772 This irony not only further indicates 
that the tension was between the mystical language of Porete and the liturgical 
language of the church, rather than with a metaphysical system, it also 
demonstrates that mystical language, at least in principle, need not be 
contradictory of communal canonical norms. The potential for harmony between 
mystical and liturgical languages is demonstrated by the life and writings of 
Teresa of Ávila (1515 – 1582), whose ecstatic experiences and theological 
reflections thereon1773 were repeatedly tested by clergy and inquisitors 
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throughout her life. In the end, unlike Porete, Teresa was found to be thoroughly 
orthodox, going on to canonization forty years after her death and then being 
declared a Doctor of the Church by Pope Paul VI in 1970.1774 Nevertheless, intent 
to conform to the canonical forms prescribed in communal convention is no 
guarantee of acceptance of mystical insight, as demonstrated by the case of 
Meister Eckhart (c. 1260 – c. 1328). Eckhart made a solemn declaration on 
February 13, 1327 in the Domincan church that “If any error in faith or morals 
should be discovered in anything he had said or written, publicly or privately, 
this should be considered retracted and not said or written.”1775 Nevertheless, the 
Pope issued a bull against him posthumously, In agro dominico, “in which 
twenty-six articles from Eckhart's Latin works were listed, of which the first 
fifteen were declared heretical and the remaining eleven termed 'dangerous and 
suspect of heresy,' though just capable of an orthodox interpretation.”1776  
Rather than the contemplative ecstasies that gave rise to the mystical 
language employed by Porete and Teresa, Baruch Spinoza (1632 – 1677) arrived 
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at his mystical insights via philosophical reflection leading to a staunch rejection 
of Cartesian thought in dialogue with medieval, modern, and Jewish 
philosophy.1777 The alternate discriminations he advanced to those of Descartes 
resulted in a thoroughly original, and thoroughly modern, metaphysical system 
employing metaphysical language in novel ways, largely codified in the first two 
parts of his Ethics.1778 It is in following through the implications of his 
metaphysical system that Spinoza ran into trouble with the Portuguese Jewish 
community in Amsterdam, of which he was a member, on the grounds of his 
resulting denial of the immortality of the soul.1779 Indeed, the “Jewish community 
felt it necessary to ban, with a writ of cherem harsher than any that it had ever 
used before or would ever use again, a remarkably intelligent and promising 
member of one of its more prominent families.”1780 The posthumous publication 
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of his Theological-Political Treatise1781 would result in even greater 
condemnation1782 and the inclusion of all of his writings on the Catholic Index 
librorum prohibitorum, “List of Prohibited Books,” right alongside his antagonist, 
Descartes.1783 Now viewed as one of the harbingers of modernity and liberalism, 
the mystical language of Spinoza, as it influenced his metaphysical language, 
conflicted with the liturgical languages of Christians and Jews and he suffered 
for it, in life and in death. Mystical language expressing mystical insight is 
deeply personal, and as the modern feminist and womanist movements have 
made clear, the personal is political1784 and therefore constitutes an existential 
threat to the political status quo as encoded in the communal canon that governs 
liturgical language. 
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Poetic Language 
The world, like Dionysus, is torn to pieces by pure intellect; but the poet is Zeus; he has 
swallowed the heart of the world; and he can reproduce it as a living body.1785 
All meaningful language, situated among the poles of reality, mind, and society, 
mediates the equally subjunctive tension between determinacy and 
indeterminacy. Language, as a species of ritual, necessarily determines reality 
such that elements thereof may be ritualized by its process. Yet, through its 
process, language seeks to express the indeterminacy of reality as a whole, and at 
least some elements thereof with respect to at least some other elements, apart 
from being so ritualized. Reality as it is expressed in language is thus 
transformed for having been determined and then knit back together so as to be 
recast in metaphysical, liturgical, and mystical gestures toward indeterminacy. 
Ray L. Hart notes that “everything living is margined by two nots: the nothing it 
is from and the nothing it is toward.”1786 Life, then, is a process of transformation 
from indeterminacy through determinacy to indeterminacy, yet a different 
indeterminacy than the first for having been determined, if such a thing as two 
indeterminacies, different from one another, might be posited, and indeed they 
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may, subjunctively. The transformation of reality from indeterminacy through 
determinacy to indeterminacy is the divine creative act, and so God is the poet of 
the world in the etymological sense of the Greek ποιέω, “to make, to create, to 
produce, to bring about.”1787 Reality, then, is the heartbeat of God, oscillating 
between the systole of determination and the diastole of indeterminacy. 
Humanity, through its rituals, including language, participates in this divine 
creativity, and so humans too are poets, rendering language necessarily poetic. 
Human creativity is nonetheless derivative and secondary to divine creativity as 
humans create from what already is whereas God creates what is ex nihilo, from 
nothing. Moreover, while both humans and God engage in ποίησις (poiesis), 
“activity in which a person brings something into being that did not exist 
before,”1788 human creativity is within and continuous with the stream of divine 
creativity. As such, both humans and God create ritually, whereby determinate 
sign processes are harmonized into relatively stable and reliable sign systems. In 
																																																								
1787 “Ποιέω,” The Online Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon, accessed February 23, 2019, 
http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/lsj/#eid=86774&context=lsj&action=hw-list-click. 
1788 Donald Polkinghorne, Practice and the Human Sciences: The Case for a Judgment-Based Practice of 
Care (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004), 115. See also Alexander Ferrari Di 
Pippo, “The Concept of Poiesis in Heidegger’s An Introduction to Metaphysics,” Thinking 
Fundamentals, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences, Vienna, 9 (2000): 33, 
https://www.iwm.at/wp-content/uploads/jc-09-03.pdf. 
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the Aristotelian sense, ritual is a form of τέχνη (techne), “a way of reasoning 
about doing something; ‘techne’ can also refer to the body of knowledge 
produced by techne reasoning.”1789 The performance of the ritual τέχνη is its 
ποίησις, the creation of genuine novelty. Of course, the classic principle that ex 
nihilo, nihil fit, “out of nothing, nothing becomes,”1790 holds because the 
indeterminate nothing from which the divine creative act emerges is transformed 
through these ritual processes in the subjunctive mode of determinacy into a 
novel indeterminate nothing. Language, like all ritual, is in the flow of 
determination and process, poetically making creative contributions thereto, and 
itself undergoing transformation amidst the thick, rich, pervasive matrix of 
overlapping and interacting ritual performances.  
The solution to the problem of religious language may now be stated 
directly: God is not special. There is nothing about God, regardless of how 
indeterminate God is understood to be, that exempts God from the applicability 
of the ritual process of language. Language rituals render God sufficiently 
determinate to engage in their processes and then harmonize God together with 
																																																								
1789 Polkinghorne, Practice and the Human Sciences, 114. See also the discussion of ritual as 
technique in chapter three above. 
1790 Hart, God Being Nothing, 68–70. 
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other elements, aspects, and relations in reality, just as they do anything else. It is 
inevitable that the indeterminate God will resist such determination, rendering 
the resulting harmony less reliable and stable than might be hoped, and indeed 
that might be assumed by the language users, but at least some entailments may 
yet be generated nonetheless. Regardless, there is no difference in the linguistic 
process between saying that “God is love” and saying “That mug is red.” The 
mug is not fully determinate as a vessel for containing liquids because a cookie 
could be laid across its mouth and suddenly it would be a plate, but the language 
ritual that says “That mug is red” may treat it subjunctively as if it were so 
determined. The same is true of God. God is barely determinate at all, and yet 
language may engage God as if divinity were determinate on the terms the 
language ritual makes God to be. God may be rendered determinate and 
harmonized together with virtually every other element, aspect, and relation in 
reality in metaphysical language that attempts to represent the world and its 
ritualization generally, and so seeks to minimize the extent of its own 
transformative process. God may be rendered determinate as an element of the 
communal canon that governs liturgical language, thereby becoming the focal 
point of a community ritually harmonizing its membership together. God may be 
freshly discriminated in a mental ritual, rendered determinate by reference to 
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that discrimination, and then offered in testimony in mystical language as a 
corrective to the inadequacies of prior determinations. That said, anything and 
everything else must likewise be determined through metaphysical, liturgical, 
and mystical language processes, so once again, God is not special. What 
language does is to subjunctively engage God as if God were determinate 
according to the terms of the language ritual at play. In doing so, language 
makes God what the language ritual says God is in the reality of the other 
elements of the ritual, which is part and parcel of the fullness of reality that 
exceeds that particular ritualization. God is the poet of the world, and language 
users are among the poets of God, the tension between which fuels the 
oscillations of the divine heartbeat. 
Liberation theologies provide unique purchase on the ways in which the 
three types of language, and thus of religious language, interrelate and overlap 
in a given instance so as to poetically make God. Liberation theologies, which 
identify God as a partisan actor on the side of the oppressed in any given 
situation, begin with fresh discriminations of divinity, and so are inevitably 
initially primarily mystical in their idiom. Some of the fresh discriminations that 
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liberation theologies make include that “God is black,”1791 that God has “a 
preferential option for the poor,”1792 and that God is not male;1793 the most 
sophisticated forms of liberation theology recognize that these insights intersect, 
and that their intersections are determinative.1794 What distinguishes the mystical 
discriminations of liberation theology from the mystical language analyzed in 
the subsection thereon above is that liberation theologians have, in most cases, 
immediately moved to identify their insights as already within the communal 
canon governing liturgical language. The primary tactic for achieving success in 
this liturgical invasion is to locate the mystical insight not just within the biblical 
record but as the core teaching to which the biblical record testifies by giving an 
“interpretation of Jesus as religious subject rather than religious object:”1795 “The 
solution which Jesus found for himself and for Israel, as they faced the hostility 
of the Greco-Roman world, becomes the word and the work of redemption for 
																																																								
1791 James H Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2010). 
1792 Gustavo Gutiérrez and Gerhard Ludwig Müller, On the Side of the Poor: The Theology of 
Liberation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2015); Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, 
Politics, and Salvation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1988). 
1793 Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation (Boston, MA: 
Beacon, 1985). 
1794 Dolores S. Williams, Sisters in the Wilderness: The Challenge of Womanist God-Talk (Maryknoll, 
NY: Orbis, 2013). 
1795 Howard Thurman, Jesus and the Disinherited (New York, NY: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1949), 15. 
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all the cast-down people in every generation and in every age.”1796 The fact that 
the biblical text is so amenable to such an interpretation makes it quite difficult to 
dislodge these mystical insights from their liturgical beachhead, although this is 
hardly to say that liberation theologies have had much success in recoding the 
DNA of the communal canon of religion writ large. Moreover, given the 
metaphysical skepticism that has predominated throughout the emergence of 
liberation theologies, it is little surprise that liberative insights have not generally 
been overly concerned to render themselves in terms of metaphysical systems. 
One exception to this trend is Martin Luther King, Jr., who located his liberative 
praxis in the metaphysical milieu of personalism, which takes the person to be 
the fundamental category of reality, as grounding the value, worth, and dignity 
of all people.1797  
Mystical language inevitably overlaps with liturgical and metaphysical 
languages as the insight being expressed must be rendered together with extant 
discriminations, unless it is to be expressed in a wholly novel language,1798 in 
																																																								
1796 Thurman, 28–29. 
1797 Rufus Burrow Jr, God and Human Dignity: The Personalism, Theology, and Ethics of Martin Luther 
King, Jr. (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987). 
1798 Sarah L. Higley, Hildegard of Bingen’s Unknown Language: An Edition, Translation, and Discussion 
(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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which case it is no language as the communicative function falls out. Liberation 
theologies tend to articulate their insights toward the liturgical pole, largely 
following the move to privilege the liturgical over the mystical and metaphysical 
made by Emil Brunner (1889 – 1966) in his critique of Friedrich Schleiermacher 
(1768 – 1834):  
First, Brunner saw mysticism as a threat to the theology of the word. Mystical human 
subjectivism undermined the radically alien and objective divine word of judgment and 
gospel. Second, mysticism’s illegitimate conflation of nature and spirit was due to its 
unholy alliance with philosophy. Together, mysticism and metaphysics provided 
grounds for a theology that betrayed the witness of the Bible and the Reformation.1799 
By identifying its mystical insights at the core of the biblical witness, thereby 
downplaying their subjectivity, and by largely avoiding metaphysical language, 
liberation theologies have maintained “a viable connection to the experiential 
intensity of a determinate mysticism”1800 on the very terms of what has become 
the basis of rationality in theology. While important as a strategic means of 
correcting for prior faults and failures, privileging liturgical language is a deeply 
unhealthy state for theology in the long term as it puts the growth and 
sustenance of the community over above its members and connection with 
																																																								
1799 Christine Helmer, “Mysticism and Metaphysics: Schleiermacher and a Historical-Theological 
Trajectory,” The Journal of Religion 83, no. 4 (2003): 517, https://doi.org/10.1086/491397. 
1800 Helmer, 517–18. 
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reality. Privileging any of the poles of meaningful language over against the 
others is unhealthy as language is most meaningful, and thus most true, at the 
center of the ellipse of meaning. The answer to the problem of religious language 
advanced here, while acknowledging the important corrections liberation 
theologies continue to make, seeks a return to this center. This should not be 
accomplished by sacrificing the advances of liberation and other liturgical 
paradigms, but by making them answerable beyond their own communities to a 
broader public, to the individual insights of their own members and those 
outside the community, and to systematic representations of reality in 
philosophy and the sciences. Indeed, the contributions of liberative liturgy will 
only be enhanced and strengthened by the call to a pervasively processive 
metaphysical semiotics cosmologically regulated by rituals, including language, 
that subjunctively transform their elements so as to generate reliable and stable 
harmonies as the basis for meaning and flourishing. Along the way, the theory of 
language as ritual has jettisoned many of the very faults and failures liberation 
paradigms have sought to correct. It proclaims release to prisoners of the 
subjective captivity and recovery of sight to those blinded by representational 
theories of knowledge. It identifies as idolatry the orthodoxy that the structure of 
language is the structure of all sign systems. It emancipates ritual from slavery to 
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religion, and language from servitude to mind. It denies the distinction between 
the physical and the mental as without a difference. Perhaps most distinctively, 
language as ritual puts religious language on an even keel and on equal footing 
with all other uses of language, engaging reality as mentally discriminated so as 
to transform it to be socially hospitable. These shifts make for a far more 
amenable metaphysical language for drawing the meaning of the mystical and 
liturgical languages of liberation theology back to the center of the ellipse. 
On What Has Not Been Said: On Metaphors and Models 
The claim that there is nothing that cannot be said has already been 
defended, but that does not mean that everything that can be said has been said 
here despite the perfusion of language across so many pages. Already 
acknowledged in the above discussion is the need for a more robust, dialectical, 
and detailed account of the metaphysical semiotics upon which the theory of 
language as ritual is based, as well as of the theory of mind as ritual that 
contributes to the theory of language as ritual. Both of these projects must await 
treatment in further developments of this project. What may be addressed here 
are two interrelated ways of addressing the problem of religious language that 
are prevalent in the literature but have not been adopted here, namely the 
notions of language as metaphor and of language as model. Indeed, use of the 
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very terms “metaphor” and “model” are excluded in the preceding discussion 
except as appearing in and employed by other thinkers precisely to avoid 
association with these prevalent approaches. Brief treatment of each, along with 
explanation as to why they have not been adopted in the theory of language as 
ritual, helps to clarify both the contribution and the distinctiveness of what has 
been elaborated over the course of all of these pages. 
Given the extent of the literature on metaphor, a dictionary definition 
provides helpful orientation to the core of the concept: A metaphor is “a figure of 
speech in which a name or descriptive word or phrase is transferred to an object 
or action different from, but analogous to, that to which it is literally applicable… 
something regarded as representative or suggestive of something else.”1801 The 
part of the definition that identifies metaphor as a figure of speech points toward 
the rhetorical and stylistic conception of metaphor as a linguistic feature of 
philosophical interest1802 since Aristotle1803 and spanning divisions between 
																																																								
1801 “Metaphor, n.,” in Oxford English Dictionary Online, accessed February 25, 2019, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/117328. 
1802 David Hills, “Metaphor,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall, 
2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/metaphor/. 
1803 Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle; Aristotle, On Rhetoric; John T. Kirby, “Aristotle on Metaphor,” 
American Journal of Philology 118 (1997): 517–54, https://doi.org/10.1353/ajp.1997.0056; Richard 
Moran, “Artifice and Persuasion: The Work of Metaphor in the Rhetoric,” in Essays on Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, ed. Amelie Oskenberg Rorty (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 385–98. 
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analytic1804 and Continental1805 approaches. A more recent approach abstracts the 
notion of metaphor from its linguistic root and renders it across the domains of 
language, thought, and action in a way not entirely unlike the abstraction of 
ritual from religion and its metaphysical rendering in the present project. Such 
conceptual or cognitive metaphors map the characteristics of and relations in a 
source domain that is relatively understood to a target domain of which 
understanding is desired.1806 For example, the target domain of quantity may be 
understood by mapping to the source domain of spatiality in saying that “the 
stock market is up.” Likewise, in religious language, the target domain of the 
kingdom of God is mapped in the parables Jesus tells in the gospels to domains 
																																																								
1804 Max Black, “Metaphor,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55 (1954): 273–94, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/55.1.273; Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language 
and Philosophy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962); Donald Davidson, “What Metaphors 
Mean,” Critical Inquiry 5, no. 1 (1978): 31–47, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1342976; R. Harré, 
“Metaphor, Model and Mechanism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60 (1959): 101–22, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/60.1.101; Andrew Ortony, Metaphor and Thought (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
1805 Clive Cazeaux, Metaphor and Continental Philosophy: From Kant to Derrida (London: Routledge, 
2007); Paul Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in 
Language (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press, 1981). 
1806 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 2008); Kovecses, Metaphor; Gibbs, The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought; 
Fauconnier and Turner, The Way We Think. 
	 904 
of daily life,1807 salvation is understood in economic terms in the letters of Paul,1808 
and the relationship between God and the world may be understood in terms of 
quantum entanglement.1809 Clearly, metaphors operate in the domain of the 
subjunctive, treating one thing as if it exhibits the same characteristics and 
internal relations as another thing, which only makes the risk of confusing the 
theory of language as ritual for a theory of metaphor more acute. In fact, the two 
theories are starkly different. The theory of metaphor treats two domains as 
subjunctive with respect to one another moving from the source domain to the 
target domain, and both domains are represented to mind by language. The 
theory of language as ritual, by contrast, understands language itself as the 
source domain related subjunctively to the target domain of reality and 
transforming the target domain by rendering it more determinate according to its 
terms and structuring it according to its pattern. Moreover, language as ritual 
provides an interpretation of metaphor as the transformation of reality by 
relating domains thereof such that they mutually constrain one another even as 
																																																								
1807 McFague, Metaphorical Theology, chap. 2; Sallie McFague, Speaking in Parables: A Study in 
Metaphor and Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1975). 
1808 Jennifer Aileen Quigley, “Divine Accounting: Theo-Economics in the Letter to the 
Philippians” (ThD diss, Harvard University, 2018). 
1809 Kirk Wegter-McNelly, The Entangled God: Divine Relationality and Quantum Physics (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2011). 
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they are simultaneously constrained by the third domain of the language itself. 
Theories of metaphor do not provide an equivalent interpretation of language as 
such, but only of language as a medium for representing the mapping of the 
source and target domains. The answer to the problem of religious language 
advanced from the theory of language as ritual should therefore not be 
understood as a form of metaphorical theology. 
A second, related approach to that of metaphor is that of model. The 
relationship between metaphors and models is easily understood as models are 
precisely models of the source domain subjunctively related to the target domain 
in a metaphor. Hence, Sally McFague subtitles Metaphorical Theology: Models of 
God in Religious Language. Model construction is a familiar approach in the 
sciences as “an imagined mechanism or process, postulated by analogy with 
familiar mechanisms or processes and used to construct a theory to correlate a set 
of observations.”1810 For example, a geocentric model in astronomy describes the 
motions of celestial bodies with respect to the Earth, by contrast with a 
heliocentric model that describes their motion with respect to the Sun. In 
addition to the problems identified with the paradigm of metaphor, models are 
																																																								
1810 Ian G. Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1974), 30. 
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problematic for the theory of language as ritual because they aspire to be 
explanatory. As Edward Slingerland explains, 
Any truly interesting explanation of a given phenomenon is interesting precisely because 
it involves reduction of some sort – tracing causation from higher to lower levels or 
uncovering hidden correlations. We are generally not satisfied with explanations unless 
they answer the “why” question by means of reduction: by linking the explanandum to 
some deeper, hidden, more basic explanans.1811 
Admittedly, language as ritual is reductive in the sense that language 
overdetermines its objects, which is again why it is likely to be confused for a 
theory of language as model. The fact that all explanation is reductive, though, 
does not mean that all reduction is explanatory. The reduction involved in 
modeling is for the sake of explanation, but the reduction involved in language 
as ritual is for the sake of transformation. Language is not a model. Language is 
ritual. 
A Concluding Theopoetic Postscript 
[Theopoetics is] an acceptance of cognitive uncertainty regarding the Divine, an 
unwillingness to attempt to unduly banish that uncertainty, and an emphasis on action 
and creative articulation regardless. It also suggests that when the dust has settled after 
things have been said and done in the name of God, the reflection and interpretation to 
be done ought to be grounded in dialogue and enacted with a hermeneutic of hospitality 
																																																								
1811 Edward Slingerland, “Who’s Afraid of Reductionism? The Study of Religion in the Age of 
Cognitive Science,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 76, no. 2 (June 1, 2008): 384, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/lfn004. See also, Whitney, “Symmetry and Asymmetry: Problems 
and Prospects for Modeling,” 39–40. 
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and humility, an acceptance of cognitive uncertainty regarding the Divine, an 
unwillingness to attempt to unduly banish that uncertainty…1812 
The broad movement that invokes the nomenclature of theopoetics largely 
identifies itself against the pretension of completeness, finality, and certainty 
purportedly pedaled, and too frequently aspired to, by systematic philosophy 
and theology.1813 The ultimate conclusion to be drawn from the present study, 
itself an insight worthy of elaboration beyond what is said here, is that all 
religious language, whether systematic or poetic or otherwise, is theopoetic in 
the sense that religious language creates God in the human way of transforming 
what is already given. God is made increasingly determinate with every 
utterance, but never finally so as the determinacy of God must be open to 
disruption toward indeterminacy by further discriminations of indeterminacy 
giving birth to fresh determinations even as they unsay the old. The subjunctive 
space of linguistic transformation inhabits the subjunctivity of ritual inhabits the 
subjunctivity of reality as if the indeterminate divinity were the determinate 
creator of the whole realm of determinateness. In system and in song, God is 
																																																								
1812 L. Callid Keefe-Perry, Way to Water: A Theopoetics Primer (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2014), 
131. 
1813 Amos Niven Wilder, Theopoetic: Theology and the Religious Imagination (Eugene, OR: Wipf & 
Stock, 2014); Rubem A. Alves, The Poet, the Warrior, the Prophet (London: SCM Press, 2002); 
Stanley Romaine Hopper and R. Melvin Keiser, The Way of Transfiguration: Religious Imagination as 
Theopoiesis (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1992); Keefe-Perry, Way to Water. 
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grasped even as God is missed by the as if facilitating the transformative ritual 
process of effing God. 
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America, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 2015. 
“Law, Love, and Life: Conversations Theological and Musicological with Luther, 
Bach, and Schweitzer” Music and Religion Group and Global Lutheran 
Traditions Group, American Academy of Religion, with the Marsh Chapel 
Choir and Bach Collegium San Diego, San Diego, California, November 
2014. 
“Effing God: The Paradox of Religious Language” Semiotic Society of America, 
Seattle, Washington, October 2014. 
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“Correlating to ‘Nones:’ Tillich’s Method of Correlation and Late Modernity” 
North American Paul Tillich Society, American Academy of Religion, 
Baltimore, Maryland, November 2013. 
“Martin Luther King, Jr. as Comparative Theologian” Unacknowledged Pioneers 
of Comparative Theology panel, Comparative Theology Group, American 
Academy of Religion, Atlanta, Georgia, November 2010. 
“Mission Theology and Interreligious Encounter: 1910-2010” North American 
Paul Tillich Society, American Academy of Religion, Atlanta, Georgia, 
October 2010. 
“Symmetry and Asymmetry: Problems and Prospects for Modeling” Models of 
God and Other Ultimate Realities annual meeting pre-conference at the 
American Academy of Religion, Atlanta, Georgia, October 2010. 
“Illusions of Managing Church: Reconstruction in Ecumenism” New Challenges 
in Faith and Order, Boston Theological Institute, Holy Cross Greek 
Orthodox School of Theology, Brookline, Massachusetts, 4 April 2009. 
“Leftovers and Side Effects: Problems in Pragmatist Cosmology” Pragmatism 
and Empiricism in American Religious Thought Group, American 
Academy of Religion, Chicago, Illinois, 2 November 2008. 
“Strategic Transition: The Cosmology of Security” Concerned Philosophers for 
Peace Annual Conference, SUNY Cortland, Cortland, New York, 31 
October 2008. 
“Inward Bound: Ecumenical Spirituality Overcoming Violence in a Bounded 
World” Young Adult Ecumenical Forum, Chicago, Illinois, 3-6 August 
2006. 
Campus Talks 
“The Ethics of Genetic Engineering: From Frankenstein to CRISPR,” panelist. 
Kilachand Honors College, Boston University, November 2018. 
“Govern Them with Moral Force by Ritual: The Confucian Prescription for 
Achieving Peace among the Warring States,” Colloquium Presentation, 
Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs, Pardee School of Global 
Studies, Boston University, September 2018. 
“The Ultimate Concern of Liberal Modernity: Perils of Conflict and Promise of 
Collaboration” Colloquium Presentation, Institute on Culture, Religion, 
and World Affairs, Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University, 
February 2018. 
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“Pluralism and Its Consequences: An Essay on the Limits of Ritual” 
Confucianism and the West lecture series, Boston University Confucian 
Association, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, 20 March 2015. 
Conference Organization 
16 November 2018: Panel Organizer, Book Review of Paul Tillich and Asian 
Religions and Workshop Facilitator, Fellows of the North American Paul 
Tillich Society, Annual Meeting of the North American Paul Tillich 
Society, Denver, Colorado. 
28-30 September 2018: Co-Organizer, “Rectifying the Name of Confucianism,” 
Boston University Confucian Association, Marsh Chapel, Boston 
University, Boston, Massachusetts. 
17 November 2017: Panel Organizer, “The Influence of Paul Tillich on Robert 
Neville's Philosophical Theology” North American Paul Tillich Society, 
American Academy of Religion, Boston, Massachusetts. 
4-7 November 2010: Registrar, Workshop Coordinator, Technologist, and 
Conference Co-Coordinator, “2010Boston Mission Conference: The 
Changing Contours of World Mission and Christianity,” Boston 
Theological Institute, Newton Centre, Massachusetts. 
2007-2010: Co-Organizer, Costas Consultation on Global Mission, Boston 
Theological Institute. 
2010 – “An Atlas of Global Christianity” – Boston University 
2009 – “Mission and Multiple Religious Belonging” – Episcopal Divinity 
School 
2008 – “Technology for Mission” – Boston University 
2007 – “Korea: Reconciliation in Church and Society” – Andover Newton 
Theological School 
2007: Conference Planner and Host, “Young Adult Ecumenical Forum,” Boston 
University. 
Teaching 
2011-present: Instructor, First Year Experience Course. 
2012: Teaching Assistant, The Church and the Arts, Professor Andrew Shenton, 
Boston University School of Theology. 
2013: Teaching Assistant, Advanced Systematic Theology III, Professor Robert 




Modern Spanish – Excellent 
Modern German – Reading: Good 
Mandarin Chinese – Elementary, Reading: Good 
Koine Greek – Reading: Good 
Ecclesiastical Latin – Reading: Good. 
Service to the Profession 
2018-2019: President Elect, North American Paul Tillich Society 
2017-2018: Vice President, North American Paul Tillich Society 
2015-Present: Board Member, North American Paul Tillich Society 
2006-2011: Coordinator, International Mission and Ecumenism Committee, 
Boston Theological Institute. 
Professional Memberships 
2014-Present: North American Paul Tillich Society 
2013-Present: Institute for American Religious and Philosophical Thought 
2005-Present: American Academy of Religion 
Ministry and Ecclesiastical Standing 
Ministry Positions 
2007-Present: University Chaplain for Community Life, Marsh Chapel, Boston 
University. 
2007: Chapel Associate for First-Year Students, Marsh Chapel, Boston University. 
2005-2006: Boston Citywide Coordinator for Interfaith Youth Work, Consultant, 
Interfaith Youth Core. 
2004: Intern, Women’s Interfaith Institute in the Finger Lakes. 
Ecclesiastical Certification in the Lindisfarne Community 
2009: Ordained to the Priesthood 




2019-Present: Free Speech Operations Committee, Boston University 
2013-2016: Board of Advisors, The Forum for Theological Exploration (FTE; 
formerly The Fund for Theological Education) 
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2007-Present: Religious Life Council, Boston University. 
2007-Present: Board of Advisors, Marsh Chapel, Boston University. 
Professional Ministry Memberships 
2009-Present: Association of College and University Religious Affairs. 
2009-Present: National Association of College and University Chaplains. 
Selected Sermons (* indicates a comparative sermon) 
*“Rectifying the Name of Christianity” Marsh Chapel, Boston University, 27 May 
2018. 
*“The Discipleship of the Lost” Marsh Chapel, Boston University, 2 July 2017. 
*“Development” Marsh Chapel, Boston University, 28 May 2017. 
*“Making Our Way Ritually” Marsh Chapel, Boston University, 3 July 2016. 
*“Forming a Trinity” Marsh Chapel, Boston University, 29 May, 2016. 
“The Bach Experience” Marsh Chapel, Boston University, 9 November, 2014. 
“Re-Membering” Marsh Chapel, Boston University, 26 May 2013. 
“Time, Eternity and End Times” Hughes United Methodist Church, Wheaton, 
Maryland, 16 August 2009. 
“Called to Transfigured Life” Alumni Weekend, Ithaca College Protestant 
Community, Ithaca College, 22 February 2009. 
“Feast of the Epiphany” All Saints Episcopal Church, Ashmont, Massachusetts, 6 
January 2009. 
 
